

The logo consists of a green square with a white graphic of three overlapping pages on the left side.

GREEN  
EUROPEAN  
JOURNAL

A large, circular satellite image of the Earth, showing the continents of Europe, Africa, and Asia, and the surrounding oceans. The image is the background for the entire cover.

# MAPPING THE GREEN TRANSFORMATION

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The logo is a green square with the letters 'GEF' in white.

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The Green European Foundation is a European-level political foundation whose mission is to contribute to a lively European sphere of debate and to foster greater involvement by citizens in European politics. GEF strives to mainstream discussions on European policies and politics both within and beyond the Green political family. The foundation acts as a laboratory for new ideas, offers cross-border political education and a platform for cooperation and exchange at the European level.

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**GREEN  
EUROPEAN  
JOURNAL**

**MAPPING  
THE GREEN  
TRANSFORMATION**



## BUILDING A COMMON GREEN VOCABULARY

This special edition of the Green European Journal is centred on two objectives:

In the current context of the concurrent crises that we are currently experiencing, it seems essential to remember that the only way out of this 'polycrisis' (Edgar Morin) is by acknowledging its systemic nature. That is why it is crucial to strongly reaffirm that our societies' green transformation project is a comprehensive political project, which carries hope for all Europeans.

However, the changes involved are extremely profound. Moreover, implementing these changes requires a debate at all levels of governance - from the local level to the European level - and in the most transnational way possible.

### NATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURES ADDING COMPLEXITY

But everything depends on our ability to listen to one another. **Speaking the same language does not necessarily mean that we understand one another. Therefore, when national political cultures add a level of complexity and uncertainty to the messages exchanged between us, it becomes necessary to work at finding a common vocabulary.** Too often, in 'French green', 'German green', 'Polish green' or 'Greek green', it is the national adjective that dictates the meaning of words, rather than the ideological affiliation.

In order to illustrate this difficulty and to reflect upon resolutions, we have decided to concentrate on four themes: **sustainability, solidarity, hospitality and federalism.**

What is a green transformation if not the transition into a society where the economy respects and repairs ecosystems, all whilst guaranteeing everyone's well being?

Implementing it requires political reforms on several levels:

It involves better - less or alternative - production and consumption, or even a combination of technological innovation and social transformation of lifestyles. This will not be possible, however,

without strengthening solidarity and without accepting our duty of acceptance both within the European Union and towards non-Europeans. Green transformation will involve institutional reforms over the next decades, in terms of European federalism that is capable of ensuring that different circles of solidarity can coexist.

Among the issues linked to the production/consumption cycle and social links at the various levels of the political community, these four notions are gateways to penetrating the transnational complexity of the European environmental debate.

These four themes are simultaneously extremely concrete and extremely general: they directly and indirectly involve our daily lives. They are also marked by tensions between different fundamental options.

### TRANSNATIONALISING THE DEBATES

Our objective is to bring out these differences in order to communicate them. As such, **the Green European Journal intends to contribute to 'transnationalising' the debate**, interconnecting national public spaces where debates on the fundamental issues for our future are still being carried out in an overly compartmentalised fashion.

Sixteen authors have contributed to this edition. Each of them gave their view on one of the four selected themes. They are not completely representative of European diversity or their national contexts. However, together they constitute a good sample of the internal wealth of the European green movement. Each of them wrote individually and on his/her own behalf, answering a series of questions. They were not aware of the others' contribution.

Like some of David Hockney's paintings, all of their articles constitute **a group of snapshots of identical objects, taken simultaneously from slightly different angles, during the gloomy spring of 2013.** The material gathered provided the Editorial Board of the Green European Journal with various ideas and questions to continue the debate on the type of European society that we wish to build in the 21st Century.

Enjoy!

**BENOIT LECHAT**  
Editor-in-chief



**SUSTAINABILITY**

**THE GREEN TRANSFORMATION TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY  
IMPLIES BOTH TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL INNOVATIONS.**

**WE NEED NOT ONLY TO DEVELOP TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS  
IN ORDER TO DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE OUR RESOURCE  
AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY BUT WE MUST ALSO REDUCE OUR  
OVERALL CONSUMPTION OF NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCES.**

**THIS IMPLIES RADICAL CHANGES IN OUR DAILY LIVES, FOR EXAMPLE  
IN OUR FOOD, HOUSING AND MOBILITY SYSTEMS. HOW CAN WE BEST  
STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN THE NECESSITIES OF IMPROVING OUR  
PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY AND REDUCING OUR CONSUMPTION?**

**AS ALL INNOVATIONS - BE THEY TECHNOLOGICAL OR SOCIAL -  
ARE ROOTED IN DIFFERENT NORMATIVE VISIONS, HOW SHOULD  
DAILY LIFE BE STRUCTURED? WHAT KIND OF SOCIAL CHANGES  
DO THE GREENS SUPPORT FOR THE COMING DECADES?**





# THE PROGRESS OF THE ARTS AND ECOLOGICAL WISDOM

**PLACING OUR SOCIETY AND ECONOMY WITHIN AN ECOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK WILL REQUIRE A RADICAL RETHINK OF WHAT 'PROGRESS' MEANS AS TO DATE THIS HAS BECOME SYNONYMOUS WITH ECONOMIC GROWTH. THIS WILL MEAN A CHANGE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH TECHNOLOGY AND A REBUILDING OF OUR SOCIAL RELATIONS.**



## **CATHERINE LARRÈRE**

is a French philosopher who teaches at the University of Paris-Sorbonne on environment and ethics. She is president of the New French Green Foundation, «Fondation de l'Ecologie politique».



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The term progress, rich in meaning in the 18th century (so much so that the term in French was used exclusively in the plural and one spoke of, e.g., *des progrès des arts et des sciences*), became, in the 19th and 20th centuries, a synonym for economic growth: progress was associated with the accumulation of material goods. Speaking of ecological progress is thus tantamount to describing green growth, as defined by the UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme), as an economy “significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities”, thus assuring the “enhance(ment of) energy and resource efficiency”.

### THE HIDDEN CARBON COST

In Europe, green growth has often been portrayed as the transition to an economy of knowledge and the development of services. Was it not the “Lisbon Strategy’s” aim to “make the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010”? But an immaterial economy (knowledge

and service-based) cannot develop without a material basis which often consumes a great deal of energy and scarce resources: the hospitality professions are being replaced by machines packed with electronics. Communication and information rely on the widespread adoption of computers, the production and transports of which weigh heavily in terms of carbon equivalents and the operation of which expends great amounts of energy. As the highly complex products they are, based on the use of uncommon materials, “green” technologies, such as the use of lighter-weight materials in automotive engineering, can only be recycled with difficulty or in a very incomplete manner, while needing to be replaced frequently as the result of rapid product obsolescence.

As a result, they are extremely energy consuming and produce high levels of waste. Their widespread application as a substitute for currently employed products

is not easily achieved. Biotechnologies (such as GMOs) involve risks that are far from being completely understood and their anticipated efficiency is very time-limited, or even questionable. As with all technologies, it is not enough to consider only the intended effect while failing to take into account the unintended consequences of this intentional action. In the quest for sustainability, it is not an isolated trait of technology that requires consideration, but the entire system that makes it possible.

### THE ROLE OF DESIRE

Postulating that it is possible to separate growth from the intensive use of raw materials and energy and emissions of pollutants is like entertaining the illusion that the same lifestyle can be kept up by simply changing the means. But it is precisely the way of life that is the problem. And isn't a model of society based on moderation what we really need? The real issues are the anthropological hypotheses governing progress which in turn is equated with growth: while acknowledging the moral superiority of those who can make do with little, Adam Smith vividly demonstrated in *Theory of Moral Sentiments* that the desire to imitate our neighbour, pushing us to increase our consumption, has positive repercussions on the entire economic engine. The moral rehabilitation of desire was achieved by the appreciation of its effects: the emergence of a society capable of infinite expansion, generating progress.

### REBUILDING SOCIAL RELATIONS

Will taking into account the limited character of resources made available for these insatiable desires and the discovery that, beyond a certain limit, material abundance no longer results in more well-being, prompt the renewed distinction between luxury and subsistence, thus moving again from desires, between which no distinction can be made, to needs which, as opposed to desires, have limits, limits one could even attempt to align with nature? Leaving it at that would mean retaining the individual basis from which derives the illusion of growth as a generator of welfare and social equity. This would mean believing that it is enough to change individual behaviour (consume less, be modest) while ignoring the social basis making such behaviour possible: the only way, therefore, to shift from desires to needs and to impose virtue, would be by an authoritarian state.

But growth is more than just the aggregation of individual initiatives; it creates as much dependency as it ensures independence, which is why GNP does not measure social well-being, because other aspects such as health and education must be considered

as well. Therefore, there can be no modest society without the modification of social relations, without substituting competition with cooperation, the "every man for himself" mentality with solidarity, and competition with conviviality. If social progress is the capacity of each individual to liberate himself or herself from the common evils of poverty, illness and ignorance, and if this progress depends on the adoption of a certain number of technologies, only the socially equitable use of these technologies, as demonstrated by Ivan Illich, can ensure that doctors do not induce illness, schools do not induce illiteracy and poverty does not become destitution.

### HOW TO DO BETTER WITH LESS

A convivial society is no doubt a more modest society: 'being' replaces 'having'. But is it also an ecological society? Is it enough to produce and consume less for the pressure on our environment to lift and for us to stay within the physical limits of growth as a result? Isn't a different approach necessary, and the profound modification of our relationship to our environment? "Humanity has always progressed by increasingly harnessing nature to its needs and not the reverse", proclaimed the Heidelberg Appeal, which, in May 1992 expressed concern about the threats the Earth Summit posed to economic and social development and technical progress. Isn't this purely instrumental perception of nature in need of review? "Do better with less": the formula used to summarise the goals of green technologies stands for an instrumental rationality. Ecological efficiency can of course clash with economic efficiency. The agricultural production system of crop-livestock farming, addressing the ecological imperatives of recycling and closed cycles, has been swept away by the economic imperatives of integration into marketing channels. How to ensure the sustainability of eco-efficiency?

### THE NECESSARY INDEPENDENCE OF COMMON GOODS

Present ecological thinking, in particular with regard to questions concerning biodiversity, revolves around the notion of the "commons" as an intermediary level between private appropriation and recourse to the State; the duality to which economic thinking generally confines itself. The point is to demonstrate, as Elinor Ostrom has done, how user communities are capable of ensuring the sustainability of resources as soon as they use them collectively, as "common goods". Lawyers object to this expression, arguing that it doesn't make sense, because a good, being appropriated, thereby ceases to be common. According to them, there is no such thing as common goods, just "common things". But doesn't this mean that what counts with regard to these "commons" is not so much the



ownership structure, rather than the relationship with the “things” that constitute them and which must, in order to remain common, retain a certain independence, and not dissolve, in terms of their identity as things, into the use made of them?

This independence can go so far as to make genuine legal entities of these things. The Constitution of Ecuador explicitly recognises Pacha Mama, the ancient Mother Earth deity of the Amerindians, as a subject of law: “Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes. All persons, communities, peoples and nations can call upon public authorities to enforce the rights of nature.” (Article 71). This enables environmental groups to take oil companies before the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court for environmental damage caused by oil spills. Thereby, instrumentalisation has ceased.


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### TECHNOLOGY AS THE MASTERY OF NATURE

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According to Jürgen Habermas, in *Technology and Science as Ideology*, the instrumental rationality of technical action does not raise any objections as long as it doesn’t invade the sphere of relationships between people, which fall under the realm of axiological rationality. But one may wonder whether the best manner to fight this invasion wouldn’t be to integrate axiological rationality into technical rationality. In fact, it already is, if we refer to technology as the mastery of nature. It is therefore our idea of technical action as the imposition of form on material or as the application of a power relationship that should be challenged. What we must aspire to is a conception of technical action as a form of partnership with nature or cooperation in a community of humans and non-humans. This means recognising that our technical actions are also rooted in the moral domain, do not depend solely on our knowledge, or even on our know-how, but on true wisdom.

If progress is equalled to economic growth, the phrase economic growth becomes meaningless. The conceptions of progress, even if they take account of quality and social requirements, omit the relationship with nature; they cannot be termed ecological. Following in the footsteps of Rousseau, rather than speaking of ecological progress, thought should be given to exploring the conditions under which the progress of the arts and sciences can be aligned with ecological wisdom.



# END OR BEGINNING? EUROPE THE TRAILBLAZER OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION

THE DECISIVE QUESTION FOR THE COMING DECADES IS NOT 'IF' BUT 'HOW' THE GLOBAL ECONOMY WILL GROW. WE ARE CURRENTLY IN THE MIDDLE OF A GREEN REVOLUTION IN WHICH MILLIONS ARE ALREADY PARTICIPATING. TO ADVANCE, HOWEVER, WE NEED EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS. AND ABOVE ALL, WE NEED A EUROPEAN GREEN NEW DEAL.



## **RALF FÜCKS**

is Co-President of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. He has published widely in newspapers and international journals on ecological and environmental themes, European affairs and international politics.

The 1990s were a time of historical optimism. The Wall had come down and the Cold War was over. Democracy was on a victory march. The digital revolution had opened up seemingly unbound opportunities. This mood, however, has now changed. The world has become more crisis prone. Europe is mired in debt. Public confidence has given way to self-doubt. The majority of Germans no longer believe that life will be better for their children. In view of the 50% unemployment rate amongst young people in Greece and Spain, many are already talking about a 'lost generation'. The rise of China and the shift of economic driving forces to the Pacific Rim have strengthened the feeling that Europe has passed its zenith.

Environmental questions are also subject to a state of depression. Climate change policy is stuck in a cul de sac, greenhouse gas emissions are rising and species diversity is declining. While billions of people find themselves on the way to a modern industrial life, a fatalistic view is gaining ground: resources are running low; the party would seem to be over. Radical belt tightening is called for or we will face a series of catastrophes that will reduce civilisation to a size nature can support. Even the German renewable energy success story has been transformed into a spectre. Christian Democrat Environment minister Altmaier

is hitting the brakes while China, India and the Gulf States position themselves to overtake.

### GROWTH? YES, BUT NO BUSINESS AS USUAL

Since Dennis Meadow and his scientific team published Limits to Growth in 1972, our view of economic growth has fundamentally changed. What was long seen as a vehicle for social change, is now associated with greed, environmental degradation and social inequality. Current criticism of growth, however, is schizophrenic: while calling for 'a departure from growth madness', the whole of Europe desires growth to help it break out of the vicious circle of debt and unemployment. Even the Greens have castigated the austerity policy of the German Chancellor because it does not open up the prospect of sustainable growth.

Given the increase in global population, with all its attendant needs, desires and ambitions, it would seem that there is no end in sight for growth. The decisive question for the coming decades is not 'if' but 'how' the global economy will grow. It may seem an attractive option for 'old' Europe to retire to a state of frugal tranquillity but in the eyes of the rest of the world this

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Can widespread adoption of renewable energies, such as these solar panels on a building in Freiburg, Germany permit economic growth in harmony with the planet?  
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would imply departing to oblivion. Greece and Spain are currently experiencing what it means to have a shrinking economy. One would not like to think that this would become the model for Europe's future. What is true is that we cannot return to the sort of resource consumption and energy-intensive growth of the last century. Climate change, extensive loss of productive agricultural land and water shortages in highly populated regions are warning signals that our current economic model destroys the basic elements on which it relies. If continuing with business as usual perpetuates the crime of damaging opportunities for future generations and simple calls for less consumption are ignored, what then is the alternative?

THE START OF A NEW ERA

The current crisis is neither the end of capitalism nor the swan song of scientific/technological advance. Rather it marks the passage from the age of industry based on fossil fuels to production that is more environmentally friendly, the outlines of which are already visible. This new system will derive energy from solar, wind, geo-thermal and wave power. To this list of familiar renewables we can add artificial photosynthesis: the transformation of water and carbon dioxide into chemical energy. Bio reactors will transform waste and algae into fuel and chemicals. Electric vehicles and electricity generation will be part of a coordinated network. Buildings will become power stations, producing more energy than they require. Biological and industrial waste will be processed back

into the system. Permanent innovation will drive increased efficiency in the use of energy and resources. Advanced filtration plants will transform sewage into drinking water. Food production will return to towns. Old factories, roof gardens and energy independent tower blocks will produce fruit and vegetables all year round. Bringing depleted land back into cultivation, crop rotation and modern plant breeding technology will enable stable growth in agricultural yields. Biotechnology will become the new leading science. The earth is not a narrow, limited place to live but a dynamic system full of undiscovered possibilities. Intelligent growth means advancing in tune with nature.

REDUCTION OF CONSUMPTION AND GREEN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Expressing confidence that the crisis in the developed world can be overcome by creative solutions quickly attracts accusations of technological fervour. The dynamics of global growth are such that any call for reduced consumption will be useless unless supported by the flanking measure of a new industrial revolution. It is right and proper to eat less meat, cycle more and not buy products for which people have been oppressed or rain forests cut down but without a revolution in production efficiency and a swift move to renewable energy, we will not win the climate change battle.

In the coming 20-25 years, global economic production will double as billions of people, now on the threshold of modern industrial development, pur-

sue the aim of improving their living standards. The needs and desires of these people will drive economic growth creatively and with entrepreneurial spirit. While 'old' Europe suffers a loss of confidence, these people will continue working to acquire the attributes of modern life that we have long taken for granted. Instead of preaching abstention, we should help them to leapfrog fossil fuel-based development. This will require technology and knowhow transfers. At the same time, the old industrial countries need to steer themselves towards environmentally friendly production methods. We need to curb our consumption of natural resources, not our love of life.

