After yet another year of rising temperatures and devasting extreme weather events around the world, COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh came at a critical time in the fight against climate change. In the wake of the conference, the verdict from many environmentalists has been one of failure. Yet even though it may have fallen short in many ways, this COP was significant for finally acting on long-standing demands from the Global South and listening to the voices of those most at risk of suffering irreversible harm.

Was the COP27 summit in Sharm El-Sheikh a success or a failure? The answer to this question depends on whom you ask. If we were to ask a political figure, an activist, or even a scientist from the United States – the country which has historically contributed most to the climate crisis – they would be likely to view it as a defeat, while their counterparts in the Global South – the area of the planet most affected by the climate crisis – might see COP27 as a noteworthy victory.

A hard-won breakthrough

After two weeks of intense negotiation – under the strict conditions imposed by the Egyptian presidency – almost 200 countries represented at the Sharm El-Sheikh summit agreed to create a fund in accordance with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to tackle the now inevitable impacts of the environmental crisis: droughts, floods, disease, extreme, heat and other climate-related natural disasters with high material and human costs. The fund had been a long-standing demand of the Global South, first put forward over 30 years ago by the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. In essence, they aimed to challenge the moral superiority of Global North governments who claim to champion the fight against climate change while profiting from it, leaving lower-income countries, who contribute the least to this phenomenon, to foot the bill for its consequences.

To no one’s surprise, the summit was largely dominated by the issue of loss and damage. This political forum – increasingly relevant to multilateral cooperation – was originally advertised as an African summit at which international climate justice would take centre stage and which would, especially in light of the deadly floods in Pakistan, place the spotlight firmly on the issue of loss and damage.

However, it was not at all clear whether loss and damage would even make it onto the official negotiation agenda, though it eventually did at the beginning of the event. This first step, though widely celebrated by environmental organisations and delegations from vulnerable countries such as island states, did not guarantee that tangible progress would result from the Sharm El-Sheikh meeting. Countries agreed to address the issue but gave themselves until 2024 to finalise the details of what form the loss and damage mechanism would take. The big debate regarding this point unfolded as follows: wealthy nations advocated for drawing on existing funds from within the UNFCCC – such as the Green Climate Fund, widely criticised for failing to reach the annual objective of raising 100 billion US dollars proposed by donors – in order to provide economic support for victims of phenomena related to the climate crisis. On the other side of the debate, states most affected by climate change argued for the creation of a new fund under the UNFCCC umbrella which would channel aid directly to those most in need, and for measures to be put in place to monitor its activity.

The fund had been a long-standing demand of the Global South, first put forward over 30 years ago by the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

This tug-of-war was the subject of many questions during press conferences, in which the EU’s role in recent investments in gas infrastructure on the African continent – a response to the European energy crisis triggered by the war in Ukraine – was also discussed. Reform of the international financial system was the topic of further debate, with proposals led by leaders of island nations such as the prime minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley, and the prime minister of Antigua and Barbuda, Gaston Browne, the latter also arguing for a tax on the extraordinary profits of gas and petroleum companies to provide a source of funding for the loss and damage mechanism. “In the first half of this year, six fossil fuel companies, and I emphasise six, made more than enough money to cover the costs of major climate damages in developing countries, with nearly 70 billion dollars in profits,” stated Browne. “While they are profiting, the planet is burning.”

The Global South’s rhetoric permeated the summit through its various demands, which included a carbon tax on petroleum companies, loss and damage reparations, the cancellation of debt to help climate action, and slowing the “energy colonialism” of European investment in African gas.

Regarding the possibility of a new fund, the EU insisted that creating one from scratch would delay the mobilisation of aid at a moment when time is of the essence. As the Vice-President of the European Commission Fran Timmermans reiterated on several occasions, this could take “six or seven years” to come into full effect. The European negotiating bloc advocated instead for a “mosaic of solutions” whereby a variety of measures are included to enable countries vulnerable to climate change to have easy access to aid. The G7 countries – the seven largest global superpowers – led by Germany, even ventured to create their own system for distributing climate reparations, Global Shield, which came under heavy criticism from several activists from the Global South who dismissed it as a “distraction” from establishing a real, effective fund.

At this point the debate began to stall. Less wealthy nations stood firm in their demand to create a new fund under the UNFCCC, while the EU and the USA (among others) dragged their heels. As these discussions threatened to eclipse or slow progress on dealing with climate change, the EU, as their negotiators explained to the press, acquiesced, and proposed the creation of a fund to address the matter. However, the EU stipulated that the fund had to come from a wide spectrum of donors, wide enough to include countries not formally considered to be “developed” nations in these forums but which have considerable financial means, including China, which is currently the largest emitter of greenhouse gases and responsible for almost a third of global emissions. These conditions also allowed for the involvement of the private sector. In the same vein, the European bloc made the non-negotiable demand that aid from the fund be extended exclusively to “especially vulnerable” developing countries, as opposed to all those classified as “developing” by the UNFCCC (a category which includes China, Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia among others) as China and the G77 nations had proposed.

Eventually, at the plenary session convened in the early hours of Sunday 20 November, with the summit already in extra time and the delegates exhausted after days of marathon negotiation sessions, the loss and damage fund was given the green light, with no specifics as to its donors, but with allusions as to its recipients: developing countries which are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

The fund was met with applause upon signing and, as many diplomats pointed out, it represented a significant step forward for the countries of the Global South, as well as for other long-standing players in international climate cooperation.

“In a historic breakthrough, wealthy nations have finally agreed to create a fund to aid vulnerable countries that are reeling from devastating climate damage. This loss and damage fund will be a lifeline for poor families whose houses are destroyed, farmers whose fields are ruined, and islanders forced from their ancestral homes,” proclaimed Ani Dasgupta, president and CEO of the World Resources Institute (WRI). “This positive outcome from COP27 is an important step toward rebuilding trust with vulnerable countries,” he added.

If the loss and damage fund was merely “a dream” at COP26, “now it is enshrined and on track to start running in 2023,” declared Laurence Tubiana, architect of the Paris Agreement and CEO of the European Climate Foundation.

A battle won in a war being lost?

However, the final agreement made in Sharm El-Sheikh did not result in any additional commitments with regard to mitigation. This was condemned by various actors from the Northern Hemisphere, with representatives such as Timmermans and the president of the European Commission Ursula Von Der Leyen, along with columnists, activists, scientists, and journalists, publishing critical analyses of COP27 en masse, declaring it a “failure” lacking in ambition. Among the criticisms, it was pointed out that the agreement made in Sharm El-Sheikh was a carbon copy of that made in Glasgow at COP26, and that this had therefore been “a lost year” in the fight against climate change.

Among the criticisms, it was pointed out that the agreement made in Sharm El-Sheikh was a carbon copy of that made in Glasgow at COP26.

One of the main weaknesses that critics cited was the call for parties to “gradually phase out” the use of “unabated coal” (coal burning without carbon capture), as well as to reduce “inefficient subsidies” for fossil fuels, with this point being copied verbatim from what was drafted in Glasgow. They lamented that the efforts of numerous delegations (including that of the EU) to create a text that called for the phasing out of not only coal but all fossil fuels had been in vain – such a process would begin with coal, followed by petroleum and gas in accordance with the recommendations made in the most recent IPCC report.

The text was also criticised for the fact that the “Sharm El-Sheikh Implementation Plan” (as the agreement was eventually named) will not require countries to present updated commitments to reduce their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) on an annual basis, but rather every five years. The plan also included references to the energy crisis and the need to promote “low-carbon energy” (a category that does not necessarily exclude gas) which, according to environmentalists, may even have weakened the Glasgow agreement.

Seeking common ground

The North-South disparity reflected in the final assessments of the event revealed the privileges of wealthy (and polluting) countries in relation to those who most acutely suffer the consequences of climate change. In the aftermath of the conference, this was decried by voices from the developing world such as Mohamed Adow, founder of the think tank PowerShift Africa. “Truth be told, some of these COP27 ‘analyses’ are a bit rich, especially coming from the historic polluters who got us into this climate emergency in the first place,” Adow asserted on Twitter. “Outcomes from COPs need to balance both the causes of climate change and deal with the consequences. For years the UNFCCC process has skewed heavily towards dealing with mitigation, of course without targeting the root cause – fossil fuels, with half hearted and incomplete support for those dealing with the consequences, particularly on adaptation, loss and damage and climate finance. COP27 was a surprise precisely because for once the needs of the vulnerable were actually listened to.”

These reactions exposed some of the fault lines between the verdicts from those in different parts of the world, divisions which risk becoming exacerbated by perceptions of hypocrisy regarding the statements from the Global North criticising the lack of progress on emissions reductions at COP27, in light of both its responsibility for, and failure to act on, climate change historically.

For Adow, a decolonial approach is crucial to tackling these systemic inequalities. “To decarbonise we must decolonise,” he argued on the social network. “For the rest, let’s not also accept their hypocrisy to be used by our elites to repeat their historic mistakes. We can leapfrog their outdated system while also decolonising the system.”

COP27 will take place in a bleak geopolitical context. Yet there are reasons for cautious optimism. Broad mobilisations of civil society offer glimmers of hope, building networks and alliances across borders, and exerting a growing power that is becoming harder to ignore. Rather than proclaiming the failure of climate diplomacy, we should seek to redefine it, argues Lucile Schmid. A new climate agenda must extend to all areas of politics, society, and the economy.

