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This fifteenth edition of the Green European Journal goes to press just a few days before the elections in the Netherlands, the first of a series in Europe in 2017, set to be a year ridden with dangers. Throughout the European Union, anger and fear can be felt, and swell the ranks of the extremists and the national populists who feed off them, and are fed by them. Despite unprecedented levels of social welfare and material wealth, in all its forms, security – or rather insecurity – imposes itself onto the political agenda: the physical insecurity of societies afflicted both in spirit and in the flesh by terrorist threat and attacks; cultural insecurity provoked by the crisis of the nation state and the increasing flows of migrants through a continent beset by an existential malaise; the material and economic insecurity experienced by the many workers hard hit by the consequences of global neoliberalism.

As heralds of forward thinking and the precautionary principle, Greens have always battled military, environmental, health, nuclear, and industrial risks – on behalf of citizens, and against states with few scruples on these matters. But, paradoxically, even if they were born of the dialectic between security and change, Greens are ill at ease with today’s demands for security. They claim, and always have, that neither the militarisation of prevention and repression, nor the restriction of freedoms in the name of security, are the answer to today’s challenges. On the question of external security, for
example, they stress that spending more to meet NATO criteria, while the 28 Member States together already spend four times more than Russia on defence, doesn’t really guarantee Europe’s security.

But the emotive power underlying the prevailing discourse, the fear and feelings of insecurity, make for a complex political challenge for Greens. The security debate certainly forces them to grapple with difficult, nay existential, questions. But it is not about ‘greening’ defence and policing, or accepting ‘discipline and punishment’ in exchange for ever more fragile guarantees of individual liberties. Today, it is about being a force for change, playing a role in reassuring and helping us break free from an obsession with the ‘risk society’ and the permanent anxiety over how we ‘manage’ a multitude of threats and uncertainties. It’s about setting out a broad, positive vision of security: not naïve but honest. A resolutely concrete vision to respond to the legitimate anger and fear that permeate our societies.

For Greens in Europe, the challenge is to change the terms of the debate, to untether security and protection from its association with inward-looking nationalism and the dangers of a ‘surveillance society’. For security is more than just another ‘political issue’. It cannot be restricted to matters of policing or immigration, nor reduced to the irrational emotions that justify states of emergency, walls, and barbed wire, and general control. This debate, monopolised by the politics of fear and its talented orators, rallies around a retrograde project of shaping internal identities and national states of mind; the promise of a future, but a future devoid of prospects. The stakes are high and what we stand to gain is vital: a vision for society with security at its heart, a collective vision that citizens would fight for.

The cross-cutting approach of this edition, while not claiming exhaustive coverage of all topics, underlines the ubiquity of security issues in the Greens’ current and yet-to-come political programmes. From the EU’s place in the world to the risks faced in the Baltic Sea region, from terrorism to the affirmation of progressive values against national populism, from technology, food, climate, and energy security to home affairs and
prevention, from identity politics to the economics of fear and surveillance, from welfare systems to social instability, from the banality of widespread domestic violence to the brutal injustice faced by minorities, the cracks in European societies are laid bare through all the articles in this edition. Greens and progressives have a duty to respond to these waves of fear and anger with a discourse of hope, and policies that can integrate security and protection profoundly and positively.

In a Europe with a changing political landscape, the future of the Union – and incidentally that of the Greens in 2019 – will be largely played out over the question of security. Security and protection are at the heart of the democratic pact between the values of liberty and solidarity. Greens must grasp this subject, for all its emotional charge and communication challenges, with both hands, and proclaim, loud and clear, their progressive pro-European message. A politics of hope to trump the politics of fear.
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The election of Donald Trump as U.S. president is an event with deep implications for European security, the transatlantic relationship, and the global balance of power. An international system largely based on U.S. security commitments and expanding global trade is suddenly confronted with a fundamental challenge from the very nation that acted as its main guarantor since 1945. Europe must urgently face up to this new reality and build up its military capacity to defend itself.

**THOMAS KLAU:** How do you see the implications of the election of U.S. president Trump for European security?

**JOSCHKA FISCHER:** One key consequence for us Europeans is that we will have to pay far more attention and invest much more in our own security, both its external and internal dimensions. Trump’s electoral victory means that Europe must try much harder to reach common positions and must build up the ability to defend itself in military terms – even if the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) will remain irreplaceable for as long as it exists, and even if we will continue to need the American nuclear guarantee should NATO come to an end. Boosting Europe’s autonomous capacities is not just a question of spending more money. A lot can be achieved by pooling resources, by enabling the European Defence Agency to do its job so as to end wasteful spending duplications, and by working to narrow the deep-seated cultural and political differences between some EU Member States regarding defence policy, including highly sensitive topics such as arms exports. Take France and Germany, for instance: the degree of personal involvement of French presidents in the sale of French weapons systems abroad is something without real
equivalent in Germany. The underlying cause: Germany’s economy is far less dependent on arms exports than France’s.

Developing common practices and approaches will be anything but easy. But we must do it because there is simply no viable alternative. It is no good burying our heads in the sand. The plain fact is that wherever you look, Europe is faced with a very difficult neighbourhood where threats can suddenly materialise, as Ukraine has shown. It is essential for the safety of our citizens to prepare for a European future where we do not have to rely on U.S. defence guarantees and U.S. military spending in the way we have done until now. And that means having hard power, building up European air transport capacities, a European air defence system, European commando forces, cyber space capacities – the list goes on. Without enough hard power, you simply lack the material basis to discuss effective common policies in any meaningful way. If you don’t have the capacity to act, why discuss whether taking action makes sense, meets a need, is the better option? It would just be a waste of time. It is a mistake to think – like many Germans do – that foreign policy can be effective without having hard power capacity somewhere in the mix.

A case in point is Eastern Europe. Putin has made it crystal clear that Russia aims for renewed dominance in the region. The challenge there for us is to be true to our treaty obligations and resist Russian ambitions to establish control – while never forgetting that Russia is our neighbour as well and must be treated accordingly. In all of this, we must be realistic and accept that dealing with Russia’s ambitions in Europe is not something we can continue to delegate forever to the US.

It is not generally understood that for Moscow, it is the European Union that has now become the main threat, far more than NATO actually. To grasp what the Russian government is doing, you must understand that its most deep-seated and unspoken fear is to be faced with a Kiev Maidan-like situation on the Red Square. That is the reason why Moscow is offering finance to the political forces and parties that aim to destroy Europe’s political integration and with it everything that has been achieved here since 1945. Of course, Moscow money for political movements that seek to undermine Western unity is nothing new. Think of the massive covert Soviet and East German financing and influencing of the German peace movement, the full extent of which became apparent only after the end of the Cold War.

Then there is what is happening on our southern borders. Here too we are faced with a dual obligation. We must win back control over our external sea and land boundaries. In a Europe of open internal borders, we owe it to our citizens to provide them with effective external
tation. Building up an adequate navy capacity and a European Coast Guard, especially for the Mediterranean, must be part of that. If we fail, dangerous nationalism will continue to grow throughout Europe. The second obligation is to save the people who are trying to come to Europe from drowning on the way. And to be clear, this cannot just mean shipping all of them straight back to Africa as long as the situation there is what it is. We need a common European migration refugee policy that is more than a sham and that respects European values. The Dublin system no longer has any basis in the reality on the ground and everyone knows it.

As for Turkey, it is a country of absolutely essential importance to European security and too many people currently tend to forget it. However much we may disagree with what Erdogan is doing (and there is plenty to criticise), we must keep a cool head and think carefully about how we respond to it. It would be utter folly for us Europeans to push Turkey into Putin’s arms. Of course it is a delicate balancing act – and one where we must succeed. We cannot afford the price of failure.

After his election, Trump and other senior U.S. administration members repeatedly stressed NATO’s importance. American calls for more European military spending are nothing new. Is Trump’s election really a turning point?

JOSCHKA FISCHER: What we are witnessing right now is the suicide of the Atlantic West, comparable with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989. Europe will have to find out what it means to be transatlantic on its own, meaning without the US. What is happening is an act of self-destruction that is not rooted in any rational thinking – Gorbachov at least was aiming to reform the Soviet Union even if it did not work out in the end. And he had good, powerful reasons on his side.

Brexit in the north, Trump in the west, Putin in the east: wherever you look, a deranged new kind of nationalism is gaining political traction.
In Germany, words like ‘völkisch’ have reappeared in the political discourse. As for France: if Marine Le Pen wins the forthcoming presidential elections, it would mean the end of both the European Union and the euro. We must all hope that we will be spared this worst-case scenario.

One factor behind what is happening is the de-legitimation of traditional Western elites as a result of two major failures: the big financial crisis, the consequences of which are still unresolved, and the launch of unwinnable wars such as that in Iraq which has destabilised a whole region and destroyed or upended the lives of millions. Add to that an Anglo-American social model shaped by a winner-takes-all approach that leaves the majority of the population on the losing side, rapid societal change like the emancipation of women and sexual minorities, and contemporary liberal economic policies that created a world where many people no longer feel a sense of belonging. Then there is the rise of China and India – both still in their early stages, the related perception that the West is in decline, and the end of the Soviet threat that had helped to build a sense of common Western identity.

Take all of this together and you still do not have a good enough explanation for the collapse of the West. Maybe it is just that more than 70 years after the end of World War II, our societies are beginning to forget what nationalism really means.

You have mentioned the disaster that has hit the Middle East as a result of a catastrophic U.S.-led military intervention. What should Europe do to help stabilise the region?

**JOSCHKA FISCHER:** At this stage, I don’t believe any external intervention, whether European, American, or Russian, can solve the problems of the region. If the Russians think they can succeed where the Americans have failed, they are badly mistaken. The problems in the Middle East surfaced with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire a century ago. Since then, they have been suppressed by a succession of external hegemons: first the European Christian powers after World War I, then after World War II the United States, which took over the role seamlessly. What the US has done with its disastrous intervention in Iraq is to destabilise the regional framework that had resulted from the Franco-British Sykes-Picot agreement a century ago. Since then, they have been suppressed by a succession of external hegemons: first the European Christian powers after World War I, then after World War II the United States, which took over the role seamlessly. What the US has done with its disastrous intervention in Iraq is to destabilise the regional framework that had resulted from the Franco-British Sykes-Picot agreement a century ago. It was a war that was clearly unwinnable before it was even started – and George W. Bush launched it nevertheless.

One could add that serious Western policy mistakes have been made in the region since then. One of them was Libya: “intervene and forget!” isn’t working. Another was careless American talk of red lines that must not be crossed, relating to the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons. That Russia did what it did in Ukraine was partly a consequence of the fact that in Syria, an American president’s
The humanitarian consequences of all these failures are appalling and the security implications deeply worrisome, including for us in Europe. In the Middle East, we are now faced with a situation where none of the main regional powers is strong enough to impose a new order as a triumphant new hegemon. The Iranians represent a minority religious sect in Islam – Schi’ism - and they are not part of the Arab world. For different reasons, Saudi Arabia is also too weak to emerge as a victor. It is a vicious conflict in which religion is largely used as a cover-up for other interests – in that sense, there is a parallel with Europe’s own Thirty Years’ War which ended in 1648 only after all the main powers involved were too exhausted to continue the fight.

What we are facing in the coming decades in the Middle East is an extremely dangerous situation with a serious risk that conventional military confrontation could escalate into a nuclear dimension. Another risk, the export of terror, has already materialised, as the the last decade’s string of attacks in Europe and the US has shown. Protecting European citizens from terrorism is another reason why European governments must act together at home as well as abroad. If they are seen to fail in their duty to protect their citizens, they will lose public support and nationalist and xenophobic forces in Europe will grow even stronger. Of course they must do so while respecting the European values’ framework and the rule of law.

Incidentally, this is an area where, even after Brexit, working together with the UK will be essential and in everyone’s interest. All the talk of not rewarding the British for leaving the EU, or refraining from punishing them, creates the wrong alternatives: there will be a life after divorce. This is about mutual interests, not about punishment or reward. For the EU, it will be about determining what is in the best collective advantage of all European citizens once the UK is no longer a EU Member State. Close cooperation in security matters will definitely be part of this relationship.

To fight terror, effective policing is important but far from sufficient. It is for instance a really bad idea to let hundreds of thousands of people lose hope in refugee camps, creating perfect
breeding grounds for the radicalisation of the young. We did not focus on this particular prospect when we took the decision to intervene in Kosovo in 1998, and it is not why we intervened – but just imagine what might have happened if tens of thousands of young Albanians had been forced out of Kosovo into refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania as a result of a Serbian invasion.

The West has a long tradition of pursuing its interests and seeking better security by exporting its value system – first Christianity, later enlightenment values like human rights and democracy. Given our failures in the Middle East and the current rise of non-Western great powers, would it be safer to abandon the push for common global values?

**Joschka Fischer:** Look at the global fundamentals: intolerable global disparities between rich and poor, the beginning of climate change, a huge population explosion. We have gone from two billion humans a century ago to seven billion today, and we will pass the nine billion mark in my grandchildren’s lifetime. If we fail to achieve a shared understanding about how to deal with this challenge, the living conditions of humanity as a whole will suffer a dramatic decline in the foreseeable future. How will it be possible for people to agree on how to tackle such a fundamental challenge if they do not coalesce around some shared global values? I cannot imagine how that could work. I have said in the past that there is no such thing as a specific Green foreign policy. What there is, and what must be developed further, is the ecological dimension of international policy. That is a task for the Greens as a political force: helping to put and keep the ecological imperative at the core of the global agenda. The Paris climate change agreement was a step in the right direction – a small one. More steps and bigger ones must follow.
You have mentioned the risk of nuclear conflict. Has Trump’s election given new urgency to nuclear disarmament?

**JOSCHKA FISCHER:** I am for a world without nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons pose a constant threat. We have been extremely lucky so far: as recently opened state archives have revealed to us, there have been several occasions where nuclear confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War decades was avoided – but only just. But we have got to be realistic about getting there any time soon, given the political forces at play in the world. In practical political terms, I think the prospects are hopeless for now. Whether the Trump presidency means a generally increased risk of war is another matter. Let us remember that a significant percentage of the U.S. population has grown seriously tired of military intervention, which have come in recent decades at a huge cost to the US. The new president might well choose to take that into account.

**JOSCHKA FISCHER** was German Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor from 1998-2005. He entered electoral politics after participating in the anti-establishment protests of the 1960s and 1970s, and played a key role in founding the German Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), which he led for almost two decades. He is the author of the book *Is Europe Failing?* (2014).

**THOMAS KLAU** is a political analyst, writer and consultant. He has previously worked as bureau chief and policy fellow for the European Council on Foreign Relations in Paris, and as columnist and correspondent for the *Financial Times Deutschland* in Brussels and later Washington. He is a co-founder and trustee of Asylos, a charity engaging in research for refugees and asylum seekers.
The rise of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria – and subsequent IS-inspired attacks in Europe – has led to expanding counter-terror legislation which sacrifices the personal freedoms of citizens to safeguard national security. This approach has created a set of conditions which not only jeopardises the rights of citizens, but is both counter-productive and dangerous, supporting the stated objectives of Islamic State. A new course urgently needs to be charted.

With heightened concern over Islamic State attacks in Europe and the potential return of foreign fighters, counter-terrorism has expanded exponentially. It operates within a geopolitical context beset with fear and fast veering rightwards – with migrants, minorities, and disadvantaged groups regularly scapegoated by powerful media and an emboldened Far Right. This is most notably visible, amongst other examples, in Brexit’s anti-immigration clarion call, and Donald Trump’s recent ‘Muslim’ immigration ban, both justified by national security concerns. Progressive parties face a difficult and complex task when responding to Islamic State: they need to ensure an erudite response to the threat of ‘terrorism’ whilst understanding the repercussions that such responses may have on the lives of citizens.

In forming a response, it is important to explore the aims of Islamic State towards Europe and the credibility of the threat. But providing a detailed analysis of Islamic State is only half the process – we must also be brave enough to criticise counter-terrorism and be realistic in what should be achieved. In creating a more effective response, we must radically rethink the relationship between the twin concepts of security and civil liberties.
redefining the relationship between them not as antagonistic but, inversely, as interdependent.

**ISLAMIC STATE’S STRATEGY IN EUROPE – WHAT DOES IT WANT?**

It is easy to dismiss the actions of Islamic State as irrational, the brutality of indiscriminate attacks too dangerous or zealous to be understood. However, important findings can be made by treating jihadi groups as strategic actors and we should look to understand Islamic State’s strategy, exploring both their discourse and their organisation.

In examining their discourse, we turn to what is arguably the most prominent text in Islamic State doctrine, a publication widely circulated amongst members and credited with greatly influencing tactics: *The Management of Savagery* (‘Idarat al-Tawahush’). Written by Abu Bakr Naji in 2004, it offers indications as to Islamic State’s general approach to Europe, proffering three conditions for a sustainable Islamic state, or caliphate (١٠٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠،٠，), within the current political world: first, the West must attack the Middle East directly; second, an Islamic state must engage in tactical terror attacks; and third, Western failure to prevent these must be exploited. These three goals – distilled into a process of **escalation**, **insecurity**, and **exploitation** – can roughly be understood as the basis of Islamic State’s strategy in Europe.

**I. ESCALATION**

The first key aim of Islamic State in Europe is to encourage the escalation of direct military intervention, provoking the West into a military response through the carrying out of ‘terrorist’ actions in Europe. Escalation may seem counter-intuitive, especially as Islamic State is losing strategic power in the Middle East. Strategically, however, ‘terrorist’-style tactics have often been used by groups facing diminishing opportunities: when insurgent organisations lose territory, terrorism becomes a way of regaining momentum, with attacks on civilians cheaper, easier and just as politically effective. Constant insecurity in Europe, it is hoped, increases calls for military intervention.

This manipulation of the West into an intensified air war or ground invasion against Islamic State would be costly, unpopular, and yield counterproductive blowback and instability. This is shown in previous interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya – and jihadi organisations are aware that the presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil enabled the creation of al-Qaeda. Furthermore, the escalation of military intervention supports Islamic State’s narrative that the West is engaged in aggressive and expansionist acts against the Islamic World, and allows European states to be portrayed as ‘Judeo-Christian Crusaders’, whilst Islamic State become both the heir, and answer, to historical grievances of Muslim communities.
II. INSECURITY

In order to ensure such a military escalation, *The Management of Savagery* encourages the creation of insecurity in the West through the following two actions: first, ‘qualitative, medium operations’ – by which it specifically references the attacks in Bali and Djerba, and by which we could also understand the *Charlie Hebdo* and Bataclan attacks; and second, operations ‘small in size or effect’ – often referred to in the media as ‘Islamic State-inspired’ or ‘lone-wolf’ attacks, whereby individuals declare allegiance before committing seemingly random attacks. In marked contrast to other jihadist groups, Islamic State takes a decidedly ‘hands-off’ approach, encouraging decentralised, disparate groups to take action with little or no guidance.

Such attacks are difficult to legislate against and impossible to predict, designed to place the West “in a constant state of apprehension”. This approach shows a complex understanding of how to ‘game’ Western media, politicians, and public opinion into adopting an increasingly militarised position: the publication states that, “although the blow of the rod may strike a (single) Crusader head, its spread and escalation will have an effect for a long period of time”. Singular attacks have the purpose of demonstrating the far-reaching strength of Islamic State and – they hope – will encourage “crowds drawn from the masses to fly to the regions which we manage” joining the caliphate. This represents an extensive propaganda effort – evidenced by hours of slick propaganda – focused on “particularly the youth” in order to create a sustainable state-building project.

III. EXPLOITATION

Islamic State’s final aim is an exploitation of the previous goals of military escalation and European insecurity to highlight the weakness and moral bankruptcy of the West. It aims to exploit this by taking aim at what has been termed as the ‘grey zone’ in European society, heightening divisions within and against multicultural states so as to realise a ‘clash of civilisations’ condition – a binary struggle between (those Islamic State considers) Muslims and the rest. By encouraging terrorist attacks, Islamic State hopes to stoke anti-Muslim sentiment and trigger violence against minorities, thus creating an escalating spiral of mutual alienation, distrust, hatred, and collective revenge.
Following acts of terrorism, there is clear evidence of upswings in Islamophobic attacks, with large spikes in anti-Muslim activity documented following the murder of Lee Rigby and the 2015 Paris attacks. This helps to normalise anti-Muslim sentiment within society, weaving Islamophobia into the everyday spaces that European Muslims navigate. An increasing prevalence of anti-Muslim and anti-cosmopolitan rhetoric is developing in concurrence with this, with rising far-right groups including the Dutch Partij Voor de Vrijheid, Denmark’s Dansk Folkeparti, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland, France’s Front National, and the United Kingdom Independence Party – all of which propound an alarmist discourse framing Muslims as the vanguard of a hostile ‘other’. Such language is increasingly thrust into the political mainstream, leading to the securitisation of minority communities, proposals to deport Muslims, and the problematisation of ‘Islamic’ identity markers.

By encouraging Western aggression, the securitisation of Muslims, and the stoking of anti-Muslim animus, Islamic State aims to recruit supporters and intimidate, disrupt, and demoralise European societies. This approach is effective, with Islamic State media delighting in provoking European states into “a wave of panic and intensified security measures” in order “to turn the world into a series of wildernesses in which only those under our rule enjoy security”.

**BUILDING A RESPONSE**

When examining Islamic State’s aims and the orthodox security response, it becomes clear that current responses are failing to effectively challenge the narrative set by Islamic State. In response, progressive parties should look to develop an approach built on the following three foundational statements: first, Islamic State look scarier than they actually are, and we should treat them as less powerful and less coherent than we do now; second, counter-terrorism is, on the other hand, scarier than we think it is, and it’s time we took the threat from counter-terrorism more seriously to understand how to make it work; and third, security against Islamic State does not, and should not, involve the erosion of the civil and political rights of the citizen; rather, a more efficient response – and one that takes account of the society within which we wish to live – is to be found through the explicit bolstering of these rights, particularly towards minority communities.

I. ISLAMIC STATE: MORE BARK THAN BITE

It is easy to be worried about Islamic State, especially when only examining their rhetoric, as many commentators tend to. However, a closer look at the organisational dynamics of Islamic State reveals limitations. For instance, their structure reveals different objectives at different levels of hierarchy. Whilst the majority
of media and policy focuses on jihadi foreign fighters, much of the organisational spine and leadership of Islamic State is comprised of Saddam-era, ex-Ba’ath Party officers. These have benefitted Islamic State, endowing them with effective military tactics, battlefield discipline, and links to local tribal leaders. However, these members are largely ‘pragmatic’ actors, involved in Islamic State due to local power struggles and anti-Iraqi Government grievances. Their alignment and their tactics have little to do with any desire for a global jihad, in which they have neither an interest nor a stake. Thus, viewing Islamic State through their propaganda – which portrays them as unified in a jihadist-eschatological cause – is misleading, as Islamic State’s interest in Europe is more cursory and fragmented than is projected.

Furthermore, Islamic State’s involvement in terrorist attacks in Europe is questionable. In ‘outsourcing’ violence, the organisation’s participation and influence becomes limited: of those involved in European attacks, only a minority travelled to Syria as foreign fighters, whilst the majority were drawn to act through petty crime networks, individual grievances, or mental health issues. In fact, the danger of returning foreign fighters has been critiqued as overstated, and research suggests returnees are more likely to return disillusioned or battle fatigued than interested in conducting attacks. Those that are drawn into terrorism do so because Islamic State are seen within mainstream discourse as the embodiment of anti-Western action. By turning Islamic State into a ‘bogeyman’ of the West, we give vast amounts of undeserved credence to the notion that it can strike at will, has a coherent strategy, and credit them more prestige than they deserve.

II. COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE REAL THREAT?
Secondly, the continual expansion of counter-terrorism is a problematic response to Islamic State as it is ineffective and erodes individual liberties – in fact, it is ineffective because of its negation of rights. Simply in terms of resources, counter-terror programmes have seen vast amounts of resources poured into prevention – yet, the threat remains ‘severe’, as it has since 2014.

Alongside a high financial cost, civil freedoms have been dealt a significant blow, with fear of terrorism exploited by politicians as a way of “ensuring re-election, silencing their critics, controlling dissent, creating a more docile public, distracting the public from more
entrenched and difficult social problems”, as well as ensuring the creation of a number of other projects unrelated to terrorism, “such as the introduction of identity cards, restrictions on immigration, increasing financial regulation, and limiting civil liberties”¹. Such governmental legislative changes are generally framed as temporary means of tackling immediate threats, yet security laws are rarely, if ever, revoked – as seen in Northern Ireland, Germany, and in France’s indefinite state of emergency.

Critics state that terrorism does not pose a threat sufficient to justify the kinds of legislation currently being enacted. What is more, current counter-terrorism practices often pose more of a threat to the individual physical security and well-being of citizens than terrorism, limiting and securitising forms of political engagement, dissent, and activism. As such, “we should fear counter-terrorism more than we should fear terrorism”².

III. CHAMPIONING – NOT ERODING – CIVIL RIGHTS

We can respond best by re-orientating our response: security against Islamic State should not mean the dilution of civil rights and the militarisation of society. Rather, in championing rights, we make counter-terror responses more effective by limiting Islamic State’s ability to incite governments and political forces to scapegoat Muslims and minorities. The best answer to Islamic State is to demonstrate that Europe can credibly be a common home, by drawing upon concepts of what sort of community we want. This is not utopian thinking but a necessary strategic response. Take, for instance, the large numbers fleeing persecution for Europe within the ‘refugee crisis’. This migration undermines Islamic State’s state-building credibility as well as their narrative of the Western oppressor – so they have responded by shifting the narrative to security.

By treating refugees as potential enemies rather than common allies, we become complicit in Islamic State’s narrative, recasting the ‘crisis’ not as a clear demonstration of the caliphate’s intrinsic dysfunction, but as an unsubstantiated extension of its threat.

We must respond by rejecting the simplistic narrative of a ‘clash of civilisations’, holding to account policy-makers that eliminate the ‘grey zone’, and pushing back against rhetoric that securitises Muslim communities. For instance, whilst Matteo Salvini of Italy’s far-right party Lega Nord cited the 2015 Cologne assaults as proof that Islam is incompatible with European values, German Green politician Simone Peter took the lead in challenging racial profiling, questioning the proportionately and legality of such actions within a highly racialised context. In rejecting the securitisation of Muslim communities, we reject the problematic racialisation of ‘terrorism’. We must also challenge media and politicians who reflexively ascribe all attacks to Islamic State, often without evidence of involvement. Such attribution makes Islamic State look more threatening and coordinated, and gives the organisation airtime, something which, in the immediacy, provokes anti-Islamic sentiment and, longer-term, advances Islamophobic responses. In protecting minority rights, however, we assuage grievances and delegitimise Islamic State support, more so than current approaches are managing.