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
### WHY WE NEED A EUROPEAN GREEN NEW DEAL

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We are currently in the middle of a green revolution in which millions are already participating: researchers, engineers, architects, town planners; business people and investors; environmental activists and critical consumers; journalists and artists. Since the 1970s, the environment in large areas of Europe has substantially improved: rivers and forests have recovered; urban smog has cleared. To advance, however, we need effective environmental policy at national and international level. This policy needs to define goals and rules for markets that will successfully decouple economic wealth creation from the consumption of natural resources. For those doubting that this is possible consider that since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the German economy has grown by a third while greenhouse gas emissions have declined by almost 25%. We need to continue along this path.

Our continent could become the trailblazer for a new industrial revolution but we will require policies that define a clear vision for Europe's economic future and provide environmentally friendly guidelines for those operating in our markets. In other words, we need a European Green New Deal, a transnational programme of innovation and investment that can break Europe out of its downward spiral by providing: an internal power market based on an integrated network of renewable energy providers; proper infrastructure for the use of electric vehicles; urban modernisation based on respect for the environment; and increased investment in education, science and research. With such a policy, we not only play our part in tackling climate change but also lay the foundation for the kind of sustainable growth that can offer younger generations a brighter future.

This article is based on the author's book *Intelligent wachsen. Die grüne Revolution* published February 2013.



# TECHNOLOGY, RELOCALISATION AND SELF-LIMITATION

**THE 21ST CENTURY PRESENTS A FASCINATING PARADOX: NEVER BEFORE IN ITS HISTORY HAS HUMANITY REACHED SUCH AN ADVANCED AND REFINED LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT, BUT NEVER HAS IT COME SO CLOSE TO THE ECOLOGICAL PRECIPICE AND GLOBAL COLLAPSE. IF THIS CONTRADICTION IS TO BE OVERCOME, POLITICAL ECOLOGY MUST FOCUS ON TWO PRIORITIES: THE RELOCALISATION OF THE ECONOMY AND THE DEMOCRACY OF SELF-LIMITATION.**



## **FLORENT MARCELLESI**

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### THE LIMITS OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS

Together with the growth in GDP, increased productivity or buying-power, technological progress is one of the central driving forces of “the growth society” and is based on the following principles:

- 1 Everything that is technically possible is acceptable.
- 2 Nature exists primarily for our benefit and control, thanks to techno-science.
- 3 And, above all, technology will enable us to overcome the social or ecological problems that confront us.

### HOWEVER, THAT APPROACH DOES NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF

- 1 The risks associated with technologies which exceed a human being’s capacity to control them (nuclear energy, genetic modification, etc.). As Illich explained, only a “convivial” society which agrees to impose limits on certain technologies (mega-technologies, mega-infrastructure) in its production methods, which is not operated by a body of specialists and which allows more room for autonomy, has political alternatives available to it. Therefore, without an act of blind faith in techno-science, we need to adopt principles of precaution and responsibility so that we can jointly decide which technologies are appropriate for an orderly ecological transition.
- 2 The fact that, as Riechmann reminds us, this is one of the foundations of the ecological economy: “The environment does not form part of the economy; rather, the economy forms part of the environment. It is the human economic subsystems which must be integrated into the encompassing ecological system, and not the other way round”.
- 3 What is known as the “rebound effect” (or the Jevons paradox) which means that, however much the environmental impact declines per unit produced, technological improvements are systematically cancelled out by the multiplication of the number of units sold and consumed in absolute terms.

### AN ENERGY COMPLEXITY SPIRAL

Added to that, the development of the northern countries, which includes the “European way of life”, is based on the ability to have access to abundant sources of good, cheap energy (principally oil). However, Europe – like the other industrial regions – is now facing the end of the era of fossil fuels and their extremely high energy yields. We have now entered the era of energy sobriety in which new sources (whether renewable or not) provide much lower returns than fossil sources and, a priori, do not allow the level of complexity of industrial societies (and hence their way of life) to be maintained. In this sense, the use

of increasingly sophisticated and modern technology as a magic potion to solve the structural problem of a model society usually succumbs to the temptation of complicating the system which, in turn, becomes impossible without a high availability rate of cheap energy. As Tainter explains, there is an energy-complexity spiral: energy and complexity “tend to intermingle and either increase or decline together. In fact, they can only increase or decline together ( ... ): you cannot have complexity without energy and, if you have energy, you will have complexity”.

In this context, political ecology must make it clear that if there is to be a solution – which is neither ecological collapse nor eco-fascism – it will imply a radical change in the “European way of life”, away from a system based on endless growth (and all the characteristics associated with it, technological progress in particular) to one based on material and energetic sobriety and self-limitation. That is to say a society capable of living well and happily within the planet’s ecological limits. In particular, and not exhaustively, the energy challenge makes us think in terms of decentralisation and simplification through the relocalisation of the economy, while the cultural change necessary for self-limitation leads us directly to posit the central nature of the democratic question.

### RELOCALISING THE ECONOMY (AND “GLOCALISING” SOCIO-POLITICAL ACTION)

Emphasis must be placed on activities which are socially and ecologically useful, promote short production and consumption circuits, create wealth at local level with a low ecological footprint, a high level of resilience and the democratic management of common property. Whether it be by having control over food production and agro-ecology, being self-sufficient as regards energy, ethical banking, local currencies, co-operative organisations (concerning energy, housing, consumption, etc.) or cities in transition, such decisions are made so that the economy can serve the people in harmony with nature and citizens’ power and control over the economy and the future of our societies can increase.

Two further conditions are also necessary so that the transition can be as peaceful and orderly as possible:

- 1 To institutionalise and generalise the practices and initiatives carried out from below. Once the think-tank and ideas laboratory-testing phase is complete, the new successful initiatives will need to be regulated (at local and supra-local level) so as to fix the new rules of the game and enable them to expand. Political action is fundamental to complement social action and make it sustainable beyond local experiments.



2 To coordinate and accumulate strengths at supra-local level (regional, European and global) so as to guarantee inter-territorial solidarity, transition to a framework of peace and cooperation, and policies and networks capable of standing up to the world's political and economic powers and being alternatives to them. The route taken by Via Campesina, which is fighting simultaneously for agricultural relocalisation and the construction of worldwide alliances, is a good example of this dynamic in which relocalisation is a global project. In this sense, the relocalisation of the economy and the European project (always provided it does not fall into the trap of technocracy and added complexity) are two indispensable foundation stones for "glocal" thought and action. At the same time, further consideration needs to be given to the conjunction of a dynamic of relocalising the economy and other proposals such as the Green New Deal, and the possible contradictions between them. Just as Jackson argues, the proposal of a green stimulus through a Green New Deal has potential, especially in the short to medium term, because the phase of transition to a sustainable economy needs investments in green sectors and jobs. At the same time, reactivating the flow of the economy through the Keynesian logic of increasing credit, consumption, productivity, GDP, etc. remains a strategy based on the dead end with no structural way out, and the unsustainability of long-term growth, with fairly high faith in technology that does not pay sufficient attention to the rebound effect. Something more than changing the present growth driver for a "green driver" will

be needed. The stability and resilience of the no-growth system will have to be guaranteed.

#### DEMOCRACY AND SELF-LIMITATION

Changing personal and group expectations about production, consumption and work, that is to say bringing about a socio-cultural change which will make it possible to leave the productivist and consumerist system, inevitably implies rethinking and democratically deciding on:

- The nature of desirable and realistic social projects according to the ecological load capacity available
- The collective needs and the acceptable level of consumption associated with them.
- How and where to invest the labour force in order to bring about that change.

In fact, considering the wastefulness and injustice of the current model, one of the decisive factors is self-limitation (on a finite planet, resources are, by definition, finite, and limits have to be established) and the equitable implementation of this. In more institutional terms, the global management of demand is a priority, not only in more widely accepted matters such as water or energy, but also in all aspects of mass consumption: the consumption of meat and fish, CO2 emissions, the use of natural resources (renewable or otherwise), available land space, acceptable material and economic extravagances.





## DECIDING LIMITS THROUGH DEBATE

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Therefore, debate and assessment by citizens are of central importance, whether in order to define other indicators of wealth or the “ability to live well”, to fix collectively what are desirable and possible needs in a shared and finite world, to choose what kinds of work (and where to invest in them) are therefore required to cover these needs and to discuss and choose the right technologies for this projected society (all offset against the danger of an authoritarian and violent transition).

Now is the time to make life in general, and technology and science (including economics) in particular, the subject of extensive democratic debate, both locally and globally (increased trans-frontier communication). These forums for the “collective self-management of needs and the means for their fulfilment” are where it becomes possible to make a plural, participative and multi-criteria assessment of production and its efficiency, the distribution of work and of economic, ecological and social wealth, the reproduction of life or equality between men and women, faced by the need to fulfil the necessities of a fair and sustainable society. In other words, it is where the European way of life of the future is planned and put into practice.

## WHAT IS ECOLOGICAL PROGRESS?

In a “living well” society based on autonomy, solidarity, participation, citizenship and ecology, “ecological progress” would have to be understood as a multi-dimensional perfecting process – neither deterministic nor linear – of our personal and collective capacities

(manual, intellectual, emotional, relationship-based, etc.) within the limits of the biosphere, with local and international, intra-generational and intergenerational solidarity, and solidarity with all other living things. It is what has been defined as “post-development”, that is to say “the evolution of a community or society towards levels of life compatible with the planet’s ecological limits which covers the basic needs of its components and their legitimate aspirations for autonomy and happiness”.

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**SUSTAINABILITY**



## CONTINUING THE DEBATE...

Over the last few years, the Greens have reopened a debate which strongly influenced their emergence as a movement. Supporters of “Green growth” now face off against the defenders of a ‘steady-state’ or even ‘degrowth’ economy. Traditionally, environmentalism has been highly suspicious of any purported compatibility between growth and sustainability in a global economy; however, in order to escape what can sometimes be an overly-technical discussion (is decoupling economic growth and environmental pollution technically feasible?), we need to open a truly political debate on the route we want to take to a sustainable society.

True, the technical question is important, but, as future developments in science and technology are largely unpredictable, we can never be sure of the answer. We know well, however, that the whole history of the Green movement has been the story of struggles against the counterproductive, unforeseen consequences of technological innovations. But the Greens are neither technophobes, nor technophiles.

We also need a fair balance between technological innovation and social change. But how could we define such a balance?

- 1 If, like Florent Marcellesi and Catherine Larrère, we believe that increasing resource efficiency will not enable us to reduce the global ecological footprint of humanity (the opposite could even prove to be the case), and if we want to promote a modest mode of life worldwide, how do we convince the populations of emerging countries of our position while they yearn for our “modern” way of life?
- 2 Conversely, if we, along with Ralf Fücks, think that an “efficiency revolution” represents the best path towards a green transformation, are we really ready to support the strong green taxation necessary to counter the rebound effect which will result from the improvement of resource efficiency?

It is my strong conviction that, in both cases, the Greens must prioritise social change and social dynamics. Furthermore, they should start by trying to improve their understanding of why some societies have a stronger interest in a balanced relationship with nature than others.

The German example teaches us that the “Energiewende” could not have begun without a deeply-rooted, anti-nuclear movement, inspired both by the environmental consequences of the nuclear industry and by the hope for a “different” kind of social organisation geared towards autonomy and decentralisation.

In the short term we can all agree that we need to implement a Green New Deal to improve the energy performance of our housing stock, to move towards a 100% renewable energy supply and to prepare for the transition to agro-ecology. But this will only happen if we can plant the seeds of hope for a better life, one which can foster a renewed sense of human flourishing. Without this hope, the whole New Deal society—with its social movements, institutions and codes—never would have emerged. Prosperity in a Green New Deal society will be a markedly different affair from the status quo. And we are only just starting to redefine it.



**BENOÎT LECHAT**

is editor-in-chief of the Green European Journal



**GREEN SOLIDARITY**

**SOLIDARITY IS ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL VALUES  
OF ALL PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL MOVEMENTS.**

**WHILE THE GREENS HAVE STRIVEN TO BROADEN ITS SCOPE  
TO INCLUDE THE RIGHTS OF FUTURE GENERATIONS, IT IS THE  
CORE OF THE CONCEPT WHICH HAS BECOME CONTESTED  
RECENTLY, AND NOT ONLY ON THE EUROPEAN LEVEL.**

**WHAT DOES SOLIDARITY MEAN? IS IT JUST ANOTHER WORD  
FOR INSURANCE (I.E. ONE'S SELF-INTEREST) OR IS IT POSSIBLE  
TO GO BEYOND A SHEER UTILITARIAN DEFINITION?**

**CAN SOLIDARITY BE IMAGINED BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK  
OF THE NATION-STATE ON THE EUROPEAN LEVEL?**



# WHAT IS GREEN SOLIDARITY?

REFLECTING ON CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL DEBATES ON THE  
CONCEPT OF 'SOLIDARITY' IN SWEDEN, PER GAHRTON FINDS CON-  
FLICTING VIEWS ON WHAT MANY TAKE TO BE A SIMPLE CONCEPT.



## PER GAHRTON

is a founding member of the Swedish Green Party, and served as an MP and MEP for the Party. He is currently President of the Swedish think tank Cogito and has published over 30 books on topics such as foreign policy, green ideology and the EU.





## BACK IN THE 1960S

I was editor of a Swedish liberal magazine, *Liberal Debatt*. We tried to develop and pursue a kind of “left liberalism”. The concept of solidarity was very important to us and we were very disturbed that the socialist left was trying to monopolise the concept. One of the great debates in Sweden at the time concerned the welfare of prisoners. While socialists defined the prisoners as a kind of proletariat which the workers movement and trade unions should show solidarity with, because they were supposed to basically have the same interests, we, the left liberals, considered the prisoners to be in need of help to resocialise and that we should show solidarity with them despite having very different social positions and interests. This attitude was contemptuously discarded by the socialist left as “pisshumanism” (pissy humanism). From this discussion I drew the conclusion that solidarity can mean very different things.

## PATERNALISM OR SOLIDARITY

One type of solidarity, like class solidarity or national solidarity, is basically a kind of egocentrism, because the solidarity demanded from people is that they should act in solidarity with people of their own type, social or national.

Another type of solidarity is what we then believed to be a liberal solidarity with people of other types, for example by socially well adapted persons with prisoners, by rich with poor, by Swedes with starving people in Africa etc. This type was often looked upon with great contempt by socialists, as a kind of paternalistic benevolence by the upper class with lower classes. The socialists didn’t want the poor to get benevolent support by rich; they should join in class solidarity and fight for their rights. And starving Africans shouldn’t accept alms from Europeans; they should fight for their independence.

There may be some truth in the left wing criticism of liberal solidarity; there is a risk that it deteriorates into paternalistic charity, serving more to prevent than to promote necessary social change.

But at the same time I am still convinced that it is not enough to show solidarity with people who are in a very similar situation as oneself. As a matter of fact, if people understand solidarity only as a kind of common action with people of the same social or national group, the world will be full of left-overs who cannot enjoy any solidarity at all.

## A WIDER TAKE ON SOLIDARITY

This is the more obvious when the perspective is broadened from our anthropocentric liberal view of

solidarity to a Green perspective. According to the Swedish Green party (*Miljöpartiet de Gröna*) program the aim of the Green policy is to show solidarity with three groups or items: 1. Animals, nature and the ecological system. 2. Future generations. 3. All humans in the world.

None of these three solidarities has anything to do with group egoism. Greens are not supposed to show solidarity with other Swedes or with Green activists or with people who may come from a similar social background. The objects of the Green solidarity are quite different. And this solidarity with “the other” is basic for the possibility of Green politics.

If your concept of solidarity is limited to other people of the same type, social or national, the logical result is a common struggle to improve the position of the group. This is a basic cause behind the ideology of unlimited material growth. The class struggle does not accept or recognise any restrictions imposed from outside, neither from bourgeois rulers, nor from nature.

Sometimes of course, group solidarity is needed. Trade unions are very important to a democratic society. Feminist solidarity among women may promote a higher degree of gender equality. Group solidarity by discriminated groups to pursue a common struggle for equal rights is of course commendable. All this is not enough, not to create justice between human beings and far less in order to solve the huge ecological problems and to realise decent relations to other life forms, animals and nature.

## WHAT SPACE FOR NATURE?

Even if nature is looked upon as an organism, Gaia, and even if there are many signs that nature is taking revenge and is striking back at humanity, I think it is obvious that nature will lose heavily against humanity for a long time, if humanity only feels solidarity with itself. At the end, of course, nature will win, in the sense that humanity will destroy the possibilities for its own survival. But nature cannot by itself stop the destructive forces of humanity before it is too late. In order to do this there must be a considerable number of human beings feeling solidarity with nature.

## THE DEBATE OVER IMMIGRATION CONTINUED

From the point of view of electoral politics, the traditional group solidarities are of course much easier to handle. Socialists may urge wage-earners or workers to show solidarity, right-wingers may demand every Swede to show solidarity with other Swedes. In fact this means that people are supposed to show solidarity with themselves and fight for their own interests. This is solidarity without sacrifice. Just now we have

a debate in Sweden that illustrates the different concepts of solidarity. The new Social Democratic leader, Stefan Löfven and the General Federation of Trade Unions (LO) has started to attack a law that allows for some immigration from outside the EU for employment reasons.