As COP26 drew to a close on 13 November 2021, its president, British minister Alok Sharma, fought back tears. The pact’s ambition had just been significantly watered down. At India’s insistence, the text now spoke of a commitment to “phase down” rather than “phase out” coal. The Indian government had prevailed in Glasgow with the support of its Chinese rival, while the divergences between countries of the Global North and Global South remained unreconciled. Whether on priorities – mitigation, adaptation, loss, and damage – or financial commitments, the gap had widened. Despite a 4 per cent increase since 2019 – including an extra 40 per cent for adaptation – in 2020 there was still a 17-billion-dollar shortfall in the Green Climate Fund for developing countries. The delay in putting this solidarity mechanism in place is serious in light of the growing scale of loss and damage[1].

COP26 thus cruelly laid bare the reluctance of Western powers to honour their obligations towards the Global South. While Joe Biden’s United States has re-engaged with these obligations, this has primarily been motivated by the opportunities that climate ambition offers for the American economy and jobs. The relatively low profile kept by the European Union highlighted the challenges of turning the Green Deal into a tool for external influence; it disappointed developing countries who expected more support with financing. And by offering a high-quality nationally determined contribution, China almost made up for the absence of Xi Jinping.

Geopolitical complications

Since then, a series of events have illustrated both the need for a new model and the impossibility of achieving it through state policies. The war in Ukraine has exposed EU countries’ dependence on Russian gas in particular, and fossil fuels in general, as well as developing countries’ vulnerability to famine when global food markets are disrupted. Many of these nations have sought to avoid taking sides in this conflict. More than ideological non-alignment, this caution betrays their distrust of the West. At the same time, the United States and China, the two main greenhouse gas emitters, have been openly hostile to one another since the visit of House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan this summer (In response, China announced the suspension of cooperation between the two countries on climate.)

But while a hot war and a new cold war are being fought, climate catastrophes continue. In Pakistan, record-breaking monsoon rains have turned the lives of 33 million people upside down and left one third of the country under water. This disaster is a tipping point. For a regional power with 225 million inhabitants and almost 800,000 km² of territory to be plunged into catastrophe starkly resonates with the appeals made at COP after COP by small island states (Tuvalu, Kiribati, the Maldives and others). As for biodiversity, it has continued to collapse. WWF’s latest Living Planet report, published in October 2022, highlights the increasingly strong links between climate change and species extinction.

How can we imagine COP27 being even a partial success like Glasgow?

In this new global landscape, the EU’s commitments to phase out fossil fuels and to end international public finance of this industry, which were confirmed at COP26, have been eclipsed by the urgent search for new or strengthened fossil-fuel partnerships (with the likes of the United States, Israel, Algeria, and Egypt) to wean itself off Russian gas. Since the end of 2021, the majority of American LNG exports have been destined for Europe rather than the Asia-Pacific region. And in France, fallout from the controversy surrounding Total’s partnerships with Russia has continued. When will there be a genuine change of model?

“Getting through the winter” seems to have become the goal that trumps all else in Europe, as Vladimir Putin resorts to nuclear blackmail and governments fear the continent-wide spread of movements inspired by France’s gilets jaunes. How then can we imagine COP27, which will take place at Sharm-el-Sheikh in Egypt in November 2022, being even a partial success like Glasgow?

A foregone conclusion?

The first African country to host a COP meeting for six years, Egypt — which has also been heavily criticised for its repressive policies on human rights — wants to focus on climate finance, particularly loss and damage. Countries from the Global South are pushing for a new financing facility to be launched at COP27. The summit’s other main objective is to raise climate ambition to stay on course in limiting global temperature rises to 1.5 degrees. “No backtracking on commitments and promises will be permitted,” declared the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sameh Shoukry. But the script appears to have already been written: a dialogue of the deaf between a North committed to increasing defence spending and fearful of shortages and social unrest, and a South just trying to survive. And, in the middle, giants China and India, opportunist referees acting in their own self-interest. Will climate diplomacy be stillborn as war and geopolitical tensions encourage a return to the traditional view of power?

When they are democratic, governments cannot remain unmoved by society’s determination.

Let us not write it off just yet. That would be to ignore what it is built on. This is by no means to absolve countries of all blame. But governments are not the only players. And when they are democratic, governments cannot remain unmoved by society’s determination. Since the COPs began, they have evolved, gradually moving beyond the realm of “ordinary” international negotiations. The expression “climate diplomacy” emerged from this evolution. While conferences continue to separate spaces for official discussion from those for side events led by civil society organisations, meetings and conversations between these two sides of COP are frequent during the two weeks it is in session. Indeed, the success of a COP is judged in part on the expertise brought by NGOs, scientists, and activists, not just on the official communication. These conferences are an opportunity to consolidate, regain momentum, dive deeper, and exert pressure for a community that keeps growing. The climate agenda cannot be reduced to COPs and preparations for them.

The power of social movements

Ever since the foundations were laid at COP21 in Paris-Le Bourget, a hitherto unseen landscape has slowly taken shape before our eyes. With the creation of fora for discussions on specific industries or geographic areas (regional COPs), the success of climate lawsuits and alternative economic models (the circular economy, degrowth), activism that is as strong as ever, and environmental disasters forcing developed countries to adapt too, a green wave has been sweeping across the world. In the midst of environmental crises, an international society and a new culture are emerging in which the players are forging new ways of collaborating, negotiating, and decision-making.

This does not mean that societies are already united and that this green society has no enemies:[2] the NGO Global Witness revealed that hundreds of fossil fuel lobbyists were present in Glasgow for COP26, well aware of the threat hanging over their livelihoods. Neither does it mean that tensions over social and territorial justice are palpable everywhere. Or that the citizens of the Global North and South are experiencing the climate emergency to the same extent. Nevertheless, climate diplomacy no longer consists solely of nationally determined contributions and official climate negotiations. Today, it is non-state actors who are pushing for greater ambition. Whether it is through the pressure they exert, the commitments they make, or the role they play in democratising complex issues, as the scientific community and increasing numbers of media outlets are doing (notably with the Charter for green journalism published in France on 14 September 2022). Talking about climate diplomacy means envisaging the prospect of a green society.

But there are also non-state actors working against the climate, chief among them the fossil fuel industry, while the global energy crisis has allowed some companies to make record profits. In the energy sector, there is a real risk of a rolling-back of environmental obligations and decarbonisation objectives. The rise of renewable energies is weakened. With restrictions on access to Russian gas, for example, we are witnessing a European campaign in favour of the exploitation of shale gas in the name of innovation and national independence.

Joining the dots between the climate and the economy

The growing success of calls for energy saving and degrowth, and the concern this is causing among people living in poverty and economic insecurity, as well as those who profit from this, underline the urgent need for a new climate agenda on transforming the economic model. This is undoubtedly what climate diplomacy lacks most today: a forum for openly discussing this new green economy, of which there are growing signs locally but which remains far too unambitious when it comes to global implementation. The three existing COPs cover the climate, biodiversity, and desertification. When will an economic COP be created that is not just a pale imitation of the World Economic Forum, but an alternative G20 that brings together countries from the Global North and South? The success of world social forums has shown the way. But the urgency of today’s situation requires first and foremost that economic actors, primarily businesses, to switch from one model to another. An economic COP should not hesitate to bring together yesterday’s adversaries, so long as their commitments to building a shared future converge. 

The urgency of today’s situation requires economic actors, primarily businesses, to switch from one model to another.

Today, the proliferation of proposals in the energy field is primarily in the name of the short term and relegates ecological concerns as secondary. Such a forum would provide a framework for articulating coherence between ecology and economy and pointing out the inconsistencies of the flood of proposals being churned out every day.

Clearly, climate diplomacy frames the link with democracy differently from diplomacy in its traditional sense, where diplomats, plying their trade in secrecy, report to their governments and express official positions. Are we not all climate diplomats in our own way?

What will happen in Sharm-el-Sheikh in a world where wars, geopolitical tensions, and climate catastrophes are intertwined? At these conferences that drag on for two weeks, sudden bursts of activity, surprises, and plot twists are inevitable. Where will they lead? Can we expect raised ambitions for nationally determined contributions when the energy crisis has put fossil fuel producers centre stage again, including Saudi Arabia, which sought to derail the Paris Agreement? We should prepare for further disappointment on this front. But above all, we must focus on assessing the Global North’s ability to finally respond to the humanitarian emergency caused by the environmental crises in the South. The EU will have a major role to play here. As in Glasgow, it is by opening up this conference as widely as possible to the outside world and by giving voice to the concerns, activism, and initiatives of non-state actors, that genuine international solidarity can emerge.

For climate negotiations to succeed, all the stars must align in a way that often appears impossible, so numerous are the obstacles and pitfalls. Building alliances and coalitions across cultural, economic, and geographical divides is crucial to any breakthrough. In this context, argues Robyn Eckersley, leadership becomes the delicate art of bringing various parties together to forge agreements that move the process forward, however incrementally.

Beatrice White: Global crises have heightened understanding of our interdependence, yet we also see growing discourses around regional and national autonomy. The trends are pulling in different directions. What is the state of play with multilateralism, and where might we be heading?

Robyn Eckersley: There are some interesting and conflicting trends. The international order is in a state of flux, with its liberal nature and stability in question. A multipolar order is always less stable than a bipolar one. We’ve been there before. In 1815, the Concert of Europe provided a period of stability,^[1] but then things started to buckle later that century. What’s new today is a multilateral order in which two of the most significant powers are outside the West: China and India.