Progressive politicians and parties must shift the narrative away from an all-encompassing security. Security and freedom are not mutually exclusive concepts, and treating them as such creates easy propaganda wins for Islamic State, alienating minorities and militarising society. Conventional security wisdom, as such, is counter-productive and acts to enhance the threat. Responding to terrorism from an inverse viewpoint, in which we champion hard-fought rights and support those most vulnerable within European society, offers us a far more efficient and sustainable approach to the threat posed by Islamic State.

**RICHARD MCNEIL-WILLSON**

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AN INSIDE JOB
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES NEED TO LOOK WITHIN TO ACHIEVE REAL SECURITY

Anyone in power – or aspiring to be – today cannot afford to ignore a pervasive sense of insecurity that seems to be increasingly taking hold among the citizens of Europe. Greens are no exception and therefore must also provide convincing policies and messages that respond to people’s fears and anxieties. We brought together Green leaders from around Europe to discuss how to reclaim this debate from the populist forces who exploit insecurity for their own gains, and how Greens can contribute to bringing about a more informed and positive discussion around security.

GREEN EUROPEAN JOURNAL: What do we refer to when we talk about security today in terms of public opinion? Does this perception correspond to the real sources of insecurity today, in your view?

MEYREM ALMACI: We live in turbulent times. The two major issues of our time are globalisation and immigration. If that is combined with random acts of violence and terror in your neighbourhood or country, then your sense of security gets shaken up and it turns into real fear. Insecurity because of terrorist attacks is something real, so you cannot dismiss it by saying that being killed by a car is much more likely – this is not an answer. You need to acknowledge the real fear of people towards this violence and at the same time respond to it with real answers. We are trying to provide real answers. You have to name those who are terrorists, but not equate them to the whole population or to everyone who is a member of the Islamic community.
But we see that this fear is not being met by real answers which respond to the root causes of this unrest, but rather is being aggravated and stoked by right-wing populistic forces. The only recipe they have, in the end, is to go back to a past that never existed – a Europe with new borders and everyone leaving after a Brexit, Frexit, and a Nexit. There is a different answer possible, and it is to acknowledge that every single one of us, Muslim or not, is equally threatened by these attacks. These attackers and terrorists do not discriminate in age or religion – they just randomly attack. So we should stick together and enhance our interconnectedness to be able to face these threats strongly and fiercely. And that includes also some repression and prevention, because that’s the only way to tackle this problem.

What we need is a well-balanced policy in terms of security and social cohesion. In our parliament, we proposed an integrated plan for security and solidarity. Providing security means a strong intelligence service and well-organised police services. The second pillar – social cohesion – means connecting our citizens. Preventing people, young people mostly, from becoming isolated. Our goal should be to involve everyone in our country, our community of civilians. From that perspective, we need a stronger commitment from our governments.

**Franziska Brantner:** I agree, security threats are real also in Germany. In Germany, we have to improve the communication and coordination between intelligence, police, and security institutions of all the different federal states (Länder) and federal authorities. We know this is objectively necessary because we Greens are part of the government in 11 of the 16 federal states and not because we are giving in to ever increasing populist pressure. We need more manpower in the police as well as to improve and expand our prevention programmes. We know that young Germans are joining the war in Syria and Iraq. We need to figure out how they have been so radicalised that they are ready to fight and die, and how to prevent this radicalisation. There is a real security threat here but we must fight the stigmatisation of one religion or one group of people. Terrorists do use refugee routes in order to perpetrate their killings, but that does not mean refugees are terrorists. We need better European cooperation, better exchange of information, and better coordination for the necessary security operations, without ever losing sight that this also requires improved European coordination and cooperation on protecting human rights. We have to internalise and practice J.P. Curran’s idea that “The price of freedom is eternal vigilance”.

**Amelia Womack:** How do you replace that culture of fear with one that respects engagement, vigilance, and solidarity? When it comes to security, there are no easy answers. Although we must make security our first priority, using military action to achieve that security must
be a last resort. We have been spending billions, here in the UK, on our trident missile system with the idea of having an independent nuclear deterrent. Those billions would be better invested into addressing rising inequality and ensuring that people have true engagement in our communities, especially because cuts from our government, who are implementing an austerity agenda, are tearing our communities apart.

In the sense that people feel it in everyday life, for example through unemployment, poverty, precarity, and threats to welfare. In some cases, we can see very clearly how violence and economic and social consequences of the system go hand in hand. For example, in Spain when an eviction takes place, this often entails violent action on behalf of the authorities. So there needs to be a balance in society; if not then xenophobia and a sense that insecurity is due to migration and refugees can flare up.

But I want to point out that there is a kind of violence which is increasing in Spain and that is violence against women, sexual attacks and gender-based violence. I have the impression that women today feel more insecure than ten years ago. As Greens, we should also make the point that in Europe, the insecurity of women is still an issue and one that no one is talking about.

A woman is far more likely to be murdered, attacked, abused, or raped than to be killed in a jihadist attack. And focusing on this aspect could help us as Greens to dismantle this populist vision of security linked to foreigners, and to broaden it to all types of violence and insecurity. Because this is a clear form of violence and insecurity – but as it’s not coming from outside, we don’t think about it in the same way.

At the moment in the UK there is a policy called ‘Prevent’ strategy, which sounds very progressive in terms of looking at the root causes of radicalisation. But, actually, it’s turning our schools, our NHS, and our landlords into border controllers by making landlords, for example, check people’s passports and records. This idea of prevention and anti-extremism being injected into parts of our society, although it sounds like it’s trying to reduce the root causes, is simply driving a wedge between different groups – particularly Muslim groups – and the rest of society.

ROSAMARTÍNEZ RODRÍGUEZ: I don’t think insecurity is at the core of the public debate in Spain today, but of course, if there is an attack and people see it on the news, their concern increases. The concept of insecurity is widening,
MEYREM ALMACI: People like Trump, Le Pen, and Wilders are false prophets. The way to tackle these populists is to try to create a new cohesion at the European level. We have to be clear on who can be our allies in the future to face our threats. We know that Salafism and radicalism is on the rise here in Belgium, yet the country’s foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia, who sponsors these groups, ignores this. It’s good that we are investing in security systems, but if we are looking at prevention, there is a lot of talk but never any walking the walk – there’s no budget there. We need to protect war victims from becoming victims of new security legislation. In Belgium, just as in many other European countries, the authorities knew who the needles in the haystack – the terrorists – were. They had them on their radar, but did nothing with that information. The answer is not to make the haystack bigger, but rather to take the needles out of it.

In addition, we do need an emotional answer to fear. For that we have to make sure that we all work together. We know that information about potential attackers is often reported by members of the same community. If we can somehow connect with people who are pro-democracy, regardless of religion or...

FRANZISKA BRANTNER: This is a big issue in Germany, which is very much linked to the refugee crisis. It is challenging for us Greens to acknowledge that the new arrivals very often do not share our 40 years of feminist debates and the transformation this has brought about in society. Thus it is a challenge to find good answers whilst not trivialising the endemic violence against women still existing in Germany. The German electorate demands from us policies and measures to effectively protect women, and at the same time they expect us to defend refugees, immigrants, and minorities. We have to give plausible and understandable answers to people’s fears and expectations. If we fail to do this, we give the populists a free ride.

MEYREM ALMACI: I think we, as Greens, already have the answer to that. The emancipation of women and that of minorities are not mutually exclusive. By being very firm in saying that violence or restricting the freedom of women is never acceptable, you open the possibility to discuss how women can achieve their freedom, and there are different paths to achieving it. What we have to do is make sure there is more diversity in the women’s rights movement. But, if you don’t name the problem, someone else will name it and generalise it. By naming it, you can bring in the nuances to the debate. If you don’t start by very clearly saying that this is not acceptable, no one will feel secure and no one will listen to the next level of your message.

How do we respond to the violent rhetoric and the securitisation discourse that we see unleashed and legitimised by national populist forces today?
background, this could be a very strong emotional basis on which to build community in a positive way in a response to the negative discourses of populists.

**ROSA MARTÍNEZ RODRÍGUEZ:** I agree that we need to connect with people. As Greens, we are often not very good at dealing with people’s emotions, fears, and expectations. We see politics as a rational space but we need to acknowledge that political decisions are made on a basis that is not always rational. In recent years, Green parties have tried to sound more connected to people. In terms of insecurity, we need to acknowledge and recognise people’s concerns. I think that Greens are good at conveying the whole picture on many issues. Our proposals are usually comprehensive, cover all aspects and dimensions, and are aimed at eradicating the problem, not alleviating it. If that’s the case, Greens should approach the root of terrorism, not only in Europe, but across the world. It’s not just a question of police or security measures, but also a general strategy, focusing on poverty, education, foreign policy, not only in Europe but in other countries, too.

**AMELIA WOMACK:** In the UK, we’ve seen the rise of the populist Right and even the rise of the far-right movement, the British National Party, who have been getting seats in local councils, despite the lack of evidence underpinning their ideas. They claim to have silver bullets to absolutely every problem that people face, whereas our approach is more analytical. We have to be very clear that people are facing issues around housing, wages, poverty, access to healthcare – we have to acknowledge that first and foremost. We need to be very clear that we will not allow the failure of our government policies to be blamed on migration or on these groups who are least to blame for our problems. That’s always a hard message to get across.
When it comes to defence, we have a European approach. We are developing European defence concepts, looking to create synergies to optimise our defence spending. That is our Green distinctiveness. If I were defence minister I would look and work for shared European answers.

In terms of home affairs, we have a very good track record here in Germany, at the state level. Whenever we have been part of the government, on justice and home affairs, we have put our focus on inclusion, on upholding human rights, we have increased manpower where and where it was needed. We increased the number of police officers, we invested in local police forces, and we improved safety measures and prevention policies locally. We generally need better implementation of the law rather than new security packages every other week. For that to work you need people. Maybe it is easier in Germany due to our financial situation; we don’t have to choose between education and police, we can afford both.

On the prevention front, we are providing inclusive education systems and opportunities for people with different backgrounds. That’s part of the answer, not the full picture. In Germany, experience teaches us that if people don’t trust their institutions, they don’t come and report things, so it’s essential to have faith in the institutions. That prevents terror attacks and that saves lives.
ROSA MARTÍNEZ RODRÍGUEZ: I’m not sure which Green would accept such an office! Jokes aside, I think there’s a real debate about whether we as Greens should enter into areas where we are not as comfortable to change things, even if it means compromising on our principles. In terms of security policy, be it in defence or in interior affairs, I think that we should always apply the principles of transparency and accountability that are essential for democracy. In Spain, the police forces and the army are often in places where there is a lack of democracy and equal opportunities. As Greens we should also put human rights at the core of any policies and try to give answers to the specific kind of violence being perpetrated against certain groups – such as women, as I stressed earlier. If we do not take this specificity into account in our societies, I think it would be neglecting the reality that there are many different sorts of violence in our society.

MEYREM ALMACI: In terms of the financial implications, there is an aspect that could make a huge difference, and that is stopping the financial flows of radical groups. It is possible at a the European level, yet it isn’t being done, because it would also mean addressing the issue of tax havens. It’s a question of political will.

We know we could save a lot of money by removing the root of the problem. But the nature of our political systems makes it difficult to have a long-term perspective, so we try to find quick fixes in a short space of time, even if it’s more expensive in the long run. I think we are over-spending on security, with symbolic measures that are not necessarily effective, and underspending on prevention. That debate, on what is effective, should be at the centre of Green policy-making.

FRANZISKA BRANTNER: As chairwoman of the crisis-prevention sub-committee in the Bundestag, we will have our next session on the financing of terrorism. It is a priority issue in Germany.

AMELIA WOMACK: Any true review of security, as we discussed, needs to look at the impact of the arms industry and the instances where we are
giving power to some of the most unstable regions on earth. The UK produces 30 billion pounds of arms that is sold to repressive regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, Kazakhstan, and China and it has now also started personnel courses to train people in Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.

We’ve talked about the social side of security in the UK and Europe, and the fact that more women are killed at the hands of their partners than by terrorists. In the US, more people have been killed by toddlers with guns than by terrorists. The real issues at home and abroad need to be central to our discussions. It’s true that we are not just looking at the military but also the social implications of it. Obviously, there are environmental implications of climate change that will decrease our security around the world – the fact that 33 countries are going to be water-scarce by 2040 means that wars in our future are potentially going to be fought over water, not oil. That’s one of the key parts of being Green: talking about security and defence in anticipation of what lies ahead. In the UK, our history has been scarred by our involvement in military interventions that undermined our national and international security. The fact that we’ve always opposed those interventions and sought more grassroots and European solutions is one of the key things that distinguishes us.

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DR. FRANZISKA BRANTNER has been a Green MP in the German Bundestag since October 2013. Prior to this, she was a member of the European Parliament for four years.

ROSA MARTÍNEZ RODRÍGUEZ is co-spokesperson of the Spanish Green Party (EQUO) and has been an MP in Spain since December 2015.

AMELIA WOMACK has been the deputy leader of the Green Party of England and Wales since 2014.
In a context where acts of terrorism and violence provide justification for increasingly intrusive interference with the rights of citizens, what international frameworks exist to limit government surveillance and how effective are they? What can be done at the EU level to complement those safeguarding mechanisms?

“Security is the first among freedoms”1. With this sentence, former French Prime Minister Manuel Valls opened his statement to advocate for the adoption of the privacy-invasive law on intelligence that significantly expanded the surveillance powers and capacities of French authorities. This law was adopted shortly after the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack. Fear-based political actions lead to unlawful and ineffective policies as well as disproportionate restrictions on the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection.

THE SECURITY THEATRE

Terrorism has been a part of the daily life of millions of Europeans for a long time. Groups like ETA and the IRA were particularly active from the 1960s onwards, resulting in the deaths of thousands of people in Spain, France, Ireland, and the UK. The terrible events of 9/11 were followed by the horrific bombings in European capitals: London and Madrid. In 2011, Norway was hit by unprecedented attacks in Oslo and on the island of Utøya. Most recently, Europe has been impacted

1 Motto of Jean-Marie Le Pen, former leader and 1992 presidential candidate of French far-right party, the Front National. Former Prime Minister Manuel Valls used this same sentence on 19 November 2015.
by terrorist attacks at the Charlie Hebdo offices, Copenhagen, Paris, Brussels, Nice, and Berlin. These attacks differ greatly in motive and modus operandi but have in common the breadth of their impact.

People gather to mourn and deliver a clear message: to not give in to fear and not let hate win. In practice, however, people often do give in to fear, but not the one spread by the terrorists. As cynical as it may seem, governments have recurrently used the aftermath of terrorist events to advance their security agenda and pass sweeping measures in record time — measures that would perhaps never have been adopted at a time of peace. This is how the French intelligence and international surveillance laws were adopted. Similarly, at the EU level, some mass surveillance laws have been adopted in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, such as the Data Retention law — which has since been invalidated by the EU court for violating fundamental rights — and the Passenger Name Record law. The infographic to the right illustrates the process leading to the adoption of these laws.

This is the security theatre, where fear-based policy-making is used to provide the population with a false sense of national security. In France for instance, the government repeatedly called for a limitation of freedoms for the sake of security. This discourse is not new but was first made mainstream by the far-right extremists of the Front National.
On top of the national security agenda was the expansion of surveillance powers. France, the UK, Belgium, and Germany have all undergone massive reforms over the past few years in that direction, whilst of course simultaneously expressing outrage at the reach of U.S. surveillance. In a context where security means mass surveillance, governments have developed a special interest in tech companies or, more specifically, in the volume of personal data they hold and the technological capabilities they can offer, such as facial recognition and predictive policing, to name a few. From phone records, activity metadata, to webcam feeds and internet searches, the EU governments want it all and want to keep it all. Again, they have learnt from the best (or, as it were, the worst) here. It was not so long ago that we discovered the extent of U.S. mass surveillance programmes, such as PRISM, through which the U.S. authorities can gain access to emails, chat, videos, photos, and more from Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo!, Skype, or Facebook. The slide on the next page is part of the documents Snowden released and shows how the PRISM programme works and on which companies’ data it relies.

The legitimacy of the ‘collect it all’ discourse is, however, called into question by the fact that in nearly all the terrorist attacks to have hit Europe, the perpetrators were known to the intelligence services of at least one EU country. In several cases, the failure to share information between different law enforcement or intelligence agencies has led to serious security failures. But in a discourse where everything is for and about security, with little to no consideration for human rights, governments have difficulties explaining why attacks still happen.

A TALE OF SURVEILLANCE, SECURITY, AND FREEDOMS

The extent of the collection, use of, and access to personal data for law enforcement and national security purposes should be subject to public debate in an open and democratic society. To have that public debate there is a need to shift from the political exploitation of emotions to proper evidence-based policy-making.
Up until today, success stories of surveillance measures have been anecdotal and limited. Governments have not provided any evidence that bulk collection of personal data has been key to solving crimes or terror attacks, or been any more effective than human intelligence gathering or effective cooperation between agencies. If we are in the golden age of surveillance, then why aren’t we in the golden age of safety and security? The lack of evidence showing that more data and more surveillance lead to higher levels of security has consequences going beyond the practicalities of politics.

What we call evidence in this context is part of the widely applied legal standard any human right restriction by a state must pass: the necessity and proportionality test. These principles were developed under the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg to enforce the European Convention of Human Rights.
Any government that wants to impose limitations on fundamental rights, such as the right to private life, must meet the following criteria under the Convention: the restriction must be prescribed by law and in accordance with the law; it must achieve a legitimate aim; it must be deemed necessary in a democratic society given the circumstances; and finally, it must be a proportionate response to the pressing social need identified, and justified by sufficient relevant reasons by the authorities. This set of requirements establishes what constitutes a lawful interference.

This brief overview of the European Court of Human Rights’ legal standard shows that evidence comes into question twice. First, during the assessment of necessity and then second, as part of the proportionality test. The Court of Justice of the EU, the highest court in the European Union is also following this standard for the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The question of efficiency or capability of a measure is, more often than not, overlooked in rulings. The recent data retention ruling of the Court of Justice has taken a first step to declare that “national legislation must be based on objective evidence”. It is high time for these courts to hold governments accountable for not demonstrating clearer evidence on the efficiency and necessity of surveillance measures.

As Edward Snowden has explained, the mass surveillance revelations point to questions not only about privacy but also the values of a democratic society. People must take over the public discourse and discredit politicians, governments, and policies that exploit people’s emotions and deaths. A less cynical interpretation of the same situation would read this not as exploitation but acting in extreme and highly emotive circumstances. Yet perhaps there should be mechanisms in place to prevent politicians from drafting surveillance laws ‘under the influence’ of such emotional pressure, such as when the fictional president of the West Wing series temporarily steps aside after realising that he cannot make unbiased decisions about his daughter’s kidnapping.

PRIVACY HEROES AND VILLAINS
Protecting the right to privacy and data protection can be Europe’s success story. In addition to international frameworks, the EU also has an important role in curbing mass surveillance. While the EU still exercises little to no control over surveillance programmes as it technically remains a full competence of Member States, the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection are enforceable through a critical EU legal instrument, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Member States must respect it and EU institutions should increase their engagement in enforcement.
Both from a commercial and government perspective, the EU has a significant role and capacity to limit companies’ collection of information. A major first step was concluded in 2016 with the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation that updated Europe’s data protection rules dating back to 1995.

This law will enter into force in May 2018. From that date, companies will for instance have to limit the amount of data they collect to what is strictly necessary for a specifically defined purpose, and ensure that users have the right to delete or correct any information they collect. If not, they might face fines of up to 4% of their worldwide turnover. This regulation also introduces the concepts of data protection by design and by default in law. These concepts require companies to take a proactive approach to protecting privacy and data protection at every stage of the creation of their products. This approach to data protection should lead to greater consideration for human rights within companies, at the earliest stage of the conception of a product or service. This means that engineers and designers would ask themselves: what is the minimum amount of personal information that need to be collected for the product to function? Can the privacy settings be improved? The potential benefits for users are significant as the industry would finally stop seeing the right to data protection as a burden.

To complete this regulation, the EU is currently initiating the review of the e-Privacy Directive from 2002. This law protects the right to privacy and has the potential to establish binding requirements on hardware and software providers to implement the privacy by design and default concepts. Such requirements would guarantee the protection of information that might be stored on our devices, such as computers and

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2 A Directive is an EU law that establishes minimum rules that each Member State must comply with by adopting a national law that implements them. The States can also develop additional rules as long as these always respect the ones provided by the EU. In contrast, a Regulation is an EU law that establishes a single set of rules for all Member States and is directly applicable, without having the need to adopt a national law to implement it.
phones, and promote the use of anonymity tools, such as encryption. Nowadays, nearly half of the most popular websites on the internet have implemented a protocol for secure communications called “https”. Additionally, more and more messaging services such as WhatsApp and Signal offer end-to-end encrypted communications, though the level of protection varies significantly. The law is also crucial to protect the confidentiality of communications, both the content and the associated metadata, which refers to all the information about a call such as time, length, location, and more.

There is of course always a ‘but’ and this scenario is no different. When negotiating those laws, the EU Member States represented in the Council of the EU usually seek broad exceptions and flexibility, in order to bypass basic data protection and privacy rules and use data for surveillance. This is why it is crucial for companies to limit their data collection, as anything less would make them willing partners and complicit of the surveillance ecosystem. Robust rules on access to data should also be developed by the EU to avoid government snooping into our private lives. Member States must also stop attempts to use EU legislations on privacy, migration, free movement of people, or consumer protection as surveillance tools. These are the necessary steps to end the vicious security theatre we have been witnessing on repeat.

WHERE DOES THIS TAKE US?
If mass surveillance is not the answer, what will bring security? Our security challenges are not new, and so far, our society as a whole has not been able to find the correct answer. It would be unwise, or even dangerous, to attribute a single cause – like the lack of available data – to the security failures we encounter. This means that any solution also has to be multi-faceted.
What we do know is that whatever the approach lawmakers decide to take, it must be unbiased, fact-based, and above all uphold human rights. If undermining privacy did not make us safer, perhaps protecting it will. The benefits of privacy for society are invaluable as this right not only protects people’s private lives but is also an enabler for freedom of expression, association, and religion; values that thrive in open and democratic societies free from government suppression and mass surveillance.

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What does security in socio-economic terms mean in the 21st century, given our current political and economic situation? Green MEP Philippe Lamberts and editor-in-chief of Alternatives Économiques Guillaume Duval explain the factors underlying rising job insecurity and social insecurity, despite Europe being richer than ever. Why are governments and the EU seen as less able to provide economic and social security, and how is this type of insecurity linked to other security concerns?

**GREEN EUROPEAN JOURNAL:** What observations would you make on the importance of security in economic and social terms in the public debate today?

**GUILLAUME DUVAL:** The question of economic insecurity plays a central role in the concerns of the French these days, just as it does for other Europeans. Economic insecurity in terms of unemployment, of course, and the risk of becoming unemployed, but also in terms of the precarity of employment and the poverty into which, rightly or wrongly, large numbers of the middle classes feel themselves to be in danger of falling. This economic insecurity is of particular concern for the future, the long-term stability that our social systems offer often seems highly uncertain to European citizens, along with their capacity to allow their children to live comfortably. This is a result in particular of political decisions taken over the last thirty years, since the 1986 Single European Act. These decisions have resulted in the systematic challenging of our national social systems by the practice of social and fiscal dumping in a Europe considered above all as a market-place. This was made worse in the early 2000s by a broad but shallow enlargement...
of the Union, which widened the income gap in this market-style Europe lacking in social and fiscal regulation. The disastrous effect of these political decisions has been further aggravated in the last few years by the Eurozone crisis and the essentially deflationary response given largely by the German government. As a result, further projects to challenge social systems provoke strong societal reactions.

PHILIPPE LAMBERTS: If we look at the legislation being adopted in Europe – such as the free trade agreement with Canada, which has just been voted through the European Parliament (CETA) – security plays an important role: at least, security for investors; security in order to protect investment and allow the banks to put the burden of risk onto their clients. The question of security is therefore centre stage, but it is essentially that of the investors and pension funds; that of equity holders. The security of the working people is not really a priority. When I hear, for example, Emmanuel Macron in France declare that the first “privilege” which needs to be tackled is that of permanent contracts, it really does seem to be all the wrong way around. For the last 30 years, and since the movement towards neo-liberalism, workers’ rights have been continually weakened through the competitive nature of free-trade logic, and the social systems of EU Member States have been under permanent pressure. Individuals are put into a precarious situation while big businesses are strengthened. When the president of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, declares that the “European social model is dead”, I don’t know what to think exactly. How, when with an annual GDP of 10 000 euros per inhabitant, it was possible to finance the social systems of the 1960s, is it not possible today with a GDP 3.5 times higher (GDP of 35 000 euros per person in Europe in 2015)? The real question is that of added value: the percentage of profit, of remuneration of capital, has gone up considerably. It is not true that it would be impossible in purely financial terms to provide each individual with a universal basic income. It is simply a question of political choice and not of feasibility, as we so often hear. I say this because the European Union has never been as rich as it is today. The only real question is how this wealth is distributed. The work of Thomas Piketty demonstrates this perfectly: capital is shared more and more unevenly and the private sector is becoming concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. It is easy to see who the system benefits. Some may continue to doubt that climate change is of human origin, but in the case of inequality, there can be no doubt.
How is the question of insecurity today linked as much to the economic situation of individuals (growing instability in the job market, fear of unemployment, social exclusion, increasing automation in the workplace, etc.) as to the real risks these individuals face in terms of physical danger (fear of terrorist attacks, assaults, etc.)?

**GUILLAUME DUVAL:** With the exception of certain urban areas and specific situations, the real risk of encountering this type of violence remains limited for now, in France as in the rest of Europe – we are still far from the situation of Brazil or Venezuela, for example – and many categories of crime are actually dropping. As for the risk of being the victim of a terrorist attack, this remains extremely unlikely. But it is true that this type of event, loudly amplified in the media and on social networks, finds an echo in the anxiety generated by the perpetuation of economic insecurity. And all this in a geopolitical context where the instability and threats which are growing ever greater on the edges of Europe do not encourage a climate of serenity; rather, they fan the flames of the fear of seeing a huge number of refugees “invade” the old continent and in so doing, drive the last nail in the coffin of our social systems. These multiple forms of insecurity sounding off against one another inevitably provoke a desire to escape reality with the search for a pseudo-security through a return to a fantasised past and a golden age which has never actually existed. It is the basis of the temptation of fascism.

**PHILIPPE LAMBERTS:** The more inequality grows, the greater the risk that economic violence turns to physical violence. Terrorist attacks cannot be explained by simply equating them with inequality of income, but it is clear that a society with marked inequalities creates fertile ground for all kinds of insanity, including the most violent. If people imagine they can go on living without violence in a world where differences in income vary from 1 to 400, they are deluded. The violence of the system will do everything in its power to maintain, by force, the right of the rich to their security. We must therefore act against inequality, if only for the sake of our own security, for an exaggerated concentration of wealth in the hands of a few exerts financial pressure on government. We see it every day. We are still surprised to see that the governments currently in power in Europe go on pursuing policies – which they have for a long time now – which, above all, benefit the rich. It is the richest 1% who benefit from these policies. If “democracy is the government of the people, by the people, for the people”, the last part of this saying no longer stands, since the policies followed today in Europe are designed only for a very small minority. According to Lincoln’s definition, we are therefore no longer in a democracy. The predatory capitalism that we observe today also, of course, endangers people’s physical security by the mass destruction of the social framework it causes and by the degradation of the environment. This violence is doubtless most visible for the moment in the countries of the Southern hemisphere, but is becoming more widespread.
Given the phenomenon of ‘uberisation’ and the increasing automation that is threatening the very existence of a human workforce in many fields, how do you envisage future models, both of work and of social welfare?