The number of such immigrants is very low compared to the number of refugees. Most of them are employed in areas where there is a real shortage of experts in Sweden, such as computer experts from India. However the argument by the Social Democrats is that some thousands of these immigrants have been employed in jobs where there is no real shortage of labour among the population already living in Sweden. The law was adopted by the right-wing majority with the support of the Greens. To the social democratic mind it is clear that a Swedish worker always should have priority, which is a combination of class and national solidarity. To the Green mind this is not obvious, even if everybody agrees that a totally open border is not practically possible even if it, from a Green point of view, would be the right thing ideologically. As a matter of fact both the democratic left and the democratic right are arguing more and more like the xenophobes. One reason, apart from mere electoral tactics, is that neither the left nor the right ever understood a solidarity which applies to people and items which are not very similar to oneself.

### SELLING SACRIFICE

The Green solidarity is of course more difficult to “sell” in an election campaign. When Greens talk about solidarity with nature or future generations or people in other parts of the world, the inherent implication is that such a solidarity entails some kind of sacrifice for their own population.

Of course it could be said that even the Green solidarity with “the other” is a solidarity with oneself – in the long run. Yes, in the very long run, because it is about the survival of humanity. But at the same time it is a reality that a majority of people in rich European countries may live quite some time without personally feeling any direct effects of ecological destruction. They will not be mobilised for ecological activity only by an appeal to their self-interest. There must be added a feeling of responsibility for interests other than one’s own, a solidarity with “the other”.

### THE PLACE FOR NATIONAL SOLIDARITY

All good rules have exceptions, it is said, and that applies also to Green solidarity with “the other”. As already mentioned sometimes it is obvious that class or group solidarity in a common struggle to enhance

the position of a special social group is both needed and legitimate.

But what about national solidarity? This is a tricky thing. It cannot be denied that nation states are based upon a large amount of national solidarity, not only in the form of armies to fight ugly enemies, but also in form of common taxation, social security, etc. In order to be entitled to all benefits of Swedish social security a person should be a Swedish citizen or at least be a legal resident. About sixty years ago most of the social rights were extended to other Nordic citizens. I have personally used Danish health care with exactly the same rights as Danes, without even being resident. Through the EU the right to enjoy social security in many respects has been extended to include all EU-citizens.

I have nothing against Nordic and/or European social solidarity – as long as it is clear that it can be considered as steps towards a future global solidarity.

### THE XENOPHOBIC MIND-SET

It is obvious that this is not the way many people think. Let’s take another example from the Swedish political reality just now. This summer illegal refugees, hiding from legal decisions that they should leave the country, will get some rights concerning health care and schools for children. This is a result of a campaign by the Greens, which finally resulted in a deal with the right-wing government. Interestingly it was impossible to get an agreement on this with the Social Democrats before the elections of 2010 despite the fact that a very comprehensive draft for a Red-Green common government was agreed. I was one of the Greens in the working group which handled these matters and had to listen to normally decent Social Democrats arguing like xenophobes: “They are legally denied the right to be in Sweden, thus they should be driven out, not given social security.” Very logical, but very inhuman. I asked: “So you are prepared to mobilise huge police forces to track them down and throw them out?” Now this was not the meaning, rather they hoped the illegal immigrants, including their children, would be starved physically and psychologically in order to make them leave. Social Democratic solidarity did not include non-European illegal immigrants.

### A SHRINKING SOLIDARITY

The question is: What about European solidarity generally? In Sweden we have seen how the partly imposed European solidarity has shrunk the space for global solidarity. This happens both very practically, with Swedish financial contributions to areas in Europe that may be poorer than Sweden, but are much better off than for example most people in Africa. It

Can we extend solidarity so that it also includes nature?



happens also morally, in the sense that the whole debate and thinking about solidarity since the Swedish entry into the EU has been redirected from the “third world” to Europe. Europe featured very little in Swedish public debate on international issues before 1990; instead debate was concentrated on the “third world”: solidarity with freedom struggles in Vietnam, South Africa etc. International aid was a huge issue and nobody would have dreamt that Swedish taxpayers one day would have to support French agriculture instead of African famers.

The ever growing Swedish financial contribution to the EU is of course a sign a European solidarity. But is it a Green solidarity? Is it legitimate and Green that somewhat richer countries in the EU, like Sweden, sends billions of euros every year to somewhat less rich European countries, when the need in Africa is limitless?

Some internal cohesion and internal solidarity is needed in every political body. I find it inevitable and legitimate with limited Swedish, Nordic, European solidarities. But if any of these leads to less global solidarity it is not OK from a Green point of view.

In the 1950s a very famous book was published in Sweden proposing that the military defence should be scrapped and all the money used for global solidarity. Sweden, it argued, should develop from a conventional national state defending its own interests, showing solidarity only with its own population, into an active partner in a global society. The proposal was not realised, but its thinking strongly influenced public life for

the following three decades – until Europe was drawn into the picture.

Thus, the question that has not got an answer is: What is the point of Europe? To create a European state premised upon traditional nation states, with internal solidarity, but borders, limits, weapons against the world outside? Or is the aim to make Europe a strong player in order to support the rest of the world and to widen the concept and the feeling of solidarity to include nature, future generations and human beings all over the world?



# SOLIDARITY IN EUROPE, SOLIDARITY IN THE WORLD

USING EXAMPLES FROM HER OWN HOME, CORFU, VERA KORONAKI  
DESCRIBES THE REASONS WHY WE NEED SOLIDARITY, BOTH IN EUROPE  
AS WELL AS BEYOND, AND THE STEPS THAT WE CAN TAKE TO ACHIEVE IT.



## **VERA KORONAKI**

is a Member of the National  
Council of Oikologoi Prasinoi  
(Greek Green Party)



What kind of solidarity  
can we have when there is  
detention and exclusion?







**ORIGINS OF SOLIDARITY**

The term solidarity owes its existence to the current weakness of welfare society. In a welfare society a decent standard of living is taken for granted by all people regardless of their abilities or disabilities. In other words, fair taxation and wise management of the state’s revenues are the conditions which will guarantee the needs of certain groups of people, who for various reasons cannot support themselves.

The term solidarity owes its existence, furthermore, to the lack of democracy and peace. In a peaceful, democratic world everybody can be creative and can give and receive on equal terms. All this sounds utopian: our world is far from perfect and neither are the centers of authority. As a result, the most sensitive of us must care for those who are not as lucky, as healthy or as rich as we are and this is where solidarity comes in.

**SOLIDARITY IN PRACTICE**

Taking all this into consideration, I would say that movements for solidarity should be effective and fruitful and, as people’s needs are permanent, not merely serve as temporary relief. This can be illustrated with an example from our island: Corfu is a stopover station for immigrants and refugees who wish to travel to other European countries. Unfortunately, the Dublin II treaty prevents these poor people from travelling to their destination and forces them either to stay in Greece or return to their countries. As neither the former nor the latter is possible, they are trapped, home-

less and jobless, in a stalemate. Some kind-hearted ladies cook for them three or four times a week, other kind people would offer them some fruit and drinks but these people need food every day.

Moreover, some countries in southern Europe are afflicted by austerity measures imposed by the troika and more and more people are unable to satisfy their basic needs. The consequences are often tragic as a number of people decide to put an end to their misery by committing suicide. In these countries the people who are not that poor care for the people in need and are showing solidarity by organising soup kitchens or offering clothes and other goods. Every kind of help is certainly welcome but it would be more effective if social entities pressed governments to take measures to strengthen the local economy by encouraging investments which would create new jobs.

**HOW CAN THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN EUROPE SHOW THEIR SOLIDARITY?**

On the other hand the more fortunate people of northern Europe can (while their fortune lasts) show their solidarity with their fellow Europeans by urging their governments to react to the unpopular policies of the EU/IMF/ECB troika which have turned people into slaves in their own countries. Going even further, if the governments are not responsive to their pleas, the democratic citizens of the developed European countries should send them a strong message by voting against their policies. Crucial issues, such as the



recession and immigration should be urgently tackled, aiming at the root of the problem.

Let's go back to the first example mentioned above; the Dublin II treaty. Greece, as the state of first-entry for many asylum seekers, bears disproportionate responsibility for asylum claims and, as if this was not enough, these desperate people, who have been forced to leave their homes, find themselves in detention centres or in the streets because this treaty forbids them to travel to their final destinations. European civil society can show their support by urging their MEPs to amend the treaty to stop the problems it causes.


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### WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

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The next step of effective solidarity would be to tackle the root of the emigration problem by making a persistent effort to eliminate the conditions which drive people from Asia and Africa to leave their homes. Europeans have their share of responsibility for the exploitation of the wealth of these countries, for the terrible working conditions and child labour and for the wars that devastate these places. A film star visiting a hospital for child amputees is not enough; it does not solve the problem and even perpetuates it.

In my opinion the gradual steps that we Europeans should take to make the world a better place are the following: promoting awareness of what is really happening to the less fortunate peoples on our planet, fostering sympathy for their predicament and ensuring persistent efforts to urge politicians to improve the standard of living in developing countries. We, as Greens, dream of a Europe of the people, not a Europe of markets. In the age of globalisation we cannot see ourselves as isolated from the rest of the world; we should strive for a better Europe in a better world where peace and justice prevail, a world in which solidarity as it currently exists will be a thing of the past!



# SOLIDARITY AND STRENGTH

**AFTER CONSIDERABLE RESEARCH AND DELIBERATION, A COMMISSION OF EXPERTS WORKING FOR THE HEINRICH BOELL STIFTUNG PUBLISHED ITS REPORT “STRENGTH AND SOLIDARITY” WHICH PUTS FORWARD A SERIES OF PROPOSALS IN AREAS SUCH AS FOREIGN AND SECURITY; AGRICULTURAL; ENERGY; ECONOMICS AND MONETARY AND ENLARGEMENT POLICY. THE REPORT AIMS TO FACILITATE DISCUSSION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN GREEN MOVEMENT. BELOW IS AN EXTRACT FROM THAT REPORT.**

 **HEINRICH  
BÖLL  
STIFTUNG**

## **HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG**

The report, on which this article was based, was commissioned by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, a German political foundation affiliated with the German Green Party.



Solidarity and strength are the guiding themes for the future of the EU. Here, solidarity is not only a decree of EU internal policies but also a commitment to adjust international politics to global fairness. Strength means to be able to act within and outside of our borders. This includes advocating aggressively for the values and political model of the EU.

Solidarity has been, and is, a motor for European integration. It is anchored in the Treaties – for example in the principle of mutual assistance or in the statements concerning economic, social and territorial cohesion in the European community. In a material sense, solidarity has, to date, been most reflected in the agricultural, structural and cohesion funds. The Solidarity Fund provides assistance in the case of natural disasters and emergencies for which a country bears no responsibility.

### MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST

Solidarity that comes about spontaneously or follows an event, such as with security threats, humanitarian crises or natural disasters, is an undisputed value that extends beyond European borders. In heterogeneous political communities such as the EU, solidarity is based on reciprocity and mutual responsibility.

Solidarity as a principle of mutual assurance is an important source of European cohesion. Solidarity in this sense is not altruism but structured self-interest.

It is particularly valid where there is awareness of mutual dependence. The EU's internal redistribution policy is based on the understanding that reducing the prosperity gap is not only advantageous for poorer regions but also for the wealthier ones.

In any system incorporating solidarity there are always sources of friction between donors and recipients. Success is based on a commitment to come to each other's aid for the wellbeing of the whole community. The debt crisis is the result of a lack of commitment to the common wellbeing: on the one hand excessive debt and fabricated statistics and on the other failure to adhere to the Stability Pact. In the long term, communities based on solidarity will only work when there are provisions to deter or sanction behaviour that runs counter to solidarity.

Communities based on solidarity can therefore only function over time if there are arrangements to avoid or sanction "bad" behaviour. The debt crisis has been something of an ordeal for solidarity between Member States and their readiness to take responsibility for each other. The fact today is that in the public consciousness the EU is de facto based on solidarity. Now,

we need to decide if we are to go further down this path. We would like to campaign for this.

### COOPERATIVE STRENGTH

European integration is also an answer to the decline in the power European nation states have to shape events in a globalised world. It comes down to a democratically agreed European policy that can really impact other global players.

The maintenance and development of the values, institutions and goals of the European project can only be achieved if the EU realises its global responsibilities. It is not just about defending oneself from the effects of global change. The EU must demonstrate the worth of the liberal constitutional state, the social and environmental market economy and the value of supra national integration. This will be the most successful way to campaign for this political model.

### NEW PROJECTS TO ENHANCE THE IMAGE OF THE EU

To win popular support the EU needs new key projects that will encourage more dynamic forms of co-operation and clearly demonstrate the added value that Europe brings; such projects might include areas that go beyond the maintenance of peace, security and freedom. Here, relevant projects are those that further identity and which create a new basis of legitimacy beyond the preservation of peace, security and freedom.

### KEY EU PROJECTS

The currency union need to be complemented by an economic union (governance) to enable especially the crisis and weaker Member States to find a path to sustainable growth.

A 'Green New Deal' for Europe that will trigger a new economic dynamic through massive investments in the ecological modernisation of the infrastructure as well as in education and research.

A European Community for Renewable Energies (ERENE) shall provide the political framework for a Europe-wide extension of renewable energies.

A European grid for electricity from renewable energy sources, that will connect wind energy from the coasts, solar energy from the Mediterranean region and bio energy from the large agricultural regions with each other.

An extension of transnational rail systems and a modernisation of public transport systems in the EU in or-

der to create an attractive, cheap and environmentally friendly alternative to road traffic.

A sustainable agricultural policy that respects the environment and social needs, improves the added value of rural regions, encourages biodiversity and ensures fairer cooperation with developing countries.

A Europe of social progress, in which the EU plays the role of pioneer for equal opportunities and fair participation. This is especially relevant for opportunities for participation and advancement of youths, women and immigrants.

A foreign and security policy based on the EU's values that provides a living example of supranational cooperation and shared sovereignty able to help the world operate in the spirit of international cooperation. To do this we need a greater integration (Europeanisation) of Foreign affairs. This requires a stronger role of the Commission and the European Parliament in foreign and security policies.

An enlargement and neighbourhood policy that benchmarks cooperation in terms of democracy and human rights and provides for democratic civil society in the region. The EU must keep to its promise that all European countries can join when they have fulfilled the political and economic requirements of membership.

### MORE EUROPE NEEDS MORE DEMOCRACY

Advances in the integration process are only possible in a 'living democracy', in which participation and control of the democratic institutions, especially the European and national parliaments, are strengthened and the rights of citizens to be involved in the process are also extended. In concrete terms this means:

the European Parliament to be strengthened by the addition of the right of initiative; the Commission to be linked to the party distribution in the European Parliament; future minority parties and individual MEPs to have increased rights; transnational lists for European Parliament elections to make them more European; improvements in the status of European wide parties and political foundations; a widening of the areas that fall within the European Citizens' Initiative.

European democracy and democracy in the Member States are inextricably bound together. The EU can only realise its democratic character in cooperation with the democratic institutions of its Member States. The reverse is also true. The EU must act as a control mechanism and counteract undemocratic developments in Member States (as currently in Hungary) and call for a public debate on such issues.

At the same time the EU must demonstrate its role as the guarantor of equal opportunity and equality of participation for all, including in the Member States. The European Parliament and the Commission have a control function and must guarantee that the Member States uphold the principles of equal opportunity and rights for all.

Competences need to be reallocated to the European level if this is for the benefit of the community and increases the community's courses for action. If this is not the case, Europe's local, regional or national competences need to be strengthened. The democratic multi-level system and the principle of subsidiarity need to be accepted literally. Here, it is necessary to define the assets not only of the European level but also of action at the local and national levels.

### EUROPEAN CONVENTION


For "more Europe" to go hand in hand with "more democracy", we will need, in the foreseeable future, a new European convention where all the various ideas as to where Europe is going can be brought together and a collaborative effort made to answer the questions that arise.

Given the failure of the first convention and the current re-nationalisation tendencies in some Member States it would appear foolhardy to be thinking of a new European convention. The current practice of the executive by-passing parliaments and public opinion, however, provides no permanent solution. A convention could turn the measures that are now being decided ad hoc in the wake of the financial crisis into a collective tax and fiscal policy. In addition, it would provide an opportunity for the national debates that have drifted apart during the course of the crisis to be brought together in a common discourse and allow the creation of a European public view.

### THE ABILITY TO ACT AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AT ODDS WITH EACH OTHER

The difficult relationship between the EU's capacity to act and its legitimacy is a conflict that will never be completely resolved. Only a strongly united EU can shape policy. This will presumably mean saying goodbye to the principle of unanimity in areas such as foreign and security policy. This will touch the core of national sovereignty and make extended democratic legitimacy imperative.

Widening and deepening of the EU also make for uneasy bedfellows. Further moves towards internal integration will affect enlargement policy. If we continue with internal integration and "deepen" the EU, the neighbouring countries will find accession even



more difficult. If, on the other hand, we enlarge the EU to 35 countries, capacity to act internally will only be possible if majority voting is used more often. This, in turn, raises issues of legitimacy.

Without solidarity between Member States, what role can Europe expect to play on the global stage?  
Crown copyright.

### DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION: A RISKY ALTERNATIVE

Differentiated integration illustrates the dilemma of capacity to act versus legitimacy. When some Member States agree to work more closely together this can simplify reform or make it possible in the first place. This option is not new and is already being used: Schengen and the euro area being examples.