We certainly need reform in our global governance institutions. Institutions like the UN Security Council and the G7 are anachronistic and favour certain states in the West. These countries will need to elinquish some of their privileges and powers if the institutions are to maintain legitimacy. We also see China and the BRICS^[2] countries developing their own financial and lending institutions. However, the UN General Assembly remains crucial to developing countries as they are the majority and it’s one vote one state, whereas in the Bretton Woods institutions like the International Monetary Fund it’s one vote per dollar. If I had to bet, my money would be on the growth of more regionalism, rather than larger or more concerted multilateralism.

What kind of changes does the current global governance framework need?

There needs to be more effort to green the institutions of economic governance, and more effort by major powers to green their economies. At the WTO [World Trade Organization], ministers are currently working on a declaration on trade and climate change. But they are likely to focus on the easy synergies and ignore the deep contradictions. The WTO does not require international trade to be sustainable, and it is premised on a continually expanding international economy. Neither the WTO’s trade agreements nor preferential trade agreements require the internalisation of the negative ecological externalities associated with trade. Unless we see the great powers like the US and China start to bring ecology and not just climate into their grand strategies, we’re in trouble.

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The carbon border adjustment mechanism that the EU is putting in place is a good development because it will impose a carbon price on carbon-intensive exports from recalcitrant countries like Australia, which repealed its carbon pricing mechanism in 2014. Under the climate regime’s burden-sharing principles of differentiated responsibilities, developed countries are supposed to take the lead in mitigation while assisting developing countries. In effect, one might argue that the EU mechanism forces a carbon price on exports from developed countries that have failed to take the lead in mitigation and would steal an unfair competitive advantage over those who have made an effort. However, it seems contrary to these burden-sharing principles to impose the same price on exports from developing countries. At the very least, the additional charge should be collected by the EU and recycled back to the country of origin to assist in their decarbonised development.

How do you assess the development of global climate and environmental governance? Did the Paris Agreement mark a turning point?

From the start, we knew the journey was going to be hard. Whatever agreement was negotiated, if it didn’t have all the major emitters present then it would not be effective. For all of the US’s faults, President Barack Obama understood that. He appeared to have a very weak hand, with a hostile congress, but he played it well domestically and engaged in diplomacy that eventually got China and India on board. The idea of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) came from the US, who knew that China and India would not accept legally binding commitments and that the US Senate might be prepared to accept a new agreement with this kind of flexibility. Of course, this flexibility worried the most vulnerable countries. Thanks to the leadership of the late, great Tony de Brum, the foreign minister of the Marshall Islands, working with the EU, a High Ambition Coalition was formed, which demanded that a global rise in temperature be limited to 1.5 degrees in the agreement, among a range of other things.

The grand bargain of Paris was flexibility for the major emitters. To give the vulnerable countries something back, we got a more ambitious temperature target and, thanks to the EU, some very hard procedural language that stated that each successive NDC will be more ambitious than the previous one (but with a non-punitive review – thanks to China’s strenuous negotiation).

Unlikely coalitions that cross traditional political boundaries are very valuable

I thought, at the time, it was a historic breakthrough because we couldn’t really expect more. But the very presence of a durable climate agreement with a more ambitious temperature target of 1.5 degrees is working some magic in driving governments, business, financial institutions, and international organisations to try harder. Plus, environmental NGOs can point to the target to hold governments to account to at all levels.

So that’s where we’ve landed. Will this be good enough? It is certainly not optimal. There have been many compromises, but we have to make the treaty we have work. In the current context, the 1.5-degree target appears as the one light on the hill, thanks to the High Ambition Coalition. As a result of this success, we’re seeing similar coalitions forming in the biodiversity negotiations that are taking place. The beauty of this coalition in Paris was that it cut across those stale, well-worn negotiating groups which are either in the Global South or the Global North. What we need now are more coalitions that bridge this divide, bringing the relative leaders like the EU and vulnerable states together.

So coalitions with ambition are crucial. But these do not necessarily form organically. What is climate leadership? How would you evaluate the EU as a climate leader?

I distinguish between two types of leadership. One is just being a frontrunner in a field of performance. Australia is a frontrunner in global fossil fuel exports; it’s a leader in that sense, but it’s not something we’re very proud of. China is a leader in producing solar panels, just like it’s a leader in financing coal, but that is fortunately changing. In a performance field, frontrunners can be cooperative or competitive. They might be trying to compete at the expense of others, or they could be leading because they actually want to set an example. This type of performance or directional leadership can feed into the second kind of leadership, which is political leadership. This entails building support around a common goal and enabling collective action. It often starts by building a like-minded coalition of the willing.

The EU’s finest diplomatic moment was at COP17 in Durban in 2011, where it played a key political leadership role in brokering a new roadmap and building support through a promise of performance leadership. Here the EU agreed to a second commitment period (2013-2020) under the Kyoto Protocol in return for the major emitters in the developing world agreeing to negotiate a new roadmap.

The 1.5-degree tempreature target of the Paris Agreement appears as the one light on the hill

This broke the deadlock. Kyoto was so important to developing countries because that was their interpretation of common but differentiated responsibilities: “Why should we do anything until the rich countries have demonstrated their leadership in mitigation?” Bridging those differences was really important and got us to Paris.

So despite not always showing a great performance – especially under the earlier iterations of its emissions trading scheme – the EU has shown directional leadership. The EU has committed to an enhanced 2030 target of cutting emissions by 55 per cent and has dedicated 30 per cent of its budget to climate action. It is also contributing around a quarter of the 100 billion dollars that will be mobilised annually up to 2025. But the EU cannot solve this problem by itself, and it will need to muster all of its diplomatic skills to develop a productive relationship with China to accelerate the decarbonisation of the biggest emitter of all.

What is the likelihood of other major powers stepping up to the plate?

There’s always been a lot of bad faith by both the US and China. Obama showed his commitment to the common purpose by engaging in active climate diplomacy at Paris. But the US has walked away twice from the climate regime, first with the second Bush administration’s repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol and second with the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. China has made much of this sorry record and highlighted how the US has contributed the lion’s share of historical emissions. Yet China is the biggest aggregate emitter (since around 2007) and the world’s second-biggest historical emitter. China keeps hiding behind its poor and ignoring its rapidly growing middle class, which is bigger than the total US population. China’s average per capita emissions are now higher than the EU’s but still lower than the US’s giant yeti carbon footprint and big military carbon boot-print.

However, one promising idea that China has developed – and maybe it’s just empty rhetoric – is the idea of ecological civilisation. Given that climate change is a civilisational challenge, I love the term. “Let’s build an ecological civilisation.” China meant it purely for domestic consumption and it’s not trying to proselytise, but we should congratulate China for working with that idea and use it as a form of track-two diplomacy by building cooperation between citizens and universities and organisations, but also diplomatically at a very high level.

Non-state actors, such as civil society groups and the worldwide movements and networks of people calling for climate action, are also involved in this process. How significant are these forces?

Absolutely crucial! The failure of Copenhagen^[3] created a new generation of anti-fossil fuel movements such as Keep It In The Ground, driven by organisations like 350.org and figures such as Bill McKibben. The whole idea of a carbon budget was born then, as well as the idea of un-burnable carbon. These are powerful concepts for campaigning and crunching numbers, and climate think tanks such as Climate Action Tracker and Climate Analytics have been providing critical analysis and guidance for developing countries, particularly small-island developing nations. Non-state actors have demonstrated incredible innovation and brainpower, and they’re mobilising across all levels of society and governance, from cities and municipalities to businesses and organisations.

Then you’ve got Fridays for Future with the school strikes and Extinction Rebellion. These are wonderful developments, born out of frustration with inadequate action nationally. The climate emergency frame plays a significant role in galvanising declarations and enhanced commitments.

Your work contrasts an inclusive multilateralism, which aspires to get everyone around the table, with exclusive “minilateralism”, where smaller groups of countries reach agreements to move forward together. There is often a dilemma in foreign affairs between insisting on the principles of equity and solidarity as a pre-condition to any engagement or adopting a pragmatic attitude to make progress in any configuration that allows for it. What is your advice?

Both inclusive multilateralism and exclusive minilateralism have their problems. The former is too slow and can lead to the lowest common denominator. The latter is simply unfair and self-serving if confined to the major emitters. It’s like putting the foxes in charge of the hen house. More promising is inclusive minilateralism that includes representation from the most responsible, the most capable, and the most vulnerable. This ensures a diverse range of views and is more representative, while the smaller size can facilitate a deeper discussion and trust-building. Agreements reached in forums of this kind can also be scaled up.

Unlikely coalitions that cross traditional political boundaries are very valuable, particularly at the national level. If climate NGOs can find other organisations with at least some common interests – discovered via careful “back channel” diplomacy – then this can be the basis for campaigns with wider political reach. This might include faith groups, social welfare groups, unions, farmers’ groups, and certain industry associations. Building looser and broader, cross-cutting coalitions is an important development, not just in decarbonisation but in building ecologically sustainable economies more generally. It can depolarise. You’ll find that folks on the other side of the divide don’t have horns; that they’re real people who have real concerns that must be respectfully acknowledged and taken on board.

Taking a longer view, is the move away from fossil fuels good news for the international system?