Guillaume Duval: I don’t believe for a moment that automation is going to eradicate work. The difficulties faced in this area in France and the rest of Europe over the past few years are mostly linked to a marked slow-down in productivity gains, not an acceleration. Difficulties are, above all, related to global and European social and fiscal dumping, and to economic policies adopted in Europe which are completely inappropriate, especially since the 2008/9 financial crisis.

For the future, the digital revolution will indeed destroy many jobs and whole industries (for example, the written press), and that will, of course, create considerable social problems. Public policy will have to tackle this as thoroughly and urgently as possible. But, as with the weaving looms in the 19th century, or automotive production lines, it need not necessarily lead to a reduction in the total number of jobs available in our societies. Enormous social needs must still be met, and the capacity of the human imagination to invent new jobs and activities is infinite. The nature and legal status of these jobs can, though, be transformed by the digital revolution. Indeed, lowering ‘transaction costs’, as economists put it, can actually challenge the current logic of companies and employment patterns in favour of a return to more independent, pre-capitalist types of work. To guard against any harmful effects of this development on our welfare systems, we must ensure that the systems in place evolve to provide the same kind of protection both to employees and the self-employed. We must equally ensure that independent contractors can band together to negotiate collectively with so-called ‘sharing economy’ platforms.

In your opinion, are authorities providing the right responses to questions of economic security?

Guillaume Duval: No, and that is the whole problem of the Left in France. During the last government’s term in office, those on the Left were actively involved in making the working class less secure by supporting the view that it is essential to challenge and reform welfare and employment rights in order to bring down the
costs of employment and public spending and the inescapable argument that the labour market must be made more flexible. This was particularly the case with the disastrous Labour Code Reform, debated in 2016, which was brought in after two other laws were passed in 2013 and 2015, and which already aimed at this loosening of the labour market. It was the last straw which forced François Hollande to step down from the presidential race. But it is also the case more widely throughout Europe and, of course, in particular in those countries that have suffered the most from the Eurozone crisis. It is true that some people are aware of this as shown by the ‘European pillar of social rights’ set up by Jean-Claude Juncker, but in the absence of decisive progress on fiscal integration and the challenging of economic policies, these social concerns can only ever remain superficial in Europe.

PHILIPPE LAMBERTS: It all depends on whose point of view you take. From the point of view of the investors, no doubt. But let’s call them ‘equity holders’, investors are people who make long term investments to obtain long term results. But they are an endangered species. These days, it is the equity holders who tend to use the planet and its people for immediate profit, rather than middle or long term investment. In his encyclical _Laudato si’_, Pope Francis denounces the restricted economy of the modern world. The governments in power today endanger the security of the great majority. After Brexit in Europe and the victory of Donald Trump in the United States, we have obviously not taken seriously the dangers that threaten us: we continue to deregulate the financial system, we congratulate ourselves on finalising CETA, we keep up the financial pressure on Greece, etc. In short, we don’t change a thing. The security which we want to continue to guarantee is still that of the ‘equity holders’, at the expense of everyone else’s.

THE CAPACITY OF THE HUMAN IMAGINATION TO INVENT NEW JOBS AND ACTIVITIES IS INFINITE — G. DUVAL
In your view, what would be the right responses to adopt, political as well as economic and social, in the face of this economic insecurity whether experienced first-hand or sensed, particularly by young people in Europe, and which feeds populism and a backward-looking sense of identity that is on the rise today in France and throughout Europe?

GUILLAUME DUVAL: In my view, the major challenge here is the change of direction of economic policy led by the German government. These policies are just absurd. In fact, according to the European Commission, the Eurozone had a positive current account balance last year of 384 billion euros (sales of goods and services); in other words, 3.6% of Eurozone GDP. This means that we could have spent 384 billion euros more in Europe last year without creating any deficit. No need to go begging to Qatar or to the Chinese; we ourselves produced this amount, despite corrosive unemployment, the poverty that has skyrocketed since the crisis, and the delay in transitioning to renewable energy. We didn’t spend it, simply because our own policies prevented us. In this context, it is totally unacceptable that the European monetary policy continues to devalue the euro. But, despite her claims to the contrary, it is Angela Merkel who largely holds the keys to this problem. With the present state of the European economy, the ECB can only adopt a less lax monetary policy, if for their part the European Member States themselves adopt less restrictive budgetary policies and less deflationary policies for the labour market. These policies are the ones which the German government, however, insists on imposing on its neighbours. If public opinion and the German leadership do not rapidly change their approach, the European construction will fall apart and the Far Right will take over power, notably in France.

PHILIPPE LAMBERTS: We need a change of direction in Europe: our objectives as Europeans should be objectives which are binding with regard to our ecological imprint and our fight against inequality in order to finally put in place a Europe of fiscal and social integration that embraces ecological transition. All our big trading partners around the world, in particular China and the US, are protectionist, and if borders are there to be crossed, it is our democracies that must fix the conditions of movement of goods, of services, and above all of capital. Europe has an important bargaining chip: access to its vast internal market. It is a powerful bargaining chip, for no multinational business can ignore the European market and this can be used to impose rigorous social and environmental norms here and elsewhere. The response of the populist parties to insecurity is to promise security by turning inwards. It is the strategy of the ‘fortress’ or the ‘umbrella’. It is the infamous ‘us and them’, where ‘us’ preferably means the ‘white man’. It is a common element of the populist parties today, even if...
some of them are led by women. This diagnosis is mistaken in the sense that certain of these populist parties in Europe are neoliberal: the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie in Belgium, the Dutch extreme right Partij Voor de Vrijheid, etc. The real question is not the level at which these decisions are taken, like the European level denounced by populists of the Far Right, but their nature. These populists lie to people when they let them believe that building walls will isolate them from the storms of the outside world (climate change, migration, etc.) Europeans will make up 5% of the global population in 2050, living on 2.2% of the land mass. We therefore have no other choice but to work together. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” This, however, is not a description of reality, but a promise, and the present political powers are not doing what it takes to keep this promise. The task, therefore, is to create political majorities built around this first article.

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PHILIPPE LAMBERTS
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According to the United Nations, the world’s population is set to hit 9.7 billion in 2050. It is legitimate to ask ourselves just how the planet will be able to feed all of those people, especially considering the already significant extent of hunger and malnutrition. European industrial farming – a practice barren of any social or environmental value – has always justified its otherwise dubious practices through the need to “feed the world”. It’s hard enough to buy this narrative of virtuous sacrifice when it comes from the agro-food industry multinationals, but beyond this, it actually contradicts the basic principles of the anthropology of development. Whilst this slogan is sometimes used in good faith, it reflects a dangerous vision of rural economies and how societies function. In reality, it violates the principles of food security, which, according to United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) should meet four criteria: availability, accessibility, resilience, and quality. The agro-food industry could not “feed the world” even if it wanted to. Agribusiness giants are unable to, even today. And by gradually destroying their means of

The ‘Feed the World’ slogan might present expanding agribusiness as the only solution to increasing population and hunger. Yet rather than providing answers, it only exacerbates the problem, destroying the nature it relies on, exacerbating poverty, and leaving whole populations and its very own farmers at the mercy of fluctuating market rates. However, there is another solution that benefits both consumers, nature, and small-scale farmers around the world.

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1 Cf in particular the works of Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, or the definition given by Pierre Pradervand: “Development is a process by which individuals and communities make themselves masters of their own resources, in the broadest sense of the word – social, cultural, spiritual, and material – in order to improve their situation, according to criteria that they have themselves defined.”
production, they are reducing their capacity to do so still further, a situation exacerbated by the disruptive symptoms of climate change.

The destruction of local rural economies (here and elsewhere) does not safeguard the food security of rural societies. However, much more effective agricultural approaches exist which would enable each continent and community to feed itself.

SPECIALISATION TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE POOREST

It is widely believed that Europe exports grain, milk, and meat to countries that cannot produce enough for their own needs. In fact, a significant proportion of food exports are sold to other industrialised countries (just over 40%, according to the latest Eurostat data, with the main importer being the US), particularly in the case of meat. Rather than food flowing from countries with ‘efficient agriculture’ to countries with ‘inefficient agriculture’, the industrial agricultural system is essentially an opening up of international markets, and specialisation of commodities, causing damage to economies and food production.

Let’s take the example of European milk and meat production. This is largely reliant on plant protein (such as soya), imported predominantly from South America. Production is based primarily in landholdings that are holdovers from the colonial period, and its traditionally highly labour-intensive land use. For decades, industrialisation and financial optimisation of production have led to labour being partly replaced by machines (and thus oil), and chemicals. Brazilian and Argentinian farm workers are moving en masse to the slums in big cities where they face hunger, yet Brazil is the number one exporter of food to the European Union (more than 10,000 million Euros worth per month). The country could easily actually feed its current population, yet each year 12 million Brazilians are counted among the 800 million people currently living in hunger, listed by the FAO. These 12 million men, women and children have moved from working on the land to living in poverty, as a result of U.S., Canadian, and EU industrial farming.

FOOD DUMPING DESTROYS RURAL COMMUNITIES

Poor farmers working very small land parcels also contribute to feed production for South American livestock; their precarious situation makes them highly dependent on volatile world prices. Agricultural speculation – large financial groups capitalising on relative shortages to buy and stock food, thereby forcing up prices – and Word Trade Organisation (WTO) rules dictate that the products must be sold at prices below cost, i.e. at a loss. Small-scale family farms produce 80% of the world’s food and yet three-quarters of
people suffering from hunger are from small farming communities. They are victims of a system which forces them to grow products for export (livestock feed, palm oil, cotton, coffee, biomass for bio-fuels, etc.), and at the mercy of price speculation. Once their harvest has been sold, they have nothing left over to be able to buy food.

This problem of speculation and trade quotas also affects other types of production. Agricultural Europe orchestrates the reliance of some countries on wheat exports: thanks to subsidies, European wheat can be sold at a loss to developing countries, preventing the development of local production, which cannot compete with these bargain basement prices. Price fluctuations are therefore devastating to the least privileged in the importing countries, and people who are dependent on imports for their food do not have food security.

**FARMERS IN THE NORTH ALSO LOSE OUT**

It is not the case that the system guarantees food security in ‘rich’ countries at the expense of ‘poor’ countries. Farmers in Europe, North America, and Canada are also struggling: occupational illness due to pesticide exposure, depression, and poverty abound. The profits produced by the sector mostly benefit agribusiness, mass retail, and speculators. The number of farmers in Europe has dropped spectacularly in 50 years (by 17% between 2005 and 2010), concentrating production in oversized farms that depend on banks and public subsidies for their survival. These very production methods are also in danger: depleted soil, dying out of pollinating insects, and polluted water, etc. What type of medium and long term food production can we possibly hope for if the production methods destroy its most fundamental resource – nature?

A handful of multinationals are monopolising the means of food production, particularly seeds (a commercial sector with one of the highest

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For example, 95% of the EU market in vegetable seeds is controlled by five multinationals, according to a 2014 report by Ivan Mammama, commissioned by the Greens-EFA in the European Parliament.
concentrations in the European Union\(^2\)). This should be a major source of concern for European and national institutions. The number of varieties\(^3\) being grown has already dropped substantially as a consequence (by 75% during the 20th century according to the FAO), undermining agrarian systems and making them more prone to parasites and illnesses. There have been many mergers in the sector (Dupont and Dow, Syngenta and Chem China, Bayer and Monsanto), which is extremely worrying. These companies offer seeds that are engineered to be used with pesticides and chemical fertilisers they also sell, creating an economic model which makes farmers completely reliant on their products and leaves them in an extremely vulnerable position.

**POVERTY IS THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF HUNGER**

It is clear, as acknowledged by the FAO’s Director General, that “the predominant agricultural model today does not respond to the food security challenges of the 21st century”. By organising the dependence of certain regions of the world, imposing export crops that do not contribute to feeding local people, allowing speculation of commodities, and promoting land grabbing, it has created poverty, and thus hunger. We must do away with the idea that certain regions of the world have a food deficit: aside from war, earthquake, or climate disaster, hunger is generally due to poverty, and not to structural shortages, even if adapting farming systems to climate change is of course a key issue.

The belief that food security can be achieved by simply producing greater volumes of food comes down to a false understanding of food security that reduces it to an overall quantity produced on a global scale. However, as was previously stated, according to the FAO there are four necessary conditions to ensure food security.

First of all, there needs to be enough food. However, importing it from other countries causes dependency and undermines food sovereignty in the countries in question, and is only possible for countries with major budgetary resources from another activity, generally oil production.

To be able to buy food, people must have enough income to pay for it. As we just saw, the workings of world markets do not guarantee this condition; in fact, the opposite is the case, even before taking into account the other factors affecting social and economic inequality.

Resilience means that agricultural production must be able to remain stable in the face of changing climate conditions, which is not

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\(^3\) A plant variety has one genotype and a set of stable and transmissible characteristics.
possible without living, healthy ecosystems. By contributing 18% to 30% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and in polluting soil and water, promoting soil erosion and the decline in pollinating insects, the current agri-business model strengthens more than tempers the effects of climate change on yields. From an agronomy point of view, the centralisation and standardisation of seed production and the uniformisation of techniques run counter to the quest for resilience.

Finally, there is the question of quality. Standardised systems of industrial agriculture are increasingly singled out for their poor quality, in terms of health and nutrition, as well as for the potential dangers posed by some of the products they use (pesticides, GMOs). The most recent instance of this issue is the controversy surrounding the herbicide glyphosate4. The United Nations International Agency for Research on Cancer has stated that it is a likely carcinogen, yet the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) disagrees, basing its defence on studies that have never been published and that were produced by the industry itself5.

Food quality also depends on crop rotation. And yet the whole thinking behind the unfortunately dubbed ‘green revolution’6 involves impoverishing cropping systems and concentrating food production on one or two staples (rice, wheat, corn, etc.), leading in turn to shortages which have serious consequences. A case in point which received a lot of press coverage is Syngenta’s ‘golden rice’. Syngenta’s supposed attempt to fight vitamin A deficiency, suffered by a third of the world’s infants, show the limits to this type of thinking. This deficiency could easily be tackled through good, diversified, eating habits, as vitamin A is contained in many vegetables. It’s the shift to monoculture which partly explains the increase in the prevalence

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4 The active ingredient in the herbicide ‘Roundup’
5 Four Green MEPs have requested access to these studies and are still in discussion with the EFSA on this matter
6 Since the 1970s, the European and North American model, based on standardised seed, monoculture, mechanisation, and a reliance on fertiliser and pesticides, has been promoted throughout the world under the misleading label of ‘The Green Revolution’
of this deficiency, for Asian farming systems were traditionally based on a wide diversity of crops, to provide a balanced diet. The solution found by the biotech industry was to genetically modify rice to include vitamin A, thus compounding the initial agronomic mistake. It is important to note that after 20 years of research, costing billions of Euros, this rice still has not been grown because of its poor yields and lack of useful vitamin A content (vitamin A in genetically modified rice is not absorbed by the body).
Industrial agriculture does not guarantee world food security. It responds solely (and only in part) to the FAO’s first criterion, and this only by creating a reliance on subsidised agriculture and dependence of some countries on others. In this way, it actually undermines compliance with the three other criteria.

Ecosystems are brilliant regulators, and also offer natural security to farmers, on condition that they are allowed to interact naturally and are not destroyed by pesticide use.

EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES EXIST

Development should not be confused with growth; it is only lasting and real if it is endogenous, that is to say if it uses resources from the communities affected. This basic rule must also be applied to agriculture; numerous farmers and agronomists place great importance on it and have for decades. This rule comfortably meets the criterion of resilience. Indeed, agriculture can only be resilient – adaptable to climate change – if it interacts with its natural environment. Ecosystems are brilliant regulators, and also offer natural security to farmers, on condition that they are allowed to interact naturally and are not destroyed by pesticide use.

Since the current conventional ‘model’ is based on a centralised and standardised selection of seeds, it requires land artificialisation, causing a structural fragility which cannot be sustainable. Increasingly standardised and specialised farming doesn’t work efficiently in non-temperate areas, because it leads to wastage of solar power and depleted soil. Monocultures also consume so much fossil fuel that the energy balance is in the red, so there is no future in it. Monoculture is progressively destroying soil through erosion and pollution, which ‘eats up capital’.

Farming must be a constant co-evolution between land, society, and techniques. This means that there cannot be a universal model, and that the resources of local farmers must be valued, particularly the seeds that the communities choose themselves. In the majority of countries, farming yields are greatly improved by intercropping (several crops grown at the same time on one plot of land), which has the threefold advantage of optimising the use of sunlight, protecting the soil, and guaranteeing a varied diet. All these techniques enable farming communities to feed themselves and stay out of poverty. Furthermore, by maintaining rural jobs and decentralising production, they provide access to food and consolidate availability.

7 See the work of NGOs such as Agrisud and AVSF, and researchers such as Marc Dufumier, Miguel Altieri, François de Ravignan, and Jules Pretty
These principles have been found in the approach entitled ‘organic farming’ since the 1930s, also sometimes more recently referred to as ‘small scale farming’ or ‘agroecology’. They have demonstrated their efficacy as much in volume as in resilience, quality, and accessibility. If Europe is really committed to fighting hunger in the world, it must vigorously support them, which means stopping food dumping, putting an end to land grabbing, and fighting the economic model of dependency-speculation. In other words, it must stop massive exports and start building autonomous ecological farms at home. By producing less, but better, we can bring the world food system, as well as our own land, back into a healthy equilibrium.

The authors wish to thank Sara Monsieur
European societies such as France suffer from a fixation with a distorted vision of Islam, rooted in stereotypes and a lack of understanding of the traditions and history of the religion. This fantasised vision serves to justify the double standards set by the media and politicians, and contributes to fuelling a toxic discourse around identity. As a result, current responses to incidents of terrorism – generally carried out by home-grown radicalised individuals – only serve to aggravate fears and deepen mistrust.
Historically, Islam – as the last monotheistic religion and considered by Christians to be incomplete – has never had the place it deserves in the Western imaginary. Similarly, the expansionism that followed the birth of Islam served to create a climate of fear for the West. As for France, we should bear in mind the colonial period, notably in the Maghreb, where Muslim Arabs were made to feel inferior. The native Muslim population were subjected to the *Code de l’Indigénat* (1881), which institutionalised social and legal inequality. In contrast, the Algerian Jews, considered to be ‘useful’ for colonisation, were granted French citizenship as early as 1871. This episode was to leave its mark on Jewish-Muslim relations, which would have repercussions for their communal living later in France. The legacy of this colonial discrimination lives on in the perceptions of Muslim Arabs held by the French people and by a section of the political class. Being French and Muslim sets you apart from other French people. Doubts about your true Frenchness are cultivated and used in times of crisis. The terrorist attacks have served as a pretext to reignite the issue. Every terrorist is portrayed as a Muslim and every Muslim as a potential terrorist. This type of binary thinking is dangerous when coupled with a mind-set clouded by inherited clichés from the past. Even more so, since today’s French-born Muslims – unlike their parents, who were largely ‘invisible’ – have become ‘visible’ through their desire to claim their own identity.

**ESTHER BENBASSA:** The debate about Islam has only become more inflamed since the wave of terrorist attacks that have hit European countries. It is by no means a recent phenomenon. The second point is the reading in terms of the clash of civilisations: Islam is set in opposition to European values, which are presented as being founded on democracy, human rights, gay rights, etc. Yet, there are other value systems in Europe: the liberal one, for example, which defends all these rights, with at its centre the status of women and of sexuality. There’s also a Christian one which, however, takes a different approach again: no-one can say that the Church defends gay rights nor that it has a very feminist approach to the emancipation of women. An example is the recent forceful opposition to the teaching on ‘gender theory’ in schools in France. Nobody wants to admit this ambiguity that exists with regard to the European sense of identity, for some people founded on Christianity; for others, on the liberal values of the 1960s. The question is therefore skewed from the start. People give a secular answer to a question of identity, and in France, the Left refuses to face up to the question of Christianity, as if it had been dealt with once and for all by the law of 1905, separating the Church and the State. And yet, religion in Europe is alive and well. And by trying to keep the Church out of the public space in France, we play into the hands of the Far Right, who simply take it over as a theme.
How is the question of Islam linked to that of insecurity in Europe today, in particular since the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016?

ESTHER BENBASSA: Most of the terrorists were French or Belgian Muslims, born in the country in which they committed the atrocities. Linking insecurity with Islam creates confusion, which further undermines the Muslims living in those countries. A simple everyday Islam, both feared and despised in France where secularism, in its most dogmatic form, is nothing more than a veneer covering a visceral rejection of Muslims, was not meeting the needs of these young French people. The most vulnerable among them have been swallowed up in another Islam, radical and supposedly authentic, passed on by self-proclaimed spiritual leaders via the internet, but also in new social circles. A minority of them have ended up opting for a political and vindictive form of Islam, rejecting with hatred a Western society they judge to be ‘impure’. But even in its most hard-line form, Islam does not automatically turn people into terrorists. Acquired as it is from sources that are partisan, purist, and lacking in critical analysis, this type of Islam can contribute to the crystallisation of a warped and, in some cases, destructive sense of identity. Conversion to this form of Islam also concerns young French people of non-Muslim backgrounds, living in areas that have been abandoned by public services and where there is a lack of cultural space. A sense of community is built through this type of Islam, which is no longer simply suffering from aggression but has itself become aggressive. Without the existence of Daesh, such indoctrination would not, in and of itself, have been capable of spawning terrorism. But, on the other hand, without such a purist and politicised form of Islam, would Daesh alone have managed to achieve quite such a power of attraction? Either way, involvement in ‘jihadi’ activism only concerns a small number of Muslims, and to put all Muslims in the same boat smacks of instrumentalism.

OLIVIER ROY: The fundamental question is to what extent Islamic terrorism is linked to Islam itself. There have been other terrorist atrocities after all, such as that of Anders Breivik, for example, in Norway, who killed in the name of white Christianity in 2011. But yes, since 2001, terrorist attacks in Europe have largely been claimed to have been committed in the name of Islam. Yet, is this terrorism a consequence of the radicalisation of religion, or are we witnessing, as I would argue, a phenomenon the other way around: an Islamisation of radicalism? What relationship is there between the marginalised youths committing acts of terrorism and the religious community to which they claim to belong? There is a debate to be had on violence among young people that is certainly not simply a question of Islam. Whether they are new converts or second generation Muslims, it has
to be said that their revolt is part of an Islamic narrative. But this is because, in the world of radicalisation, the Islamic model is the most visible. This visibility is also due to the fact that the left-wing version of radicalisation has disappeared from the global stage. For decades, Europe has experienced a form of terrorism linked to the Far Left: the Red Brigade, the Baader Meinhof group, etc. But in the market for radical protest today on a global scale, sadly, only Daesh is on offer.

Can the rise of xenophobic parties in Europe be attributed to a sense of crisis or insecurity about identity experienced by a section of the population? And is this insecurity linked to the current debate around Islam in the public sphere?

OLIVIER ROY: The growing insecurity felt around issues of identity is not caused by Islam, but by a crisis in the status of the nation state. The question of ‘identity’ is a relatively recent phenomenon; a newcomer in the arena of political debate. In the past, this question belonged to the Far Right, with writers such as Alain de Benoist. In France, it was Nicolas Sarkozy who legitimised the debate on identity. If this concept is omnipresent today, it is largely because other concepts are no longer on the table, such as the class struggle, the Left-Right divide, etc. The Left has become liberal on economic policy but has abandoned its liberal values. On the other hand, the Right has espoused a wider set of values. Until the 1980s, the Right tended to defend traditional values. Then came Margaret Thatcher, Nicolas Sarkozy, etc. Today, the new generation of the People’s Party in Spain, for example, has adopted liberal values, in the same way as the Italian Right-wing under Berlusconi became Epicurean, etc. The Left didn’t see this coming, whether on the question of class or of values. To find one’s place in society, the choice is identity or anarchy.

It seems to me that we should stop worrying about what the Koran says and stop all the theologising in order to deal effectively with the question

IT IS NO COINCIDENCE THAT ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT GOES HAND IN HAND WITH AN ANTI-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE

— O. ROY
of Islam in concrete terms. Religion is treated as if it constitutes a threat to our human rights, but religious freedom is an integral part of those very rights. No politician today is asking the Catholic Church to adopt the ordination of women, yet when it comes to Islam, anything goes. The question of Islam should be reconsidered within the framework of the religious freedom offered by modern democracy and we should return to basics; to a legal and constitutional vision of the religious question. By collecting basic sociological statistics, we will see that in France, as in Europe, the Muslim middle classes exist and that social mobility has been able to function. But in people’s minds, Muslims are all either young suburban delinquents or ‘bearded’ fundamentalists. We have a fantasised and imagined vision of Islam and we don’t see the real changes and developments that have taken place. It is time we opened our eyes.

Would you say that politicians and law-makers are coming up with the right responses to the challenges of these questions around security and identity?

ESTHER BENBASSA: Those in power have been caught up in the drama of the terrorist attacks and made it their priority to reassure people by putting on a show of strength. But the challenge of terrorism cannot be dealt with overnight, and there is a whole long-term effort to be made to put in place preventative measures. There can be no excuse for these acts committed by young people seduced by the evil of radicalism, but that should not prevent us from asking what incites them to commit such atrocities. If we had managed to let them share more equally in the values we hold so dear and from which we consider them to be excluded, perhaps these young people might have made other choices. There are those who need to have something to believe in, and not just in religious terms. The same goes for the issue of ‘de-radicalisation’. There is no dialogue, no rational discussion, no commitment to thought and debate. Public perception takes centre stage because, sadly, in politics, things have to move fast.
OLIVIER ROY: In terms of security, the current policy adopts the same old approach of measuring effectiveness solely in terms of ensuring the physical protection of the population. Fundamentally, this type of policy on security comes into conflict with freedoms and the safeguarding of human rights. There is, then, a legitimate debate to be had on the right balance to be struck between security and respect for freedom. It is, of course, of vital importance, but it seems to me more urgent to be clear about where the threat is coming from. If we consider, for example, that any sign of religious radicalisation is taken to indicate a potential terrorist threat, we have the wrong target in our sights and risk missing the real threats. Banning headscarves in universities, for example, clamping down on halal products, or taking vegetarian meals off the menu in our schools while somehow equating these things with a potential terrorist threat is completely outrageous.

In your opinion, what would the right response be – in political as in economic and social terms – to this identity insecurity and to the fear of Islam that we see on the rise in France and throughout Europe?