Enhanced cooperation between interested Member States is most certainly one option to push forward European integration – some examples being the European Community for Renewable Energy (ERENE), closer economic union between a group of Member States or the successive development of structures to secure peace and resolve conflict.

Building such forms of differentiated cooperation offers the possibility of tackling closer integration by constructively utilising diverse levels of willingness and capacity. This strategy appears even more plausible the larger and more diverse the European Union becomes.



**SOLIDARITY**



## CONTINUING THE DEBATE...

Solidarity is one of the fundamental values of all progressive political movements, but there are many different concepts of solidarity. Today, this is made especially clear by the debate on the future of the European Union. The report 'Solidarity and Strength', commissioned by the Heinrich Böell foundation, argues that European solidarity is structured self-interest, or awareness of mutual dependence. Per Gahrton takes it a step further. In contrast with the Social Democrats, who mostly see solidarity as a union of people who basically have the same interests, the Greens have broadened the concept to solidarity with 'the other', which means that sacrifices for nature, future generations and other humans elsewhere in the world is needed.

Since the economic crisis the debate on solidarity from 'the North' with 'the South' has been redirected from the 'third world' to Europe. Gahrton considers this as problematic. And what happens to the concept of 'national solidarity' within the context of a changing Europe? Vera Koronaki links this question to the erosion of the welfare society, increased immigration and the harsh consequences of European policies resulting from the financial crisis. Nevertheless, like Per Gahrton, she concludes that solidarity must be international solidarity, not merely European. The emigration problem can only be tackled by improving the living conditions of people in Asia and Africa. Also the report of the Heinrich Böell foundation has envisaged this same goal of linking national, European and global solidarity.

If the Greens want to continue to talk about solidarity in a credible way, they have to react in a constructive way to at least the following intertwined challenges:

To develop and promote (not create, since it already exists) a European public space, which means to generate a political debate in Europe on solidarity, instead of a national debate on the European Union as such. There can be no solidarity between people who do not know one another.

To formulate a vision of social security on a European level, but with an international perspective, and, in relation to this, to link the European 'North-South' debate to the global situation. This asks for propositions that are aware of the political consequences of economic dependence of the south on the north. Without a balance of power that is acceptable to all partners, there is no sustainable solidarity.

To find a new balance between the market-economy, the state and the participations of citizens as individuals and as groups (commons), which means to explore new forms of property and production. Since the national welfare state is losing its strength, it is crucial to develop new local and international initiatives on solidarity, which cannot come into being without new concepts of property.

To find new concepts and political practices on national sovereignty, to combat nationalism and populism while at the same time recognise the need to belong to a community and the existence of local identity.

To rethink the existing green solidarity with 'the other', like refugees, immigrants and unemployed people. After all, every theoretical concept and all political visions are rooted in relations and practices. To prevent the 'solidarity with the other' from becoming paternalistic or completely out of place, it must be rooted in real relations and social action. Is this still the case and if not, how can those relations be (re) established?



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**HOSPITALITY**


## **IS THERE A EUROPEAN HOSPITALITY?**

**WHILE THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS BEEN MORE OR LESS SUCCESSFUL IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO CONSOLIDATE ITS BORDERS AND TO REDUCE MIGRATION FLOWS, MOST EUROPEANS ARE ALREADY LIVING IN A “MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY”, CHARACTERISED BY THE CO-EXISTENCE OF PEOPLES BELONGING TO DIFFERENT CULTURAL COMMUNITIES.**

**THIS IS A HUGE CHALLENGE FOR THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATES, WHO HAVE DEDICATED A GREAT PART OF THEIR HISTORIES TO THE CREATION OF COHESIVE NATIONAL IDENTITIES. THESE MOVEMENTS HAVE BROACHED A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT QUESTIONS THAT EXTEND INTO OUR EVERYDAY LIVES AND PERCEPTIONS AND WHICH REQUIRE PRACTICAL ANSWERS FROM ALL EUROPEANS.**

**SHOULD ‘EUROPEAN MIGRANTS’ (WHO COME FROM OTHER EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES) ENJOY EXACTLY THE SAME RIGHTS AS THE ‘HOST’ POPULATION? SHOULD WE STICK TO THE IDEA OF INTEGRATION WHERE THE ‘GUEST’ OR ‘NEWCOMER’ IS EXPECTED TO ADAPT TO THE NORMS OF THE ‘HOST’ OR SHOULD WE WORK TOWARDS SOME OTHER IDEA, FOR INSTANCE “CO-INTEGRATION”, I.E. OF A COMMON INTEGRATION OF BOTH THE RECIPIENTS OF ‘EUROPEAN HOSPITALITY’ AND OF ‘EUROPEAN HOSTS’?**

**WHAT ABOUT MIGRANTS COMING FROM OUTSIDE EUROPE? SHOULD THEY BE SUBJECTED TO THE SAME ‘INTEGRATION REGIMES’ AS THEIR PREDECESSORS?**



# EU AS A PROJECT TO ENHANCE HOSPITALITY

THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS ALWAYS BEEN A PROJECT THAT MARRIES DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES — THE PURSUIT OF PEACE AND BORDERS OPEN TO PEOPLE, GOODS AND IDEAS. HOWEVER THE STEADY EVOLUTION OF THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN DISRUPTED BY THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, WHICH HAS LED TO A RISE OF XENOPHOBIC, NATIONALIST THOUGHTS. FOR JEAN LAMBERT, EUROPE MUST NOW CONFRONT THE IDEA OF 'US' VERSUS 'THEM' THAT EXISTS AND WORK TOWARDS CREATING A TRULY HOSPITABLE EU.



## JEAN LAMBERT

is a Greens/EFA MEP from the UK, serving since 1999, and is a member of the European Parliament's Committee on Employment and Social Affairs.





The history of the European Union can be described in several ways: from the UK perspective it has tended to be presented as an overlapping series of trade agreements giving access to a single market, culminating in the present arrangements set out in the Lisbon Treaty.

But in other nations it has been perceived as a project to work together for the achievement of common goals for Europe's people, principally among them peaceful co-existence, and a guarantee that the horrors of the Second World War will never happen again.

Merging the two perspectives gives us a description of the EU as a project to guarantee the right of all citizens of the 28 EU Member States to enjoy freedom of movement across the union, to enjoy the right to live and work anywhere in the EU and be treated as a national of that country and, in short, to enjoy the hospitality of other member states in a spirit of international solidarity.

Of course the UK has declined to join the Schengen Area as regards making borderless travel a reali-

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ty across much of Europe. The current Government decided to use transition measures for the most recent enlargements for Romanian and Bulgarian citizens and this will also apply to Croatians. This is in marked contrast to the Labour Government's decision to be one of only three countries not to apply transition measures for the so-called A-8 countries (the Maltese and Cypriots were never subject to transition measures). We did, however, apply certain conditions on welfare benefits, which have since seen the UK referred to the European Court of Justice on a number of questions.

#### A TWO-WAY PATH

Nonetheless, hospitality is a well-trodden path. The London region I represent in the European Parliament, for example, is home to more than one million non-UK EU citizens – that's more than 10% of the region's total population. Recent figures from the UK Parlia-



Anti-immigration parties such as UKIP in the UK have been the big winners from the on-going economic uncertainty



ment suggest there are about half a million UK citizens living elsewhere in the EU.

They're not all employed either; there are thousands of older people receiving social care and health services, thousands of children in local schools, many people running their own businesses, and so on.

Of course this represents a major migrant population, and one that has experienced significant problems: at a recent discussion of these issues to mark the European Year of Citizens it became clear that these problems have tended to focus on access to housing and work permits, as well as access to benefits. The right to vote in elections for national governments is also a growing question, as the current European Citizens' Initiative Letmevote demonstrates. We must sort these problems out to make hospitality a reality, and I try to do exactly that where my authority as an MEP allows. I have, after all, spent ten years in the European Parliament working on the updating of the Co-ordination of Social Security Regulation, amongst other things.

### NOT JUST LAWS ON THE BOOK

But hospitality isn't just a legal issue concerned with access to public services – it's about people's attitudes too, and the question of 'what kind of Europe do we want to live in' and on this measure the UK has rather more work to do.

As the economic 'crisis' has resulted in spending cuts, austerity measures, and rising unemployment, more people in the UK (and indeed across the EU) have reached the clumsy and erroneous conclusion that it

is international migration, rather than any regulatory failure in the banking and finance industries, that is to blame. This in turn has helped foster the development of xenophobic nationalism (just look, for example, as the recent electoral success enjoyed by Jobbik in Hungary or Golden Dawn in Greece). Populist parties have also followed an anti-immigration agenda: the UK Independence Party here in Britain and the so-called Freedom Party of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, have targeted the right of EU nationals to freedom of movement and created the view that hospitality should be viewed as something which either benefits or harms UK or Dutch citizens, rather than as something to be enjoyed by everyone, regardless of their nationality.

### WHAT KIND OF EUROPE

For example, I was recently vilified in some elements of the UK's right-wing press for suggesting that the EU should require member states to maintain spending on care for vulnerable groups wherever in the EU they came from. 'How does that benefit us?' seemed to be the implied question – a question not far from many people's lips right across the EU.

Of course, the answer lies in the question I posed earlier: 'What kind of Europe do we want to live in?' I believe strongly that we want to live in an EU with the ideas of hospitality and international solidarity at its core; an EU run for its people, not for the companies they operate.

The post-austerity question of how increased hospitality benefits 'us' is turned on its head: it benefits 'us'

because ‘we’ are ‘they’: a single, diverse, population of some half a billion people all offering each other hospitality, all enjoying a fundamental set of rights and freedoms, a clean environment and all having a stake in the economic benefits of our common efforts. The concept of hospitality works two ways: we offer our hospitality to citizens of other EU states in return for them offering the same hospitality to us. The half a million UK citizens living elsewhere in the EU understand this all too well.

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### HOSPITALITY BEYOND EUROPE'S BORDERS

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
But that sense of hospitality is not only for those holding a passport from an EU Member State. We must ensure that the European Union really develops a Common Asylum System which gives protection to those in need. We should not close our borders to those who wish to be part of our society, while doing all we can to ensure that the demands and policies of the EU do not drive people into poverty and push them to leave their homes. The reality of climate change means we must open our eyes to the consequences for us and for others in terms of where we might have to go.

So I see the EU as a project to enhance a sense of hospitality and make it a reality for all of us. Of course, there are many difficult issues to address in making hospitality real: Where will everyone live? How do we ensure that people don't migrate to the richest areas of the EU? How do we ensure that we all pay equally for the costs of accessing public services, health and social care, benefits and state-funded pensions? How do we defend diversity, preserve cultural differences and guarantee freedom of religion? How do we share equally in the economic and social benefits of hospitality?

These are some of the most pressing questions facing the EU today, and they have become larger and more urgent as a result of the current economic crisis – but we mustn't shy away from them. That's why my work as an MEP has tended to focus on developing and enhancing rules for cross-border benefit management, for access to care in a post-austerity EU, for common standards in the workplace, and so on.

Resolving some of these tricky questions will help break down some the sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ which prevails across so much of the EU today. It will help make the rights of citizens and access to the freedoms which introduce the Treaties and lie at the heart of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a reality. In short, it will help deliver an EU based on the principle of hospitality, of sharing – a Europe that puts its people first. That's the kind of EU I want to live in.





# SOME REFLECTIONS ON HOSPITALITY AND INTEGRATION IN EUROPE

**'HOSPITALITY' IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE IS TOO LIMITED A CONCEPT WHEN DISCUSSING OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE'S MIGRANT COMMUNITIES. INSTEAD WHAT WE NEED IS A LANGUAGE THAT RECOGNISES ALL GROUPS AS EQUAL PARTNERS STRIVING FOR A SHARED IDENTITY.**



**MEYREM ALMACI**

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## *hospitality:*

This contribution is a personal view and presents some concepts for the reader to consider. It does not pretend to define a scientific framework, and aims solely to stimulate an active discussion.

For the ancient Greeks, hospitality was a divine right. The host was duty-bound to provide for every need his guest might feel. In classical Rome, it was normal to receive guests into one's house, to share food and drink with them and to feast with them. The idea was that although people started out as strangers, cossetting them as guests would eventually turn them into friends of the household.

In quite a few countries around the Mediterranean, the hospitality remains legendary to this day. People will slaughter their last animal to provide the guest with a festive meal, sparing neither cost nor effort despite their own limited circumstances. Religion as well as history plays a part in this: the three Abrahamic religions stress the importance of a generous welcome for those who are uprooted or travelling.

### THE WORLD COMES TO EUROPE

More and more people have become increasingly mobile in the course of time. For all kinds of reasons, the whole world has come to today's Europe. Like many large cities, Antwerp in Belgium houses people from over 170 different ethnic backgrounds. The people are not in transit but have arrived in Europe with the intention of staying permanently. They did not always come alone, moreover, but often in large groups (invited or otherwise).

The concept of hospitality faces a challenge in a situation like this: you are hospitable if you accept guests generously from a majority position. The prevailing norms and values are those of your group, which is in the majority. Guests are by definition temporary. But what do you do with guests who stay for generations?

Working on the basis of the hospitality notion is therefore limiting: as a concept it is bound in time. Efforts to create hospitable places, a hospitable attitude or a hospitable society all remain conceptually based on the temporary presence of the newcomer, the visitor, the "stranger", or the "migrant". But what if that temporariness is challenged and there suddenly appears to be far more "guests" than anticipated?

### FROM HOSPITALITY TO HOSTILITY

The prevailing attitude in Europe is that if the integration of a group of migrants runs into problems, it is the fault of that group and not of the hospitality of the receiving country. A reputation for hospitality and tolerance is after all an ideal which every region likes to uphold for itself. But given large numbers and

The word hospitality stems from the Latin *hospes*, meaning "host", "guest" or "stranger". *Hospes* stems in turn from *hostis*, a "stranger" or "enemy". *Hostis* is also the origin of the word *hostile*, which indicates a negative attitude towards another person. So hospitality and hostility are closely related. You are hospitable towards a person you consider a friend or who is good to you, and hostile towards an enemy, someone who does you harm. The act or practice of being hospitable therefore carries a positive connotation: we treat strangers with respect and provide for their needs; we treat them as equals or in some cultures even as friends. But hospitality implies, in my view, a definite mutual position. It is the host who is hospitable while the other "receives" his hospitality. The visitor is clearly not on his own territory. Undeniably, the "stranger" is dependent on the hospitality afforded by the host or hostess, and this implies additional effort on the part of the latter.

lengthy stays, the hospitality sometimes gives way to feelings of hostility. The feeling of being obliged to cope with an invasion of newcomers sets off a swing of the pendulum. Alongside hospitality and tolerance, there is thus also discrimination and resistance. That is clearly evident today. Those groups who endeavour to defend the interests of migrants (see [www.gastvrijegemeente.be](http://www.gastvrijegemeente.be) for example) have a counterpart in other groups who fiercely oppose the incoming stream of newcomers and ethno-cultural minorities.

### INTEGRATION AND PARTICIPATION

And it would seem that the faster and more diverse the inflow, and the more difficult the socioeconomic circumstances, the greater the opposition encountered. The rapidity and diversity of immigration hence presents a substantial challenge to the stability of society – not least in our cities. The preferred answer to this challenge in the EU has been to opt for integration as the model for dealing with new groups. It was the intention to admit new population groups into society without those groups having to sacrifice their own cultural hallmarks or becoming isolated from the majority. Integration is thus participation in society without being made separate as a community (segregation) and without the imposition of compulsory conformity with the sociocultural hallmarks of the majority (assimilation).

Cultural differences should not, in this model, be a hindrance to participation in the various aspects of society. The intention is evolution towards a multi-cultural society in which diverse groups not only live alongside one another but with one another. Compare this to a motorway: integration implies that the various makes and colours of cars range themselves in the traffic lanes of the motorway and obey the same highway code, without sacrificing their original colour or make. The goal in other words is a society in which differences are recognised and in which people learn to deal with those differences by being open towards the other and by learning to interact with the other.

That was in theory. The word integration has in practice become a catchword which has drifted well away from conventional definitions such as “the incorporation on an equal basis of a population group (of a different race [sic]) into a certain society” (from Van Dale Groot woordenboek der Nederlandse taal).

### ASSIMILATION OR RELATIVISM?

The main problem resides in the vagueness and ambiguity of the word “integration” as it is widely used. On the one hand it insists on the preservation of the original culture, while on the other it demands a certain measure of adaptation. In reality, however, it remains unclear in which areas adaptation is required and in which one can emphasise individual identity. How far does the right to individuality reach? And what exactly is involved in the cultural distinctiveness of Europeans, Turks, Maghribis, Africans, South-Americans, Moroccan Berbers and Brussels folk? The indistinct semantic context has become fuel for debate. For some the term has become a symbol of a profound cultural relativism, while for others it implies assimilation. In Belgium, the Vlaamse Blok (a political party condemned for racism) expressed the latter view with the slogan “assimilate or get lost!”

The integration concept became the stake in a bitter political and ideological battle as soon as it came down to the concrete political measures to be taken for the effective realisation of the goal. It was not long before the adaptation of the “guest” to the “host environment” gained a more coercive character. In Belgium, integration first became an “imperative invitation” to newcomers under the Minister for Integration Marino Keulen:

“The imperative invitation to everyone who resides legally in our society and wishes to build his future here, to take an active part in this society, to learn the language, to know and respect its basic values and, as soon as possible, to stand on his own two feet.”