If you think of some of the terrible events that have happened during the 20th century, many were about oil. Think of the OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil embargo of 1973 to 1974 that sent the price of oil sky-high. And why did the US decide to establish a military command centre in the Middle East after the 1979 Iranian Revolution if not for concerns about access to oil? The Iran-Iraq War and the first and second Gulf Wars also had much to do with oil. A lot of blood has been spilt and treasure wasted over securing access to oil. Once the world is hooked on renewable energy, countries will enjoy much greater energy independence. We know some countries may not be able to be fully independent, but with developments in battery storage and the green hydrogen revolution – which might be over-hyped but will have a role – we can take a lot of that out of the equation. Gazprom won’t be holding the EU to ransom in a cold winter, for instance. That’s going to create a lot more energy independence, relative to the last century, and a lot less blackmail, price gouging, and military conflict.

Renewable energy is such a good news story on so many grounds, but it is very important that we assist developing countries in building their own capability, and I do worry about who will control the lithium, cobalt, and rare earths that will feed the renewable energy revolution.

With the backdrop of deepening vaccine inequality, climate disasters, and continued efforts to delay real action, COP26 got underway this weekend. This much anticipated United Nations conference has drawn attention not least for its significance in the struggle against climate change but also for mismanagement by the UK, the host of COP26.

One issue that civil society has mobilised around is representation and access to the conference. Networks like the Global Greens put in motion initiatives that would give leading voices from the frontlines a chance to go to Glasgow. However, the crossroads of issues would ensure that their journey to COP was anything but smooth. While some delegates waited in frustration for promised vaccines, funding and travel documents, others were facing climate disasters in their homelands.

To shine a light on the climate crisis’s stark effects in different parts of the world, the Green European Journal spoke with Global Greens COP delegates from Canada, Egypt, and Rwanda. These are leaders of green movements in their countries who are determined to carry on pushing their governments to do more beyond the political moment that is COP26. We asked how their countries are experiencing climate change, key areas for action, and their message to the green movement in Europe.

The view from Rwanda – Frank Habineza

Rwanda is situated in East and Central African region. It has a moderate climate with relatively high rainfall, spanning two major agricultural seasons. Communities experience climate change mainly through prolonged dry seasons and droughts. The Eastern province is most prone to droughts and desertification which affects agriculture and animal husbandry. This has already led to famine, internal migrations through population displacement, conflicts over land and water between pastoralists and farmers, and a loss of biodiversity in areas that fail to recover vegetation.

Rwanda also experiences increased temperatures during dry seasons and greater-intensity rainfall during rainy seasons which have caused severe flooding that has destroyed homes, bridges, crops, and lives. It also leads to soil erosion and landslides which paralyse the transportation of people and goods. Climate change effects have also lowered the water levels in lakes, waterways, and rivers, insufficient water supply especially in cities, forest degradation, serious health problems, and the emergence of new diseases.

The most important issues for the Rwandan Green movement at COP26 are climate mitigation and adaptation. We would like Rwanda to fully implement its national adaptation programme which had identified six actions that could bring improvements to livelihoods in Rwanda. These include integrated water resources management, early warning systems and rapid interventions, promotion of income-generating activities, promotion of intensive agriculture and animal husbandry, introduction of crop varieties resistant to environmental conditions, and the development of energy sources alternative to firewood.

On top of that, we would like to have sustainable land use management with modern methods of farming and irrigation techniques and empowerment of small-scale farming. Farmers and pastoralists need alternative water supply sources so that they can stop being dependent on rainfall.

We would also like to see an increase in climate financing from international bodies extending to both government and other non-governmental actors. We would like to have improved waste management plans in all major cities, including in the capital Kigali where there is still no waste management plant. Rwanda also needs to invest in waste-to-energy projects as sprawling dumping sites continue to endanger people, water, biodiversity, and the climate in cities like Kigali.

We are very grateful to the Green movement in Europe for all the support rendered to the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda, especially in its struggle to get official recognition as a party. We request that it continues to stand with us in our plight for the full democratisation of Rwanda. Without the chance of enjoying all the universal freedoms as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it would be impossible to even stand up for environmental protection. Together we win.

The view from Canada – Dianne Saxe

In Canada, climate impacts are being felt everywhere, though most keenly by coastal and far northern communities and by the most vulnerable. As in other countries, the impacts of climate change are not felt equally. Indigenous communities especially are experiencing the brunt of climate chaos.

This summer, Canada saw record heat that damaged forests and crops, cooking fruit on trees and a billion marine animals on beaches. Wildfires burnt down forests and displaced First Nations communities, and their toxic smoke caused physical and mental health impacts right across the country. Heat deaths soared. In the winter, snow cover and critical ice roads are becoming less reliable.

Meanwhile, in Ontario, Canada, where I call home, climate-blind government policy is driving up pollution and congestion by turbocharging urban sprawl, destroying wetlands and forests, and trapping families in a high-carbon lifestyle. It is even making our electricity dirtier.

Canada should be a climate leader but isn’t. In fact, Canada is one of the highest climate-polluting countries in the world, as well as a major exporter of fossil fuels.

Canada can be influenced to do better. Canada is heavily involved in global trade thus depends on access to international capital and market. It can suffer major economic damage by getting out of step with its customers. It is also strongly influenced by international opinion.

Ontario Greens will watch COP26 closely for progress on global financial and commodity markets that redirects finance and customers away from fossil fuels and into the clean economy. Border carbon adjustments and green public procurement would allow our governments to pressure domestic producers to make lower-carbon materials and products. Strict international standards on what counts as “green” (such as the EU Taxonomy for green bonds) would set useful benchmarks for Canada to follow.

But the most important single step is for governments and companies around the world to commit to a cumulative carbon budget consistent with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. A target of net-zero by 2050 is not enough if it does not limit total carbon emissions between now and then.

EU leadership on climate action would set the pace for the rest of the world. The European Union needs to come together and show the world how rapidly scaling up the green transition creates jobs, invigorates the economy, cleans the air, restores biodiversity, reduces reliance on foreign powers, and reduces inequality at home. Successful European examples will ease fears about the transition and inspire competition in other parts of the globe.

The view from Egypt – Mohamed Awad

Egypt is in a geographical area that is mostly desert aside from the Nile Valley. It has a Mediterranean climate in the North and a dry climate in the South where rain scarcity has always been an issue.

Historically, its two seasons have been predictable and stable. However, this climate has been subjected to distortion for several years. The dramatic effects of climate change are happening fast in sharp contrast to the 10-to-20-year outlook predicted by scientific research. Water torrents caused by changes in rain patterns, and extreme heatwaves are common and are taking Egyptians and our infrastructure by surprise.

Agriculture, one of the most important pillars of the Egyptian economy, is also being impacted by climate change – whether in terms of crop diversity, quality, or production. This has prompted the Egyptian government to adopt a new adaptation and mitigation strategy including rehabilitating waterways, infrastructure and crops to resist climate change, modernising agricultural technology, and reclaiming new agricultural lands.

From my perspective, three main challenges lie ahead for Egypt: water scarcity, desertification, and population increase. No one can be certain about the impact of climate change on the quantities of water from the Nile River. There is speculation over whether it will increase and decrease. At the same time, population growth and rising demand for food will put additional pressure on water, land, agriculture, and the cost of adaptation measures.

Raising awareness about climate change and the issue of water requires a space of political freedoms to demand the government adjust development priorities, which does not exist in the current political context in Egypt.

There is a lot of news that raises confusion regarding government efforts to combat climate change, including the Egyptian government’s announcement that it has signed contracts to export electricity to some European countries – through Cyprus and Greece – as well as Saudi Arabia and other countries. 95 per cent of electricity in Egypt is produced by power plants that run on gas, coal, and diesel. Does this not mean an increase in the percentage of carbon emissions in Egypt? Maybe this move will reopen the idea of carbon capture which would allow emissions until an identified limit has been reached. But we are facing immediate danger and emissions must stop immediately. This idea of carbon capture must go.

The participation of the Egyptian Greens in the COP26 is one of the positive developments since the party was established in the early 1990s. Our main task will be to support the call for a reduction in fossil fuel use, push for compensation of the Global South for their losses and to build a green economy, and stop the industry lobby.

As the issue of food security preoccupies leaders at the COP26, it is surprising that water security has not been introduced to the discussion despite being the basis of food security and at the root of conflicts and volatile security contexts around the world. This gap is why the Egyptian Greens have taken up water as a climate rather than a resource issue.

My concern is that COP26 might turn into a mere auction hall for the Global South to display the damages and losses to obtain financial support, without there being real control and monitoring of how these funds will be spent. The Global South has received enormous financial support under the pretext of combating environmental degradation, yet environmental degradation is increasing nonetheless.

The success of Green parties like the German Greens generates pressure on the Egyptian Greens to perform better. The contexts are very different but we have common challenges and they have been instrumental to our past national struggles by organising in solidarity. We would like to see this model of support continue and strengthen.

Until 2011, gender did not have a formal place on the United Nations’ climate agenda. Now the UN boasts of roadmaps, action plans, and work programmes hoping to spur the inclusion of women in national and international climate action. Yet the gender balance in COP delegations remains at 75 per cent male to 25 per cent female. The United Kingdom, the host of COP26, is led by a male-dominated team, while many voices from the Global South are locked out of the conference. Professor Karen Morrow explains what climate governance’s gender divide looks like, and why gender justice is crucial to combatting climate change.

Jennifer Kwao: What are the gendered impacts of climate change?