ESTHER BENBASSA: If there is no real work of long-term prevention through reviewing the catastrophic policies in urban development, real opposition to discrimination, racism, and the precarity faced by young people in urban neighbourhoods, identity politics will only increase. Thankfully, not all inward-looking attitudes to identity lead to terrorism. It is time we stopped raising the spectre of communitarianism. There is nothing unusual in the fact that people will turn to their community for answers in the face of rejection from outside. What about trying, for example, in France to collect statistics based on ethnicity, or at least a census of the birthplace of an individual’s parents and the previous nationality of that person, in order to obtain a more precise breakdown of figures? There is opposition to this proposal through fear that the results might result in a call for a policy of ‘affirmative action’.

OLIVIER ROY: We are in the middle of a crisis in the political imagination. And the European Union is unable to give us the sort of vision we can believe in. We have reached the limits of the European model. It is vital to make the European institutions more democratic, and the European Parliament in particular must have a greater role to play. Equally, we must rethink the nation state, based on a restoration of the political engagement of citizens and starting at the grassroots level of local councils. Democracy at a local level must be developed and encouraged, rather than stunted. In economic terms, the Left has completely failed in its engagement with deprived urban areas, in particular with regard to the question of police violence. The French are European ‘champions’
in terms of violence in the relations between police and citizens. We also have to accept the consequences of religious liberty and stop, for example, painting all those who take part in protests, such as ‘La Manif Pour Tous’ in France (a campaign opposed to equal marriage), as fascists. Many people have a religious faith, and they are not all potential terrorists. We need to revise this authoritarian conception of secularism which simply leaves religion to those who are marginalised or have radical tendencies. We need to reinvent a peaceful relationship with all religions. There is a lot of talk of communitarianism in a Muslim context, but it is just as present in Orthodox Jewish circles, particularly in the area of education. The State ends up simply forcing religions to set themselves up as counter forces of society. What is needed is a rethink on religious freedoms in France within the framework of the law of 1905, which is an excellent piece of legislation.

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OLIVIER ROY is a political analyst, a professor at the European University Institute in Florence and an expert on Islam. He has authored numerous books such as Secularism Confronts Islam (2005) and most recently Jihad and Death (2016).

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We are not prescribing ignoring populism or not trying to understand it. On the contrary, it is precisely because we want – we need – to understand populism that the categorical mistake has to be avoided. But it is in the search for an answer to populism that progressives fail both to understand and to find political horizons that will then provide answers to the many questions and challenges of today’s world: globalisation, insecurity, fear, unemployment, political corruption, and a general dispiritedness or lack of hope regarding the future.

Looking for “answers to populism” means entering into a conversation on the topics and terms chosen by populists and for the benefit of populists. This is the strategic mistake that comes after the categorical mistake: because progressives tend to see populism as a set of claims regarding policy rather than a claim to a monopoly on politics, they will veer off from their own obligations to look for answers – not to populism, but simply to the rapidly changing nature of the social, political, and ecological reality around us.

After the victories of the Leave campaign in the Brexit referendum and of Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential elections of last year, the progressive debate has seen a flurry of articles and thoughts on how to “respond to populism”. In opposition to that trend, we argue that “looking for answers to populism”, as it is currently framed in the progressive debate, is an error in itself. It is a “categorical mistake”, an error on the ontology of populism itself, that prevents us from properly understanding what is truly at stake.
The most commonly used objection in the current political debate is: “it is precisely because of that (attitude/strategy/idea/argument) that the populists are winning!” Every time someone somewhere stumbles across a good, progressive idea, immediately we hear a fearful choir berating us for providing more opportunities for the populists to seize and grow. In due time, progressives will grow afraid of defending the EU, immigration, tolerance, or cosmopolitanism. This is a self-defeating reaction to nonsense. It is only natural that the populists will want to make us feel any progressive idea is on its own a terrible idea that we shouldn’t even touch. This is understandable, if objectionable. It is when the Left uses the same arguments that it becomes self-defeating.

In order to win, we will need a plurality of fierce ideas courageously held. Making us feel ashamed of our values is as unhelpful as it gets.

Fear and insecurity are both the drivers and the by-products of the main trends in our current political debate. National populism thrives on fear, feeds on fear, and produces more fear than we are able to consume. But it would be the wrong answer to just deny the legitimacy of fear. People cannot be reasoned out of the fear that they were not reasoned into – as David Hume once wrote about the very real belief in irrational things. The point of fear is that whether it is rational or irrational is beside the point.
Consequently, one already sees that the populist answer to terrorism and the possibility of military conflict is reduced to, at the European level, making the EU looking more like a traditional state, with its security apparatus, its own intelligence agencies, and even its own joint armed forces. In this sense, national populism, while being Europhobic in nature, may be providing the impetus to a much greater integration of the EU than even most of the progressives would suggest possible. As national populists emphasise the “impossibility”, in their view, of the EU protecting itself against external threats, they may well be pushing the EU into the form of the super-state they so vociferously claim to want to avoid. Again, we are falling into their trap. In order to maintain its internal peace, the EU first needs strong economic cooperation and joint tools for social cohesion, strong mechanisms of democracy, and rule of law protections.

**WHY DO WE PROGRESSIVES FALL INTO THEIR TRAP SO EASILY?**

In order to apprehend these dynamics, one has to understand the role that populism plays in politics and, in particular, what populism in the 21st century is about.

According to Jan-Werner Müller, populism is the allegation that ‘the People’ speak with one voice and that only one person (or movement) is able to interpret what that voice feels or wants to say. And what about national populism? It is the further claim that the locus for that ‘voice of the people’ can only be the Nation. National populism believes that the collective will of the people can’t be expressed any further than the borders of the Nation. The Right understands this much better than the Left: in order for the Nation to speak with one voice, one ultimately has to portray extraneous voices as not belonging to the Nation. As Viktor Orbán – perhaps the initiator of the current strand of national populist movements in the EU – once aptly said: “The Nation cannot be in opposition”. Conversely, it is evident that the opposition cannot be from the Nation.
National populism is much less about a set of coherent policies than it is about a monopolistic claim as to whom shall control any kind of policies and, indeed, all of politics. The only conversation that national populism allows for is a conversation about the undisputed centrality of national populists themselves.

This may be the reason why fear plays such an essential role in populism and also in its national populist variety. Fear is a monopolistic sentiment. When you are afraid, you tend not to be able to process other emotions or to engage in reasoning or reflection. Playing the politics of fear will drag the civic sphere to one discussion and one discussion only – usually the one that benefits the populists – and discard any vision of the present or the future that is about connection, creativity, or solidarity. Most of the time, fear does trump hope.

Many progressives recognise this, and they will, in consequence, avoid interacting directly with populists. But they will then prescribe that while one has to ignore the national populists, one should, however, engage with the questions that populists raise among common citizens. It is the well-known “do not engage with Trump, but engage with Trump’s voters” strategy, which is understandable, but which runs the risk of being severely misguided in its execution; national populists have a keen ability to occupy the centre of the debate and to monopolise politics. We can easily find ourselves, while ignoring Trump, addressing Trump’s voters only on the topics that Trump has promoted and on the terms Trump has set for the debate. Once put in such a spot, progressives will again find themselves on the losing side of a conversation that they themselves have not chosen and where they will probably have to compromise with the agenda that was set by national populists.

The reason is precisely because progressives have ceased to demonstrate conviction about their values and have started to be seen by the general population as insincere. And yet, Donald Trump or Nigel Farage in the UK are also seen as insincere. In fact, people are well aware that they are liars and cheats. They have as good as admitted so themselves. Which is why they are seen as authentic – and, in a political battle between the insincere and the authentic, the authentic wins, even when he is an authentic liar.

**SO WHAT?**

From this reality, we can derive important lessons for progressive pro-Europeans in the current debate about insecurity, instability, and change. Progressives must not avoid what they believe are the real causes of insecurity, but they must authentically and sincerely defend their values as to the diagnosis, the
prognosis, and the prescription they defend for such problems – in progressive terms. While not accepting the reactionary terms of the debate, they must, however, confront national populists. They must deride them and mock them. They must attack mercilessly. And they must do it in the political arena and in a political way.

Surely, populists and even some progressives will claim that doing so will risk us being seen as patronising, condescending, and definitely – gasp – elitist. Well, of course they would say that, wouldn’t they? Remember: whatever you do will automatically be portrayed, especially if possibly successful, as “the reason why populists may win”. This is one of the purposes of political rhetoric and one should not be naïve about it. National populists are not here to engage in a cool, cerebral, wonkish debate about policies. On this, we can learn from them: since the beginning, they have been here to invent issues, heat the political debate around their favourite topics, and attack progressives as aggressively as they can on the grounds that they have chosen.

While confronting, attacking, and mocking – with no hesitation – the national populists, progressives should then address all their fellow citizens with their answers to the problems they (and not the national populists) feel deeply about.

HOW DOES THIS TRANSLATE INTO THE CURRENT EU DEBATE?
First of all, if progressives love the EU, they have to say so. If they are critical of how the EU works, but are enthusiastic about the idea of European unification, they must voice their criticisms and address the problems they have spotted but, more than that, they must spend most of their time putting forward a vision of what Europe and our common future can be.

While recognising that the EU must adapt to face the reality of increasing international tensions, probably with an increased level of EU military coordination, progressive pro-Europeans must not waste time in moving to the issues that they feel would really address the everyday sense of insecurity amongst all of us: joblessness, inequality, ever-increasing personal debt, and the lack of a future to look forward to.

We must be bold in our proposals: a European minimum wage, a European social security, federal European universities to reverse brain drain from the South, preparation for the technologies of the future, taxation of multinational companies in the EU, Eurozone-wide sovereign debt, etc. And if someone answers that there are no majorities in the Council to accept that or EU Commissioners good enough to propose it, we must then reply to those objections, content enough in the knowledge that at least the debate is now being had on our terms and on issues that are a real answer to the sources of change and instability of today’s world.
The example of the Green movement across Europe in the 1980s is quite illustrative of the advantages of this strategy. When the Greens started demonstrating against nuclear power plants, almost all governments in Europe were strongly invested in the use of nuclear energy. EURATOM, as a treaty, was little more than 20 years old and the Greens did not need to be anti-European to criticise aspects of the EU integration process. They also didn’t need to be concerned with majorities in the Council; they only needed to point to reality and to mobilise people.

In the same way, the bolder EU proposals we are suggesting really do need to be argued for even if one has to posit a political revolution in order to achieve them. If these policies will only come to fruition in the case of millions of Europeans demanding them, so much the better: in that way, we shall have, as an end result, both the policies that we aim for and the movement that we have created in order to achieve them. And, as we have strengthened that movement in order to get those achievements, we will also have preserved and promoted the essential rule of law, human rights, democratically-based European Union that we need to fulfil the European promise.

In sum, instead of ignoring the populists while addressing the fears that they have disseminated among the electorate, what progressives must do is quite the opposite: to confront populists and their fears head-on, in order to create breathing space for disseminating their own progressive views and alternatives among the citizenry. Fear is not always dissipated by reasoned argument, but can be vanquished by a language of alternative emotions that covers a wide range of feelings, from derision to optimism, that can be stronger than fear. While stopping fear from monopolising the political debate, progressives must then put front and centre their vision of how to solve the problems of globalisation. In order to do this, we call for not backing away from cosmopolitanism, but instead putting cosmopolitanism at the core of everything we do politically.
WHY WE NEED AN EMPHATICALLY POLITICAL COSMOPOLITANISM

It is not only because we have forgotten our historical reflexes and gained a numbing distance from our core values that we have ceased to be able to act politically in the way that we have described in the last paragraphs. It is mainly because the world has enormously changed in recent times.

The existing situation of distress in the international system and of disorientation regarding an increasingly globalised world has resulted into a two-dimensional grid criss-crossed by two axes, at the ends of which lie four distinct systems: nationalism or globalisation, internationalism or cosmopolitanism. While internationalism – in effect, an intergovernmental version thereof – has been the democratic consensus in the last decades, we recognise that the challenges posed by both the current pace of globalisation and the intensity of the nationalism backlash have rendered mainstream intergovernmental internationalism incapable of satisfying the collective anxiety in our societies. We therefore argue for a return to the core progressive vision of cosmopolitanism, understood in its original political sense, as the most promising source of answers in our rapidly changing, highly insecure, world.

At the far-end of one axis, we have the current system in crisis, with its globalisation pushed forward by very powerful impersonal vectors such as technology, corporations, and ecological change. On the opposite side, we have the international system defined by an increasingly outdated intergovernmental method that vainly tries to moderate those fluid vectors of globalisation.

At the two extremes of the second axis, we have the two possible answers to globalisation and to the crisis of internationalism. On the one hand, the nationalist retreat into the primacy of selfishness according to current neo-nationalist thought: self-interested action by the State is always justified, be it for protectionist reasons or transactional ones. At the other end, opposite nationalism, we have cosmopolitanism as defined by the
extension of a citizen’s sovereignty to all the political scales where decisions must be taken.

Cosmopolitanism is the alternative in which the crisis in human rights can be addressed via international humanitarian passports for refugees and regional, or even global, human rights courts accessible for every citizen who wishes to defend his or her rights. This is the alternative in which multinational corporations can be taxed and thus provide for the resources we need for the protection of our populations and the investment into our future; where global redistribution mechanisms can be implemented, albeit gradually. This is also the alternative in which the continuing existence of the EU as an example of a highly integrated transnational entity is so crucial. This, in sum, is the alternative where real answers for real problems start to take shape – as opposed to fake answers for perceived problems that are currently being imposed on people.

Although the construction of a cosmopolitan sphere is a tall order in itself, it is only at this level that the pieces of the insecurity and fear puzzle of globalisation, technology, migrations, and addressing climate change or terrorism, start to fall into their proper places. We must not be afraid to promote these answers right away, even though their implementation may still seem to belong to a distant future – because they are already urgently needed.
THE ECONOMICS OF FEAR
HOW ORBÁN PROFITS FROM INSECURITIES

Orbán’s rhetoric is made up of a creative combination of fears: social insecurities, loss of national identity, and threats to national security all play an important role when it comes to Orbán positioning himself as the sole protector of Hungary.

Krisztian Simon: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán builds his politics on pre-existing fears of his society, but he doesn’t shy away from creating new dangers and enemies. Where do the origins of this kind of politics lie?

Zoltán Lakner: Orbán found his way to the long existing Hungarian conservative tradition (the so-called national tradition, which claims an exclusive right to this title) in the second half of the 1990s. This is partly due to ideological changes and partly to political calculations. At this time, Hungary was governed by a Liberal-Socialist coalition, and thus, Orbán realised that in order to gain political success, he had to turn his back on liberalism and transform his party into a nationalist, anti-liberal political force. This already explains some of the fears that he is building on in his rhetoric, as this tradition is suspicious of cosmopolitanism, universal human rights, and everything it identifies as contrary to or opposing the national interest, which it traces back to some kind of foreign conspiracy.

Moreover, right-wing thinking is also heavily burdened by the Treaty of Trianon, signed after the end of World War I, which led to Hungary losing two-thirds of its old territory. In Hungary, this national trauma is seen as the most obvious sign that the country is constantly humiliated and the survival of the nation is in danger – and therefore

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it is usually foreign actors (or their alleged accomplices, the Liberals and the Socialists) who take the blame if something is not going right in Hungary.

In the early 2000s, there was a social-populist turn in Orbán’s politics: after he lost the national election in 2002, he realised that his old rhetoric, which addressed merely the well-off and the middle classes, didn’t reach enough people – there was a need to speak to the marginalised parts of society as well. Although this didn’t change the actual goals of his social policies (he still doesn’t want to reduce social inequalities, and neither does he support the abolition of school segregation), he realised that there were widespread fears amongst the losers of post-Communist transition, which he had to incorporate into his rhetoric (combined with some national sentiments). Today, 4 million Hungarians live below the subsistence level, and even prior to the economic crisis, in the pre-Orbán years, this number was well above 3 million. So, there have been plenty of potential addressees for messages that were built around social security.

Therefore, by the time he was elected to become prime minister in 2010, Orbán’s rhetoric was built around three threats: the so-called “death of the nation” (the disappearance of the nation, or at least the dissolution of national identity); social fears; and the fear of the foreign and the unknown.

All three of these fears can be found in his rhetoric on refugees: he says that foreigners and potential terrorists are crossing the country’s borders; as cheap labourers they steal the jobs of locals; and with their unwillingness to integrate they are destroying our culture. Is this trinity of fears present every time he talks about a new enemy?

ZOLTÁN LAKNER: A main characteristic of Orbán’s political machinery is his ability to masterfully combine different fears. The number of combinations and variations is almost endless. Due to government propaganda, almost every topic in the country is discussed along the lines of fears and threats. This doesn’t necessarily mean that all three threats come up together, but it happens – for example, in the case of his ‘fight’ against Brussels. Since the EU disapproves of the Hungarian government’s most prominent social policy, the so-called rezsicsökkentés (the government imposed price-cuts on utility providers) and would impose austerity on the country, Orbán can position himself as the saviour of Hungary, who keeps the foreigners (the EU) at bay, protects national sovereignty, and last – but not least – shields the people from austerity (even though the Hungarian government is, in fact, cutting spending on healthcare, education and social services).

Moreover, since the government presents itself as the only representative of the people, and the
only protector of their interests – where both the ‘people’ and their ‘interests’ are defined by the government – all political opponents are labelled enemies, as we have seen in the cases of activists who were collecting signatures against the planned Olympic games in Hungary, or human rights organisations who were helping refugees.

**Why does the loss of identity play such a dominant role in security discourses, both in Hungary and other European countries?**

**ZOLTÁN LAKNER:** I would mention two reasons, though there are many, which are, to some extent, interrelated. One is globalisation, which affects our cultures, lifestyles, as well as our political and economic relations: this phenomenon raises questions regarding what sovereignty means today, and can lead to a number of different responses from politicians. The right-wing critics say that the disappearance of a national framework will lead to the liquidation of the traditions that define our identity, while the left-wing critics of neoliberal globalisation decry a lack of transnational governance that could control the borderless flow of capital. Enabling transnational governance would, however, exacerbate the already existing dangers of globalisation – say the supporters of national sovereignty.

The other group of problems is that of inequalities: today, it is not only the developmental differences between different countries or regions of the world that are problematic, as there are also growing differences within the so-called developed countries, both in terms of wealth and in terms of income. It is becoming more and more questionable how there could be a sense of shared belonging between all those people who might live in the same country, but may face very different hardships. A possible response by governments is the newly rediscovered mobilising power of national sentiments, which can also absolve governments from tackling inequalities, as they can claim that social injustices can be traced back to national grievances and are thus the faults of foreign forces.

There is an imminent danger in this situation: those governments that try to remedy the experienced uncertainty of the world by referring to the nation are, in fact, camouflaging their authoritarian experiments as the embodiment of the national will. And thus, they extort an authorisation from the voters to concentrate power in their hands.
Not so long ago, Orbán branded the foundation of Hungarian-born American billionaire George Soros, as well as the NGOs that receive funding from him, his new enemies. The vice-president of Orbán’s Fidesz party, Szilárd Németh, even said that these organisations should be wiped out of the country. Why was it so important for him to declare Soros an enemy?

ZOLTÁN LAKNER: The attack on Soros started somewhat earlier. Its roots can be traced back to the times before the refugee crisis, when the government started to attack the NGOs who received funding from the Norway Grants, right after the election in 2014.¹

At the time, parts of the public expected that, following his dynamic and arrogant first term, his second term would be about consolidation. Instead, he decided to attack civil society, even at the price of a diplomatic conflict. The reason for this behaviour was most likely that, following the weakening of the power-sharing system, and the capturing of the media, the government wanted to abolish the control-functions of an independent civil society. Since civil society organisations receive most of their funding from the state – and the decisions regarding the group of organisations that deserve funding are made by those loyal to Fidesz – independent NGOs are more and more reliant on foreign funding (mainly from the Norway Grants and George Soros’ Open Society Foundations). If foreign funds are taken away from them, they won’t be able to operate anymore, as fundraising is still not a viable alternative to donor activity in the region. The Hungarian government is presenting these NGOs as agents of foreign forces, which are said to pose a threat to national sovereignty.

¹ The grant programme was set up by the governments of Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein to support the 13 EU member countries that joined the EU in 2004 or after. Its civil society branch has funded a number of civil rights organisations in Hungary (just as it did in other countries in the region), but the Hungarian government would have preferred to have a say in who the money goes to. The Hungarian authorities therefore started investigating those local organisations that were tasked with evaluating the project proposals of the NGOs, and even raided some of their offices, which led to tensions between Hungary and the donor countries.
Since there are existing fears in society, the government will create an extra supply of fears so that it can itself decide which ones to protect from.

Of course, the demonisation of George Soros is not merely a Hungarian phenomenon: he is often accused by the U.S. right-wing of manipulating politics from behind the scenes, and Russia has even banned the Open Society Foundations. In this sense, Orbán is a talented politician, at least if we define political talent as the ability to acquire and keep power. He is able to think in the context of world politics, and he uses this ability to create threats and enemies that fit into international political trends.

Why can’t progressive political forces explain to voters that the fears the government is planting in them are unreal?

Zoltán Lakner: Partly because it is hard to reach the people. My experience in many small and middle-sized cities is that people are reluctant to attend opposition political events. And even if they do attend, they often ask us not to take pictures, because they don’t want others to find out that they were there – people are afraid that they might lose their jobs or that they would have it harder in life. This is very troublesome. I wouldn’t have thought that in my adult life I would see these conditions returning to Hungary.

This fear makes it hard to start political initiatives. Moreover, the existing political offers are also not satisfying. It would be important to have a competition of visions and trustworthy politicians, so that the messages can reach the people. We can’t expect of people to go out onto the streets, join campaigns, hand out leaflets and fight for a cause that is obviously lost. If there were an opposition which combined a political vision with a competence in policy, and thus, had at least some chance of becoming a real opponent to Fidesz, that would change a lot. If this were the case, voters would be more willing to take risks.
So, you are saying that the people have real, existing fears (in part, due to the politics and the omissions of the government), and in the meantime, the government is planting in them a range of different fears to divert attention?

ZOLTÁN LAKNER: In Hungarian politics, you can witness the economics of fear, which defines the directions and targets of the existing or emerging fears of the electorate: since there are existing fears in society, and thus, existing demands for protection, the government will create an extra supply of fears so that it can itself decide which ones to protect from. I have the impression that Orbán’s advisors know a lot about social psychology, and this knowledge finds its way into Orbán’s speeches. The Fidesz party has recognised that there is not sufficient awareness among the people about their interests, advocacy is weak, and there is no trust. Moreover, the longing for egalitarianism is not rooted in solidarity, but in jealousy. Thus, even though there is discontent, there is no one to organise a resistance – the only resistance fighter is Orbán, who fights against the threats that he himself invented.
Looking at the word afresh is a guaranteed result of Frédéric Gros’s book *Le Principe Sécurité* (The Principle Security, 2012). Gros is a French philosopher, Michel Foucault expert, and author of the bestseller *A Philosophy of Walking* (2014). No less intellectually stimulating and philosophical for being a readable ride through history, Gros sets out a Foucauldian-style genealogy of the concept of security. He sets out what he calls its four main usages, contextualising them within their historic Western origins, and ending with biosecurity (a nascent, under-theorised Foucauldian concept that Gros defines anew).

One of the book’s most intriguing elements is how Gros conceives these four disparate senses of security to interact with each other, and how they disappear and re-emerge, modernised and updated to the situation, throughout time and space. Most salient is the way he maps out the increasing importance of biosecurity and its contradictory, potent synthesis with other senses of security to make up our current notion of security.
Jesus would walk amongst and lead the living, and exploitation and cruelty would cease.

Here, security is a future time period, one which is both historically written in the stars yet needs to be catalysed in some way. Many smaller crusades in the eleventh century attempted to spark it by reaching Jerusalem, such as the People’s Crusade, made up of a rabble of desperate and landless peasants, and the poignant 30,000-strong Children’s Crusade. This belief resurfaces throughout the medieval period in the West with the idea of the coming of the last emperor who would unite the land and rule justly. It is about achieving the next stage of history – indeed, the ‘end of history’ where the earth is unified in one (Christian) Empire. It stands out for its political basis, its critique of the status quo, and its imagining of a more equal future. Many small yet disruptive millenarian movements, such as the Franciscans, driven by a desire to rid the world of evil and critical of inequality and church corruption, were brutally repressed. These movements were doubly threatening to the powers that be for promising a better life on this earth – a ‘heaven on earth’. According to some historians, the Catholic Church’s denial and repression of this ideology contributed to the supplanting of religion in people’s hearts by twentieth century materialist visions of a better world. People were given little hope of a better life in this world, so gradually moved to an espousal of ideologies which promised this, such as communism.

PEACE OF MIND
Gros’s first sense of security transports the reader back to third century Rome and Greece. This concept is closely related to ataraxia: a concept central to Epicurean, Stoic, and Sceptic schools of thought, which means “security of spirit/mind justified or not in a situation where there could be cause for fear”. Security here is a subjective state of mind, a stable and imper turbable attitude of serenity, achieved through arduous and never-ending mental exercises.

It is embodied by the image of the quintessential sage, head held high and serene amongst the swirling tempests of life, resolutely unaffected by external circumstances be they political upheaval, personal trauma, or abject poverty. This section is reminiscent of currently popular techniques such as meditation and mindfulness, and their aims of peace of mind and inner equilibrium.

THE SUNDAY OF HISTORY
Gros’s next chapter is abundant in engrossing historical detail. It describes his second sense of security: the objective absence of harm. This idea is traced back to millenarianism, which emerged in the early Middle Ages; a belief rooted in Christianity of the coming of a period of one thousand years of sublime and total peace and plenty, before judgement day. In this utopic period, the earth will be fertile, everyone will have enough, the world will be unified, and exploitation and cruelty would cease.

Here, security is a future time period, one which is both historically written in the stars yet needs to be catalysed in some way. Many smaller crusades in the eleventh century attempted to spark it by reaching Jerusalem, such as the People’s Crusade, made up of a rabble of desperate and landless peasants, and the poignant 30,000-strong Children’s Crusade. This belief resurfaces throughout the medieval period in the West with the idea of the coming of the last emperor who would unite the land and rule justly. It is about achieving the next stage of history – indeed, the ‘end of history’ where the earth is unified in one (Christian) Empire. It stands out for its political basis, its critique of the status quo, and its imagining of a more equal future. Many small yet disruptive millenarian movements, such as the Franciscans, driven by a desire to rid the world of evil and critical of inequality and church corruption, were brutally repressed. These movements were doubly threatening to the powers that be for promising a better life on this earth – a ‘heaven on earth’. According to some historians, the Catholic Church’s denial and repression of this ideology contributed to the supplanting of religion in people’s hearts by twentieth century materialist visions of a better world. People were given little hope of a better life in this world, so gradually moved to an espousal of ideologies which promised this, such as communism.
THE STATE OF SECURITY

From being wholly absent in the previous meanings (indeed the bounded nation state is contrary to the idea of a global Empire), the state and its apparatus take centre stage in this concept, embodying security through three figures: the policeman, the judge, and the soldier, representing respectively the protection of citizens and their property, their civil rights, and territorial integrity. Here Gros excavates the idea of security as one and the same as the state, from liberal thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and their notions of ‘the state of nature’ and the social contract, through which another part of human ‘nature’ is fulfilled (human beings’ presumed need for ‘natural laws’, intrinsic to them, such as equality and liberty). What stands out is Gros’s deconstruction of this idea – so often taken for granted – which intrinsically ties security to the state. Security is thus a powerful state, with strong and effective police, judiciary, and military branches. However, the judicial branch of this security is today increasingly left by the wayside as the police and the military dominate, such as during infinitely extended states of emergency when civil rights are suspended. These two senses also gradually merge, as internal policing becomes more militarised (especially in relation to protest and policing minorities), and enemies of the states are perceived to be inside the state (such as terrorists).