### CIVIC INTEGRATION

Can people be “forced” to integrate in this way, to be accepted on an equal basis into society? This question becomes all the more pressing when we consider that the requirement for integration has in recent years been accompanied or even overshadowed by the new demand for *inburgering* (“civic integration”, a managed integration process with language and citizenship courses and examinations). The replacement of the term integration by *inburgering* emits a signal: a newcomer must be actively turned into a citizen. In other words, without citizenship training and without a managed process, the newcomer cannot become

a fully-fledged citizen with complete rights including the right to domicile. But does he or she stay as a guest (and hence temporarily)?

### AN OBLIGATION ON THE GUEST

*Inburgering* is defined in Flemish legislation as an interactive process in which the government offers a specific programme to aliens, which on the one hand enables them to familiarise themselves with their new societal context, and on the other hand helps society to recognise members of the target group as fully-fledged citizens, with the goal of full participation of those persons in society. The target group of *inburgering* consists only of the newcomers, however, and the process is a mandatory one. *Inburgering* is thus exceptionally one-sided and is coercively directed – inevitably – at the “guest” who is obliged to transform himself into a citizen.

This is hardly surprising. Currently there is a consensus in Europe among quite a few politicians and academics, as well as in the media and public opinion, that the integration policies of the last 50 years have failed. Not a single country has succeeded in completely eliminating the communal, societal and economic disadvantage, and disadvantaging, of certain groups of migrants. This observation is however all too often coupled with the thought that the blame lies with an excessively informal character of the integration processes for newcomers. They are unwilling to integrate, and they do not grasp the available opportunities, the argument runs, so the project has come to nothing; and with it, the multicultural society. “We” must therefore compel “them” to actively grasp their opportunities, and the law must stop pampering them. This discourse is then packaged in a narrative of civic rights and duties. Those who conform to these duties and who do not abuse our hospitality may stay. Those who obstinately reject them do not belong here.

The word refers to the incorporation of diverse elements into a whole. In everyday discourse it relates largely to the inclusion of specific population categories into society. Newcomers gain a place in society through a process of adaptation. Two dimensions may be distinguished: the preservation of group identity, and the contact/interchange with the population at large (Berry et al. 1992i). An important hallmark of integration is that the inclusion of people is a two-way process: there is a mutual contact without a sacrifice of identity. Both the incoming group and the receiving community adapt to one another. In this respect, integration is clearly different from assimilation, in which the adaption comes from one side only and the new group conforms and adapts to the other, thus adopting the social and cultural hallmarks of the majority and finally becoming entirely absorbed into the dominant culture.

*integration:*



## A DISCOURSE BETWEEN EQUAL PARTNERS

But the last expectation is an absolute illusion. In today's world and today's Europe, we are fooling ourselves if we think that we can continue believing in the host-guest model. Ethnocultural minorities are present in Europe and will stay here. They and we are well past the stage of the "guest worker". For far too long, immigrants have been treated as guests who are subject to the decisions of others. They have always been the subject of legislation, but they have never been equal partners in the discourse or had the chance to contribute to shaping public policy.

What is more, newcomers will continue to arrive. It is inevitable that the super-diversification of our society will proceed further. Eurostat has reckoned that the Belgian population will grow by 24 per cent, to 13.5 million citizens, by 2060. The majority of the growth will come from immigration. Politicians who pretend that this clock can be turned back are making empty promises. The question is not how we can eradicate this super-diverse society but how we can live with it.

## PROBLEMS WITH MONOCULTURAL CITIZENSHIP

The ideological answer to cultural super-diversity which currently prevails in many European countries is increasingly reverting to a monocultural concept. In *The New Religious Intolerance* (2012)<sup>ii</sup>, the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum argues that homogeneity and cultural assimilation have always been the dominant paradigm in Europe. Nussbaum compares the countries of Europe to gated communities. This interpretation of citizenship inverts the situation: you aren't a citizen because you live here, but you become a citizen only if the dominant culture embraces you.

But learning to deal with the existing diversity calls for more than a civic integration course for newcomers, and for more effort on the part of the "receiving" community than a superficial acquaintance and an informal attitude of openness. It demands a fully-fledged, cosmopolitan citizenship for everyone in the community in which no group stands above another: it demands equality. Not hosts, nor guests.

## MOVING BEYOND MAJORITY/MINORITY

The first task facing politics is to rise above dualistic thinking in terms of we/them or majority/minority. This in turn implies taking a firm hand against racism and discrimination in whatever form they occur, and working actively towards developing an "intercultural competence" for everyone. In the words of Rik Pinxten (Ghent University)<sup>iii</sup>: "With the growth of actual intercultural contact between people from all over the world, and with the growth of mutual depen-

The issue of immigration has often been abused by right-wing populists



dency, cosmopolitan citizenship is no longer a mere luxury. The alternative is something we have experienced more and more in recent years: intercultural conflict, hostile imagery, and confrontation in cities between so-called socially, religiously or culturally 'other' groups."

i Berry, J.W., Poortinga, Y.H., Segal, M.H. & Dasen, P.R. (1992), *Cross-cultural psychology: research and applications*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

ii Martha Nussbaum, *The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age*, Harvard University Press, 2012.

iii [http://www.toneelgroepdeappel.nl/voorstelling/163/page/2441/Kosmopolitisme\\_internationaal\\_burgerschap\\_en\\_culturele\\_identiteit](http://www.toneelgroepdeappel.nl/voorstelling/163/page/2441/Kosmopolitisme_internationaal_burgerschap_en_culturele_identiteit)



# INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS IDEAS AND PERSPECTIVES FROM HUNGARY

**HUNGARY HAS BECOME AN INTERESTING TEST CASE FOR INTEGRATION AND MIGRATION POLICIES ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO CO-ETHNIC IMMIGRATION (THOSE OF HUNGARIAN DESCENT BORN IN OTHER COUNTRIES) AND OF COURSE THE MIGRATION OF PEOPLE FROM OTHER EU COUNTRIES. THIS COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP IS NOT WITHOUT LESSONS ON EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION.**



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Integration is a fluid and complex concept which has become known over the past 30 years for its opposition to concepts such as assimilation and acculturation. Integration basically means the construction of transnational social spaces connecting the sending and receiving communities and the migrants themselves but without privileging of any of these segments. This space is a common space and cannot be subdivided into further segments, thus there is no such thing as the receiving space in itself regardless of the fact that Europeanism (the idea that Europe is civilized and this is mainly due to its own achievements) and nationalism work very hard to establish such an idea. The key issue is the need to avoid the loaded question underlying integration research and policy: "...who or what is integrating whom and with what?"<sup>1</sup>. Nonetheless, we have to note that in public and scholarly discourses this question remains the fundamental question even today. The best way to avoid this "activist" type of concept would be to focus on the complex interaction (spaces) of migrants, migrant groups, host groups and institutions, and sending groups and sending societies whose interaction is shaped by various social conditions, norms and public discourses.

### THE "PROPER" MIGRANT

There are several reasons for the maintenance of the exclusive and rigid Europeanist and nationalist perspectives. The deeply institutionalised competition between nations and blocks of countries today results in the idea that there is a need for closer management of population and migration in order to secure a better position in the global economic competition. In this pattern "proper" migrants serve as a group for providing: (a) better skills, (b) the willingness to work for lower wages and/ or in worse working conditions, (c) a lowering of a country's ageing and the improving of its demographic conditions, (d) a higher number of co-ethnics. So migrants should be selected accordingly and those who do not serve the above purposes should adapt to the criteria or should be excluded. This means extensive selection mechanisms embedded in policy mechanisms and discourses.

In terms of exclusion the most important factor is that EU migrants enjoy the social and political rights that come with EU citizenship, and this is why the EU can reject and suppress all ideas that would go beyond the "club logic" and would provide better rights for documented and most importantly undocumented migrants. Such thinking rejects solidarity between "European" citizens and Third Country Nationals (TCNs). TCNs are subjected to various controls over entry into

and residence in the EU and it is a rather definite aim to maintain strict exclusion from the rights associated with citizenship. This missing solidarity link is compensated for by formal "equal" non-discriminatory treatment in some welfare services and very importantly in the labour market, and there is a definite attempt to better integrate them into the labour force (into the so-called workfare regime) without providing larger scale welfare services. Thus it clearly serves to increase the receiving country's global competitiveness and capital accumulation.

In this management and control of migration there is an emphasis on the willingness of the migrant to become integrated and more and more there is the idea of providing legal residence only to those who integrate and adopt "key European" values. We can refer to the 2008 Vichy Declaration by EU Justice Minister on the integration of immigrants, which set cultural adaptation as a requirement. This also appears in the German "Leitkultur" discourse initiated by the Social Democrat Thilo Sarazin and eventually adopted by Angela Merkel. We may talk about a "conservative" turn in this respect, moving more and more towards the defence of European values and placing the greatest integration requirements on the shoulders of migrants. Europeanism and nationalism prevail.

### DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES OF INTEGRATION IN HUNGARY

Hungary does not have any overall policy document on migration policy and the integration of migrants. In Hungary there was an attempt in 2007 to at least produce a white paper, but the leaking of the document led to outrage from right-wing opposition politicians. This outrage was based on the false claim that the then ruling socialist government was actively seeking the immigration of millions of Chinese people. Right now a new policy document is being formulated which has not yet been made public.

As an institutional practice, Hungarian migration policy can be understood as being built on three pillars. The country is supporting the free movement of people within the EU and it fully respects the Schengen agreement. Citizens of the EU are welcome and there are hardly any examples of criticism directed towards migrants from Germany, for example.

This pro-Western and pro-large scale immigration attitude has been made clear during recent debates on North African immigrants, but from qualitative studies we know that this is also the case for Hungarian visa policy. It actively excludes would-be migrants coming from certain regions and countries (e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa). And we know very well (even from interviews)

<sup>1</sup> Favell, 2000 IN: Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices edited by T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Doug Klusmeyer, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute/Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001, p 351





that visa policy does matter in terms of the ability of migrants to integrate.

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Hungary follows a rather hard and non-supportive policy toward TNCs of non-Hungarian origin. This is most clear in the case of refugees, who now face an increasing rate of rejection of their applications and an increasing hostility toward them (such as regular rallies against their presence organised by the far-right). Hungary handles them mainly as a security risk; it provides little legal or linguistic support; it is biased against non-European and/or lower class immigrants and migrants with family members face great difficulties.

### CONNECTING TO A DIFFERENT TYPE OF MIGRANT

As already noted above, the Hungarian state clearly endorses migratory and other links with Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries. It is not alone with this approach as most Eastern, Southern and South Eastern states follow a somewhat similar line and due to historical colonial links even France and Britain have such inclinations, but in Hungary it seems that the motivation behind such an approach is somewhat clearer. Hungary imagines itself as a state fully responsible for the maintenance of "historic" Hungary in terms of ethnic composition and cultural historic legacies even beyond its borders, and in a gradual process it has built up legal links with "affiliated" people living outside Hungary.

Special legislation has been passed for incoming Hungarians from neighbouring countries being extended as far as now offering citizenship without residing in the country itself. In terms of granting special ethnic privileges the country has been a pioneer, where opinion polls are sharply divided in attitudes toward immigrants of Hungarian ethnic background and

those without such status. In the early 2000s it was national policy to offer special ID cards to ethnic Hungarians. These cards provided a privileged status with the Hungarian state, such as help in visa issuance to third countries. Now the country offers full citizenship to all Hungarians who can claim some ethnic background and/or one ancestor who lives or lived in Hungarian territories.

### COMPETING DISCOURSES

Regarding public discourses, different strands can be identified which, taken together, show a very interesting discursive framework of public discussions. First, there is a clear nationalist discourse which discusses the relevant laws as a national collective act for the empowerment and the virtual "reunification" of the nation across borders. Second, we can identify a liberal discourse, which defines its main themes as the fight against discrimination, the extension of rights to wider groups, the acceptance of multiple identities and transnational rights, and the fight against the racism of the majority. The other major discourse is based on social exclusion and is concerned with the defence of domestic employees and the protection of the state against an "Eastern" flood. In this way migration policies are embedded into a civilizational and very importantly related ethnic discourse.

### EMANCIPATION DENIED

The provision of citizenship is most emancipatory to those from outside the EU. Such emancipation is beneficial on many levels, but it does not exclude the fact that this population is used for purposes that are political (voting rights, quasi-imperial claims on neigh-



bouring countries), demographic and economic. So their emancipation comes at a price.

Furthermore it is clearly stated that this emancipation should not be extended to other non-nationals, whose second class status is now obvious in a state which openly celebrates its “ethnic character”, which can be extended to religious grounds also as traditional churches are lynchpins of this loose hybrid empire-like system. It is revealing that when senior government officials are interviewed they claim that Hungarian citizenship for non-Hungarians is attractive due to the “beauty” of the Hungarian language. Surely in this atmosphere of imperial heritage non-Hungarians find themselves rather strange animals. This division is further sharpened by the fact that Hungarian public opinion seems to be even more xenophobic than most European countries. It is not surprising then that no integration policy has been developed fully as migration has been squeezed into an almost segregated dual system of Hungarian versus non-Hungarian immigrants without offering an overall discourse or approach which sees migration as at least a developmental tool.

**A SILVER LINING**


Concerning integration practices, it can be clearly stated that the country is lagging behind some other regional countries like Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia in developing an integration policy. But there are very positive elements also. Hungary scores 45 overall on the MIPEX ([www.mipex.org](http://www.mipex.org)) scale, a composite index of integration compiled in 2010. It is in the middle range concerning labour market access, family reunion and long-term residence policies for legally-resident third-country nationals. Regarding political participation and access to nationality there are

however serious problems. In contrast anti-discrimination policy stands out as a definite area of strength and Hungary places third best in the 28 MIPEX countries. Hungarian authorities seem to have a formalistic and legalistic approach, which can be clearly alienating but it can also be neutral.

And this is the last point where the Hungarian experience deserves some attention. Repeated empirical analyses have shown that in education and in various institutionalised cultural encounters the local population and teachers are basically trying to downplay the importance of cultural diversity and especially the need for handling such problematic social relationships. They avoid these questions and with this they basically push them into the “individual” characteristics of immigrant (and minority) children. Foreignness is a handicap, and integration is the responsibility of the immigrant only.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

This is how the circle is complete. Co-ethnic and non-co ethnic migrants are seen as resources in various competitive games. However when any of the issues (their acceptance, cultural conflicts) are to be handled then all the burden should fall on them as the local population is already preoccupied with its own struggle for survival, especially in an era of continuously difficult labour market conditions and deskilling. But even this last element fails to ring the bell for solidarity between “Europeans”, “Hungarians”, co-ethnic Hungarians, Third Country Nationals in an era when the whole continent is losing its relative strength. Historic reflexes of European and national pride might lead to a trap in which the wrong enemies and problems are targeted.



# MIGRANTS MUST BECOME ECO-CITIZENS OF THE WORLD

**FRANCE'S EXPERIENCE WITH IMMIGRATION TEACHES US THAT UNLESS WE PROVIDE REAL EQUALITY, INCLUDING POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, WE WILL ALWAYS STRUGGLE AS A SOCIETY TO COPE WITH OUR CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS. FOR THIS TO HAPPEN, WE NEED TO STEP OUT OF OUR NATIONAL CONTEXT AND SEE THIS AS AN ISSUE THAT NEEDS EUROPEAN LEVEL AND GLOBAL ATTENTION. THIS INCLUDES LOOKING AT ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE.**



## **STÉPHANE GATIGNON**

has been the Mayor of the French town of Sevrans near Paris since 2001. He is a member of the French Green Party Europe Écologie Les Verts



'La Banlieue'- the lessons from their success and failures is important for all of Europe



In the French Department of Seine-Saint-Denis, there are more nationalities than there are members of the UN. In Sevrans, the city of which I am Mayor, there are 73 nationalities from the 4 corners of the world. I use these figures in order to demonstrate that, in our countries, the issue of migration is one that is constant, both historically and economically. The issue of immigration and immigrant rights (rights in the widest sense), or lack thereof, does not solely concern Europeans. There is a veritable migratory history from which the continuity of society is built. It is very clear that France has changed, not solely due to various political powers but also and primarily due to its historic social evolutions and the transformation of the French population since the Second World War.

### AN ISSUE THAT CONSTANTLY EVOLVES

France is historically a land of migration, a land of invasions as Foucault said, a land of regional confrontations. This is precisely why French nationality is political and not an ethnic, *jus soli* applies. The French Republic is 'one and indivisible', an act of political faith, almost a religion. In order to hold French nationality despite our diversity, I would even say against our diversity, the Jacobinism that we inherit – wilfully or otherwise, is a permanent threat to the liberty of cultures and minorities. Each new wave of immigration re-launches the debate on political nationality and, due to the rigidity of the current system; the legitimacy of immigrants being part of a societal movement is brought into question. Today it's the Romani people; yesterday it was West Africans, before that it was North Africans, Italians... not to mention the sensitive Algerian issue. All of these stages in our history represent an opportunity for confrontation between ethnicity and citi-

zenry to reappear, which means that no problem is ever really resolved.

### FROM NATIONAL TO EUROPEAN

As for intra-European migrants, there have been two waves of immigration: the old wave (Polish, Italian...) and a more recent wave (a result of the Balkans war and Romani people). Populations from older waves of immigration are often considered as being well integrated and stakeholders of local dynamics. They also have a form of political inclusion through participation in local and European elections, which is fundamental to feeling integrated in a country. Other questions are being raised regarding the recent wave of European immigration. For the Romani people from Romania, the issue of Romania's real integration into the EU is pertinent. This precise question regarding Romani people illustrates that immigration cannot be managed state by state and that a European policy needs to be implemented. Today's challenge is being able to think beyond the national level and territorial egoisms and to turn more towards a European and cosmopolitan vision.