Karen Morrow: Climate change is gendered. It is gendered because the society that produces it is gendered, as are the economic system and industry. A recent report in The Guardian showed that only eight of the top 100 FTSE companies listed on our stock exchange are led by women. Equally, science is gendered and so is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) system.

The worst impacts of climate change are felt by those who are least to blame for causing it and most exposed to risks, usually through poverty. In many parts of the world, the responsibility for food production, as well as preparation, lies with women. Access to water is usually women’s work. And where climate change makes those things more difficult, women are the ones who bear the consequences; it’s the girls who get taken out of school to help with the extra time it takes to provision everyday life.

Climate change is gendered. It is gendered because the society that produces it is gendered, as are the economic system and industry.

While the gendered impacts of climate change are everywhere, they are experienced very differently in different societies. For example, there are all sorts of vulnerabilities attached to displacement – we don’t call people climate refugees, but that’s what they are. Work on disasters like Hurricane Katrina has shown that women are least well positioned to insulate themselves from shocks.  In these situations, women are vulnerable to domestic violence, sexual predatory violence, and loss of precarious incomes.

An intersectional analysis also shows that women and the LGBTQIA+ community are among the poorest and the least insulated from any kind of systemic shock, be it economic or environmental.

Looking at the UNFCCC regime, why is it relevant to talk about gender? What and who are we talking about? Who are we leaving out?

Until 2011, women did not have official status as a regime stakeholder group in the UNFCCC process. That was when the gender constituency was recognised in the UNFCCC regime and that always shocks people to hear. It was 2011 before women participated as a formal stakeholder group. That’s nearly 20 years after the convention was signed. Active efforts to improve women’s participation followed the grant of constituency status, albeit progress has been fitful and limited. By way of illustration: since 2020, the overall percentage change in membership of UNFCCC bodies is negligible. In 2020, only three of the 16 bodies had a 50 per cent female membership or above; three had 40 per cent or above; six had 30 per cent or above; four had 20 per cent or under.  We’re talking about representation that only really gained momentum after the Lima work programme and the gender action programme.

Gender is still seen as a women’s issue in the UN system. But a gender-equal and gender-just approach to climate change needs to have male buy-in and needs to include people who are not part of the dominant cisgender set up. Change is happening at the grassroots, but equal representation is a human rights shift that is yet to happen. Nearly half a century after Hillary Clinton’s “women’s rights are human rights” speech in Beijing, we’re still trying to make a case for things that should already be in force.

Change is happening at the grassroots, but equal representation is a human rights shift that is yet to happen.

Slow progress towards gender justice isn’t enough anymore. Climate change is so complex and so far-reaching that we, as a species, are robbing ourselves of the different perspectives that might help us better engage with the challenges it poses. Critical talent and experience is overlooked. In adaptation, for example, women on the ground in Africa who are having to provide for their families, having to go farther for wood, having to grow different things because the climate is literally changing around them, they have learnt so much the very hard way, but for many years have not had an adequate platform to share what they have learnt .

Our strength comes from diversity, not uniformity. So, it’s good to see indigenous people taking a much more pro-active role, saying, “we have things we can teach you!” and not waiting to have something foisted upon them that doesn’t fit with their worldview and doesn’t fit with the environment they understand very, very well. 

Our strength comes from diversity, not uniformity.

Why does the UNFCCC focus on a quantitative approach to representation? The numbers don’t even show much change.

The UNFCCC now issues a gender composition report every year. In the 2021 report, this contained a very revealing case study of speaking time in virtual plenaries and meetings on technology and finance from May to June 2021. The report aggregated data by gender and age, examining who was speaking and for how long. The results are revealing, even though counting speaking time is quite a blunt instrument.

In the first instance, looking at eight plenary meetings, the report observed more women participating, because the online format facilitated circumventing some of the gendered constraints on joining international meetings (childcare responsibilities for example). Where plenaries were concerned, men formed 51 per cent of delegations, 60 per cent of those who spoke and accounted for 63 per cent of speaking time. Once session chairs were taken out of the equation, men accounted for 60 per cent of those who spoke and 74 per cent of the speaking time. That sends a stark message in terms of who is talking. It does not, however, look at what they’re saying so cannot tell us what influence people had on the debate. We might infer that if you speak more you will have more of an opportunity to influence outcomes – but it depends on what you’re saying. If you’re a chair, you will speak more, but you’ll often be housekeeping or inviting people to speak. You’re taking time and using words but you’re not changing the outcomes.

Why do you think the UN relies so much on measurement and indicators?

It’s a general preoccupation of modern societies. If you look at the Sustainable Development Goals, for example, the indicators for them are driven by measurable metrics. They look at things you could tick a box on and measure easily. And they often focus on quantity rather than quality even though they’re supposed to be achieving qualitative changes in the end. So a preoccupation with the quantitative is not unique to the UNFCCC.

We also need to consider the nature of international law and the role of the UNFCCC. Its secretariat has no real power over the states that populate it. You cannot compel a state to do the right thing. You cannot really compel a state to even give effect to the human rights it’s signed up to. But you can embarrass them when they don’t. The nationally determined contributions (NDCs, country plans to cut carbon emissions) are a similar idea by making states set down on paper what they think their contributions are going to be. That gives you something to measure when it comes to walking the walk instead of just talking the talk. It’s understandable, from that point of view.

If states don’t feel embarrassment about not bothering to include a gender-equal perspective in their society and delegations, then you lose that lever; there’s no shame to motivate them. 

Are quantitative approaches enough to force states to ensure that their negotiating teams are representative?

While I do think quantitative approaches are never going to be adequate, they are, at least, a factual base from which to argue. The gender constituency in the UNFCCC won their place by using factual information to make their case. It’s very hard-headed, and it’s had to be, because it’s not wanting to be seen as soft, feminine, and emotion-driven in a system that is based on evidence.

The more public those are, the better. I don’t think people realise how hugely dominated by men international law and policy spaces are. But, then again, look at our national parliaments. It comes back to women’s participation in public life, in politics, but also in running state systems, it’s hugely problematic. In the UK, more than half of law students are female; yet you look at our highest courts and you find a tiny number of women sitting in them.

I don’t think people realise how hugely dominated by men international law and policy spaces are.

In the UK team for COP26, there’s only one woman at the top table. There are lots of women involved in junior positions. The one woman at the top table was only added after there was a public outcry. This means the UK’s COP26 leadership is male-dominated – those are the people who will be talking. 

It’s a systemic issue. These things change very slowly and unless they’re really reflected on and we facilitate those changes to make sure we’re embracing the whole range of human talent and voices, we impoverish not only women and non-cisgender people, but everyone.

Let’s talk about COP26. What can we expect from a COP with a dismal record on representation? What are some of the key battles going to be? 

I’ve been looking at COPs for a long time and what will happen is that there will be a lot of talk –there’s always a lot of talk. Greta Thunberg’s  “blah blah blah” speech – she’s not wrong. Whatever is achieved, however little it is, will be packaged as progress. The problem is that we can’t just evolve. We need revolution. We need to change direction.

The emissions reduction plans, the NDCs, aren’t on track. At the moment, they seem to be leading to a 3-degree increase in temperature, not the 1.5 that we need as a politically endorsed minimum – to be honest, we probably need more than that. It’s deeply, deeply depressing: the lowering of expectations with the mantra for this COP of “keeping 1.5 degrees alive” – tells us two very important things: It’s not a given that that aspiration will continue to motivate; and even if it did, it wouldn’t be enough. So “keeping 1.5 degrees alive” is not aspirational. The least COP26 needs to do is to bring it back into the frame and, if you like, renew our focus.

We need revolution. We need to change direction.

Funding will be a major issue. The international community promises funding for the developing world in all areas – not just climate change. That is not charity; it is an investment in everybody’s future. But it is never seen as that and never fully delivered. So, funding will be the issue. We’ll see people saying the right things, and the US has, at least, agreed to double their climate contribution which may encourage others.

What types of funding need to be debated? And why is it important to have it on the agenda?

We need to look at all of finance and that includes subsidies. I read something that really horrified me recently. The IMF has just done some work on fossil fuels subsidies and at the moment, globally, as of 2020 figures, we are subsidising fossil fuels to the tune of 11 million dollars a minute. It’s not just that our house is on fire: we are paying fossil fuel companies to throw fuel on that fire!

We should be talking about not financing climate vandalism. We know what the problem is, and it is ludicrous that we are paying – either in direct subsidies or in preferential taxes – big fossil fuel companies to keep producing fossil fuels. Nobody is talking about it and it needs to be talked about!

We also need to be providing the money we promised to enable countries to leapfrog over the really dirty aspects of development that we have had in the past. If we stop paying big fossil fuel companies to add to our problems, the money we would be saving could be used to help those most impacted by climate change. We need to be thinking more creatively and more holistically.  

We need to be providing the money we promised to enable countries to leapfrog over the really dirty aspects of development that we have had in the past.

Stopping subsidies would actually get us on to another problem everyone is talking about: carbon pricing. According to the IMF study, nobody in the world is getting it right in terms of just the industry inputs, let alone the environmental costs. Implementing fully accurate and comprehensive carbon pricing is virtually impossible but making fossil fuels unprofitable to produce could at least cut down the magnitude of the problem. So, finance needs to be looked at, but all of finance, not just the little bits that look promising for profit-making. Everybody cannot make a profit from this but, at the moment, everybody is paying.  