BIOSECURITY

These concepts appear to cover all the bases of security as we know it. What, then, is biosecurity? This slippery and little known concept has nevertheless been embedded in society for the last couple of decades, according to Gros. Security here is the “continuity of a process” – the tracing and monitoring of auto-regulated flows, be they flows of humans, of goods, of capital, and so on. The important thing to grasp here is the auto-regulatory nature of these flows. Energy security, for example, entails ensuring the regularity of a flux that must spread continuously and evenly through a territory, through the diversification of energy sources, geopolitical calculations, investment in renewable energy, and so on.
Biosecurity entails protection, control, and regulation. The protection aspect of biosecurity conceives of the human as vulnerable and permeable, reduced to her “most basic biological substrat” – physical wants, fears, and needs. In other words, the human is first and foremost a “biological finitude”, a physiological entity rather than a political subject; a living entity who makes up populations of feeding, breathing, moving, suffering bodies, rather than a group of active citizens. Security is therefore redefined as the securing of the “vital nucleus of life” of this human. This transforms the scope of what is considered a security issue to anything which impinges on the wellbeing of this vital nucleus; it results in a “semantic explosion” of the word, which can now encompass climate, food, energy, migration, information, and more.

A GLOBAL COMMUNITY OF VICTIMS
On an international level this view of protection of the human, unseats the traditional realist centring of the state as the main actor in international relations and reframes the objective of international institutions to ‘human security’, which encompasses poverty, gender discrimination, racial discrimination, unemployment, ecological problems, and so on. This can be seen in the increasing involvement of international institutions within these arenas, and the language of ‘vulnerable populations’, the protection of which is the justification for military interventions under norms such as Responsibility to Protect. Gros damningly describes this as a move from respect to compassion; the creation of a “global community of victims”. Indeed, we can see here a certain decontextualisation and dehistoricising of a political situation and the people affected by it, to just generic and homogeneous biological beings. This has also led to the mainstreaming of what some have called the ‘precautionary principle’, whereby the risk of harm to the population requires large-scale measures unless proved otherwise, reversing the burden of proof (a narrative, Gros argues, also perpetuated by the climate change discourse). We can also see echoes of something akin to the ‘risk society’. Moreover, the human’s own auto-regulated body is put at risk by the increasingly globalised flows of goods, people, food, which could contain dangerous pathogens.

MUTUALISED CONTROL
The control part of biosecurity perceives these human bodies as also uniquely genetically identifiable and localisable, whilst surveillance changes from being centralised and hierarchical to being “democratic, reticulated (reticulé), participative, privatised”. Our communications, movements, web searches, purchases, are recorded, stored, and tied to various profiles (from consumer to security profiles), retrievable at any moment, but it is spread around many
sources; not only companies such as phone operators and airlines but individuals too. This horizontal twenty-first century surveillance is not top-down; instead we ‘survive’ each other to create “a community of watchers” with “mutualised control” where everyone’s whereabouts, purchases, interests, are available to others (for example, the Find my Friend app allows you to geolocate your friend’s phone if you allow them to do the same).

Anyone having read Dave Eggers’ novel *The Circle* would find it well described here. Eggers’ novel is set within a gargantuan and hip social media platform which slowly incorporates more and more aspects of people’s lives into it – from buying everything through it, to voting, to organising everything – crescendoing into a compulsory and manic collective voyeurism, in which everyone (including politicians) is constantly visible, available, sharing, and connecting (though all, crucially, controlled by the platform). Gros’s analysis of this is as a rejection of doubt and uncertainty: “To secure the world is to deliver it from hesitations, opacity, doubts of conscience and of words.”. Indeed, this is key to his theory – drawing on Foucault’s overused yet no less true quote that ‘knowledge is power’ – which underlines the overseeing, watching, and recording of flows and processes. Traceability is at the core of Gros’s theory. The loci of biosecurity are not borders and doors – like that of state security which is about enclosing – but crossroads for flux such as airports where these can be monitored, labelled, recorded. Biosecurity measures relating to ‘food security’, for example, imply the meticulous and multi-levelled following of food across the world and across borders, by tagging and recording and following the whole process in order to know providence, journey, quality, status etc.

**DIY REGULATION**

Gros stresses the centrality of auto-regulation; the fluxes and flows are balanced and recalibrate or readjust organically according to inner needs and to outer circumstances – they are reactive. They can be thrown off kilter by outside human interference, so security consists in managing and following them. Just like the human body, they may need subtle curation, but no direct or alien interference. Regulation is about the “management of a milieu” then, rather than repression or direct imposition. And this management is not done by a centralised state authority, but, as explained above, by a democratised and organic process. This is how biosecurity takes us beyond Orwellian surveillance or the tension between rights, as in the freedom versus security debate. There is no imposition or repression; human will, human agency, does not enter the equation. The debate is centred around mobile packages of skin and bones and their physical needs and desires, and the management of the ideal way to secure their wellbeing.
This idea of auto-regulation, Gros argues, has permeated how liberal economists conceptualise the market. Capital is seen as a flow and the market is conceived like a living body, with internal processes and fluxes which auto-regulate perfectly to be prosperous; it is “an island of naturality to preserve”. The only way to maintain the prosperity and functioning of the market is therefore to remove barriers to its spontaneous and natural regulation. The principle of auto-regulation of the market is what makes it perceived as ‘infallible’; prices on unregulated markets are ‘true’ as they haven’t been polluted by alien interference. If a market is free – that’s security; it hasn’t been tainted by arbitrary and brutal laws, and by blind and flawed political will. Gros calls this the “utopia of securitising auto-regulation”. Neoliberalism has extended this logic into an entrenched and seemingly common sense dogma claiming everything is better run without interference, on an unregulated market.

A POTENT POTION

As we know, state-centred security still very much shapes our world today, yet is modified to fit biosecurity’s increasingly ubiquitous logic. This leads to the strange tension of the state’s military and police functions being seen as necessary but being transplanted from the public to the private domain, for example in the increasing privatisation of military and police forces, from private contractors in armed interventions, to private companies such as G4S managing prisons. Biosecurity shapes our understanding of economics and politics and the place of humans within these realms. Migration may still be conceptualised as a national borders issue, and rising nationalist parties certainly ascribe to the nation state the unique power of dealing with the issue, but migration is mainly seen as a flow, full of living beings who need to be recorded, classified, and followed, and whose physiological needs must be managed. Biosecurity, Gros seems to be implying, is fundamentally about depoliticisation: the markets, populations, flows of goods, capital should not be subject...
to the destabilising effect of human influence. Security is just the natural continuation of existing processes; Gros for this reason states that security is “everything continuing like it was before”. Security is leaving in place the systems fostering ecological destruction and rising social inequality. These areas are removed from the purview of democratic and political will, of human free will and agency. Humans are at once atomised and de-individualised into ‘populations’.

How biosecurity interacts with other senses of security today is another debate; mindfulness and ‘wellbeing’ as increasingly institutionalised and business-led can be looked at through the lens of managing humans’ wellbeing within the context of an anxiety-inducing ‘risk society’ which centres itself around risk and how to manage and prevent it.

Some critiques may be levelled at Gros, such as the stark lack of structural or class analysis. Considering his critique that biosecurity ‘dehumanises’ and removes human will from the equation, his own analysis, situated well within poststructuralism, fails to engage with the human wills, power dynamics, and structures that create and perpetuate these different senses of security. The omission of security in the sense of ‘social security’ – social protection and welfare systems – is surprising, though he might class this under biosecurity.

Yet Gros’s book is rich, accessible, and key reading for anyone wishing to look under the surface of our society and unpack one of its most powerful political concepts. He spins a historically engaging and contemporarily important account of what security in its various shapes means today. By defamiliarising processes and ways of talking and of acting that we take for granted, he achieves what is surely every academic’s aim: to make us look at the world with new eyes.

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IT’S THE SECURITY, STUPID!
HOW GREENS COULD SHAPE
THE EU’S CLIMATE SECURITY POLICY

Whether we are comfortable with it or not, security is now a key problem to address, on which European citizens expect their politicians to take the lead and present clear solutions. Yet, despite being the most life-threatening challenge of this century and despite numerous warnings from experts in fields from agriculture and health to the military, the direct and indirect security threats posed by global warming continue to be absent from the public debate.

Today, in every Member State of the European Union, citizens are feeling the effects of what is now becoming an increasingly unstable world. Our times are marked by the Paris, Brussels, and Berlin terrorist attacks, the war in Ukraine, the fall of Aleppo, and most recently by the first political decisions made by the Trump administration.

With a series of important European elections coming up in 2017, and the rise of an emotive public discourse about security and migration, it has become crucial to discuss European perspectives on climate security, particularly if the EU is serious about driving forward the Paris Agreement, the hard-won outcome of the 21st UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP 21). Here the Greens can make a contribution and show that they have a broad understanding of today’s challenges and can adopt a comprehensive and pragmatic approach towards protecting both our planet and EU citizens.

A NEW ERA MEANS NEW RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE EU

The latest geopolitical developments with the election of a climate-sceptic to the head of the US and the rise of new actors on the international
stage, such as China and India, coupled with a worrying rise in global temperatures in recent years, force Europe to assume its role in the fight against climate change and in the protection of democracy and stability.

2018 is supposed to be the year of ambition when it comes to the fight against global warming. At the COP21 in Paris, countries promised to come back to the negotiating table with more ambitious national action plans to reduce their emissions in order to increase the collective effort, as the current pledges still fall short of limiting temperature increases to safe levels.

All these elements, coupled with the upcoming European elections and the growing worries among both citizens and the governments about the migration issue, make it very important for Europe to influence the narrative and the ‘traditional’ focus on the security issue in order to connect the dots and widen its scope.

CLIMATE CHANGE THREATENS OUR SECURITY

Since the UN Security Council’s first debate on the matter in 2007, climate change has been understood as a threat multiplier, an accelerant of instability and physical and material insecurity. The fact that the Obama Administration was very vocal on the issue also helped to move the discussion forward: many will remember Secretary of State Kerry addressing Europeans at the 2015 Glacier conference, stressing the direct link between climate change, food security, and armed conflict: “You think migration is a challenge to Europe today because of extremism. Wait until you see what happens when there’s an absence of water, an absence of food, or one tribe fighting against another for mere survival”.

These words are as clear a verbal wake-up call for the EU to address climate change as there could ever be, not only to mitigate its negative effects and improve the quality of life of its citizens but also to increase global security. This requires both vision and the appropriate policy tools. However, on the other side of the coin, it is obvious that, while climate change can generate insecurity, tensions, crisis, and even armed conflict, it is never the one and only factor leading to conflict. Policies that ‘only’ aim at reducing the negative impacts of climate change, or which directly reduce the speed and intensity of climate change, will never automatically become security policies. The issue is far more complex and therefore requires a more precise definition and concrete proposals.

THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE EU

The EU has already engaged in quite a bit of reflection on what a climate security policy is and the role it could play on this matter: in
2008, High Representative Javier Solana and the European Commission presented some recommendations on climate change and international security and in 2012 the Council conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy were followed by a joint European External Action Service (EEAS) and European Commission reflection paper on the matter. The same year, the European Parliament adopted a report drafted by Greens/EFA Member of European Parliament Indrek Tarand on *The role of the Common Security and Defence Policy in case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters* and the 28 national Parliaments, together with the European Parliament, adopted progressive language on “the security implications of climate change” at a conference on security and defence in 2015.

In 2016, the EU Global Strategy referred to climate change as a challenge similar to terrorism and hybrid threats, and framed climate change as “a threat multiplier that catalyses water and food scarcity, pandemics, and displacement” and promised to “increase climate financing, drive climate mainstreaming in multilateral fora, raise the ambition for review foreseen in the Paris agreement, and work for clean energy cost reductions”. The very same promises were made just after COP21 by the Council of the EU, whose conclusions on European climate diplomacy after COP21 promoted the idea of “climate risk assessments and support to capacity building”.

Unfortunately, while the issue is gaining growing interest within the Council, the Commission and the EEAS, we still lack a proper definition of climate security that could trigger concrete action or develop a well-defined policy. Europeans agree on the problem but have not yet taken sufficient steps to work towards a solution.

**DEVELOPING A GEOGRAPHIC CLIMATE SECURITY POLICY**

In order to achieve more effective climate security, climate security must be understood in a geographical sense. Here, the report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 2011, entitled *Livelihood security: Climate change, conflict and migration in the Sahel*, could serve as a blueprint for defining the parameters of such a policy. In this report, UNEP pointed out that current national, regional, and international conflicts are also climate-driven. This is the case in the Sahel region (which includes everything in and between the Sahara and Sudan), where UNEP found that rising temperatures have led to water shortages and have put several local groups – whose livelihoods are dependent on farming, fishing, or herding – under strong pressure, resulting in cases of violence and armed conflict. Terrorism, migration, and socio-economic tensions in the region are also due to the negative effects of climate change.
In short, our approach to climate security would mean that a decision to act is dependent on the specific geographical area affected by climate change. Such a geographic climate security policy would first assess how climate change factors intersect with political and security factors in a given territory. Once such an analysis has led to a decision to act concerning a specific territory, the EU would then be able to plan the launch and activation of a variety of instruments. In practice this would mean that the EU would have to consider and integrate climate elements into all its relevant policy instruments, from traditional security and defence to development, energy, trade, agriculture and so on.

CORNERSTONES OF GREENS’ PROPOSALS FOR AN EU CLIMATE SECURITY POLICY

However, such a geographic or geopolitical EU climate security policy will only emerge if a number of institutional and political policies are in place. The Greens have already reflected on a series of concrete tools for the EU to put in place a robust European climate security policy and frame the debate. One fundamental element of this would be designing an EU climate security policy in a similar way as the EU’s human rights policy, which would mean that the fight against climate change would be mainstreamed into all major external policy areas, programmes, and funds (such as neighbourhood policy, the development policy, humanitarian aid, the trade policy, but also of course its security and defence missions and operations).

A key measure would be the creation of an EU Special Representative on Climate Security to lead and coordinate. Work on this matter should include the Council, but also the EEAS, given the interrelations between climate, energy-related security, and defence. Support should be given to EU delegations in the countries most at risk so that they can have a better understanding of the situation on the ground and specific climate experts should be present in all relevant bodies of the EEAS. Concretely, Greens have recommended that a specific percentage of
the budget of all external policies, regulations, funds, and trust funds should be channelled into climate change mitigation and preventive security measures in countries politically destabilised by climate change effects. A scheme based on sound knowledge of which zones are at greatest risk of conflict and instability and most vulnerable to climate change in the next 10 years would be particularly useful for countries such as the small Island States, given that their very existence is threatened by rapidly rising sea levels. The displacement of its people is a real concern that needs to be reflected upon and prevented well before the problem arises. Another element of this approach would require reducing European dependency – notably through divestment – on fossil fuel imports, in particular from certain autocratic countries with an aggressive foreign policy that threatens regional or even global peace and stability. Putting an end to gas and oil imports would contribute to reducing these states’ ability to finance aggressive moves that hinder our collective security.

Despite attempts by Greens to put climate security on the EU agenda, this has not yet led to a meaningful definition and implementation. Awareness has been raised among decision-makers but the EU has not proposed anything more concrete. The definition and exact scope of a European climate security policy remains to be seen. Europe should step forward, agree on a geographical climate security policy, and implement concrete measures without further delay. Despite holding a positive view of migration overall, Greens argue that the EU and its Member States have to address the root causes of the forced displacement of people. One of these root causes is the deterioration of livelihoods due to negative climate change effects and in some cases political and security challenges as consequence. If the EU is able, by using all kinds of external instruments, to ease these climate change-induced tensions, the security situation in our neighbourhood will improve and spillovers into EU Member States will be less likely. The world is interdependent: security improvements in Northern Africa for example will automatically lead to security improvements on EU territory.
THE WAY AHEAD

There is little hope the media or the current governments in place can be relied upon to raise awareness of the fact that climate change will exacerbate security threats across the globe, and thereby impact the EU and the lives of its citizens. This is why the Greens must step into the public debate and remind governments and EU institutions about what scientists and military experts have long been warning us about: that climate change aggravates the challenges and political instability in some foreign countries and that the EU and its citizens will sooner or later be affected and forced to take action.

This dimension of the fight against global warming should not be underestimated, particularly at a time when anger and frustration are growing among some EU citizens who oppose migration and who might support radical or more extreme political movements putting forward populist solutions that promise to put an end to it. It is in the interest of Europe to quickly widen the scope of the current debate on security and take decisive action if it is to live up to its commitments to preserve and defend peace, stability, human rights, and protect our climate.
After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and well into the 2000s, Green parties in Europe viewed military spending and national, territorial defence as outdated, called for an end to conscription, and believed that the time of insecurity had passed. Then, at some point between Russia’s invasion of Georgia and its illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the view on the security situation in Europe shifted. The countries in the Baltic Sea region, due to their position and culture, are profoundly impacted by these changes.

**MARKUS DRAKE:** In your views, what are the real sources of insecurity in the Baltic Sea region, and how will the region develop?

**ANKE SCHMIDT-FELZMANN:** The most serious threats in the Baltic Sea region stem from the strong ambitions of the Russian leadership to reassert Russia’s role as a great power. Besides the threats of military incidents and Russian military aggression, the Russian leadership’s disinterest in environmental protection and climate objectives could also have serious consequences for the region. Another challenge we face is that the trust and confidence many actors in the Baltic Sea region had for Russia was completely undermined by Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and the military intrusion into Eastern Ukraine. There are also hard military threats emerging from Kaliningrad, Russia’s sovereign territory between Poland and Lithuania. In addition, the Kremlin’s repeated use of strong nuclear rhetoric against the Nordic countries gives reason for concern. The question is whether the Russian leadership can be trusted, and how relations can be developed while Crimea remains annexed and Eastern Ukraine under attack.
ANKE SCHMIDT-FELZMANN: We should remember that after the end of the Cold War the Swedish Armed Forces took a ‘strategic time-out’. The apparent stability in the Baltic Sea region that looked like a ‘zone of peace’ was seen as an opportunity to modernise and completely restructure Sweden’s defence system, shifting the focus from territorial defence to out-of-area operations. While Sweden and the other Northern and Western European states saw relations with Russia in 2004 as better than ever, on the Eastern coast of the Baltic Sea there was a sense of foreboding.

ARŪNAS GRAZULIS: Yes, 2004 and 2005 were the turning points in Russia, with Baltic States joining NATO. Early on, Putin was rather neutral towards the Western bloc. Sure, it seemed that Russia regarded Baltic NATO membership as a bad choice, but the primary focus was on doing business. Later this changed to a geopolitical approach, like cutting off the oil pipeline to a Lithuanian oil plant, the construction of Nord Stream, as well as nuclear power plants in Belarus and Kaliningrad.

ANKE SCHMIDT-FELZMANN: To the Baltic States, the relationship with Russia has, for obvious reasons, always been central. Another important factor was that the Russian leadership decided to regain strategic control of the then already partly privatised Russian energy sector, and they did so with a clear ambition. The rapidly rising oil prices and increasing revenues made possible the reas-
assertion of Russia as a great power. Social, environmental, and health issues were given a back seat in favour of security and military interests and of “making Russia great again”. Germany’s and other western EU states’ perception of Russia’s development was completely at odds with that of Poland and the Baltic States. Already during Putin’s first presidential term it was obvious where he, and Russia, was heading, long before the 2007 Bronze soldier incident in Tallinn and the cyber-attack on the Estonian state institutions.

Which was when ethnic Russians in Estonia rioted and massive Russian pressure was put on Estonia over the moving of a Red Army memorial statue...

ARŪNAS GRAZULIS: Yes, this conflict showed the lack of potential for a peaceful relationship, like we had before. In the years of de-sovietisation, a decade earlier, statues like this were removed across the Baltics, and were put in a park of Soviet monuments, which pro-Soviet-thinking people could consider disrespect, but it happened without negative reactions from Russia and local Russian communities back then. This is indicative of the balance of power, and now that balance has shifted. Russia uses this kind of hybrid war to show both soft and hard power.

ANKE SCHMIDT-FELZMANN: Most Western observers saw the deterioration come around 2009, but it really started in 2003 with Romano Prodi, then president of the European Commission, declaring a “ring of friends”, to which Russia protested that they were special and not part of that ring of “ordinary” neighbours, and so should have a separate relationship with the EU. Now a re-writing of history is taking place, with Russia complaining that they weren’t consulted on Ukraine, although the Kremlin actually refused to be part of the “shared neighbourhood” and refused to engage. Now this is presented as ‘evidence’ of the EU’s hostility to justify Russia’s rejection of the EU’s keen interest in cooperation.

ARŪNAS GRAZULIS: But there is practical cooperation with Russia in the Baltic Sea region. I can provide multiple examples of cross-border cooperation with Kaliningrad, with Russia behaving correctly, both in Kaliningrad and Moscow. Outside the securitised area, there is a good understanding of the environmental security issues and great interest in cooperation at the local and regional levels on the issues affecting daily life.

ANKE SCHMIDT-FELZMANN: But there remains a disconnect between local politics and power politics. Good cooperation locally among the countries in the Baltic Sea region never really translated into a real sense of community and cooperation between these countries.
How about the reaction to this disconnect, and the search for a military solution to the imbalance, with Sweden going for rearmament and a return to conscription?

ANKE SCHMIDT-FELZMANN: The perception of what Sweden does and the actual situation are different. Sweden spends only 1% of its GDP on defence, and although the capacity of the Swedish Armed Forces is no longer being dismantled, defence spending has been decreasing, rather than going up, over the last three years. The decision to reintroduce conscription in Sweden is expected to come into force 2017, but only a small number of those drafted are expected to complete their military service. The main reason for the reintroduction of conscription is a serious problem of personnel shortages in the Armed Forces.

ARŪNAS GRAZULIS: I would like to defend the Swedish army’s reduction of its potential during the 1990s and 2000s. In fact, they were quite smart: they just moved their excess equipment to the Baltic States, including anti-aircraft rockets! These countries received a lot of material from both Sweden and Germany at a good price or for free. Investing in your neighbour’s security is good for your security! So Sweden and Germany were actually helping their own security by getting rid of their military capacity. Conscription was abolished in Lithuania in 2008 with the same assumption that the region was stable and that we would be protected by NATO. When conscription was reintroduced in 2015, the numbers were small and growing slowly. The large focus is also on territorial defence forces, consisting of volunteers.

ANKE SCHMIDT-FELZMANN: In Sweden, the volunteer force Hemvärnet has also been revitalised since 2014. Many volunteers had served as conscripts or had even been in the regiments that were dismantled during the 2000s. My impression is that a lot of younger people in the Baltic States, those of generations born after the end of the Cold War are now happily joining the home guard. I am not sure there is the same level of enthusiasm in Sweden.

ARŪNAS GRAZULIS: Yes, throughout the Baltics this investment is strong, Lithuania recently set the target to increase defence spending to 2.5% of the GDP, surpassing the informal NATO standard of 2%, not as a political decision but as a consequence of the geopolitical change. Putting larger emphasis on their own capacities is a shift away from the recent paradigm that the best defence of the Baltic States is the first dead American soldier...

ANKE SCHMIDT-FELZMANN: Although that may be true, we should not forget that Canadian, British, and German soldiers are going to be stationed in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, and that this is a particularly huge step for Berlin. Already the German participation in Baltic air
policing operations has provoked strong reactions from Moscow, so this was certainly not an easy step for Germany to become a framework nation for the NATO battalion in Lithuania.

**ARŪNAS GRAZULIS:** We’re seeing a shift away from the Schröder-paradigm in Germany.

**ANKE SCHMIDT-FELZMANN:** Yes and no. There are still significant differences between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats in Germany, but there is a consensus that Russia can pose a threat in the Baltic Sea region, and that it is vital for Germany to put soldiers, not only money, where our mouth is. Dialogue continues, the door is open, but Germany is leaving no doubt in the Kremlin about whom the Bundeswehr (Germany army) is ready to defend militarily.

You said that “the best defence is the first dead American soldier”. How do you think this holds up in the time of President Trump?

**ARŪNAS GRAZULIS:** Trump is a big question mark that will become clearer in the next couple of months. The first question should be how serious he is about making deals with Putin. The Baltic States, of course, are cautious, and any statement of Trump’s will be closely monitored. There is the assumption that any president will see limits set by U.S. national interests and the economy. This belief seems to be shared by Russian analysts, but they give a two-year time frame between the campaign speech and the reality settling in. Those two years might be a time crucial for the region.

**ANKE SCHMIDT-FELZMANN:** I don’t share that optimism. Maybe the new U.S. president won’t realise “how things work”. We should not take normalisation for granted, given the character of Donald Trump. We have already seen that the countries in the Baltic Sea region have moved to seek reassurances from other countries. Germany is waking up to a new reality, and the new Swedish-Finnish defence cooperation agreement prepares for defence cooperation “beyond peace”, which is quite significant.
So will these countries stand up for the idea of a European Common Security and Defence Policy, or even a European army? Are Finland and Sweden’s efforts to fill gaps in each other’s military strengths a way towards a common defence?

**ANKE SCHMIDT-FELZMANN:** Complementarity between militaries in Finland and Sweden should not be seen as a solution to the gaps in their capabilities. And the reason why an enhanced level of inter-operability is needed between Finland and Sweden is that their partners are already inter-operable through NATO. The proposed EU army has very little to do with the Baltic Sea region. The ‘Juncker plan’ rehashed in the French-German proposal at the Bratislava summit does not answer the immediate questions. Creating a European branch within NATO is totally legitimate, but what would be the added advantages of an additional structure within the EU framework that mimics NATO? The EU Army would have different ambitions, beyond being the EU branch of NATO. The plan seems to be to strengthen the cooperation inside the EU, establishing a permanent headquarters so that there would not be a need to set up a new HQ for each EU mission. But this ‘EU Army’ plan does not offer any solutions for the Baltic Sea region.

**ARŪNAS GRAZULIS:** Correct, the Baltics are not interested in the idea of an EU defence force, as it is seen as undermining NATO in one way or another, as an attempt to get rid of the key security player: the US.

Let’s move on to the Green core issues of energy security and climate change, how are they impacted by the current tensions with Russia?