The movements of the far-right that are part of the current debate, including the French National Front in France, are an expression of the continuity of the regret of a multicultural France, which has never truly existed. Jacobinism is the perpetuation of the illusion of a multicultural nation.

### EQUALITY – AN ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT

However, Europe directly brings Jacobinism directly into question, which is fundamental because otherwise there will be a retreat into nationalism and then

## *hospitality:*

we will have Marine Le Pen at the top of a coalition government with a significant proportion of the republican right. Therefore, I am absolutely convinced that Europeans in France must enjoy the same rights as French people. It is an historical requirement for spreading democracy and breaking with nationalist movements, which have burned and bloodied our continent and the world, in order to promote European citizenship. However, steps must be on both sides.

I found the Polish Plumber controversy at the time of the Bolkenstein directive in 2005 – which was a true provocation – to be scandalous. In addition to the post-democratic management of Europe by the European Commission, there is a social and legal defence of sovereignty that is an obstacle to European integration. There must be a top-down harmonisation of rights but each Member State must make steps forwards. There must be mutual recognition in this global world where nation-states no longer mediate.

Youth is a good example of what should be done because a sizeable proportion travels throughout Europe for leisure, study or work. The question is not whether everyone should have the same rights but rather how we can build common rights for everyone in the EU.

### THE VISION IS ASSIMILATION

Should we hold on to the idea of integration whereby we expect the 'outsider' to adapt to the rule of local life or should we work towards a new way of seeing integration, for example co-integration, which consists of the common integration of two parties? Actually, in our country, the vision for immigration is assimilation.

Anyone who arrives with his/her history, philosophy, and culture must strip himself or herself of it. We want to dissolve the culture of the immigrant into the national culture without understanding that democratic society is above all about what we have in common and that each new culture is an essential contribution to the common culture. In France the dominant vision is assimilation; it is a way of saying to immigrants that they have to forget their cultural heritage in order to become the grandchildren of Hugues le Grand.

This assimilationist vision, which dates back to the French First Republic – even if its roots stem back to before the French Revolution, is the national-republican basis of a combined people. It is a vision that is disconnected from today's society, from its urbanity, from its heterogeneity and its cosmopolitanism. We live in a time where this supposedly comprehensivist, centralist vision, which – for the most part – masks the poorly accepted heritage of colonisation, is opposing the current world and its changes. As it refuses to break with Jacobinism, France is marginalising itself

The term contains many semantic contradictions: There is the acceptance of the other as a fight against violence, openness towards foreign countries. There is also a certain religious duty, a sort of condescension from the people who are there towards the people arriving. This is the virtuous acceptance of a group. Hospitality is dissolving into isolation, for both families and communities. There is a dimension that is adapted to the individualism of our society: we welcome a nomad, a solitary. There is a placebo effect against solidarity, against what we have in common, against the collective construction of the world. Hospitality is both a true value and a lesser evil.

and delving into the unknown of unacknowledged separations. We need to carry out our cultural revolution in order to play our role in the global movement.

### A REPUBLIC THAT MUST ADAPT TO SOCIETY

Republican integration does not work and has undoubtedly only ever worked one-way. We always accuse schools of not doing their part when it comes to integration and teachers of no longer being the hussards noirs<sup>1</sup> of the Republic. However, we never ask ourselves whether the Republic is adapted to the society that it is supposed to organise and protect. If we look at Polish or Italian immigration, it took decades for assimilation to happen. There were ethnic confrontations, wars, and populations were sent back to their home countries, as with the Polish miners in the 1930s.

Today, how can assimilation happen whilst everyone is denying community? I am not talking about defending communitarianism; I am talking about the cultural and religious reality of our countries. Confrontation between the Republican state and the Catholic Church is out-dated. Today, Muslims make up the country's second biggest religion therefore secularism is quite a different matter. It is no longer a question of fighting against a church that was the centrepiece of society in order to push it back into the private space but rather bringing together a, now multicultural, society. We must overcome the conflicts generated by open society through democracy and that cannot be done at the national level.

In order to move forward, we must understand that it is necessary to build a federal Europe, a continuous and decentralised democracy. I am therefore campaigning for a policy that is not assimilationist but cosmopolitan, built upon the recognition of each person's path, cultural diversity... a cosmopolitan integration policy that takes into account these histories, these characteristics. That does not mean an all-out submissive Europe, which means a Europe that chooses its history; that ceases to suffer in the name of the economic reality, or xenophobia, or do-gooderism.

<sup>1</sup> A nickname used for primary school teachers under the French Third Republic

## WHAT ABOUT GLOBALISATION?

But what about migrants coming from countries outside of the EU? This requires a discussion about globalisation. The Berlin Conference in 1885 and the First World War marked the end of the first era of globalisation. A parenthesis was opened that produced two world wars, the Holocaust and many other massacres. The horror of the 20th century was only possible from this combination of extreme imperial competition and the frustration of nationalism. It was only possible because western domination, far from making peace and civilisation, fuelled mass war, which, in turn, fuelled mass destruction.

The parenthesis was closed with the fall of the Berlin wall. Globalisation resumed. We can deplore it, criticise it, even fight against it but it doesn't change anything anthropological that seeks the globalisation of human relations as the essence of our movement.

## GROWING ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION

Therefore the issue of migration from countries outside of the EU is an integral part of this movement. This type of migration is essential. It is important to remember that the majority of migrations are not from north to south but from south to south. Europeans are too focussed on themselves. They consider themselves under attack but the reality is quite different. There is a new vision of internationalism, particularly given that with economic and political migration comes environmental migration. Are we going to refuse environmental refuge to victims of the global warming phenomenon of which we are the main architects?

## OUR COLONIAL GHOSTS

Europe, Great Britain included, has a problem: its former domination of the world, the regret of its past splendour. It sees immigration from the south as weakening, as a sort of revenge from history. We invaded them, now they are invading us. They are colonial ghosts. That does not mean that Europe must welcome everyone. It means that cosmopolitanism, which no one can really deny, must be at the heart of migratory policies. It must contribute to creating

continental poles of democratic, economic, environmental and social stability that enables everyone to choose their path, to choose to stay in their country or to leave it and not be constrained, as is the case today.

## THE NEED FOR A NEW RENAISSANCE

Take a look at the young people of Europe; they are moving around more and more. This includes Sevrin; the youth from council estates are leaving our country to work abroad. Therefore Europe must bring itself up to speed, in order to become appealing again and develop a welcome policy on all fronts, whether it be academic, economic, environmental, societal, cultural, sportive... A sort of new Renaissance is needed.

From an environmental point of view, these poles of stability are fundamental because they encourage local autonomy over subjection to the whim of productivist work managed by globalised multinationals that trade and exhaust all resources whether they are human, cultural or natural. Migrants must become eco-citizens of the world, welcomed, respected and accepted as contributors and co-producers of the host society.

*integration:*

Integration's political conception evolves with time. For me, through this notion I see the construction of a European identity that doesn't disregard historicity or personal trajectories - I see integration as a true sharing tool.

It is a new approach to internationalism, or rather a new vision of everyone's place on the planet in the 21st century. From the Holy Roman Germanic Empire to the European Republic, it is still our continent's history. The end of history does not exist.



**HOSPITALITY**



## CONTINUING THE DEBATE...

We all can enjoy hospitality. Being in a new place, being treated by its denizens with respect, with kindness, with true interest, is something we remember, that we value. I remember visiting Syria as a tourist back in 1999 and experiencing an astonishingly warm welcome. As a single woman traveller, bus drivers, cafe waiters, hotel staff consistently went out of their way to ensure I was comfortable. I drank lots of strongly sweetened tea from bus drivers' own flasks, and it would have been churlish to refuse, even though I don't for preference take sugar in tea.

Unfortunately, the countries to which I have ties of birth or nationality don't always return the favour. Australia has just decided to ship arriving "boat people" to Papua New Guinea and Britain has implemented an immigration cap that is keeping out thousands of international students, and the spouses and partners, on the government's own figures, of 18,000 UK citizens.

As the following chapters outline, providing true, generous hospitality towards newcomers is hard to find across across the EU, and becoming rarer. One reason for this is clear. As Margit Feischmidt and Attila Melegh conclude, there is a temptation to identify "wrong enemies" - amidst continuing economic crisis and cutbacks to essential state provision, newcomers, whether from other European states or outside the EU, make easy scapegoats.

One thing that ties the four chapters together is a sense that newcomers are expected to adapt, to change, or somehow to "correct" themselves towards an existing, idealised norm of like-native citizen. Almaci introduces a Flemish word, "inburgering", a mandatory process for the integration of aliens, which although supposed to be a dialogue, could be in fact a one-way process by which the newcomer has to adapt to local ways.

There's always been, it is clear a tension between this approach and more accepting, multicultural ones, but it does very much feel reading these chapters that there's a strong push towards the older, and previously acknowledged to have failed, strongly integrationist approach. That immigrants have something to bring besides purely economic value needs to be acknowledged, indeed asserted.

Jean Lambert brings a further important, and frequently unacknowledged, point that all nations have immigrants and migrants. She points out that while one million non-UK EU citizens live in the London region she represents, half a million UK citizens live elsewhere in the EU. (There are about five million further UK citizens living around the globe.)

As Stephane Gatignon outlines, the opportunity at least to do this, to move to follow your heart, your career, or your interests, is a freedom that we all hope for, both for ourselves and our children. (I should note here that it is one I have enjoyed, as an Australian-born person who has chosen to be British after a sojourn in Thailand.) And as he highlights, in a world increasingly affected by climate change, even more people will be forced to move to seek refuge.

It is our joint responsibility to act to minimise the number forced to move, by climate change, by war, by economic dislocation, whilst providing for those who are, and acknowledging as British writer Bruce Chatwin did, that nomadism, the desire to wander, is part of the human condition.



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
# FEDERALISM

**ARE THE GREAT DIFFICULTIES THE EU IS EXPERIENCING  
IN SOLVING THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS MAINLY  
DUE TO THE HEGEMONIC INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL  
GOVERNMENTS AND INTERESTS ON THE EUROPEAN AGENDA  
OR IS THE CRISIS INSTEAD BEING EXACERBATED BY THE  
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE EFFECTS OF AN EXCESSIVE AMBITION,  
ROOTED IN THE UTOPIA OF A EUROPEAN SUPERSTATE?**

**FURTHERMORE, WHAT IS YOUR VISION OF FEDERALISM  
AND SUBSIDIARITY, NOT ONLY ON THE EUROPEAN LEVEL  
BUT ALSO ON YOUR NATIONAL OR REGIONAL LEVEL?**

**DO YOU WANT NATION-STATES TO CONTINUE TO  
FORM THE MOST IMPORTANT POLITICAL LEVEL?**

**AS A GREEN, WHAT WOULD BE THE BEST FEDERAL STRUCTURE  
FOR EUROPE FOR ACHIEVING THE ECOLOGICAL TRANSITION?**



# FROM A PATCHWORK TO A STABLE FEDERAL HOUSE

**THE CURRENT CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE IS A PATCHWORK: ON THE ONE HAND, RESPONSIBILITIES ARE SHIFTING TO THE EUROPEAN LEVEL THROUGH STRICTER EUROPEAN REGULATIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND THERE IS ONLY LOOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN MEMBER STATES WHEN IT COMES TO COMBATING UNEMPLOYMENT OR REVITALISING THE ECONOMY. IT IS THEREFORE MORE VITAL THAN EVER TO TRANSFORM THE POROUS STRUCTURE OF THE EU INTO A STABLE, FEDERAL HOUSE. A KEY INSTRUMENT FOR THIS IS THE BUDGET OF THE EU, THROUGH WHICH EUROPEAN PROBLEM-SOLVING CAPACITIES CAN BE ENHANCED.**



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## *federalism:*

Since the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis, EU political and economic elites have boasted that they are able to achieve stability in Europe through a number of measures. All of these measures - from the European Semester to the Euro Plus Pact to the Economic Governance Package ("six-pack" and "two-pack") to the Fiscal Compact - have one thing in common: they set binding European rules for national budgetary policies. The Member States commit themselves to austerity and budgetary discipline, which in case of non-compliance will be strictly penalised. The Commission takes further responsibility for the implementation of disciplinary measures, in combination with the supervision of budgetary requirements. Simultaneously the discretion of national parliaments to draft up and decide over the budgets is being increasingly restricted. The loss of democratic legitimacy, however, has not been balanced out by expanded parliamentary oversight on the European level. Significant responsibilities are thereby being transferred from the democratically legitimised national parliaments to the European executive (Commission and Council). Formerly national tasks are being mutualised through commitment to the binding rules of a united "economic government." From a federal perspective one can perceive the Europeanisation of national budgetary policies with a simultaneous loss of democratic mechanisms as an excessive intergovernmentalism within the European multi-level governance.

### **NATION STATES RESPONSIBLE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FIGHTING UNEMPLOYMENT**

In contrast, the responsibility to solve the social and economic consequences of the crisis (unemployment, recession) remains with the nation states. Although the European Council adopted a "Compact for Growth and Jobs," and more recently a "Youth Employment Guarantee," neither of the measures are endowed with an adequate budget, nor equipped with the same legal obligations as the fiscal discipline. The negotiations on the multiannual financial framework from 2014-2020 also remain focused on austerity. Moreover the negotiations pursue the logic of defending national interests (i.e. net contributor debate), while ambitions for a further-reaching Europeanisation are indiscernible. Overall the crisis management reveals a problematic growing divergence: the concrete crisis management is left to the nation states whose budgets are restrained by EU rules. Battling unemployment and boosting economic growth is merely coordinated at the European level. Thus a standstill in economic and integrational policy is reinforced.

"United States of Europe" as a federalist vision in a European multi-level governance system means that all those decisions will be made at the European level which, due to the complexity of the challenges, must be addressed at a superordinate level. The concept of a "United States of Europe" serves as a vision for Europe: democratically regulated, federally structured, constituted in the spirit of republicanism. This necessitates that the European Parliament be developed into a fully-fledged parliament and receives the right to initiate legislation. The Council would be transformed into a state chamber that together with the EP comprises the legislative branch. The European Commission (elected by the EP) would constitute the executive. The federal principle would coexist with the nation states insofar as the latter will continue to be responsible for key policy areas (for example education and health).

### **MULTIFACETED CRISES NEED EUROPEAN SOLUTIONS**

This crisis management policy is completely inadequate to address the current challenges (financial and economic crisis, energy and environmental crisis, crisis of democracy). It is in fact counterproductive, illustrated for instance by rising unemployment. Considering these challenges and how intertwined Europe is economically, the Member States cannot solve the resulting problems alone. There must be common solutions in a well-balanced European multi-level governance. With the EU institutions, with the division of powers between the European and national levels, and with the EU budget, the EU already possesses many traits of a federal structure. From our point of view the crisis can only be resolved by strengthening and implementing the federal principle. The decision-making responsibility of democratically legitimate bodies must take place at the level at which the problems can be addressed most effectively. Therefore the subsidiarity principle should be the guiding one.

### **EUROPEANISE THE EU BUDGET**

Just as in any federal system, the linchpin of the European project is the budget, which currently comprises only 1% of the GNP of the EU. In comparison the federal budget of the USA is approximately 22% of GDP. A similar dimension for Europe is unforeseeable as, according to the principle of subsidiarity, the European level even in the long-term will not finance certain expenditures such as health or pensions. Yet the EU budget must be considerably increased and concentrate on those areas in which it can be of added value to the national budgets and can correct distortions of the single market. The added benefit would be to foster economic stabilisation, climate protection, ecological renewal in terms of a green economy ("Green New Deal") and the production of public goods with positive cross-border synergies (for example research and infrastructure).

In addition to the principles of added value, cost efficiency and economies of scale, a federal budget is also a matter of cohesion and solidarity. The Member States display unequal levels of development and are affected by the crisis to different degrees. The previ-

ous Cohesion Policy of the EU is a solid foundation for further steps toward a European fiscal equalisation scheme. All Member States share the responsibility for economic recovery in Europe and for the elimination of all disparities. This implies that the nation states must incur the same costs in financing their national budgets. The mutualisation of debts through “Eurobonds” is therefore a vital step. Europe can be transformed into a socially fair, ecologically and democratically legitimate community only with joint measures and a political change of direction. Trust in Europe will only increase when the livelihoods of its citizens are improved through a European budgetary policy and fiscal equalisation adequate to the problems we face.

### SEPARATE EU TAXES AND TAX HARMONISATION

Financing the European budget from its own revenue sources is in line with the European spirit and lives up to further integration. The Lisbon Treaty contains the key to the additional resources for an expanded EU budget. In article 311 TFEU it states “Without prej-

udice to other revenue, the budget shall be financed wholly from own resources.” Currently the budget stems primarily from national contributions. The result is that the focus of the multiannual financial framework negotiations is not on how the funds are allocated, but rather on “horse trading” about national net returns.

Proposals for EU taxes range from a financial transaction tax to environmental taxes to company taxes. A prerequisite would be tax harmonisation in the EU with the goal of ending the ruinous tax competition between Member States. Tax harmonisation thus far has failed due to two hurdles: the fetish of tax competition and the principle of unanimity, which must be replaced with a qualified majority. One community with common interests and values must realise that tax dumping and ineffective supervision of taxation standards are counterproductive for our common livelihood. Part of such a tax package is also a unified





wealth tax, which can ensure the revenue base for the nation states.