The Global Women’s Assembly in a statement for COP26 calls for a human rights and inclusive approach to climate action that draws on leadership from frontline communities and people across the gender spectrum. With such actors stepping forward, what role can organisations, such as the EU and UN, play in uplifting these voices and taking on what they’re putting forward?

Lead by example. That’s the place to start. Not just putting your money where your mouth is, but putting your women on your committees too. This can change the nature of the discussion and outcomes. Research has shown that decision-making bodies and parliaments with more women in them think differently about environmental issues and decide differently on them.

One of the things we can do in the developed world is provide funding. We have money and the UN has resources. Internships – those don’t even cost us money. Providing living expenses or enough for someone to survive on while they see how these things work can be impactful. Bringing women from all over the world into the building and into the room to facilitate learning by seeing…it’s really important.  

Mentoring. Training. Capacity building. We have huge resources of talent in the women at the UN and EU which can be used to inspire and equip other women. Covid-19 has taught us what is possible online. Using more online workshops and things like that – masterclasses, summer schools, things where you can learn and get a qualification or certificate in climate advocacy or gender analyses of climate issues – can empower many.

A lot of what you’re talking about speaks to the systemic connection between climate change and discrimination. How do we even begin to dismantle the system? 

We begin by calling it out; by showing the system’s shape and what influences it. We know, of course, that women are silenced everywhere across the globe, and we know that damages us all. So, we should call it out for what it is.

Sustainability, on an environmental level, requires us to think in a joined-up way, so does social justice. We can’t think in silos. It doesn’t matter how advanced your policies are: if some countries don’t measure up then we all suffer. We need to think like a species.   

Networks are everything. The gender constituency in the UNFCCC built the networks that it used to make the case for its very existence. They used alliance building to build feminist approaches because not all women are the same. They recognised that we all tend to be minorities in these systems so learning from each other and building solidarity is one of the ways in which we can start to unpick the system.

Climate change is not just about science and industry, it is about people and promoting an ecologically literate approach to what it means to be human. Up until now, we have been wrecking and destroying all round for short-term gain. That’s now going to destroy us as a species if we don’t change our ways. Recent studies in behavioural psychology show that we can educate ourselves out of our toxic ways of being in the world. We need to learn from South American activists on the rights of nature and from the indigenous cosmologies, who remind us that nature is where we all start. 

Alongside the scientific understanding, the rhetoric around climate change has undergone profound shifts over recent decades. One of the factors influencing this has been the role of the media, and the way it covers climate issues. But how crucial will communication around COP26 be in determining its outcome? Climate journalist Paul Brown explores this question and takes a look back at how far the world has come.

It hardly seems credible that it has been only 30 years since the primary objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) “to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human induced) interference with the climate system” were first typed into a news story.

That sentence was part of a dispatch to The Guardian, one among many other topics, from the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, when the danger of burning fossil fuels to life on Earth and human food supply was first formally acknowledged in a treaty.

It took only three years for enough countries to ratify the UNFCCC, as it became known, to allow the first Conference of the Parties (COP1) to take place. That meeting of 150 countries in Berlin 1995 was to start the process of cutting fossil fuel use – with the rich countries that had caused the problem shouldering the main burden.

Everyone knew it would be difficult, but the optimistic delegates pointed to the success of the Montreal Protocol of 1987 that had already limited the discharges of ozone-depleting chemicals into the atmosphere – and was already showing signs of mending the ozone holes over the poles.

But the UNFCCC was a different animal. It was clear from the start that oil-producing countries in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, aided and abetted by the United States with its giant oil and coal interests, were intent on slowing progress down. In the vast conference hall in West Berlin, the fossil fuel lobby was constantly on its feet, objecting, obstructing, and questioning.

It was clear from the start that oil-producing countries in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, aided and abetted by the United States with its giant oil and coal interests, were intent on slowing progress down.

To speed things up, meetings were set up in side-rooms, working groups thrashed out various texts, sessions went late into the night. In the main hall, politicians made inspiring speeches about the need to prevent disaster for “our grandchildren.” The rhetoric of Dr Helmut Kohl, then German Chancellor, has been echoed, sometimes word for word, by every host of the climate talks ever since. Later, presidents and prime ministers began to talk about the next generation – “our children” – and now they talk about the fear there is “clear and present danger” to all of us.

But there was also a pattern that was to become familiar to journalists and delegates. The rhetoric ended with an agreed text on the last day that was inadequate to the task. Every politician accepted that to reach the consensus that the convention demanded, agreed actions would be less than perfect – some wanted more, some less but it was the best possible at that moment.

Talking at cross-purposes

At COP1 there was an unknown youngish blonde woman in the chair, the environment minister from the former East Germany. She took firm control of the proceedings. When the agreement to take the first steps to reduce emissions came to the floor of the conference to be ratified, on the final day, we all expected the Saudi delegation to jump to their feet and object. They had no opportunity. The chairman’s gavel went down with a thump before they could rise. There was a cheer for the chair. Angela Merkel beamed. It was her first appearance on the world stage. Our UK Press bench turned to each other and said: “That woman could go far.”

By the standards of international treaties, it was a racing start – a momentum that continued through to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. In between, the science of climate change was also progressing fast. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ran in parallel alongside the COPs producing deep analysis of the growing climate crisis, melting poles, loss of forests, and the warming of oceans.

Through this process too, the fossil fuel lobby was pouring billions of dollars into obstruction and delay. Every country had a right to appoint scientists to the IPCC and for the oil and coal producers their scientists’ objective was to water down the language, to emphasise the uncertainty.

The reports were a synthesis of all the scientific papers in the world produced on climate change – of necessity the results being often years out of date before they were published. Perhaps worse was the fact that the IPCC reports were so long that a summary for policy makers was produced that seriously undermined the science.

I discovered how this worked when writing the first of three books about climate change. A friendly scientist in the review process sent me all the papers. They were truly frightening. Across the world we were destroying our life support system and the signs were accelerating and growing ever more ominous. I wrote my book.

Across the world we were destroying our life support system and the signs were accelerating and growing ever more ominous.

When a summary for policy-makers compiled from the same papers was subsequently issued to journalists at a press conference, including me for The Guardian, none of that alarm was reflected in the text. It emphasised the uncertainties, the unknowns, the whole problem sounded far off and remote. The fossil fuel lobby’s black fingers were all over it.

Despite this clear interference, progress was being made politically in terms of acknowledging that greenhouse gases had to be cut and that the industrial countries had to cut them. After much horse-trading in Kyoto and real leadership by Al Gore, then vice president, leading for the United States, each industrial country agreed to a reduction target.

With hindsight this was a remarkable achievement in so short a time – only five years after the Earth Summit. Progress was never going to be as fast again. The more subtle and sinister battle had begun. The constant intervention to tone down statements and make words bland in every open session and committee room had morphed into a clever worldwide campaign to set up think tanks to produce false climate science, pay spurious experts to appear on radio and television, and plant stories undermining proper scientists. The idea was simply to hamper any attempt to slow down or stop the ever-expanding exploration and use of fossil fuels. Scientists, fearing for their jobs and their reputations, found themselves roundly attacked and “exposed” by right-wing newspapers. It was a re-run of the successful campaigns and tactics of the tobacco industry in delaying action on smoking and lung cancer.

The idea was simply to hamper any attempt to slow down or stop the ever-expanding exploration and use of fossil fuels.

As a result of this outstandingly clever and morally corrupt campaign, several of the COPs hardly produced any forward momentum at all. At COP6 in The Hague in November 2000, after two weeks of hard graft the negotiators agreed to give up and try again at COP7 the following year. Then, in March 2001, the new president of the United States, George W Bush, like other Republicans before and since, heavily in hock to the fossil fuel lobby, pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol altogether.

There were other disasters. There were high hopes for 2009 COP 15 in Copenhagen, with Barack Obama having become US president, but the meeting collapsed without agreement. It was clear that months of careful preparation are needed to get a consensus at a COP and just electing a sympathetic US president was not enough.

But scrolling forward through the troubled early years of this century, despite the unrelenting campaign of the fossil fuel lobby, the science began to get firmer and some other players with clout more alarmed. Insurance companies, important in financial markets, began to get nervous about their own future because of the destruction caused by extreme weather.

Turning points

The Stern Review into the “Economics of Climate Change” of 30 October 2006 was a game changer. It was led by Nicolas Stern, then Head of the UK Government Economic Service and an unlikely ally for environmentalists, yet the report’s stark conclusion was: “From all perspectives, the evidence gathered by the Review leads to a simple conclusion: the benefits of strong and early action far outweigh the economic costs of not acting.” Lord Stern, as he became, was a heavyweight in the economic world and convinced many doubters, not least because he has never been silent since, reinforcing the original message by saying if anything his report had underestimated the economic disaster that climate change would cause.

From all perspectives, the evidence gathered by the [Stern] Review leads to a simple conclusion: the benefits of strong and early action far outweigh the economic costs of not acting.

Perhaps even more important in the economic sense was a dramatic and surprising rapid renewable energy revolution that began about the same time. The price of first wind energy and then solar began to plummet. It happened so fast that renewables went from needing expensive subsidies to becoming cost competitive. By 2015, in some windy and sunny places it was becoming cheaper to create electricity with renewables than with coal, gas, and particularly nuclear. In 2021, this is now true over most of the planet.