**ARŪNAS GRAZULIS:** Remember that the revolution of shifting to small cars came as a reaction to the oil crisis in 1973, with Germany boosting its export of small VW Beetles! There can be positive effects. Lithuania now has a gas import terminal, so we no longer pay the highest gas prices in Europe, as was the case during the last half decade! The production of green energy has
also been on the rise for several years. It might be high time for Russia to be concerned about this, as they depend on energy exports.

**ANKE SCHMIDT-FELZMANN:** Sweden is still at the forefront, with a large share of renewables. It has been interesting to see, with the re-militarisation of the Baltic Sea region and the need to expand capabilities and develop old and new military bases, including on the island of Gotland, how the Green agenda is affecting traditional ‘hard’ military and security issues. The reintroduction of a military presence on Gotland requires new construction work, and there is resistance to this which seems to be motivated by the old peace agenda and to go beyond real environmental reasons. However, the new military architecture is taking on modern environmental and sustainability standards: new buildings and structures are planned to fit smoothly into the landscape, and plans for how to manage water use and waste from military exercises are being developed.

Another issue is the clash between new green energy infrastructure and the national military and security agendas. In south-east Sweden, a major offshore wind park was meant to supply the mainland with green energy. In December 2016, the Swedish government denied the construction permit despite protests from the local authorities at the subsequent disappearance of investments and employment. The decision was motivated by national security: their impact assessments said the wind farm would have had a negative impact on the Swedish Navy and Airforce’s ability to conduct exercises.

Finally, there’s the planned construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines across the Baltic Sea. Legitimate environmental concerns for the Baltic Sea environment and the impact on nature reserves are hardly discussed, though the increase in fossil fuels that the pipeline will bring is frequently mentioned in the Swedish debate. The Swedish government also made clear that the pipeline poses a threat to national security. Issues of the environment, energy infrastructure and supply, and the sustainable use of land, water, and other resources can no longer be separated from hard, military security concerns in the Baltic Sea region.

How do you see the differences between the Greens in the Baltic Sea region? How different are their political visions on security and their programmes, and do you have any policy suggestions on security for Green parties?

**ARŪNAS GRAZULIS:** I would say the key difference between a West European Green and a Lithuanian and Latvian Green policy is that there is less path dependence with the latter. By this I mean that the Lithuanian and Latvian Peasants and Green Parties are less bound by the ideological environmental-centred agenda. They adapt to the current situation with much larger shifts in their party programmes and political priori-
ties, when necessary. Overall, due to our specific Baltic histories, the Lithuanian and Latvian Green foreign policy positions are rather to the right, with the rest of the Greens in Europe being far to the left of them.

**ANKE SCHMIDT-FELZMANN:** It is a recent development that hard, military security issues have become intermingled with Green issues and that we have to think of the impact of green policy on these issues and on national security. I found no responses to hard threats in the Swedish Green Party programme, but rather a call for “more cooperation, more dialogue, more understanding”. I remember when Joschka Fischer supported the Kosovo intervention as Foreign Minister in 1999, and what a shock it was when “all of a sudden the Green party went to war”. Now I see Green politicians like Robert Habeck, a Minister in the Schleswig-Holstein government, and German Green party leader Cem Özdemir, adopting a hard, principled stance on security issues in Syria and Ukraine. The Greens in Sweden have managed to avoid the difficult security and military issues. This has perhaps been made easier by the Swedish Social Democrats continuing with their policy of being “militarily non-aligned”, so Swedish Greens have not had to take a stance.
In a tense climate of a ‘state of emergency’ with no end in sight, many countries in Europe have seen a clampdown on the right to protest, policed by increasingly militarised and intransigent means. The narrowing of the space for dissent has occurred in conjunction with a widening of the definition of terrorism, resulting in an alarming delegitimisation of peaceful protest in the name of counter-terrorism measures.

But the attacks continue and we retreat further. Questions are silenced. Opposition is suspicious. Police attempt to pre-empt, disrupt, and contain social movements fighting for migrant justice, climate justice and against austerity. The militarised units multiply and states of emergency are now routine, and routinely extended. Since 2015, we’ve seen states of emergency declared in Turkey, France, Hungary, Romania, Ghana, Tunisia, Gambia, North Carolina in the US, and Ethiopia. Many other countries in Europe and elsewhere have passed legislation that will make it easier to declare such a state of emergency.
A recent Amnesty International report entitled *Dangerously Disproportionate: The Ever Expanding National Security State*¹, argues that in the last two years there has been “a profound shift in paradigm across Europe: a move from the view that it is the role of governments to provide security so that people can enjoy their rights, to the view that governments must restrict people’s rights in order to provide security. The result has been an insidious redrawing of the boundaries between the powers of the state and the rights of individuals.”

This securitisation of the state gives more power, legitimacy, and influence to police agencies and intelligence agents. This has implications for social movements, from climate justice to migrant rights. This golden fleece of security is found by labelling protesters using vague definitions of terrorism, and it means that police understand protest as a threat, which justifies militarised tactics to pre-empt, contain, and disrupt.

**ON THE GROUNDS OF INTENT: PRE-EMPTIVE POLICING**

When France declared a state of emergency in November 2015, most non-Muslim activists did not foresee that it would mean constraints of the right and ability to protest. But in the lead-up to the 2015 climate summit, police used the state of emergency legislation to put at least 24 climate activists under house arrest, accusing them of flouting a ban on organising protests. The following spring, French police authorities forbade several activists from participating in labour protests or being near other protests. Their ban was justified by the Paris police chief Michel Cadot, who cited the ‘state of emergency law’ that allowed him to stop “any person seeking, by whatever means, to hinder the actions of the public authorities” from entering certain areas². Cadot argued that these people, who had been seen in past police brutality and labour demonstrations, had the intention to “participate in violent actions.”

The police ability to limit protest activity on the basis of intent is part of a pattern. Amnesty International noted that the standards of proof of criminal activity that justify intervention are shifting from ‘reasonable suspicion’ to mere ‘suspicion’ and in some states, to no formal requirement of suspicion at all.

**A CATCH-ALL DEFINITION OF TERRORISM**

The power of state of emergency decrees varies but all rest on vague definitions of terrorism.

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The French criminal code considers terrorism a number of listed acts—“including intentional homicide, assault, kidnapping, hijacking, theft, extortion, property destruction, membership in an illegal armed group, digital crimes, forgery,” and more—that are carried out with the goal of “seriously disturbing public order through intimidation or terror.” The question of what “seriously disturbing public order” means is unclear. “Preparing to commit an act of terrorism, and seeking, obtaining, and keeping material to be used for an act of terrorism,” are considered acts of terrorism. Also, “intelligence gathering and training for the purpose of carrying out an act of terrorism also falls under that definition, as does the habitual access to websites that encourage or justify terrorism.”

The inclusivity of this description with the fuzzy goal of “seriously disturbing intimidation or terror” would mean that actions like pacifist damage of military equipment or animal rights trashing of testing facilities could be considered terrorism. The EU definition is even broader, including offences to property which are committed with the aim of “seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country or an international organisation.” Given that strikes and civil disobedience actions like rail or highway blockades or even unpermitted mass marches or sit-ins have as their goal the destabilisation of economic and political structures, counter-terrorism initiatives have implications for the routine activities of social movements.

The openness in these definitions of terrorism has allowed police in France to lay terrorism charges against the Tarnac 9 environmental activist activists in France. Similarly, terrorist charges have been placed on anti-dam activists in Ecuador, animal rights activists in the US, human rights activists in Syria, opposition activists in Bahrain, and Muslim activists in Ethiopia despite the fact that none of these activists have attacked or killed people. Of particular interest is the way definitions of terrorism are stretching to include “economic disruption”.

LEGITIMATE VIOLENCE: TAKING A HARD LINE ON PROTEST

Despite political assurances that counter-terrorism initiatives will not hamper human rights, the toleration of protest is declining. Activists are monitored, migrant communities raided, and protesters arrested. In Poland, counter-terrorism legislation includes “amending the country’s constitution to give the government the power to use the army in the country for anti-terrorist operations, introduce curfews, restrict the movement of vehicles, ban mass events, and reinforce border protection.”

When protesters persist despite the efforts of emergency legislation and anti-terrorism charges, things can get ugly. Those activists who take to the streets, particularly those whom authorities see as a threat to business as usual, face a protest policing approach some observers have titled “strategic incapacitation” or “neutralisation”. In Canada and the US, this is a shift away from an emphasis on negotiation and permits, to a model whereby police attempt to evaluate the threat and risk posed by protesters. If the level is significant, police will attempt to pre-empt disruption through the spatial control of pens, barricades, or walls, or through pre-emptive arrests. If this does not succeed in

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reducing the threat, specialised units may be called in, sometimes armed with non-lethal weapons.

We’ve seen this style of protest policing become more common over the past twenty years. Indeed, weapons and strategies once used only in armed conflict are being used against demonstrators. It wasn’t until 1993 that police first used pepper (CS) spray against protesters in North America. By 2016, it had been used against protesters over 200 times in the US and Canada. In 2016, police sprayed protesters at least seven times in Canada and the US. Last year in Europe, police used the spray against Greek retirees, German and Austrian anti-fascists, anti-G7 activists, and British anti-racist activists. They used tear gas against French anti-fascists, German anti-austerity protests, and German squatters. Today, TASERs, stun grenades, and sound and water cannons are part of the police repertoire. However, in a context of emergency decrees and fuzzy definitions of terrorism, activists who distrust the police or those who wish to impact the targeted institution are increasingly seen as unpredictable, and thus threatening.

While risk and threat evaluations appear neutral and commonsensical, the logic overwhelmingly prioritises protecting ‘critical infrastructure’. Any vulnerability and risk posed to this infrastructure are considered as ‘threats’ or ‘risks’, whether they come from terrorism or disruptive protest. Risk assessments evaluate the vulnerability of a specific facility or system, with the goal of and making a decision on implementing a plan to achieve an acceptable level of risk at a cost. Threat assessments look at how attractive a target is to a range of potential attackers and sometimes at “terrorists’ capabilities and intent.”

How did we get to a point where safety means fear, and security means silence? The explanation needs to go beyond ‘responding to terrorism’. Indeed, this shift is tied both to changes in political and economic power and changes in the field of policing and security. Both have altered the way that police and security actors understand protesters and their own role in responding to protest. In combination, they can help to explain the perception of protest as threat.

GLOBALISING SECURITISATION

As is well understood, states are not what they used to be. Both neoliberal reforms, and transnational integration have meant that the capacity and desire of political leadership to be the absolute sovereigns of their domains has declined. Indeed, neither politicians nor police are able to manage transnational flows of people, violent actors, social movements, and investment. As a result, these leaders turn to transnational alliances and institutions. These range from the UN, to the EU, to Europol. This influences counter-terrorism operations through mandating strategy and harmonising operations. The UN Security Council Resolution 2178, adopted in September 2014, required states to pass laws to counter the threat of “foreign terrorist fighters”. Further encouraging integration, the EU’s European Agenda on Security argued that cross-border counter-terrorism initiatives must “drive better information exchange, increased operational cooperation, and mutual trust.” Within this regional infrastructure, there are monitoring projects like the Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), as well as the European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT)8.

This security apparatus relies on problematic assumptions about the role of the state and of police, about the danger of disruptive protest, and of the nature of terrorism. They use a flawed framework that considers threat, rather than understanding political processes and root causes. Counter-terrorism operations are making things less secure by silencing dissent, by militarising protest, and by exacerbating the racial, class, and religious divisions, inequalities, and marginalisation that stimulate terrorist attacks. If we are interested in real security, we need to move in a different direction.

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RINING THE ALARM?
ASSESSING THE THREATS TO EUROPE’S ENERGY SECURITY

When it comes to ensuring energy security, is Europe focusing its efforts in the right direction or are currently discussed measures, such as diversification, doing more harm than good by creating a distraction from the real steps needed in the current context of climate change and increasing instability?

GREEN EUROPEAN JOURNAL: It has been suggested that energy has been at the source of all the main conflicts in and around Europe. In your view, what are the real sources of energy insecurity today in Europe?

THANOS DOKOS: In any debate about real or imagined security threats, one should remember that perceived threats are as important as real ones. The dominant school of thought in Europe today is one that could be described as rather alarmist because of its strong emphasis on what it considers as too high dependence of the EU on Russia for its needs in the natural gas sector. Related concerns have intensified because of the two energy crises involving Ukraine (2006 and 2009), as well as the increasingly aggressive Russian behaviour after the Ukraine conflict (since 2014). There is no doubt that Europe’s own dwindling deposits (in the North Sea) and its increasing reliance on outside suppliers – especially in natural gas, which is a regional commodity – is a vulnerability for the EU. Since the probability of new discoveries in Member States is rather limited (with the exception of additional discoveries in the maritime zones of Cyprus or Norway – a quasi Member State), the European response to this vulnerability should consist of a combination of diversification of its suppliers and a change in the energy mix (currently, the share of renewables in the EU energy consumption mix, which also consists of hydrocarbons – oil, gas, coal – and nuclear energy, is approximately 12.5% and the objective of the 20/20/20 strategy is to increase the share to at least 20%). Substantially increasing the share
of renewables would allow Europe to reduce dependencies and increase its energy security, among other benefits.

Is the alarmist discourse on energy security creating insecurity where there was none?

THANOS DOKOS: According to the conventional wisdom on European energy security, the EU’s energy needs will continue to increase, along with its worrisome dependency on a limited number of external suppliers. The projections of the International Energy Agency show that European market demand will increase by an annual rate of 2.4% and reach 630 billion cubic metres annually in 2030. Meeting this demand becomes a difficult task, especially if it is to be reconciled with the projected plateau and eventual depletion of Norwegian natural gas over the next two decades. In addition, the crises between Russia and Ukraine, when a dispute over the price of natural gas led to the interruption of Russian gas supplies to Central and Southeastern Europe, worked as an eye-opener for many policy analysts and media. European energy dependency on Russia is being frequently highlighted, and experts and officials argue that the need to take measures to reduce it has become even more pronounced after the 2014 Ukraine conflict. As the Russian Federation is already providing approximately 25% of natural gas consumption in Europe, the European market will need to find additional quantities of natural gas from alternative sources and via alternative routes.

Competition for the control of energy resources and raw materials is certainly not a new phenomenon and has been at the heart of many conflicts in human history, although only rarely has it been the central cause of the conflict. Most often, energy resources are a contributing factor which can complicate and even exacerbate existing conflicts, but they are rarely the main cause. In many cases, the legitimate owner of energy resources is a rather weak state which suffers both from the so-called ‘Dutch disease’ and from the attention of big companies and more powerful countries who expect to benefit economically and geostrategically by exploiting those resources (especially in Africa). If there is no change in the dominant international security paradigm emphasising hard power and competitive relations between countries, it is possible that there may be a conflict between major powers (for example, involving China and the US) if there were to be global energy shortages or if their access to energy supplies was threatened by rival powers.

Although current energy security concerns are quite real and may cause friction and even conflict, there may be a degree of exaggeration in some cases, the main example being the EU and Russia.
Are the calls for the diversification of routes and providers of energy preventing the EU from having a real discussion on an energy transition?

THANOS DOKOS: Although concern about excessive reliance on Russia may be justified for countries which depend on Russian natural gas for more than 50% of their needs, it can be argued that there is a degree of exaggeration for the EU as a whole. There are continuous references to European dependency on Russia, but only rarely is the concept of interdependence discussed. Natural gas is a regional commodity (as it is mainly transported through pipelines, unlike oil, which is mainly transported by tankers, which have a much longer range and autonomy) and the customer has limited options of buying gas from neighbouring suppliers, and so too does the supplier, who is forced to sell to neighbouring customers. Russia may be using its relative advantage in dealing with each European customer separately (every great power, including China, Russia, and the US, is using the old British tactic of ‘divide and rule’ over an EU which has great difficulties acting as a single player) and ‘forcing’ higher prices. Russia’s strength is, at the same time, its weakness, as the EU countries are its largest customers. If Russia cannot export gas to the EU, where else can it sell the natural gas produced in the western parts of the country? Siberian gas can easily be sold to China and other Asian countries but Russia doesn’t have many options about the gas produced in other parts of the country. One could argue, therefore, that there is a state of relative interdependence between Russia and the EU regarding natural gas imports/exports.

In other words, diversification of suppliers is an idea in the right direction, since monopolies or oligopolies never favour the customer, but there are additional and complementary ways of addressing Europe’s energy security concerns, such as more cooperation between EU Member States that would have the overall result of reducing dependencies and increasing resilience, especially for the more ‘exposed’ Member States.

And, of course, when discussing energy security, the almost exclusive focus on dependencies on external suppliers, and especially Russia, prevents any meaningful discussion about alternative sources of energy such as renewables. It should be kept in mind that diversification may succeed in reducing dependencies on specific suppliers, but not the overall dependency of the Union on external suppliers. Only a fundamental review of our energy policies and a strong push towards renewables would satisfy both the objectives of reducing external dependencies and of managing the impact of climate change. For its own sake, but also for the world’s (given that, since Trump’s election, it is the only global player focused on managing climate change), the EU must intensify its efforts to implement the 20/20/20 policy and rapidly progress beyond that goal.
Is energy security about resilience, that is to say, European internal resilience to external shocks? And is there such a thing as an EU energy security or are Member States still too often looking out for their own energy security?

THANOS DOKOS: The current weak state of European economies and the memories of the impact of the oil shocks of the 1970s, in combination with current concerns about Russian behaviour and the possible use of the ‘energy weapon’, however alarmist and exaggerated they may be, feed Europe’s paranoia about energy security. But ‘even the paranoid have enemies’ and the EU is vulnerable to the disruption of energy flows for any prolonged period of time or to a sustained spike in the price of oil and gas. Increasing internal resilience can be achieved by closer cooperation and integration of national energy markets in
the direction of creating a European Energy Union that would take into account the interests of all its members and would allow each one individually, and the EU collectively, to deal with future energy shocks and crises. Unfortunately, the current situation in the energy sector, as in almost every other sector, is a general trend towards the re-nationalisation of European policies, instead of any meaningful deepening of European integration.

There is a rather new debate about European resilience which is still in its early stages. The idea is that the EU should be prepared to successfully withstand shocks in various parts of its critical infrastructure, with telecommunications (and especially the Internet) and energy being at the top of the list of concerns. Not much has been agreed on and even less has been implemented, as Europe was relatively fortunate not to have faced an astute crisis in any critical sector. Were this to happen, the rather relaxed European attitude might change considerably and provide the impetus for a grand political European project. Such a project would also have broad support among European societies, especially in the countries most severely affected by a crisis. Without such a crisis, however, it is rather unlikely that such a project could take off.

Are new routes and relations, be they for gas or oil, potentially fuelling insecurity and instability in the EU’s neighbourhood?

THANOS DOKOS: The diversification of gas routes is useful, even necessary, but it should not be the central objective, only one of the tools for strengthening energy security and gaining time while we implement long-term strategies for reducing our dependence on external suppliers. There are some potential opportunities regarding Eastern Mediterranean (Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel) hydrocarbons, but this would not be a ‘game changer’ for Europe, unless, of course, there are substantial new discoveries. Iran, provided the détente process holds under the expected Trump offensive, would be a different story, because of its massive and largely unexploited deposits. There should be little doubt, however, that unless our policies are carefully designed, we may end up fuelling insecurity in our already tense and unstable neighbourhood, both in the East and in the South. Any policy based on a ‘zero sum game’ approach runs the risk of rapidly upsetting regional or local balances and pushing the ‘losing side’ to extreme reactions to maintain its ‘market share’ or at least to minimise its losses. Only policies that also take into account the interests of regional powers and the existing balances of power and offer cooperative solutions have a reasonable chance of success.
Is energy security for EU citizens or for companies and businesses in this sector? What could be a progressive and green energy security vision for the EU? What about alternatives such as biofuels, divestment, decentralised production and distribution grids, and buildings and transport energy efficiency?

THANOS DOKOS: It would be naïve to argue that companies and businesses in the energy sector care more about EU citizens than their own interests. This would go against the logic of capitalism and free market economy and in that context it would be unrealistic to expect companies to behave in a different manner. But this is precisely the responsibility and obligation of national and EU authorities and institutions: to regulate the markets and prevent companies from acting solely on the basis of their own narrowly-defined interests. Companies have heavily invested in ‘traditional’ forms of energy, and especially hydrocarbons. Even if the evolving situation regarding climate change and energy security is ‘screaming’ about the need to change and for a gradual transition to alternative fuels and increased energy efficiency, the general perception is that the current high cost of new forms of energy (as far as immediate costs are concerned, as opposed to the long-term economic, security and climate change-related benefits) and their other disadvantages may significantly delay the transition process. In addition, powerful vested interests in the hydrocarbon industry and the impact of inertia will be additional constraining factors. Only large scale mobilisation and coordinated pressure exerted by civil society across the EU may convince national governments and EU institutions to modify their policies in the desired direction. Increasing energy security is certainly a powerful incentive, but reducing the extent of climate change is even more important. However, because of the constraining factors mentioned above and because citizens also decide on the basis of the short-term costs and benefits for their pockets, this will be an up-hill battle for proponents of renewable sources of energy. But the prize is so important that it makes the effort absolutely worthwhile.

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In the ‘good old days’, prior to the breakout of the global financial crisis, the Arab Spring, and the Ukrainian crisis, the security assessment for Europe, in terms of most urgent threats and answers, would have been easy to describe. One of the priorities would have been to foster further integration within the EU and, additionally, to pursue a policy towards Europe’s immediate Eastern and Southern neighbourhood that would rather gently insist on democratic reforms (while appreciating a certain stability guaranteed by authoritarian regimes). Secondly, there would have been a need to counter the growing gap between rich and poor within developed and emerging countries to avoid social and economic upheavals. And, thirdly, we would have had to address the challenges posed by global warming and climate change through a variety of multilateral measures.

Obviously, none of these challenges resulted from an immediate crisis or disruption (one caused by political decisions or by quickly unfolding dynamics and/or events), but are rather long-term problems that require long-term measures and broad cooperation.
In the last few years, however, we have seen that the security assessment for Europe has changed dramatically. The financial crisis and later the Greek crisis unveiled the unfinished architecture of the European common currency and undermined trust in a global economic system that has rewarded those responsible for the crisis. The Arab spring, which promised to bring the authoritarian states of the Middle East into the fold of a slowly but surely evolving democratic world, soon enough turned into yet another winter. Moreover, with the annexation of Crimea and with its support for the so-called separatists in Ukraine, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin showed all too clearly that he was not interested in participating in a global liberal order – one that would still be dominated by Western liberal democracies – but would instead prefer to follow his own rules.

Europe today is thus confronted with the strong leader of a weak state (Russia) who is trying to compensate for his country’s economic and soft power weakness by undermining the strength of his Western, liberal competitors, as well as by his willingness to use military force in order to achieve his goals. Moreover, there is a deep crisis of leadership and legitimacy in the Middle East that has resulted either in political turmoil, civil war, and humanitarian catastrophe, as in Syria, or in the return to a (seemingly) powerful authoritarian state, as in Egypt and Turkey, and a range of (semi-) fragile states in between those poles. Finally, Europe is also confronted with a political and ideological crisis within Europe and the Western alliance that became visible with the rise of populist governments within the European Union, namely in Hungary and Poland. The need to find a solution that helps tackle this trend became particularly urgent with the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the election of a new U.S. administration that is, for the first time in 70 years, calling into question the Western alliances and its most important security structure, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

DON'T OVERLOOK THE SHORT-TERM NEEDS

All of these crises require immediate measures due to their quickly unfolding dynamics – be it a flaring up of violence in the Donbass, or even more pressing, the huge waves of migration from the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa into Europe.

None of these crises can be resolved merely by military means, but the solutions to each of those crises have to involve hard power tools as well, be it in the form of deterrence against Russian intervention or strengthening security forces in potentially fragile states. Here, the Readiness Action Plan, which was approved at the NATO Wales summit in 2014, and with it the establishment of a 5000-strong, so-called...
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force within NATO, is a necessary first step for deterrence, and the concept of *Ertüchtigung*, loosely meaning a policy of ‘help for self-help’ that would enable fragile states to take care of their own security.

Moreover, none of these crises can be solved by one power alone. Multilateral approaches are inevitable, even if deepening ideological differences – even within the Western alliance – make it ever more difficult to act jointly. Thus, we need to tackle these crises with a carefully calibrated set of hard, soft, and smart power tools – and we shouldn’t shy away from deploying vast political, economic, and also military resources.

**A LONG-TERM VISION IS NEEDED**

Whilst Europe’s security environment has changed dramatically and the EU put under unprecedented pressure from external and internal forces, the top priority of European security has not only remained the same but has become ever more urgent, with only a slight change of emphasis: not “further integration”, but “making European integration work”; or, to put it more bluntly, keeping Europe together has to be Europe’s top priority. In order to be successful, building up ‘European capacities’ is the most promising approach, even if this has to be done via a few detours.
In order to successfully manage the threats Europe is facing in the long-term, policy-makers need to take into consideration the following four priorities:

I. TAKE THE 2% GOAL SERIOUSLY: ON A EUROPEAN SCALE WHEREVER POSSIBLE

Europe had heard about the necessity of increasing its defence spending towards a 2% GDP target even before Donald J. Trump came to power, and while the messenger may be problematic, the message is nevertheless true. Europe cannot rely on U.S. support forever; it has to build its own capacities, preferably within NATO (even if it’s only to keep the Brits on board). Needless to say, the goal of ‘spending more on defence’ has to be done through ‘building capacities’.

Europe still acts on a ‘Mac versus Windows’ blueprint from the old days of the computer age. Capacities are wasted because systems are incompatible. ‘Pooling and sharing’ has been a buzzword for years – it is high time the concept was taken seriously. After all, hard power measures have to include diverse concepts, such as ‘deterrence’ (including nuclear) and ‘anti-terror-measures’, which require vastly different means and capabilities. Deterrence only works if the means that can be employed are not only impressive, but can also credibly demonstrate that they can be deployed within a
considerably short time. Despite the agreement to establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force inside NATO, much is to be desired in this field.

It would be impossible, or worse – a wrong-headed waste of resources, for European countries to build these capacities on their own, instead of pooling their resources. Considering that security is still thought of mainly in terms of national sovereignty, an ‘island to island’ or ‘bilateral cooperation growing into something bigger’ approach might be helpful for the time being. At the 2017 Munich Security Conference, German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen pointed out how well established French-German and Dutch-German cooperation worked. This approach should be broadened so that European countries can act together when it comes to defending their borders.

II. BUILD AND STRENGTHEN EUROPEAN POLITICAL CAPACITIES AND INSTITUTIONS

Entities can only survive if there is a certain sense of cohesion. If the number one goal is to keep the EU together, then the EU has to demonstrate that it can provide its citizens with a sense of security. Nothing gives populist parties a bigger boost than a very simplified message, in which they claim that it is the nation states alone that can protect people from terror attacks and successfully mitigate the effects of migration waves. And it is the ‘bureaucratic, cold-hearted’ EU that contributed to their feeling of a ‘loss of control and identity’.