### STRENGTHENING THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

But any mechanism for solving these crises can be effective only insofar as the relevant decision are connected to the citizens of Europe. It is therefore all about attaining the division of powers on the European level. The European Parliament, the only body of the EU that is directly elected by the citizens of Europe, must be invested with all the rights of a fully-fledged parliament: the sole authority to initiate legislative proposals and budgetary sovereignty. It would become the central decision-making body for guiding economic policy as well as controlling the executive in all European affairs. The Council would be installed as a second chamber to the European Parliament to represent the member states. The European Commission would become the executive branch, charged with carrying out the EU budget and European economic


policy and accountable to the European Parliament as well as the Council.

These proposals mean that the EU must continue to develop in the direction of a federal union. This goes hand in hand with further competencies being transferred to the European level in policy areas that can only be resolved at a higher level. The future of European federalism lies in a parliamentary multi-level democracy in which the nation states continue to play a central role in fulfilling key societal needs. Only a stable federal EU house, one that can meet existing challenges thanks to its prudent division of powers, can enjoy the trust of its citizens and endure.

For Rossmann and Feigl-Heihs, a Federal Europe is one that has the European Parliament at the centre of decision-making







# COMBINING NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN ALLEGIANCES

**A FEDERAL EUROPE CANNOT COME ABOUT SOLELY THROUGH DISPARAGING NATIONAL IDENTITY. RATHER, A FEDERAL EUROPE NEEDS TO BE BUILT BASED AROUND CONCEPTS THAT ARE UNDERSTANDABLE TO CITIZENS: DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND A REFRAIN FROM SIMPLE CENTRALISATION.**



**NUALA AHERN**

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A first among equals – does identifying with a Federal Europe require us to put aside our national identities?

When I first came to Brussels as a MEP in 1994, with a positive, if critical, view of the EU, I found the rhetoric of the federalists astonishing, not only in its flights of idealistic fervour, but also in its disdain for the affinity which ordinary people had all over Europe for their regional and national loyalties. We were, it seemed, to ditch these deeply held loyalties and ingrained traditions for some kind of European super-soup, because we should “transcend” mere national loyalties for a greater goal of unity. They seemed to think one only had to demonise nationalism for it to fall away and be replaced by the European project. I thought then and still think now that it is pure folly to promote the idea that federalism in Europe means ditching one’s own national allegiance.

Such thinking is to put the cart before the horse; much more realistic is the idea of building a common Europe from the base of our own experience and affinities, sharing what is positive in our cultures with a common goal of mutual prosperity and peace, and the recognition that together we are stronger and more able to deal with the challenges of globalisation, climate change and environmental destruction, than separately.

### THE LIMITS OF FEDERALIST IDEALISM

Are a national and a European allegiance incompatible? Most Europeans clearly do not think so. From the Irish perspective a strong national identity and allegiance and a strong European allegiance are completely compatible.

But to succeed in creating a genuine, democratic Europe, peoples’ national allegiances cannot be seen as something to be dismantled, which would arouse defensive fury, but as something to be built on for the common good.

In some cases, however, this (almost ideological) federalist’s idealism, seems to stem from the dislike some have for their own national identities, and the need they feel to replace these with a greater allegiance.

In the European Parliament I noticed it was often those whose own national allegiance had been disrupted in some way that were attracted to federalism as an ideal. People from states such as Italy or Belgium, whose own states seemed fractured, or Germany, whose post-war generation sought solidarity beyond the nationalism which had proven so catastrophic.

However, I do not think that we can build a genuinely integrated Europe on these idealistic longings. Rather, one must look to what is needed to solve particular questions at particular times. Especially now, when



the Eurozone crisis is threatening to dissolve the Europe so painstakingly built for more than 50 years.

### A FRACTURED EUROPE

Behind the rhetoric of integration we have the reality of a fractured Europe with three obvious fault lines behind which Europeans glower at each other. First, there is the fractious north-south divide: the Northern states such as Germany; France; the Benelux and the Nordics, versus the mostly southern “bailout” states; Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain and Ireland. Then there are the new eastern states which have their own problematic history and which sought prosperity and stability from EU membership.

Then there is the fault line between the nation state and the EU institutions. This is most strongly expressed in key Eurosceptic states like the UK, but also exists elsewhere (e.g. Ireland) and is getting stronger because of the financial crisis. In order to construct joint forms of democratic economic governance, Europe must articulate a vision that is intelligible to its citizens and with which they can identify.

### A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPACE

Europe cannot be further democratised without the creation of an effective and open public space. Making the EU intelligible and creating real debate about policy choices could, for example, be strengthened by investing in the Europeanisation of the media. The EU should not aim to create EU media outlets operating from Brussels such as Euro news, but it could try to enhance the exchange of information among media outlets operating in individual Member States by sponsoring websites offering translations of leading articles, subsidising the exchange of radio and TV documentaries or backing a journalistic equivalent of the Erasmus programme. By making the best national

television programmes or newspaper articles available to audiences of other countries it will be possible to have more pan-European deliberation, and the scope for national politicians to say one thing in Brussels and another to their domestic audiences will be reduced.

### THE DIFFICULT WAY TO FISCAL FEDERALISM

The euro crisis has provoked debate over the quality and quantity of federalism required for the optimal functioning of the European Union. A certain amount is necessary for the monetary union to function effectively but the crisis has also revealed a lack of specifically fiscal federalism—i.e. a common framework for allocating functions to different levels of governance and for implementing appropriate instruments to properly realise those functions. However, the idea of a European Commission role in monitoring macro-economic and fiscal policy (including even possible sanctions from the Court) is proving unpalatable, particularly to the larger member states. Attachment to the idea of national budgetary sovereignty prevents significant progress towards more fiscal federalism.

A monetary, economic and fiscal regime would be a decisive move towards political union, to which many citizens might react negatively. So, what is actually emerging has been described as ‘a system of governance under which debtor countries have to accept fiscal policy prescriptions and structural reforms imposed by creditor countries’ – while the latter remain free to conduct their own policy with no ‘meaningful interference’. There could be an EU polity with a federal core and a single fiscal policy, moving in the direction of political union, surrounded by a group of non-Euro states who may or may not opt in to the core.

The topic is contentious, however: while some believe it is impossible to solve the crisis other than with a further move toward integration, others see the difficulty of persuading voters of this, and others recoil from the goal of political union altogether.

### A EUROPEAN FEDERATION OF NATION-STATES ?

The question of the sequencing of the steps towards further integration has been widely discussed since the publication of the report last year by Van Rompuy highlighting differences of opinion on whether banking, fiscal and broader political union can all progress simultaneously or whether they are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. He emphasised the importance of taking a long term view of European recovery, stating that “the crisis has revealed what it takes to be in a Union... If we want investors to buy

10-year government bonds, we need to show them where we want the Eurozone to be in ten years’ time.”

But it is hard to find either the political leadership, or the popular support, to transform the governance of the Eurozone and, with it, the long-term political and economic prospects of Europe as a whole.

One of the most striking features of the debate is the lack of consensus on what is actually meant by ‘political union’. Broadly, it refers to ambitious political integration to a degree that can reflect and support the economic integration inherent in the single currency.

One of the most likely outcomes of the move to political union is the creation of a federation of nation states. This would not amount to a super state, but rather to a democratic federation that can tackle common problems. But this ‘federation of nation states’ may, however, prove unacceptable to some, for example the UK and the Czech Republic.

A federation is not necessarily centralism. It can be based on checks and balances between the member states and an administrative and political centre. However more central control does not necessarily mean more political legitimacy. If Europe moves towards more federalism, the voters must decide, not only a few wise men. We should not allow a federal state to develop without real oversight, representation and accountability.

### FEDERALISM AND THE USA

There are huge problems in taking the USA as a model; many young people perceive it as a corrupt super state where the arms industry and corporate power have a stranglehold on the political system. However this model has been the political subtext of much federalist thinking. The EU is not the USA and will never be. Europeans would be much better acknowledging this. Moreover, the US is currently locked in political stasis as a Republican congress and a Democratic White House have opposing budgetary policies, and neither is able to prevail.

Even in the USA federalisation was a lengthy process – a central bank has only existed for a century, the FBI since the 1930s. Europe begins differently; with a central bank, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Commission and so on, Europe already has federal institutions.

Participation of state governments in federal policy-making can provide an important structural safeguard against federal overreach. Giving representatives of state interests a voice in the federal legislative process



puts them in a position to defend their prerogatives against self-aggrandizing federal authorities.

A powerful means by which to safeguard State interests structurally is to represent state governments in a powerful upper Legislative Chamber. This is the approach taken, for instance, in the German Bundesrat. Other structural safeguards may involve giving states a role in the appointment of federal officials, such as federal judges or bureaucrats, or simply over representing small states in the lower legislative chamber.

However the European Council has the major and most visible role in giving the EU political legitimacy. The challenge is to reform the European Council, the body that is most visible and interesting to the citizens, because they feel most connected to their governments and how they represent their interests in Europe. Reform and extension of other bodies may be desirable and even possible, such as the creation of a second chamber. However this will not remedy the political vacuum that exists in the EU. To do this the politicians that have the most legitimacy and visibility – that is, heads of state and government – must operate with more accountability and transparency when sitting in Council and making laws for the whole of the EU.

The EU has extremely powerful structural safeguards. Member State governments are not only directly represented in the EU's de facto 'upper chamber', the Council of Ministers, but also appoint the European Commission President and the College of Commissioners and ECJ justices. And finally, they monitor both the implementation of EU policies by the Commission, through the comitology system, and control the implementation of most policies at the national level.

All these powerful structural safeguards for state interests should make fears of dominance by the centre implausible.

Currently, however, control seems to be being ceded to a Franco-German directorate, much to the dismay of many observers who argue that this could extend to other non-treaty-based cabals. In this way the dominance of the large Member States replaces concerns of dominance by the centre.

## A SYSTEM THAT WORKS

The EU is not facing an institutional crisis. The EU's legislative machinery operates effectively and continues to make policy on everything from telecommunications and financial services, to environmental and consumer protection. The ECJ has continued to take a strict line enforcing EU law against errant governments and has expanded the reach of EU law into sen-

sitive areas including health care policy. In short, the EU still functions, and it is extending into new policy arenas despite its crisis.


However, the levels of governance are so complex that they are not intelligible to EU citizens. The experience of federal systems suggests that the cumulative effect of incremental changes may yield significant changes in the division of authority between Member States and the federal system. The EU can only be durable in the long term if its on-going operations encourage behaviours that serve to strengthen its institutional safeguards over time. The Member States need to have incentives to fulfil their obligations to the Union.

The problem that the EU faces is essentially that in order to save the Eurozone it must move to banking and fiscal union. While these may be made palatable to most Eurozone members, it still remains to be seen if a fiscal union, with all the states equally liable to budgetary scrutiny, can be agreed. Even if this can be agreed, fiscal union is really completely unacceptable without more democratic control, leading to more political union.

## CONCLUSION

A tightrope walk lies ahead of the Union, and the drop is steep: along the path to stability and solidarity a plethora of complex systems and divergent pressures must be finely balanced—federalism must incorporate national pride; socio-economic gaps must be sutured; national sovereignty must be played off against a (democratic!) federalism, whilst being wary of tendencies towards centralist domination; and, crucially, the citizen must be kept on board throughout the process. Here, we cannot simply follow the path laid down by others, but must experiment to find our own way. The creation of a public space to articulate a common vision of a balanced, integrated and functioning Union, to be achieved through democratic processes, is the challenge we face: don't look down!

Thanks to all those who spoke at the Future of Europe seminar in Dublin, especially Elizabeth Meehan, Nicola Liebert, Eamon Ryan, Dan O'Brien, Benoit Lechat and Vinay Gupta from whom I have taken much wisdom for this article. Thanks also to Mark Leonard on E.U. structural reform and Linda Barry on fiscal and political union



# DOES FEDERALISM HAVE A FUTURE IN SPAIN?

**FEDERALISM IN SPAIN IS SINGULARLY PARADOXICAL. ALTHOUGH FEDERALISM SEEMS, A PRIORI, THE MOST LOGICAL POLITICO-JURIDICAL SOLUTION FOR A TERRITORIAL REALITY AS DIVERSE AS THAT OF SPAIN, IN FACT, IT HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE REJECTED AS MUCH BY THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES—THE SPANISH SOCIALIST WORKER'S PARTY (PSOE) AND THE PEOPLE'S PARTY (PP)—AS BY THE NATIONALIST PARTIES.**



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Federalism has been advocated in particular by the left, specifically by the United Left (IU), by the Catalan left—namely the Socialists' Party in Catalonia (PSC - the Catalan socialist party linked to the PSOE) and Initiative for Catalanian Greens (ICV)—as well as in some academic spheres. But separating Catalonia from the rest of Spain has been always a minority option. It was only as far back as 1873 that the first, short-lived Spanish republic, set against the backdrop of revolution, first ratified a federal constitution.

The reasons for this rejection lie in the fact that, as much for the right as for the more Jacobine left, federalism is almost synonymous with the rupture of the State, the recognition of the parties as political subjects in their own right and of the reality of shared sovereignty. For the Basque and Catalanian nationalists also, federalism entails the recognition of the unity of the State, the renunciation of the dream of full sovereignty and the establishment of a state model free from ambiguities and with the freedom of interpretation open to the autonomous state.

The Spanish model of territorial administration, known as the "State of autonomies", is a system which shares some elements with federalism: the autonomous communities have parliaments with legislative powers as well as their own governments and they possess a series of competencies particularly with regard to social policy, such as in the areas of health, education, culture, environment and certain transportation infrastructures.

But it is not a fully federal model for the following reasons: the Statutes of the communities (constitutions) have to be approved by the General Courts (Congress and Senate) before being subjected to a referendum in the corresponding communities; the communities are not fully guaranteed their own competency frameworks as the State government has the capacity to impose its policies despite the fact that they might be in the sphere of the competencies of the communities; the finance system is controlled by the central State, with little shared fiscal responsibility with the communities; mechanisms for cooperation between the communities are practically non-existent and those between the communities and the State are very weak; the second legislative chamber, the Senate, does not directly represent the communities.

### THE LACK OF A FEDERAL CULTURE

However, the principal failing of the Spanish federal system is the lack of a federal culture: the lack of appreciation and generosity that the central State

demonstrates towards the national minorities that make up the State.

The Catalan, Basque or Galician languages, for example, do not receive the same consideration as Castilian Spanish; they are co-official languages in their respective territories but they do not enjoy the same support and protection as the majority language, despite having endured marginalisation and persecution at the hands of the State throughout history.

Another example of the lack of federal culture is the systematic violation of the competencies of the autonomous regions on the part of the State government, to the point that it genuinely becomes a process of recentralisation and a hollowing out of autonomous competencies.

The Constitution of 1978 was the result of a series of complex balancing acts as well as of the pressures against the recognition of the territorial diversity of Spain exerted by Francoist interest groups, such as the army.

The Constitution recognises the existence of distinct nationalities and regions but, at the same time, notes the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards". Such language reflects the worst of Spanish nationalism. It establishes the right of the nationalities and regions to their own autonomy but maintains the central State's own territorial division: the province.

However, the Constitution did not establish a closed state model but rather allowed for diverse possibilities for the development of the territorial model—which was originally devised as a means of assuaging the demands of the Catalonians and the Basques for self-governance. The aspirations of the Catalonians and the Basques were not wholly realised but, on the other hand, what privileges were gained were generalised throughout the Spanish state.

### THE RESISTANCE OF SPANISH NATIONALISM

Currently, this peculiar, quasi-federal model is in crisis. Catalonia has historically been the region which has led the processes for developing an autonomous State. The demands of the Catalanian political forces—whether it be for more competencies in health and education or for greater community participation in the different tax models or the latest reforms of the autonomy statutes (2006-2008)—have been initiated and concluded by Catalonia and then subsequently spread to the rest of the communities.

The strategy of the Catalanian political forces has been to, firstly, promote an autonomist and federalist reading of the Constitution and then, subsequently, in



## *federalism:*

the face of the limits of this approach, to drive reforms of the Autonomy Statute, which was then emulated by other regions in order to federalise the State without having to reform the constitution, a process for which it would have been difficult to achieve the required majorities.

The new 2006 Autonomy Statute was passed by more than a two-thirds majority in the Catalanian Parliament as well as in the General Courts and, whilst it was rejected by the PP, it was ratified by the Catalanian population in a referendum which reflected the aspirations of Catalonia to be recognised as a nation, to secure more protection for the Catalanian language, for more and more secure legislative competencies and for a more just financing system.

The political right in Spain, which is profoundly nationalist, began a campaign against the Statute which culminated in an appeal against it in the Constitutional Court.

In the eyes of the Catalanian public the deliberations in the Court were scandalous: three years of long deliberations, with constant leaks to the press; various political maneuverings sought to maintain a majority despite this being a misuse of the Court itself and a violation of its norms; the Court was politicised to an unprecedented extent, discrediting the institution.

### CONFLICTING LEGITIMACIES

At the end of this process important parts of the Statute were declared unconstitutional or interpreted in restrictive ways such that they did not conflict with the Constitution. The judgement produced a legitimacy conflict: a Statute was passed in a referendum which was then modified by a court which was acting more as a legislative chamber than a court. The Catalonians fear that the Statute proposed by the Constitutional Court will not be the one they voted for.