At the same time, it was becoming clear that climate change was no longer some distant threat to politicians’ grandchildren, but events were happening that could already be scientifically linked to climate change; heat waves, floods, and wildfires were inflicting real economic damage. The small island states, which had always been very vocal about sea level rise, were joined in their concerns by the developing country giants: China and India. Their leaders now realise that climate change is a serious threat to their economic development and stability too.

This led to a landmark decision at COP 21, in Paris in 2015, to set a demanding limit on temperature rises. The result was met with huge jubilation at the time. However, we realised well before 2021 that it is one thing to agree to not to let world temperatures rise by more than 2 degrees and aim for a more demanding target of 1.5 degrees, and quite another to put the policies in place to achieve either goal. Despite all the hope that Paris engendered: the promises, targets, and investments in new technologies it produced, the world has kept on burning fossil fuels, chopping down forests and adding more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere at an ever-increasing rate.

Yet the fossil fuel lobby has also been constantly losing ground. Academic institutions and local authorities have been divesting from oil and coal. Shareholders have been ganging up on oil company boards and demanding change.

Gathering forces for change

At the grassroots, in August 2018, a remarkable 16-year-old Swedish girl, Greta Thunberg, decided that instead of going to school on Fridays she needed to make a personal statement by sitting outside the Parliament to demand action on climate change. Greta has inspired a worldwide movement of young people demanding that the older generations do not continue to destroy their future by carrying on business as usual.

In tandem another group, Extinction Rebellion, has sprung up across major countries in the world, disrupting city centres by blocking roads and attacking offices of companies and banks exploiting fossil fuels. In Britain, an offshoot of brave protestors, Insulate Britain, have blocked motorways demanding government action to improve the homes of millions of people.

Not all this protest has gone down well with ordinary drivers and the right-wing press, but it has achieved its objective, drawn attention to the continuing failure of governments, banks, and companies to tackle the climate crisis. Public opinion shows that only a few ordinary citizens now cling on to the belief that climate change is not an urgent problem that needs immediate action.

At the same time, scientists have become bolder through a sense of duty and panic. This is partly because the science has become more certain and the extremes we are seeing this year are at the worst end of their predictions. They can point with certainty and without fear of contradiction or a backlash to the fact that the wildfires, floods, hurricanes, heat waves, and other climate-related disasters are the direct consequences of our political inaction.

The wildfires, floods, hurricanes, heat waves, and other climate-related disasters are the direct consequences of our political inaction.

Telling the story

From the media point of view, climate change has also become both easier to report and an issue seen to be directly connected to our everyday lives. To give some idea of the uphill struggle reporters once had, it was at one time the policy of the UK’s Daily Mail to ban its reporters from using the phrases “global warming” and “climate change” in stories because it was against the paper’s political line. This edict held sway for about five years but a backlash by concerned readers, who wondered why important IPCC scientific reports were not being covered, forced a change. That was 15 years ago. Gradually even the Mail has conceded that climate change is real.

At one time the policy of the UK’s Daily Mail to ban its reporters from using the phrases “global warming” and “climate change” in stories because it was against the paper’s political line.

While I personally thought from the 1990s onwards climate change was the most important story a journalist could ever cover, my environmental colleagues and I had trouble persuading even more liberal news desks of that fact. Not any longer.

Every decision we make is affected by climate change, from what sort of car we buy, how we heat or cool our homes, where and how we go on holiday, and even what we eat. Lifestyle and fashion features never mentioned climate change 30 years ago; now it is a central issue. Carbon taxes can hit us directly in the pocket. It is not a subject that will ever disappear from the daily news lists.

It is also true that the Covid-19 pandemic has interrupted negotiations and taken political energy away from the looming crisis. Some of the poorest and most vulnerable countries may not even make it to Glasgow. However, the issue has not faded from the public mind. Looking at political and opinion polls in 2021, the mood has undergone a sea change. The large majority of all generations are in favour of more rapid action on climate – and believe that it has to start immediately.

The large majority of all generations are in favour of more rapid action on climate – and believe that it has to start immediately.

Still pushing back against this are the oil nations and fossil fuel interests that have enormous political clout, embedded in governments and trade unions. Among them there are communities who make their living on fossil fuels that return members to divided parliaments and hold the balance of power in some countries. They remain an enormous deadweight holding back policy actions.

Despite inaction from some central governments there have been great strides at city level, in companies and among small communities across the world. They have demonstrated that carbon neutral is both possible and desirable. But as all eyes have moved to Glasgow and COP 26, it is clear that the mainstream political progress since Paris in 2015 has been slower than a sleepy sloth. And most crucially of all, measured in greenhouse gas emissions, the sloth is running backwards. The amount of carbon in the atmosphere is increasing week by week at an alarming rate. However, in the public mind there can no longer be an excuse for inaction because apart from the danger to life and limb, the economic opportunities of energy efficiency, renewables, and job creation are clearly so great.

Many politicians and businessmen also declare they have now “got it.” They repeat an overused quote: “I can no longer look my children in the eye and still do nothing.” But as Greta says: “Blah blah” to that. So COP 26 is finely balanced and the signs are not good, but that was true in Paris in 2015 and there was a breakthrough at the 11th hour. The politicians have this opportunity to prove Greta wrong. Let us hope for all our sake they take it.

Covid-19 restrictions in the UK and ongoing vaccine inequality will shut many voices from the Global South out of proceedings for the United Nations Conference of the Parties in Glasgow, Scotland. Fran Gater spoke with green organiser and Burundian activist Anne Marie Bihirabake about the impact of climate change in her country, vaccine politics and the seemingly insurmountable barriers her and many activists face to participating in the most important global forum for climate action.

Fran Gater: Can you start by telling us about the Covid-19 situation in Burundi? What has life been like for you since the pandemic?

Anne Marie Bihirabake: Like all countries around the world, my country Burundi has faced Covid-19. Burundi never had a lockdown – never closed churches, markets, banks, schools, nothing.

Frankly speaking, I appreciated this approach to dealing with Covid-19. Why? Because Burundi is a poor country; one of the poorest. For people to be able to eat they have to go to work, they have to go out – they have to suffer. Most Burundians live day-to-day. If they were kept at home, the government could not afford to feed them.

We have lost people. But not on the level we expected. With Covid-19 we do our best, especially washing our hands. We have been unable to social distance – it is very difficult for Burundians to avoid hugging each other.

For people to be able to eat they have to go to work, they have to go out –they have to suffer. Most Burundians live day-to-day.

What’s the situation with vaccination? Have any vaccines reached Burundi?

The government of Burundi long refused Covid-19 vaccines. We can’t monitor how the vaccination is going. We heard that some NGO and UN staff, as well as their families, could have the vaccine, but not officially because it is forbidden – it’s against the government policy. Recently we heard that the Kenyan Embassy vaccinated its staff, and some rich people, including some officials, ran there to request the remaining doses.

Why has the government refused the vaccine?

I can’t know the exact reason but since 2015, the government decided to prove its economic and political independence and self-sufficiency in most domains. It closed Burundi off from many external funders. This had a big impact, including on the health sector where there were medicine shortages.

The former president, who should have had two terms, decided to run for a third term in 2015. The international community tried to advise the Burundian government to follow the constitution, but it refused. Many human rights violations have taken place – media seen as the opposition have been banned, the opposition has been exiled, and many of them jailed. So, Burundi has violated some international agreements.

Some people in Africa believe the vaccine against Covid-19 is not something intended to improve the lives of black people but a way to eliminate us. But I don’t think the government should decide for every citizen. They should allow those who want to take it to do so. The government should lead citizens to be protected against the virus through vaccination.

The UK government promised to supply vaccine doses to COP26 delegates to make it possible for delegates from Global South countries whose populations are not vaccinated to attend. But it seems this offer does not work in practice. Have you been offered a vaccine?

I have never had the opportunity to have a vaccine and I would be glad to receive any sort of vaccine against Covid.

I’ve tried in other countries like Rwanda, Uganda, Congo, but they have also not been able to offer it to all their populations. It has also become difficult for a foreign person to travel in those countries.

So your experience is that the scheme doesn’t reach you – the offer, in reality, has not materialised?

Exactly. Even here in Burundi, they said that the World Bank will deliver some vaccines. But when we asked for them, we found that it is not even good to talk about it – someone told me, “You’d better not continue asking that.”

We can postpone the conference but the impacts of climate change are not stopping.

Because the vaccine doses are not reaching the people who need them in time, some NGOs have called for the conference to be postponed. They say that “a safe, inclusive and just global climate conference will be impossible.” What do you, and the Global Greens, say about this call for postponement of COP26?

The Global Greens have not taken an official position on postponement. What I know is that the Global Greens coordination is working hard to facilitate the participation of the maximum number of delegates. For me, the postponement of COP26 shouldn’t happen. We can postpone the conference but the impacts of climate change are not stopping, and we don’t know how the pandemic will look tomorrow.

I think the UK government should relax some of the conditions. They should be the ones to change, but we should not postpone COP26. The UK has been given the opportunity to host COP26 they should use it positively; they should not make things hard and prevent people from meeting. When they were appointed to host the COP it was not to allow only a few people. They do not know who they might prevent from coming. If it’s only a few people who can come, most of the time it’ll be government officials and we know what they say, we know their positions, we know how they negotiate, and most of the time they negotiate against the community.

This will be put on the head of the UK government. And the world will never forget this negative contribution to humanity and the coming generation. I don’t think the UK Government should accept this bad reputation.