In fact, exactly the opposite is true. Europeans have gained a sense of security over the years because the EU was, and is, the number one provider of wealth through open borders and markets. The task, therefore, is to keep Europe’s internal borders open while visibly (!) securing Europe’s external borders.

A whole range of measures is therefore necessary: strengthening European border controls, especially in the Mediterranean; supporting countries logistically, politically, and economically who have to carry the main burden of receiving and registering migrants and refugees; and strengthening the cooperation of European intelligence services in their fight against terror and (see point one) move it slowly into the direction of a truly European intelligence.

III. TAKE ‘NATION-BUILDING’ SERIOUSLY AND DEFINE IT BROADLY

Fragile and failing states in the European neighbourhood are Europe’s main security challenge. They are breeding grounds for jihadi and terrorist groups, cause huge migration waves, and contribute to growing poverty. No doubt, the concept of nation building has suffered a serious blow after the invasion of Iraq and an ongoing engagement in Afghanistan
that required vast resources, but did not provide satisfying results – because no stability is possible without a political order that provides legitimacy and security for its citizens.

While ‘nation building from outside’ is a very difficult endeavour, there are different measures that would enhance this long-term goal. An example would be strengthening institutions where they already exist, as they do in Tunisia, through a range of ‘soft power’ measures: economic cooperation, exchange programmes and trainings for parliamentarians, the executive (police and military), and ‘young leaders’, as well as ongoing dialogue and cooperation with the civil society.

Such a multi-layered, long-term approach requires an apparatus that can sufficiently coordinate different efforts and provide logistics and strategic planning. While European nation states could become stake-holders in this process, it should be a vastly strengthened and reinforced (and financially beefed-up) European External Action Service that would provide the logistical guidance.

IV. THINKING AHEAD AND SUPPORTING INTELLIGENT GROWTH

Climate change and global warming are no longer on top of the European foreign policy agenda due to the perception of other crises as currently more pressing. However, these are and will be the biggest potential disruptors. There has been a whole set of political issues – the lack of civil and political freedoms in Syria, the spark of the Arab Spring, and President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal oppression of any call for reform – that have led to the biggest humanitarian catastrophe in the 21st century. However, according to a study published by Atmospheres, the Journal of Geophysical Research, a massive drought – in fact, the worst drought of the last 900 years in the Middle East (and the inability of an authoritarian regime to acknowledge the problem, let alone tackle it) – might very well have contributed to the break-out of political unrest and the ensuing civil war.
Long-term challenges will not go away just because most of our attention is spent on solving immediate crises. Poverty, a lack of perspectives (combined with a spread of real or supposed ‘information’ about life in the Western world through global media), violent conflicts, and environmental disasters are still the biggest drivers of unrest or migration into Europe. Very often, causes are intertwined and have to be tackled in a multilayered, multilateral approach through ‘intelligent growth’, investments in renewable technologies and energy sources, and smart development aid that enforces and rewards ‘bottom-up’ approaches wherever possible. Diplomacy and supranational organisations should also play an important role. The United Nations or the World Bank are indispensable partners in the field, with enormous expertise, logistical infrastructure, and vast experience.

“Wrapping your head around current crises and thinking ahead of developing crises” should be the slogan of the day. In that context, it should come as no surprise that Chancellor Angela Merkel declared last fall that we need to do much more to “help Sub-Saharan Africa develop”. Most policy makers in Germany understand that the biggest migration waves are expected to originate from Sub-Saharan Africa, and most decision makers understand that almost no other issue could have such an unsettling impact on the political landscape in Germany and the European Union as an uncontrollable or uncontrollable wave of migration.

Germany could be in an extraordinary position to contribute to the ambitious goal of ‘helping to develop’ Sub-Saharan Africa’s vast potential; as a strong believer in multilateralism, it could be a leader in multilateral, diplomatic efforts to fulfil the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.

As a leading nation in the field of environmental technology, it should be a key provider of smart, green technology.

And finally, as a strong European power, it could work for a much smarter EU policy towards our southern neighbours. Slashing tariffs, cutting down on subsidies for European agricultural products, and boosting exports from Africa into the EU would definitely be a smart part of an overall European security policy.
RIDING THE TRICYCLE

For decades, the answer to crises within or outside Europe was the never-ending mantra “More integration, please”, sung the loudest by us Germans. Facing a multitude of different challenges that rapidly develop, this answer still holds true – in a certain sense. But Germany has to sing a slightly different tune. It will have to be a leading voice yet still ensure that all other voices in the chorus are equally heard. It will have to push for more integration in necessary fields, such as intelligence sharing, common European defence, a common policy towards the southern and eastern neighbourhood, as well as show its willingness to contribute considerably politically, economically, and militarily.

Being the one nation in Europe that most urgently wanted to leave nationalism behind and find comfort in a European identity, Germany needs a much deeper understanding of an almost banal truth: Europe, or the EU for that matter, is not – and will not in any foreseeable future be – a Political Union, nor a European super-state in the making. It will be a federal entity that consists of nations with different interests, national histories, specific perceptions, deep historical traumas, and fears of losing control of their own destiny. Germany’s push towards more integration has, therefore, to be determined yet sensible. Berlin would have to signal that strengthening the ‘Paris-Berlin Tandem’ is of utmost priority. This strengthening of the tandem could even lead to a switch to a more stable vehicle. For years, I would have preferred a ‘European four-wheel drive’, consisting of France, Poland, Germany, and Great Britain; with the UK having voted for a Brexit, this has turned into a pipe dream – however, a tricycle still seems to be a possible solution, and one that is more stable than a tandem…

After all, a common European foreign policy will not evolve *par ordre du mufti*, but through the shared experience of successful cooperation.

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We live in an increasingly interconnected world, where new technology is racing forward at breakneck speed, ostensibly to make our lives easier and more convenient. Yet the unexpected consequences of these developments have led to the emergence of sinister new threats which not only put our privacy but also our immediate safety at risk.

**GREEN EUROPEAN JOURNAL:** What are the real dangers and threats to EU citizens today when it comes to digital security?

**JAN PHILIPP ALBRECHT:** The biggest dangers come from very insecure systems developed over the past years and from the fact that most of the technology we have today was not prepared to be constantly connected to the internet or equipped to face very sophisticated attacks. That makes every person and every system vulnerable today. There are many widely-used online products and systems that lack basic IT security safeguards and therefore could easily be hacked into with very damaging results today.

So, the biggest threats are invisible to us today. When dealing with banks or insurance companies, for example, individuals are aware that they run a risk of financial loss but often do not see the greater risk of what could be done with their data or with certain systems they use if they were to be compromised in the future. The point is that we just do not know all the possibilities yet, and that’s the biggest danger.

**RALF BENDRATH:** I think the main threat at the moment goes beyond data processing – it’s about connected systems that can now have physical effects. Recently, a hotel chain fell the victim to a hacker
attack that locked the doors of all its rooms. This is because they were electronic locks with a central control systems. The hackers then demanded a ransom from the hotel owners – which was paid. Similarly, hackers in the United States proved they could remotely hack into a car’s engine control system and shut down its engine, driving at 70mph on the highway, just by using the Internet from their couches at home. That can kill people. This can get worse. Think of pacemakers. You can programme them using Bluetooth without any encryption or password security. You could kill somebody, via Bluetooth, from a couple of metres away. That’s the real danger. We have not really thought about all these physical devices, which are now online.

So that’s a very tangible threat, especially given how we all want to have smart devices, from the smart car to the smart lock or vacuum clear. How do we regulate this ‘Internet of Things’?

JAN PHILIPP ALBRECHT: It’s not that we don’t have any regulation but it’s not applied! New technological developments are being made without following basic safety standards and legal obligations. There are rules but it’s not clear which ones apply to new technologies and how, so the first task is to check to which extent existing laws could apply. The second task is then to design new laws, for example on IT security.

There is today no general safety standard applicable to all these new tools – our phones, smart watches, or smart cars. We need a certain technical standard of security to make citizens safe in the ‘internet of things’. But we also need to make designers and manufacturers liable, with fines and sanctions if they don’t comply. Not only if something happens, but in general: if a loophole is detected, for example, just because of the high risk entailed.

In other words, the current legislation is not fit for purpose. The problem is that legislation, often coming from the national level, takes a while to catch up with technology. How do we tackle this?

JAN PHILIPP ALBRECHT: At the moment, many companies produce new technology and directly provide new services online. This is a problem since they don’t stop to question which laws they should comply with and instead follow their own standards and wait to see if someone has a problem with it.

Many countries are weak in applying their own regulation and laws. Companies profit from this weakness of the regulator, and whenever a state complains, usually well after the facts or entry on the market, they then invoke the fact that citizens are already using their services and products. In Europe, we have not insisted enough on having our own standards, but the weak position also stems from the fact that
we don’t have global standards. For any company, it would be close
to impossible to produce and yet comply with hundreds of different
national laws.

**Are there basic security standards at the EU level to protect citizens?**

**JAN PHILIPP ALBRECHT:** Currently there is a lack of basic security
standards and of a basic idea of secure systems and environments.
It’s as if people were using the roads without a clear highway code,
and without independent authorities checking the safety of cars
or the functioning of traffic lights. That’s the current situation,
digitally. We are not talking about excessively burdensome security
measures which impinge on the fundamental rights of people, but
simple safety standards for the infrastructure provided. The problem
here is that this infrastructure, in most cases, is built and organised
by private companies. They don’t have an incentive to apply basic
safety standards, so the political level needs to urge them to do that
– to create the legal environment in which everybody can trust that
they can go out without getting harmed. That’s the main challenge
for the moment. Once you have safety standards, whether hackers
can get into a system is a different question. We need to talk about
proportionate action and proportionate measures when it comes
to security.

**RALF BENDRATH:** In the non-digital, or analogue, world, security is
often understood as protection from physical harm. But we also know
we can’t turn every house into a bunker to protect oneself from the
outside world. In the digital world, this is different, because everything
is based on computer code. Only if my computer code has security
vulnerabilities can somebody throw a digital bomb on my house.
In the digital world, if I want, I can actually fortify my systems and
put my virtual house under a digital bunker by making sure there
are no vulnerabilities or back doors. The defence is, theoretically,
quite strong.
So, how do we ensure and enforce security in the Internet of Things in Europe?

JAN PHILIPP ALBRECHT: First you need to set basic limits and to then make sure that these are respected, to minimise the chance of attacks occurring. Then, regarding the enforcement part it is really not very different from the physical world: when there’s a crime, you go after the criminal! That’s also why it’s important to exchange information on attackers to investigate into networks.

RALF BENDRATH: Maybe it’s slightly different and more challenging than in the analogue world in the sense that it is always cross-border. Not even just within the EU – of course we have a certain level of European police cooperation and coordination, which could be improved – but we also need common rules with other countries.

JAN PHILIPP ALBRECHT: There’s a cyber-crime centre at Europol and there have been efforts to improve technical expertise and equipment in order to have cross-border digital legal enforcement. I think that investigations in the analogue world should increasingly go digital because when it comes to fighting organised crime or terrorism, the sphere of action is increasingly digital.

RALF BENDRATH: In addition to the safety standards and law enforcement issues, there’s a third element that needs to be addressed: the immunity system of the Internet of Things. Well-meaning hackers – so-called ‘white hat hackers’ – must not be criminalised if they just happen to discover a previously unknown vulnerability. They don’t do any damage if they tell the operator or software manufacturer. We should encourage that.

Manufacturers of hardened software can only fix their vulnerabilities if they are aware of them. If hackers don’t tell them because there is, for example, a profitable black market where they can sell this knowledge – especially about vulnerabilities that nobody else has yet discovered, the so-called ‘zero days’ – then they may sell it to criminals or even to another frequent buyer on these markets: the national intelligence agencies! This also means security agencies make every one of us less secure, by increasing the profitability of selling these vulnerabilities.

Surely safety standards are key but if that’s the policy response, what’s the difference that Greens and progressive forces can bring?

JAN PHILIPP ALBRECHT: That is the difference! Of course, everybody is in favour of having a secure environment, but when it comes to really demanding that a company, for example, install basic safeguards, things are different. If a website should only use a secure connection, encrypted with ‘https’, which makes it slightly
slower than the normal connection, these companies will say that they cannot comply with such safety restrictions because it’s a huge obstacle to business and therefore puts their competitors at an advantage since clients will turn elsewhere. Many political actors just accept that answer. It’s like the fight for seatbelts in cars. For a long time, car producers were convinced that if they were obliged to put seatbelts in cars to protect drivers and passengers, the car industry would be dead. Politicians accepted this until Green and human rights activists pushed for this to be a mandatory requirement. We shouldn’t underestimate how important even slight, minimal changes to this system would be for consumers or how hard the industry will fight them.

RALF BENDRATH: Maybe Greens are quite uniquely positioned here because we’ve always been very strong on digital civil liberties – against mass surveillance of our telecommunication, for example – and because of that, we have traditionally worked together with people who know this digital stuff much better than we do, such as the hacker community, like the Chaos Computer Club in Germany. That has enabled us to understand earlier than other political parties that we really have to go after the root causes. The approach from other political families usually either calls for more surveillance or sets up helpful but weak private-public partnerships.
This discussion also brings us to very geopolitical and material questions that were asked after Merkel’s phone was tapped and Brazil’s NSA surveillance led to ideas of having ‘independent’ undersea optical fibre cables.

RALF BENDRATH: If we make the systems more secure, it doesn’t matter if a criminal or an intelligence service wants to attack me and break into my computer. If my computer is safer, then all of these threats, to a certain extent, are reduced.

We would then need European computers, because if these products come from elsewhere then we cannot regulate the manufacturer.

RALF BENDRATH: Yes, that’s the point. If it’s free and open source software, it’s already easier. The European open source industry is like a sleeping giant with the companies and movement behind it. The Snowden revelations also indicate that we should think about regaining the capacity of producing hardware within Europe that we control, and not rely on China or the US, like we did with Airbus to overcome our dependence on and the monopoly of Boeing.

JAN PHILIPP ALBRECHT: Europe has been very naïve in that regard in the past. We’ve sort of accepted that devices coming from the US or China are ok and we didn’t think that it was important to check on the telecommunications companies that installed software and manufactured our connected devices. If we really want to have a safe environment, then we need to control what’s in those devices and software. That doesn’t mean producing everything in Europe, but it means that if we buy something from somewhere else, where the rules – and also political interests – are different, we must check every little detail in the system.
The Snowden revelations were a turning point because it made politicians in Europe realise the scale of the problem – and that authorities cannot assure citizens, one hundred percent, that what is happening in their name or on their systems is within the law. That questions the basic principles upon which our democracies are built. In order to make sure that authorities are acting in accordance with the law, they need the capacity to check their systems. If they use products, such as Microsoft systems, where they don’t have access to the full source code, then maybe they should be forbidden to continue using them. They should be forced to buy an alternative. In my constituency, somebody is building an alternative to Microsoft systems already, which is open source, but it just isn’t being bought. It’s strange, because European authorities could be far better off and in better control of what’s happening if they simply invested in a different alternative.

In Europe, there is still far too little awareness about these things, not only amongst the public, but especially within policy makers’ circles. In particular, if you think two steps ahead and think of the intelligent machines which programme on their own, there will be a huge question of how to deal with this, politically, socially, and ethically. We have not yet grasped the extent to which this will affect our lives. I hope that we will be able to further develop and educate ourselves on this, quickly, and without the need for drastic, negative events or situations such as the Snowden revelations to make us realise that this is really important.
Do you see evidence that momentum is building, at the political level or among grass-roots activists, for action to be taken in this area? Can we expect this to be one of the main issues in the next elections, in Germany or at the European level?

JAN PHILIPP ALBRECHT: Rather than digital security, the main questions coming up in the elections taking place in Europe this year will be security in terms of how to fight terrorism and deal with external borders and the refugee and migration question. This is, I think, a big mistake, because forward-looking questions on digital security really need public awareness and political debate. It’s not a basic security question. In the future, we will be faced with the fact that many jobs, from insurance agents to investment bankers, will no longer be done by humans, but algorithms. Maybe there will even be automated, autonomous tanks going to war. We will certainly have to deal with the question of which ethical guidelines are necessary for such developments and what the consequences are for the humans who worked in those areas before. Along with the consequences for the social system we have to deal with the fact that all of this is vulnerable to digital attacks, technical mistakes, and insecurity. It impacts all areas.
SOCIAL POLICIES AS TOOLS TO PROMOTE SECURITY

One of the most important roles of social institutions is to promote stability and predictability in society. In the Nordic countries, the welfare state has helped to mediate between conflicting interests, contributed to the stability of society, and enhanced trust and social cohesion more cheaply and effectively than policing and strong armed forces.

The 30 years following the Great Depression and World War II were an era of rapid economic growth and prosperity among Western countries. Since then, the growth that has occurred has benefited mostly those at the top. Growing inequalities have shaken the foundations of developed societies, threatening stability and creating great uncertainty about the future direction of the security situation in Europe and in the world.

Since Brexit and Trump’s election in 2016, the leading political commentators in the West have unanimously pointed to globalisation as the culprit. Economic globalisation, boosted by the digital revolution, has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of absolute poverty, for example in China and India, whilst the middle classes in the developed countries are losing ground. They have witnessed wage stagnation and rising inequality in incomes and wealth. The digital economy is hollowing out not only blue-collar but also white-collar jobs, creating widespread insecurity and pessimism with regards to the future.

The political solution taken up by Great Britain and the United States is to retreat from global cooperation and concentrate on internal problems. Re-emerging provincialism is jeopardising global efforts to respond to the challenges we face, from climate change to weapons.
of mass destruction. In Europe, the tendency to prioritise local and national concerns over European-level issues is undermining the very idea of European unity. Is there a solution that can provide a positive outlook for the future?

**INCLUSIVE INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL TRUST**

Two influential economists, Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson, argue in their book *Why Nations Fail* (2012) that the success or failure of any society is determined by the type of institutions it has developed. Extractive institutions, in which a limited group of individuals do their best to exploit the rest of the population and natural resources, sooner or later lead to destruction, while inclusive institutions, in which all members of the population participate in the process of governing, guarantee long-term success.

In terms of security, inclusive institutions go beyond national and territorial security to ensure human security. The crucial question in the current situation, then, is how to build inclusive institutions in a globalised world. The Nordic countries, with their small and open economies, are especially vulnerable to external negative shocks. Due to their limited capacities to control globalisation they have created unique institutions to protect their citizens in the wake of economic and social crises. These institutions contribute to building safety and trust. Social trust is essential for the development of inclusive institutions. This is because when people trust each other, they can work together and cooperate for common purposes, which enhances economic growth. The idea of the importance of social trust for social and economic development has deep roots in economic thought. Trust, as argued by Francis Fukuyama and Robert Putnam, makes the emergence of a commercial free market society possible. The central argument is that the success of societies depends on the bonds of trust which help societies flourish.

In this context, trust and feelings of personal safety are of special interest. In high-trust countries, people trust in one another and in their national institutions. This is a virtuous circle: just institutions generate trust and trust generates just institutions.

Social trust also relates to taxation. People are willing to pay high taxes when they are confident that the state is using this money for necessary purposes and that the exchequer is trustworthy. As a form of social capital, trust enables societies to better and more effectively accumulate resources and accomplish various tasks, whether that be providing meals for school children or preserving the wilderness.

The key ingredient in the creation of inclusive institutions in the Nordic countries is trust.
What distinguishes the Nordic region from many other countries is that the state has come to be strong and powerful enough to resist becoming harnessed as merely a vehicle of certain interests. Thus, the state has been able to make plans and decisions centred around the collective or national good, instead of only the interests of certain groups. Very early on, the Nordic countries also established a functioning local-level democracy that was combined with, and coordinated by, the central government. The rule of law was binding for everybody, even at the highest levels of the political structure.

In the early 1900s, the Nordic countries were poor by European standards. Gradually, by simultaneously strengthening public institutions and promoting free enterprise, the Nordic group began to improve its economic performance, and today the countries are amongst the richest in the world.

UNIVERSALISM

In theory, everybody in a fair society both contributes to and benefits from the system. There is no wedge between the well-off contributors and the poorer beneficiaries; there is no room for a ‘welfare backlash’. The public institutions cater for even the poorest individuals in society. Universalism is also an expression of human rights, and aims to break the cycle of intergenerational transmission of social advantage and disadvantage, on the grounds that nobody’s life chances should be dependent upon their parents’ social standing.

The basic idea of the Nordic model is to pursue universal welfare state policies, which means that public programmes, services, and transfers are designed to serve everyone living in the country. In many other countries, especially in Central Europe, similar schemes have been based on membership of a certain occupational group or category of people, leading as a result to strong intra-group interests and strong animosity between groups.

Universalism is maintaining the virtuous circle. Strong public institutions enforce social trust, which promotes democratic participation, the rule of law, and public support for the development of these same public institutions.

There is also a technical advantage to universalism: the administrative cost-efficiency of universal programmes. The strength of universal systems, be they flat-rate or means-tested, is that they reduce ‘transaction costs’ on the labour market. Individuals, firms, and unions do not have to spend time negotiating the provision of basic insurance and services like healthcare. Furthermore, they promote mobility and flexibility on the labour market because the universal character of the system means that workers do not lose their earned rights when they move from one job to another.
One aspect that is greatly neglected in the public debate is the fact that it is, in principle, easier to control the incentive structure and increases in spending in universal homogenous systems than it is in fragmented systems. The expansion of health costs is a telling example of this: since the 1970s, healthcare expenditure have skyrocketed in decentralised or insurance-based schemes such as in the United States, whereas the cost increase in state-provided health systems has been more modest.

SOCIAL INVESTMENTS

Inequality per se is not necessarily unjust or unfair and a cause of social unrest. Much depends on the mechanisms that produce inequalities. Some people work harder, educate themselves, make better use of their resources etc. It is justifiable that some people earn more than others. If hard-working individuals cannot get ahead, they lose faith and begin to rebel. On the other hand, many people feel that their employment and livelihood are endangered due to global market forces that are impossible for nation states to harness and regulate. This is an ongoing debate in several countries around Europe. The nation state, and to an even greater degree the European Union, has lost a part of its credibility in the eyes of those who see their children’s and their own life opportunities deteriorating. This is the breeding ground for populist movements. Disillusionment in the European project, fuelled by these movements, is hindering the European Union from operating in the global arena to find problems to global security threats.

The Nordic counter strategy against this type of defeatism is investment in human capital and risk-prevention measures. Behind this social investment strategy is the notion that the road to a stable society is not merely about expenditures and compensation for risks, but more importantly, about enhancing human capital. Where, when, and to whom you are born evidently determines your life chances. This implies a loss of human capital among those unfortunate enough to be born with a less socially privileged background, in dire economic times, in
areas of social or economic disarray, or, as is often the case, in a combination of the three. Education, and social and health services aim to give individuals the opportunity to live a decent life independently of their socio-economic background and capacity to pay.

The Nordic social investment strategy recognises the inputs or social investment policies and the outputs – or the returns – of social investments. For example, future mothers’ sufficient nutrition during pregnancy is a precondition for a healthy society. Universal prenatal healthcare and training in parenting skills to ensure a healthy start for infants are steps towards a good and just society. In early childhood, childcare and pre-school education make up an important part of the social investment, as the child’s future success in education and in the labour markets rests on good cognitive and non-cognitive skills that have developed in these formative years.

As for other investments, the rate of return tends to be larger the longer-term they are. For example, childcare may give superior returns than the rehabilitation of older workers. In the early years, returns are mainly cognitive and social in nature and the size of the return increases over the years.

The Nordic vision of education is that girls and boys from less privileged backgrounds should receive an education on par with children from more privileged backgrounds. The education system is crucial for determining to what degree children inherit the situation of their parents. Thus, there are strong levelling ideas behind education systems. The notion of universal access to education was a prominent philosophy in the mass-education systems in the Nordic countries.

Grass-roots level educational systems were harnessed to accomplish the task, and – as in the case of the people’s insurance – the very name of the educational system, *folkskola/kansakoulu* (people’s school), indicates the overarching idea that the whole population should have equal access to education. There are no tuition fees at any educational level including universities. All students receive allowances for living expenses and housing. The Nordic educational system is geared towards promoting equal opportunity. This allows the full mobilisation of the nations’ human resources, to boost innovation and economic development.

**THE NORDIC RECIPE**

The Nordic countries can serve as an example of how combining gender equality with high levels of labour force participation and fertility can promote human security and social stability, and how social investments in children promote human capital accumulation and boost intergenerational mobility.
It is necessary to emphasise that the high placement of the Nordic countries on various “best country” rankings, such as the United Nations’ Human Development Index, certainly does not mean that all problems have been solved. Rather, it is an indication that they have the same problems as other countries but on a smaller scale in some areas. For example, populist right-wing movements, which are hostile towards migrants, are also gaining ground in the Nordic countries. However, the Nordic countries continue, by varying degrees, to rely on universal policies to ensure social cohesion.

The core message from the experience of the Nordic countries is that inclusive institutions are self-reinforcing. While democratisation can create pressure for more developed and more inclusive public institutions, public institutions can also contribute to democratisation. Universal social policies are an effective tool for establishing a sense of ‘usness’ and creating social cohesion among the populace. A universal social policy, to which everybody contributes, and from which everybody can expect benefits when in need, creates strong social bonds, bridging various social gaps and cleavages. Universalism is important not only for social security and basic rights, it is also a trademark of a fair society that guarantees equal possibilities to every person regardless of their individual background.

Universal and free basic education should be open to everybody regardless of gender, social background, race, or ethnicity. Social and health benefits should cover everyone. High quality childcare and school services provide equal possibilities for all children. All human beings are born free. This principle sets standards for the educational systems from early childhood schooling up to the educational possibilities for adults and elderly people. Social and educational institutions have to remedy unjust disparities and to provide people with the capacity to take full responsibility for their own lives. If they are successful they will create social trust and stability, which will in turn enhance a sense of security overall.

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I wrote these words in January 2015, when broken pencils filled my social media feed, accompanied by proclamations of “Je Suis Charlie”. Even I, for a moment, felt that I was Charlie, because despite wearing the skin of the ‘Other’, the very Other we were all Charlie in reaction to, in that moment I was first and foremost a journalist in the West, sitting in my newsroom with my colleagues as horrors unfolded 344 kilometres away from us in Paris. Over the next few days, weeks, and even months, I took in and read endless think pieces about the massacre, denouncing the attackers and more often than not absolving the magazine’s editors of any criticism levied at them in the wake of their deaths – freedom of speech was absolute. Torn, I turned to poetry. Black Lesbian Womanist, writer, poet, and activist Audre Lorde said in her seminal work *Sister Outsider*:

“Poetry is not a luxury. It is a vital necessity of our existence. It forms the quality of light within which we predicate our hopes and dreams towards survival and change, first made into language, then into idea, then into tangible action.”
Lorde’s work focused on notions of identity, belonging, and Otherness. Just as Black Feminists and Womanists of her time and before, she highlighted the need for intersectional analysis of the human experience. At the same time that we were Charlie in January 2015, we were not 2000 Nigerians massacred in the town of Baga, in the North-Eastern state of Borno; we were not the twenty-odd Maiduguri victims; and we certainly were not 132 unarmed school-children in Peshawar, Pakistan, a month earlier; or even 147 slain university students in Garissa, Kenya, in April 2015. We were none of the aforementioned because the aforementioned are society’s Other.