This whole long process was spearheaded by the Spanish right and accompanied by passivity on the part of the PSOE. The failure of the Statute provoked a wave of indignation in Catalonia which translated into a strengthening of the Catalanian independence movement—many who considered themselves federalists are now siding with the independence movement in the face of the impossibility of reaching an agreement with the Spanish state and the lack of federalists in the Spanish state with whom a deal could be struck.

Meanwhile, the PP's campaigns and their slick communications, which are falsely blaming the autonomous communities for the level of public debt, have sparked growing resentment towards the auton-

Federalism is unity in diversity and self-government plus shared government. Federalism is tied to democracy; real federalism cannot exist in undemocratic states. This general and academic definition must be adapted to specific social realities and different national circumstances. Federalism is not the same in uni-national states such as Germany, the United States or Australia as it is in plurinational states such as Belgium or Canada, or multicultural ones such as Switzerland. The federalism that I defend is one that seeks to unify everything on the basis of freedom and free decision-making on behalf of all parties.

It is a federalism tied to radical democratic values, to freedom, solidarity and the close relation between the republican and lay traditions. Plurinational federalism aims to recognise national diversity as well as the multicultural character of society, in opposition as much to that branch of nationalism that identifies the nation with the state as to that which does not recognise the cultural diversity of its own society.

In Europe the 21st century must be the century in which shared sovereignty supercedes the logic of national sovereignty.

mous regions in a significant portion of Spanish public opinion.

The solution to the crisis proposed by most of the political actors in Catalonia, including the ICV, is to consult the citizenry about their own political future. When a large part of the population is questioning the statutory and constitutional frameworks and even membership in the Spanish state, it is necessary to democratically determine what the will of the majority of Catalanian society is, as was done with Scotland in Great Britain and is currently underway with Quebec in Canada.

Unlike the conservative British government, the conservative Spanish government would reject any agreement which would allow for such a consultation.

In this context of increasing divergence between the political majorities of Catalonia and those of the rest of Spain, and of divergence between their respective public opinions, is it possible to pose a federal solution?

Lately, in fact, the PSOE proposed a constitutional reform in a federal sense, although different to that envisaged by the ICV or the IU.

### FOR A PLURINATIONAL SPAIN

In my opinion the federal solution continues to be a reasonable and valid option to resolve the territorial conflicts in Spain, but not just any federalism will do. What the PSOE proposes is to resolve the contradictions in the Spanish autonomy model but without getting to the root of the problems.

No solution will emerge until constitutional reforms are made that will, amongst other things, recognise the plurinational and plurilinguistic character of the State—Spain is not one nation with divergent traits but rather a plurinational State or, if you will, a nation of nations. It is necessary to recognise the right

Spanish Federalism needs to be fair and balanced. But what does that mean for Federalism at a European level?



of the different elements which make up the State to decide their own future, for example through a basic, democratic guarantee of a new agreement with the State. The competencies of the communities must be preserved from interference from the State government. A fairer and more balanced financing system is crucial; currently the communities which are strongest economically, headed by Catalonia, are those which contribute a greater proportion to the federal state than the richest states in any other federal country. It is also necessary to regulate the participation of the communities or member states in the decisions of the State and in European politics.


Is it too late for a federal solution? It depends if the central State and the majority of its political forces are capable of realising a new agreement with Catalonia that reflects the aspirations of the majority of Catalan society. It is important to remember that the rise in pro-independence sentiment is a recent development and one which is due to the failure of the Statute as well as the State's disloyal treatment of Catalonia; accordingly, the State could be open to negotiating an agreement proposal.

In the face of the Catalanian rejection of the constitutional framework and in the context of the difficulties and conflicts which could bring about a secession, it could be reasonable to look for solutions along the lines of those found in Quebec, where two referenda on sovereignty sparked new agreements between Quebec and Canada, or like in Great Britain, where a referendum on Scottish independence will be accom-

panied by a proposal for the broadening of Scottish self-government.

There are not many reasons for optimism: in the Spanish case the most reasonable solutions have historically not been those which were implemented. Despite thirty-five years of democracy and decentralisation, the problem in Spain continues to be the presence of a weak democratic culture and the absence of a federal culture.

In spite of these issues, a deep concept of democracy and of a federal culture continue to be values worth fighting for for many people; in Catalonia, in Spain and in Europe.



# MORE FEDERALISM, MORE AUTONOMY, MORE LINKS!

**BELGIAN FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN FEDERALISM HAVE REACHED THE END OF AN EPOCH. BOTH HAVE TO BE REINVENTED. TO ACHIEVE THIS WE MUST START FROM OUR SHARED INTERESTS AND RECOGNIZE THE INTERDEPENDENCE THAT LINKS US. ENVIRONMENTALISTS WHO HAVE ALWAYS BEEN PASSIONATE FEDERALISTS HAVE TO BE THE MOTORS OF THIS REINVENTION.**



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The seemingly interminable crisis that a growing number of European citizens are undergoing reinforces their distrust of the Institutions. What we have witnessed over these past months is deeper than a crisis of confidence. There is an ever growing hostility regarding financial, economic and political systems. This hostility is understandable: social systems have been put under extreme pressure; social inequalities are exploding, in particular in countries that have been affected by the debt crisis. Nationalisms and selfishness have resurfaced everywhere. The European project is directly threatened and the future of European integration itself is at stake.

### EUROPE DOES NOT NEED LESS FEDERALISM

What should we, as environmentalists, propose to respond to this situation? My reply is simple and at the same time complex. We must dare to have more federalism. At European level as well as at state level and in Europe, as well as in Belgium. Even if it is more difficult to do so, in these times of crisis, we do not really have a choice. The crisis cannot be fought with less federalism. This is a self-obvious fact that we must absolutely insist upon against all demagogues.

Two recent examples have convinced me of this. On the one hand, recent industrial closures in Lorraine, in Wallonia and in Flanders, as well as in other parts of Europe show the absolute necessity of a common industrial policy. This is even more dramatic than the ECSC - the European Coal and Steel Community – which was one of the initial projects on which the European Community was built. On the other hand, the difficulties that European environmentalists are currently facing in the implementation of energy transition must be tackled jointly. We must develop a Europe of renewable energy and implement the IRENE (Infrastructure Roadmap for Energy Networks in Europe) project which is indispensable to strengthen the global legitimacy of EU climate policy.

### FEDERALISTS BECAUSE WE'RE ENVIRONMENTALISTS, ENVIRONMENTALISTS BECAUSE WE'RE FEDERALISTS

Why have environmentalists always been federalists and what does this initial association between environmentalism and federalism mean? The example of Belgium gives us an opportunity to comprehend this paradigm. We have since somewhat forgotten, but if today we enjoy successful close cooperation between Belgian green parties, Groen (Flemish speaking party) and Ecolo (French speaking party), and have cooperated since their creation at the end of the 1970s - it is exactly because they were created as federalist parties from the get go. They were not created from a linguistic schism of a national party split into two

linguistic factions like the former united Belgian political parties. They were created separately and found common ground independently, united in the same rejection of destructive nationalism that provoked two world wars. For them, the Belgian unitary state of the time did not permit combining autonomy and solidarity harmoniously, decentralisation and broader democratic participation, and the respect for differences, without which there can be no recognition of any common origins. This is also why they have continued to engage in the European Green Party, as Europe is, in their eyes, the best means to overcome nationalism and to ensure the peaceful coexistence of identities and a multiplicity of roots.

### AUTONOMY AS INTERDEPENDENCE

How should we rebuild federalism in Belgium and in Europe? The following three principles that I would like to propose illustrate with concrete institutional propositions a means as to how this can be achieved.

The first principle obliges us to strike a fair balance between the principles of autonomy, cooperation and solidarity. Indeed, in order to fulfil its role, the federal government must base its intra-state relations on full respect for the autonomy of each constituent part, balanced by the principles of both horizontal and vertical cooperation and solidarity.

This is how, in Belgium, it is important that each region finally occupies an equal place with the other regional component blocs. It is out of the question, in this renewed federalism, to see large entities (Flanders and Wallonia) decide amongst themselves for the smaller ones (Brussels and the German-speaking community). The more autonomy grows, the more it becomes necessary to develop various levels of cooperation between these different entities, in order to not disturb the balance of the federation itself. From a green point of view, there can be no autonomy without recognising these self-same interdependencies, for example between Brussels, Wallonia and Flanders.

The originality of the federal pact is thus the attempt to make autonomy compatible with cooperation, even if this compatibility is still precarious, sometimes limited, and always on show, but definitively real. This obligation requires a balanced distribution of competences, most notably economic and financial, as well as the participation of each federal entity in the development of federal law.


In a federal state like Belgium, it also requires the strengthening of solidarity between people, through interpersonal transfers carried out by taxation and social security. As Phillippe Van Parijs explained, these interpersonal transfers – albeit to a lesser measure



Item ad uoluntatem suam prius et iustitiam ut si in Anglia non esset. Eundem diu respiciunt habere et eodem modo de iustitia et iudicio. De foris de alibi habere et remanere foris.

<sup>1</sup> Agenda 2010, A model for Europe, Phillippe Van Parijs, Green European Journal





Magna Carta” : this ‘Great Charter of English Liberties’ guaranteed the right of individual liberty. It is the oldest example from a long historical process which has driven constitutional law in the Anglo-Saxon countries

wonderful soil where we can create this new federalism. Skills will be assigned to the level where their management will be most democratic, efficient and appropriate for dealing with them. A strong Belgium must therefore embody four components defined on a territorial basis, linked by declarations of interdependence and solidarity. Each entity would face its responsibilities while maintaining close ties with each other and remaining connected by defining what is more akin to common interests, and a common desire to work together, and to provide for the necessary expertise to do so. This shared common desire allows for new clear and strong voices, advocating for the federation, essential to face emerging global issues. This would also make the rest of the system much more understandable for all citizens.

## HISTORY IS NOT A ONE-WAY STREET

Belgian and European federalisms are at a crossroads. Their overhaul is imperative, even if their two stories are different. One is of a nation-state inherited from the 19th century which itself created the very centrifugal forces that today threaten its future. The other is of an almost unique historic construction, born of the rejection of nationalism, which is confronted with their resurgence at the heart of its very operation. In both cases, we have not yet dedicated enough energy in identifying our common interests and reinforcing them. Above all, we have not yet managed to find the happy medium between the respect for differences and necessary strengthening of solidarity.

Democracy itself is the construction of a power – and power comes when men come together, as Paul Ricoeur taught us. We must therefore reinvent democracy, renew the ethical vision we have of power and its organisational methods. Unquestionably, this enchantment requires a federalist pact that will allow for both the development of dialogue between chosen communities to give a new direction to our society. This is what Maurice Schuman already stated as far back as 1950, at the very origin of the European project, when he declared that “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity’. Never before has any community managed in the long-term to make its wishes respected by coercive measures. We, the greens, are obliged to restore the colours to this project which is part of our origins.

think that this would be a very good way to bring European democracy to life. Moreover, they are pursuing the same idea in the organisation of ‘primaries’ to select their candidate for the role of President of the European Commission by the European Parliament.

## ARBITRATE CONFLICTS

Thirdly, federal loyalty has to be based upon trust. Trust in institutions, both federal as well as regional, allows for each individual to feel like a citizen of their own country, with trust between different levels of partners, which allows for each entity to feel respected and understood with their own specific differences. Trust again, finally, in consensus and in democratic compromise, which both are indispensable for conflict management. Regulatory mechanisms for the former still have to be found. Also, a system of proportional representation truly protects the interests of minorities much more than a majority system does.

These three major areas must be applied both on the European as well as the national level. Belgium is this



**FEDERALISM**

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## CONTINUING THE DEBATE...

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### THE THORNY ISSUE OF FEDERALISM

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Whereas the European Union defines itself as a federation of nation-states, some of which are still very centralised while others evidently federal, the mere association of both concepts rings differently according to our respective political culture. In fact, discussing federalism is an excellent introduction to the actual relationship we each, individually and collectively, entertain with the state - and beyond the state, with power.

Clearly, federalism is about redefining the scale of power. The more we expect from the centre of power (there's always a located source of power), the more powerful we wish this source to be. The most enthusiastic clergy of this worship of providential power would be the French, of course, whose history is nothing but the slow and relatively brutal construction of a nation-state and identity through an ever stronger central power. Hence Vendrell's reflections on the lack of a truly federal culture both at national and regional levels lead us to some (unexpected?) legacy of the Bourbons in contemporary Spain. And we could definitely consider that the national demands for autonomy are indeed manifestations of this claim for a stronger power - only with another centre.

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### WE NEED TO BREAK AWAY FROM THE ILLUSION THAT THE NATION-STATE COULD DO BETTER

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This paradox of power is at the other end quite well illustrated by Rossman and Feigl-Heihs' contribution. As the current European intergovernmental practices and architecture proves each day its dangerous inadequacy, it becomes obvious that we need to break away from the illusion that the nation-state could do better. Budget, taxes, economic targets and social policies: solutions can only stem from actions taken at the level of a federalised Europe.

But what kind of federation? Here, the form that a federal Europe would take paves the way for another quest. How much of ourselves would we lose, once diluted in a bigger us? The connection between our citizenship and our nationality is a matter of identity. And Ahern's legitimate mistrust of the federalist attempt to overhaul our national identities is quite well addressed by Nollet's emphasis on the multi-level governance of the type that Belgium has developed. The defence of regional and national identities is best embraced by a truly federal organisation of power. In the eyes of the Belgian Greens, federalism and environmentalism are in effect deeply connected.

The key lies with a concept that has been weakened by its abuse as a synonym for 'sheer national interest': 'subsidiarity'. But a federal power is by essence fuelled by subsidiarity, namely by genuine respect for the different scales of its implementation and thus the local environment/identity.

Democracy and federalism have has a common trait that they are defined as "self-governing". What Greens should focus more on, is the "self" part of this definition. We might then be able to initiate, far from the institutional quandaries and the concerns for historical constructions called "nations", the building of a common polity truly democratic. Whatever form it will have achieved, this will be our "federal Europe".



#### EDOUARD GAUDOT

is a strategic advisor to the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament and a member of the editorial board of the Green European Journal (include picture)



# CONCLUSION

## FOR A NEW EUROPEAN IDEALISM

IN 2009, THE GREENS Banded together under the banner of the Green New Deal. A green transformation of the economy delivered the hope of a sustainable resolution of the crisis. Concrete examples showed that this was not a completely utopian dream and that the creation of jobs and ecological modernisation were perfectly compatible.

Four years later, member state governments seem petrified. Archaic recipes like shale gas are back on the agenda. Climate negotiations have been stalled for too long. The energy transition is put in question. Austerity destroys the welfare states, especially in southern Europe. The word “growth” mesmerises both its opponents and its supporters. The agony of fossil neo-liberalism seems endless.

To overcome the continuing inability of Europe to let the “new” emerge, we need to pick up the story of the green transformation and in this prospect we need to deepen some of its concepts.

## A GREEN EUROPEAN WELFARE

Our first work area is the societal dimension of the green transformation. The passage to a low carbon economy is both a technological and social challenge. The transition towards a green economy must start from the desires of the Europeans. They want to have the right to choose their life, to find a rewarding and interesting job and to safeguard a certain level of consumption. And for those who can enjoy the energy transition, it can even increase their possibilities of choice, with potentially counterproductive rebound effects. On the other hand, there are more and more Europeans trying to develop alternative ways of life, reducing their working time and trying to increase their commitment in community projects.

Some Europeans waver between a green consumerism and the quest of a different life, less centred on consumption and more dedicated to social participation. It is counterproductive to oppose these two attitudes. The greens can find the materials for the construction of a new European way of life which will be the cultural driver of the green transformation that in the short term has the potential to help us to step back from crisis and to restore European leadership in climate negotiations.

## REALPOLITIK IS THE WORST SOLUTION

But Europe will not take up its ecologic and economic challenges with less solidarity. Of course, this is a truism. But the conditions imposed by the troika on southern Europe have had such devastating consequences not only on growth but more severely on the self-representation of the people of these countries, that the concept of solidarity has lost a good deal of its legitimacy. We therefore need to redefine it as “a political act” that possibly reaches far beyond the promotion of long term self-interest and that might even be unconditional between Europeans.

The debates on integration and on federalism show the size of the challenge. We strongly believe that realpolitik is not a solution and that a re-nationalisation of the European dream is the worst case scenario. History recalls this too much.

## EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE GREEN EUROPEAN JOURNAL



## ABOUT THE GREEN EUROPEAN JOURNAL

[www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu](http://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu)

The Green European Journal gives a concrete answer to a common European challenge: how to make debates and ideas travel across Europe's cultural and political borders?

As an online platform for outstanding articles of interest to the Green movement and beyond, it aims at contributing to the construction of a European public space that it is most urgently needed for strengthening the European democracy.


The Green European Journal is published by the Green European Foundation (GEF), as part of GEF's remit to bring the EU closer to its citizens and encourage debate about the future shape and direction of Europe.

## EDITIONS

The Green European Journal has published five quarterly editions since its launch in February 2012 on the topics of the Future of Europe, austerity, growth/degrowth, equality and food. As well as publishing these quarterly editions, the Green European Journal publishes articles on a more regular basis on an even wider range of topics.

## NETWORK

As a contribution to the European public space, the Journal builds up a European network of authors and journals committed to sustainability and political ecology. This network includes an editor and an editorial board, a network of correspondents and a wide number of partner publications that we cooperate with. Details of this network are available on [www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu](http://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu)



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