The Other must exist so that there can be an opposite of it – those who ‘belong’. Those who belong can be related to, empathised with, and understood. We can make sense of their humanity because it is supposedly like our own. The Other is a threat to what we understand and accept in Western society.

Security to contain the ‘threat’ of the Other and surveillance of those who don’t belong have come to be considered two of the most important matters of our time – arenas in which intersectional politics are played out most clearly. Why? Because the question of security in the first place and of who poses a threat is not a neutral one.

As Nitisha Barnoia, editor-in-chief of the Berkeley Political Review, noted on January 24th 2015:

“With the rise of terrorism across the globe, militant Islamic groups like ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Qaeda are beginning to conduct attacks and commit atrocities one after the other, often at the same time. Understanding the global threat that terrorism poses requires paying attention to and addressing each of these attacks – and yet media coverage and political attention has historically focused on those in the West, despite the disproportionately lower death toll they bring. This skewed coverage is concerning not only because it seems to imply a disregard for non-Western lives, but also because it incentivises world leaders to address only those issues which attract widespread public – and by extension, Western – outcry… Paris, Baga, and Peshawar may be separated by culture, geography, and language, but they are also united by a common enemy…”

Barnoia poses the question: why did the world ignore Baga and Peshawar and choose to only focus on Paris, despite all three places falling victim to terrorism at similar times?

The answer is that the victims of Baga and Peshawar were Black and Brown.

Black and Brown bodies have historically been positioned as the aggressor and never the victim; the threat and never the threatened. The sickening narrative surrounding the modern-day global refugee crisis is a terrifying example of this. Polarising those who belong
against those who do not allows for hateful voices to call immigrants and refugees “cockroaches” in national newspapers with audiences of millions of people, under the guise of freedom of speech. Reducing human beings in desperate need – often a result of warfare curated and facilitated by the West – to “swarms” and “hoards” living in “jungles” in Calais is a dehumanising practice we’ve come to be familiar with. These efforts to desensitise the public make it easier for the powers that be to refuse safety to thousands of refugee orphans, and countless Black and Brown people fleeing conflict and destruction. Creating a divide between those who belong and those who are Othered justifies the scapegoating of victims, and distracts us from holding to account those who are truly responsible for the world’s atrocities and injustices.

Anxiety levels are now at 96.5 per cent, Houston

And I think we have a problem

I can’t take it anymore

Father and brother are in the bathroom
shaving their beards and all their facial hair

Mother has decided she can’t wear her hijab anymore

Not today

Not for a while

And we are all apologetic

Even though it’s not our fault

EXTRACT OF “SWEET DREAMS AND BEAUTIFUL NIGHTMARES”, FROM ELEPHANT
The obsession with framing Blackness and Brownness as threatening has very real consequences for those racialised as Black and Brown. In Britain, we are disproportionately represented in the poorest housing, the worst schools, mental health institutions, and overcrowded prisons. According to a report by Inquest, since 1990, over 1500 people have died in, or following, police custody or contact in the UK. A report by the Institute of Race Relations shows that of this number, roughly a third were Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) individuals. Research from 2012 conducted by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) found that British police were up to 28 times more likely to stop and search black people than white people. Black neighbourhoods in Britain have historic tensions with police forces because of over-policing and excessive force used against black bodies. Young black children are taught from an early age, more often than not, that at some point, an officer will stop and search them, regardless of how ‘respectable’ they may appear.

This ‘them versus us’ framing can be traced back hundreds of years, but in more recent living memory, sixteen years ago, one particular moment changed the West’s relationship with the Other. Prior to 9/11, few of us had heard of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, or ISIS. The US deported half the number of people it deports today and its surveillance state was a fraction of the size it is today. America’s War on Terror – certainly prompted by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 – resulted in a dramatic change in the West’s attitudes and concerns around surveillance and vigilance.

The U.S. War on Terror has manifested itself as a de facto reality for Brown and Black people within and outside of the USA as well as a de jure lived experience. In Britain, the British government’s badly flawed and counterproductive ‘Prevent’ policy has trampled on the basic rights of young Muslims. Following a nine-month examination of the strategy, the Open Society Justice Initiative recommended a major government re-think, particularly in regards to the use of ‘Prevent’ in schools and
in the NHS. The NGO uncovered several cases in which information was apparently gathered from Muslim primary school children without their parents’ consent. They also found examples of ‘Prevent’ being used to bypass official disciplinary processes, such as during the attempted dismissal of a school dinner lady, and in the case of a 17-year-old who was referred to the police by his college authorities because he had become more religious. ‘Prevent’ policies have also led to the cancellation of university conferences on Islamophobia.

Particularly startling is the surveillance of children and its potentially devastating consequences – as demonstrated by the distressing example of the Lancashire primary school boy who wrote that he lived in a ‘terrorist house’, instead of a ‘terraced house’, leading to his family being reported to the police. For every one of these stories that hits mainstream media, countless others go unreported. In this way, ‘Prevent’ policies have contributed to the intensifying of pre-existing suspicions of Muslim students as well as potentially planting new seeds of suspicion and paranoia where they did not exist before.

During an interview with poet, activist, playwright, and musician Benjamin Zephaniah, for my upcoming documentary, 1500 And Counting, we discussed the surveillance of Black and Brown people in Britain, particularly those known for being outspoken about police brutality, corruption, and institutional racism. He said that policies like ‘Prevent’ encourage communities to turn against each other, in the same way that house slaves policed the slaves toiling in the cotton fields. During my most recent visit to the family of Sheku Bayoh, a British-Sierra Leonean man killed by Scottish police in May 2015 – his death being the reason why I embarked upon producing my documentary – his family spoke of the intimidation they endured in the aftermath of the death of their loved one. They were under surveillance, treated with suspicion and contempt despite being the victims. In the 2016 film, Generation Revolution, a documentation of Black and Brown activism in London at the height of Black Lives
Matter UK protests and uprisings, one of the main protagonists of the film, Joshua Virasami, spoke of the heavy surveillance he and his family were under because of his numerous clashes with the police as a result of direct action carried out as part of the work of anti-racist groups such as The London Black Revs and Black Dissidents. The activism of young brave Black and Brown revolutionaries against police brutality in the UK, institutional racism, and the ongoing mistreatment of Black and Brown people in every sphere from housing to healthcare to education, is rewarded with violence and constant fear of being locked up.

But the pushback is real and raw and Black and Brown millennials have used social media as a means to move from the margins to the centre in expert ways, amplifying their otherwise silenced voices and taking up space. This gaining of visibility has also meant an increase in perceptions of the Other as a threat. It’s no surprise that one of Trump’s first moves as president is to call for a registry of Muslim people, which would include their social media activity. It’s also no surprise that the Trump administration has vowed to “crack down” on Black Lives Matter protestors. What started as an online movement is now a global modern-day civil rights struggle, resonating everywhere from South Africa to Kenya to Brazil, and of course the UK.

In a world where Trump is president, Britain is marching towards Brexit, Marine Le Pen is on course to become France’s new president, and fascism is mainstream and normalised once again, where do we go from here? Just as Lorde spoke of poetry being a necessary tool of dissent, she also concluded that: “Black and Third World people are expected to educate white people as to our humanity. Women are expected to educate men. Lesbians and gay men are expected to educate the heterosexual world. The oppressors maintain their position and evade their responsibility for their own actions. There is a constant drain of energy which might be better used in redefining ourselves and devising realistic scenarios for altering the present and constructing the future.”
To refine ourselves, devise realistic scenarios for altering the present and constructing the future, we must also redefine what it means to be the Other. Security is not a neutral issue when the world is constructed on the dichotomy of whiteness as the default for all humanity and Blackness and Browness as deviant and dangerous, as disposable bodies worthy only of suspicion instead of the fullest humanity.

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GENESIS OF FEAR
THE CASE OF SLOVENIA

In January 2017, Slovenia’s Parliament approved amendments to the country’s Aliens Act, proposed by its centre-left government, effectively allowing the border to be closed not just to migrants but also to refugees seeking protection. Despite drawing significant international criticism and raising questions regarding a potential breach of international conventions, the move was met with popular approval. So how can we account for the perception among Slovenia’s general population that migrants pose a threat?

Slovenia experienced the first influx of refugees across the Balkan route in September 2015. People were glued to their TV screens and social media, observing the first 3600 migrants enter the country.

In the following weeks and months, almost half a million people entered Slovenia. Most subsequently left, yet the images of masses of desperate people crossing the country were haunting. It was an organisational challenge, it was a security challenge, and it was a humanitarian challenge. By early 2016, it had ceased, but in a few months it had changed the people of this country. It fundamentally changed civil society, local communities and, last but not least, politicians, political parties, the political mood, and the country as such.

EXPERIENCE FROM THE 1990s
This was not the first time Slovenia and Slovenians faced a significant influx of refugees. War in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia...
and Herzegovina, ravaged the region in the 1990s. In December 1991, there were around 23,000 refugees from Croatia, most of which had left by the end of 1995. 1993 saw around 70,000 people from Bosnia seek refuge in Slovenia. Most of them were Muslim and almost all of them – more than 90% – were women, children, and the elderly. They stayed for several years. Shelters were set up, schools were organised at first, but eventually the children were transferred to the public school system. There were of course some sporadic nationalistic outbursts, but nothing truly major.

Nevertheless, it would be counter-productive to compare this national experience with the current migration flows. The refugees who came in the 1990s were seen by most Slovenians as our brethren. Many families had at least some relatives, friends, or acquaintances in the republics devastated by the Yugoslav war. Slovenians knew we were lucky to get away with a 10-day war for independence when we broke away from Yugoslavia. It was a struggle we, on some level, shared with the people coming to us for help and shelter. Make no mistake, even back in the 1990s, Slovenia was fundamentally conservative when it came to foreigners and national, racial, or religious minorities. But until very recently, other national (from outside the region) and racial minorities have been virtually non-existent. And Slovenian society had its other outcasts – the members of the LGBT community and, most of all, the Roma. For years, the Roma ranked top in surveys asking people whom they would least like to have as neighbours. Fast forward to 2015.

**IT WAS BOUND TO HAPPEN**

With Hungary closing its border first with Serbia and then with Croatia, refugees had nowhere else to go. One of the initial problems in the second wave (October 2015) was the scattered way in which Croatia let the refugees try and cross the border. Instead of bringing them to designated crossings, where suitable infrastructure was set up, they would let thousands of them leave the trains and try to cross the border by foot virtually anywhere. This led to chaos. While people tried to cross ice cold rivers, the bureaucratic process of registration was slowed and it caused many to get stuck between borders in the cold and rain. After the initial complications, the organisation of transport to the Austrian border and care for the people was organised relatively well. The authorities managed this difficult situation well from an organisational standpoint. The police were doing their best, many of them showing immense humanity and compassion. Around 4500 people joined organisations such as Slovenska Filantropija and Red Cross as volunteers in refugee camps, whilst others organised collections of food, clothing, blankets, and other necessary supplies. There was a huge expression of solidarity and empathy.
But there was also another side to the story. From the very beginning, some started openly advocating that Slovenia should follow Hungary’s lead; right-wing politicians were eager to praise Orbán’s strategy of closing the borders, opposing the quota system, sometimes even demanding ‘they’ be sent back. Initially this did not dominate public sentiment, but it certainly took root and, within a few months, started to spread like wildfire.

**SLIDING AWAY FROM EUROPEAN VALUES**

And there was fear. Fear grew amongst rural populations, most of whom had never seen a foreigner of a different skin colour or from another culture and religion, in person. The fear also grew amongst the urban population, fuelled mostly by right-wing ideology. But the parade of fear was headed by the Slovenian authorities themselves. In order to “protect the population, to provide security, and law and order”, the Slovenian parliament adopted an annex to the Defence Act, giving the army special powers to intervene on the borders “if necessary”.

This government-driven fear stemmed from the following prospects: the possibility that Austria would start sealing off its border, that Croatia would once again break the agreement on an orderly transfer of refugees, that Slovenia would be left out of the ‘mini Schengen’ that was being discussed at that time, and that the right-wing would use the momentum to secure majority popular support. All of these were real threats. But because of this the centre-left government chartered a course of no return, slowly but surely sliding away from basic principles of human rights, as well as away from the core European values and principles.

**IT’S NOT A FENCE, IT’S A TECHNICAL BARRIER**

In November 2015, the Slovenian authorities began to build a wire fence along the border with Croatia, or ‘technical barriers’ as they were dubbed by the government to make it sound more humane (as if a barbed wire fence designed to keep people out could ever be humane). The fence was erected along the Schengen border. The government used the fear of Slovenia becoming a pocket filled with migrants, propagated by most politicians across the political spectrum, and by security experts, as one of the main arguments. Often it was pointed out that only in this way would Slovenia be able to provide orderly support and help for the migrants, because they would have no other way than to come to the official points of entry to the country.

There was some resistance to the fence from civil society, but not even remotely enough to make the authorities rethink their actions. Society at large started to reflect on what was
going on after the initial shock. It was clear this was not going to end overnight and nobody – either at the European or national levels – had a viable plan. The Balkan route started closing. You could almost hear the unbearable sound of fortress Europe’s doors – or better fences and walls – slamming shut. The tacit consent of the majority as they lowered their heads, keeping quiet and allowing the government do whatever it would take to keep “them” out, was almost palpable. Not all of my fellow citizens felt this way, but many did.

LACK OF AN EXPLANATORY NARRATIVE

It bears noting that the role of the major mainstream media outlets was rather exemplary. Considering the circumstances, no major news outlet systematically contributed to anti-migrant sentiment, mostly simply doing their job in reporting the situation. There were occasional slip-ups, but insignificant compared to those in other European countries. A different story played out on social media and small right-wing platforms. The fear and nervousness spread. Hate, unfortunately, did as well.

But the main problem was a lack of a relevant explanatory narrative from the government. It was quick to explain what it was doing and why, what it would do next and why, all in the name of protecting law and order: “our people and our country, the basic principles of our state”. But there was no long-term plan. We lacked moral leadership, we lacked a vocal plan about what we as a country would stand for, what side of history we wanted to be on. Of course, the prime minister, the president, and others reiterated that Slovenia would take care of refugees, that we would remain humane, and that we would implement international commitments, but they were simultaneously building the fence and continuously fuelling the fear of Slovenia becoming ‘a pocket’. Discourse about fundamental values and principles started and stopped with “protection and security”; of Slovenia and Slovenians, not of the refugees.
THE FEAR CAMPAIGNS

And then New Year’s Eve happened. Cologne. It was as though all hell broke loose. Proponents of the politics of fear got what they had been waiting for, their chance to say ‘I told you so’. If public opinion in Germany shifted after Cologne, in Slovenia public opinion was just strengthened in its perception that “we must protect ourselves”. Fake news and outbursts of pure hatred, intolerance, racism, and nationalism swept through social media.

In February 2016, as the issue turned from the mass of migrants travelling through Slovenia to the issue of housing for asylum seekers, the fear campaigns began to spill over from social media onto the streets. Protests were held in Šenčur, Vrhnika, Logatec, and Lenart, and later in other places being considered for the temporary housing. People rallied in their thousands to express their unwillingness to accept the asylum seekers.

THE MIRAGE OF A THREAT

I am not claiming that our current government created this situation on purpose, far from it, but through its communication with the public, the rhetoric of a threat to security undeniably contributed to this collective state of mind. Of course, there was an influence of right-wing parties’ even more extreme rhetoric and proposals, but they are currently in the opposition. The government, branding itself as centre-left, under the leadership of a party that goes by the name of the Modern Centre Party, did not prevent this situation, did not choose a different narrative, did not use all the tools at its disposal to prevent fear, insecurity, and intolerance towards migrants from spreading, not even amongst their own electorate. And from the perspective of effective political power, I point the finger of blame at them. Not that there is a lack of blame and guilt to go around. There are, of course, many other contributing sociological factors, such as a lack of education about tolerance and the ‘make sure you take care of yourself first, everybody is just looking out...
for themselves anyway’ state of mind. Despite this, the government is in a position of power, to lead, to set an example, and when necessary to enforce. Not just security, but tolerance as well. Instead, the Slovenian government, intentionally or not, has instilled fear.

In sum, Slovenia has a very different genesis of the fear towards migrants than other countries, such as France. We never had substantial African or Arab minorities. Not even now. The fear stems precisely from this lack of experience; it is a fear of the unknown. The fear of the mirage of a threat.
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘security’ as the “condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger”; but, at the same time, as “something which makes safe; a protection, guard, defence”. This means, as one of those not common (yet not uncommon either) terms that presume or imply, an organic and so once and for all sealed unity of the condition with the assumed means to attain it (a sort of unity akin to that which for instance is suggested by the term ‘nobility’).

As the condition to which this particular term refers is deeply and unquestionably appreciated and yearned for by most language users, the approbation and regard bestowed on it by the public rubs off thereby on its acknowledged guards or providers, also called ‘security’. Means bask in the glory of the condition and share in its indisputable desirability. This having been done, a fully predictable pattern of conduct follows, just as in the habit of all conditioned reflexes. Do you feel insecure? Press for more public security services to guard you, and/or buy more security gadgets believed to avert dangers. Or: people who elected you to high offices complain of feeling insufficiently secure? Hire more security guards, allowing them also more liberty to act as

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they consider necessary – however unappetising or downright loathsome the actions they might choose.

SOCIAL SECURITISATION
A heretofore unknown term in socio-political discourse – and still unrecorded in its dictionaries available in bookshops – ‘securitisation’ has appeared quite recently in debates other than on ‘hedge betting’ and been quickly adopted in the political and media vocabulary. What this imported term is meant to denote is the ever more frequent reclassification of something as an instance of ‘insecurity’, followed well-nigh automatically by transferring that something to the domain, charge, and supervision of security organs. Not being of course the cause of such automatism, the above mentioned semantic ambiguity makes it no doubt easier.

Conditional reflexes can do without lengthy argument and laborious persuasion. Conditioned reflex stays itself, safely, unreflected upon – in safe distance from the searchlights of logic. This is why politicians gladly resort to the term’s ambiguity: making their task easier and their actions assured a priori popular approval, if not of promised effects, it helps the politicians to convince their constituencies of taking their grievances seriously and acting promptly on the mandate those grievances have been presumed to bestow.

Just one example – picked up off-cuff from the most recent headline news. As Huffington Post reported shortly after the night of terrorist outrages in Paris:

French President François Hollande said a state of emergency would be declared across France and national borders shut following a spate of attacks in Paris on Friday evening [...] “It is horrifying,” Hollande said in a brief statement on television, adding that a cabinet meeting had been called.

“A state of emergency will be declared,” he said. “The second measure will be the closure of national borders,” he added. “We must ensure that no one comes in to commit any act whatsoever, and at the same time make sure that those who have committed these crimes should be arrested if they try to leave the country,” he added.

The sights of broken down doors, of swarms of uniformed police officers breaking up meetings and entering homes without their residents’ agreement, of soldiers patrolling the street in the broad daylight – these all make a powerful impression as demonstrations of the government’s resolution to go the whole hog, down to ‘the heart of the trouble’, and to allay or altogether disperse the pains of insecurity haunting their subjects.
LATENT AND MANIFEST FUNCTIONS

Such demonstration of intentions and resolve is, to use Robert Merton’s memorable conceptual distinction, its ‘manifest’ function. Its ‘latent’ function, however, is quite opposite: to promote and smooth up the process of ‘securitising’ the plethora of people’s economic and social headaches and worries born of the ambience of insecurity generated by the frailty and fissiparousness of their existential condition. The above-mentioned sights are after all guaranteed to create the atmosphere of the state of emergency, of the enemy at the gate – of the country and so also my own home – facing mortal danger; and they are bound as well to firmly entrench those ‘up there’ in the role of the providential shield barring the danger from falling on both.

Whether those sights’ manifest function has been successfully performed is, to say the least, a moot question. Acquitting itself brilliantly from their latent function is not, however, left to doubt. The effects of the French Head of State flexing his (and of the security organs he commands) muscle in public were as fast coming as they were exceeding all previous attainments by the current holder of the presidential office, heretofore found by opinion polls as the least popular president in France since 1945. A fortnight or so later, those effects were well summed up under the title “After Paris, Hollande’s Popularity Soars to Highest Level in Three Years”.

The widespread sense of existential insecurity is a hard fact: a genuine bane of our society priding itself, through the lips of its political leaders, on the progressive deregulation of labour markets and ‘flexibilisation’ of work and, in the end result, notorious for the growing fragility of social positions and instability of the socially recognised identities, as well as for unstoppably expanding the ranks of the precariat (a novel category, defined by Guy Standing primarily as the quicksand on which they are forced to move). Contrary to many an opinion, such insecurity is not just a product of politicians pursuing electoral gains or media profiting from the panic-mongering broadcasts; it is
true, however, that the all too real insecurity built into the existential condition of ever expanding sections of population is welcome grist to the politicians’ mill. It is in the process of being converted into major – perhaps even the primary – stuff out of which present-day governing is fashioned.

**GOVERNMENTS PROMOTE ANXIETY**

Governments are not interested in allaying their citizens’ anxieties. They are interested instead in beefing up the anxiety arising from the future’s uncertainty and a constant and ubiquitous sense of insecurity – providing that the roots of that insecurity can be anchored in places which provide ample photo opportunities for ministers flexing their muscles, whilst hiding from sight the rulers overwhelmed by the task with which they are too weak to cope. ‘Securitisation’ is a conjurer’s trick, calculated to do just that; it consists in shifting anxiety from problems which the governments are incapable of handling (or are not keen to try), to problems which the governments may be seen, daily and on thousands of screens, to be eagerly and (sometimes) successfully tackling.

Among the first kind of problems there are such major factors of the human condition as the availability of quality jobs, the reliability and stability of social standing, effective protection against social degradation, and immunity against a denial of dignity – determinants of safety and well-being which the governments, once promising full employment and comprehensive social security, are nowadays incapable of pledging, let alone delivering. Among the second, the fight against terrorists conspiring against ordinary folks’ bodily safety and their cherished possessions easily grasps and holds fast the first fiddle: all the more so because of its chance of feeding and sustaining the legitimation of power and the vote-collecting effort for a long time to come. After all, the ultimate victory in that fight remains a distant (and thoroughly doubtful) prospect.

Viktor Orbán’s laconic and tremendously catching dictum “all terrorists are migrants” provides the sought-after key to the government’s effective struggle for survival – all the more so thanks to the implicitly smuggled suggestion of the symmetry of the link – and so the overlap between the two linked categories. Such an interpretation defies logic – but faith does not need logic to convert and hold minds; on the contrary, it gains in power as it loses in its logical credentials. For the ears of governments wishing to redeem, against all odds, their seriously lopsided and sinking raison d’être, it must sound as a horn of a salvage-boat sailing out from the dense, impenetrable fog in which the horizon of their survival struggle has been wrapped.
fears of unknown origin. It may even prove to be, perversely, a satisfactory experience: once we decide that we are up to the task, we willy-nilly acquire vested interest in its grandiosity: the more it appears awesome and indomitable, the more proud and flattered we tend to feel. The more powerful and scheming the enemy, the higher the heroic statuses of those who declare war on him. No coincidence that an absolute majority of Hungarian respondents approved of the statement “Certain unnamed outside moving forces are behind the mass migration.”

Calling the nation to arms against an appointed (as Carl Schmitt suggested) enemy, gives an added advantage to the politicians in search of voters: it is bound to rouse the nation’s self-esteem and earn thereby the nation’s gratitude – at least of the (growing, or afraid to grow) part of the nation pained by a damaged, eroded, or altogether withdrawn recognition and self-respect, and therefore yearning for some (even if inferior because cumulative and so depersonalised) recompense for the loss of personal dignity.

Finally, the policy of ‘securitisation’ helps to stifle our, the bystanders’, pangs of conscience at the sight of its victims. It ‘adiaphorises’ the migrants issue (exempts them, that is, from moral evaluation), putting those victims, once they have been cast in public opinion in the category of would-be terrorists, outside the
realm of moral responsibility – and above all outside the realm of compassion and the impulse to care. Many people feel – knowingly or not – relieved of responsibility for the fate of the wretched as well as of the moral duty that otherwise would inevitably follow to torment the bystanders. And also for that relief – knowingly or not – many people are grateful.

VICTIMS’ FALSE GUILT

One more comment is in order. On top of being morally callous and odious, socially blind as well as to a large extent groundless and intentionally misleading, ‘securitisation’ can be charged with playing into the hands of the recruiters of genuine (as distinct from falsely accused) terrorists. “A new study by the intelligence consultancy Soufan Group puts the figure at approximately 5000 fighters from EU origins” thus far recruited by Daesh, as Pierre Baussand of the Social Platform puts it (only two attackers in Paris have been identified as non-European residents). Who are those young people fleeing Europe to join the terrorist cohorts and planning to return after receiving terrorist training?

Baussand’s well-argued answer is that “the majority of Western converts to Daesh come from disadvantaged backgrounds. A recent Pew Research Center study found that, ‘European millennials have suffered disproportionately from their countries’ recent economic troubles [...] In the face of this challenge, young Europeans often view themselves as victims of fate.’ Such widespread disenfranchisement across society goes some way to explaining the allure of the sense of importance and control that Daesh instils in its supporters.” “Rather than caving in to reactionary, misinformed populist rhetoric such as that of far-right organisations, equating all migrants with terrorists”, he warns, “our leaders must [...] reject ‘us versus them’ stances and the surge in Islamophobia. This only plays into the hands of Daesh, who use such narratives as recruitment tools.”
Reminding us this way that “social exclusion is a major contributor to the radicalisation of young Muslims in the EU”, and having repeated after Jean-Claude Juncker that “those who organised these attacks and those that perpetrated them are exactly those that the refugees are fleeing and not the opposite”, Baussand concludes: “While there is no doubt about the role the Muslim community must play in eradicating radicalisation, only society as a whole can tackle this common threat to us all […] Rather than waging war on Daesh in Syria and Iraq, the biggest weapons that the West can wield against terrorism are social investment, social inclusion, and integration on our own turf.”

This is, I suggest, a conclusion demanding our close 24/7 attention, and urgent – as well as resolute – action.
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As the world around us becomes filled with ever more present and rigorous mechanisms to enhance protection and minimise risks, it may seem paradoxical that the level of fears and anxieties is increasing across our societies. This collective sense of trepidation has a tendency to fixate on the most sensational, direct, and violent sources of risk, a distortion exacerbated by media and political forces who foment disquiet and suspicion to their own advantage. Identifying where the true threats lie is a challenging but crucial enterprise and the Green European Journal contends that progressive forces around Europe need to take the question of security seriously. This edition provides contributions that look beyond today’s politics of fear, towards a politics of hope.