If it’s only a few people who can come [to COP], most of the time it’ll be government officials and we know what they say, we know their positions, we know how they negotiate, and most of the time they negotiate against the community.

Do you want to go to COP?

Yes, of course. I really want to attend COP26, and the Global Greens would like me to be a delegate. I have worked on the preparation. If it wasn’t for Covid, I’d have no problems in getting there – I think the visa would be provided to me because I have already been to the UK twice.

Why do you want to go to the COP so much? Why is it important for you and other delegates and observers from poor countries to travel to Glasgow?

My interest is, first of all, to meet people. Even meeting other Burundians at the COP venue is much more important than meeting them here. When we meet there we discuss how to deal with climate change, how to make change, but the impact of our discussions is different. When we are here, they believe that our voice can’t go anywhere. When we meet at the COP venue, they can see we are not nothing – we can raise our voice, and others will stand with us.

At COP, we can raise awareness about problems in Burundi; we meet international delegates and can expose our problems. Very few people know Burundi. Going to COP can give us space to talk about our situation. To cry. To call for support from others, and to build our network.

Many solutions to the problems here in Burundi come from outside. The networks we make with international organisations can help solve some problems here – they give feedback from the outside and can convince leaders in Burundi to take action.

In our country, not everyone is entitled to a voice or freedom of speech. It is very difficult to communicate – the opposition, the media, whoever wants to influence the government has no space. So meeting outside is better than meeting inside the country.

Very few people know Burundi. Going to COP can give us space to talk about our situation. To cry. To call for support from others, and to build our network.

Is it safe for you?

It’s not safe for many. The situation has been very bad and people have become used to people killing others over a simple conflict. We say that the hope of life in Burundi has 48 hours – we never know what will happen. I don’t find it a secure country. It can’t be a secure country when many Burundians are not allowed to access and enjoy their country and the houses they have built.

Tell us about your personal situation. Where do you stand at the moment? Do you know if you can come to Glasgow?

I’m coordinating with the Global Greens. I’ve already booked accommodation. We are waiting for some documents but knowing that I come from a “red” country on the Covid-19 map, my chances are limited. However, I will do my best to be there.

It is bad that if we are given the opportunity to come we have to spend time in quarantine – then the two weeks in COP. It is a very long time away from home. But for the cause of climate change, I am ready to do that. The funds that are needed for quarantine may be very huge. If I’m given financial support I’m ready to go there.

The challenges that prevent me from attending COP26 are from two sides: my country and the host country. Receiving a visa is no longer sufficient. It’s possible I may be given the opportunity to attend the conference and still miss it if I don’t receive my test results on time and therefore cannot take my flight.

How is climate change affecting people in Burundi, especially women?

Climate change is a reality. It is not something far away. People here die because of rain, drought, hunger, and many other things.

In the countryside, climate change affects agricultural production. When there’s nothing to eat, most of the leaders of the households who need to find food are women. In Burundi, we have a lot of widows, and single-parent households. We have a lot of children at home. In Burundi, five to six children to a mother is common. Some have even more – up to 12, 13 children. If you have many children and you have to leave your house and look for somewhere else to live – this is a heavy job for the mother. Some people are living in very damp houses, sometimes with water inside. If children have illnesses or allergies because of the dampness, the cold situation and the poor housing, this becomes the responsibility of women. And when their time is consumed by the care of a sick person, this impacts other tasks, especially agricultural work.

When you consider the situation of women, the impacts of climate change, and now the pandemic – you want to come to COP to meet allies and donors, and to advocate for your country, but you are prevented from doing so. How do you feel in this situation?

It’s frustrating. We are a victim of being a poor country and a poorly governed country. If a country has bad governance, all problems follow. You can smell the poverty and the problems.

I have been lucky that in the past I have always been granted a visa. And I thank God for that. But most of the time people from my region miss the opportunity to attend international conferences because the host countries think that we will not return. They are partly right because many Africans are looking to leave the difficult situation they live in. Unfortunately, many other people are victims of that situation.

Being in a poor country breeds a lot of social frustrations. In the pandemic, the challenges are many.

Climate policy expert Stefan Aykut reviews the COP process and its successes since the 2015 Paris Agreement.

Benjamin Joyeux: Where are we in the COP process since the Paris Agreement was signed in September 2015?

Stefan Aykut: First of all, it is important to understand the spirit of the Paris Agreement. The Paris framework was born out of a desire to put the global governance process back on track after the total collapse of the negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009, and also from a desire to redefine the scope of this governance, to rethink what we can do and cannot do at the global level, in the presence of all the countries in the world. This was a real paradigm shift compared to what had prevailed until then with the Kyoto Protocol.

Since Paris, binding reductions targets for countries are no longer set, as was previously the case. Instead, we have a clear objective to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees, preferably 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-industrial levels. This translates into the need to achieve total decarbonisation of human activity by 2050. Next, we see the creation of a kind of “theatre of transparency”. States are obliged to submit national commitments, whose content they can freely determine, and transparency mechanisms then serve to foster regular public discussion of the actions implemented by each signatory of the agreement. This discussion must allow for a later assessment of whether the actions are sufficient or not. Thus, the COPs remain important in terms of the gradual establishment of rules for the public discussion of efforts, country by country. This could be seen in particular in Katowice, Poland, at COP24 in 2018. A whole package of measures was put in place there, including the “Paris rulebook”, which defines what needs to be put on the table in terms of national communication and country-by-country reporting, along with the differences between developed and developing countries, and the implementation of each country’s climate action plans, called Nationally Determined Contributions (or NDCs), and so on. All of this architecture has been put in place and negotiations are ongoing, particularly concerning Article 6 of the Paris Agreement protocol on market mechanisms for greenhouse gas emissions, which is still the subject of intensive discussion.

The COPs remain important in terms of the gradual establishment of rules for the public discussion of efforts, country by country.

But in general, these negotiations are becoming less important as the system is beginning to be put in place and it is the transnational mega-event aspect that is becoming fundamental. States, multinationals, the media, and NGOs meet at the great get-togethers that the COPs have become, to discuss climate policies. But the meetings are also used to stage this theatre of transparency, where states submit their climate policies – reductions, adaptation and financing – to the critical gaze of the international community.

Greenhouse gas emissions – counted in PPM (parts per million) of CO2 in the atmosphere – have risen each year since 2015. If we simply look at the figures, we do not seem to be on a good trajectory at all. Aren’t COPs just a chance for governments to pretend they’re doing something?

It is a legitimate question. But what we should look at is mainly the emissions, not the PPM. The PPM figure will continue to rise for a long time to come, no matter what we do. CO2 stays in the atmosphere for a century, so looking at the PPM does not make much sense. However, it is also true that emissions continue to rise.

Today international governance is not the place where the decisions are made; national policies are decisive. International governance remains irreplaceable. It keeps the climate on the agenda and provides for emergency warnings and a general direction. COPs are the only place where all countries – developed, developing, and the poorest – meet every year to discuss the climate together. But even if they are essential, we should not expect them to produce the most important decisions. Those are rather taken by individual states or coalitions of states in bilateral or multilateral initiatives on the margins of UN governance. For example, technological partnerships are necessary and possible in specific areas such as renewable energies, the exit from fossil fuel, international air and maritime transport, and financial regulation. Without such initiatives, the COP dynamic risks sinking into a kind of perpetual round of promises, where leaders make annual promises and then forget them. Alongside this flexible governance at COP, we need concrete agreements too.

But even if they [COPs] are essential, we should not expect them to produce the most important decisions.

But are states really the right interlocutors if we are to succeed in cutting greenhouse gases? Large multinationals have a much greater impact on climate change than many small states. Isn’t COP just a chance for multinationals to greenwash their businesses and get some cheap PR?

Since Paris, different kinds of actors are increasingly involved: large cities, companies, and federal states (including American ones under Donald Trump) have increasingly taken part in COP discussions. The inclusion of private actors was always intended by the architects of the Paris Agreement. But it is not without its problems.

Multinationals are key players in the fight against climate change, but COPs are mainly a communication platform for them. For example, at each COP there is now the UN Global Climate Action Prize to reward corporate and civil society initiatives. In 2019, Apple was among the recipients. In 2020, it was Dallas airport! A massive marketing and PR platform is made available for companies that are not necessarily pro-climate. At the same time, the international process does contribute to forging new legal norms. Climate court cases are currently taking shape around the world, including Notre Affaire à Tous in France, the recent complaint before the German constitutional court, and the Urgenda case in the Netherlands. In these cases, plaintiffs are suing governments and companies to force them to redouble their efforts to reduce emissions or to compensate for the damage caused. All of these cases rely on texts from international governance as the basis for their arguments.

So the COPs make it easier for people to take up the climate cause?

Absolutely! COPs should be thought of mainly as spaces of convergence, for the circulation of know-how, whether in terms of emissions reduction or legal argumentation. The Paris Agreement is constantly cited and the 1.5 degree limit is pointed to in all these recent court cases. We are no longer looking at binding governance but rather at a convergence of several dynamics, still insufficient but in which we can make out trajectories, connections, and synergies. For example, a recent report on coal-fired power plants under construction around the world showed that since the Paris Agreement, three quarters of the power plants that were initially planned have not been built.

There is a change underway around energy planning in many countries but it will not be enough. What remains crucial is the bottom-up movement of civil society that has been emerging over the last few years: Fridays for Future, Extinction Rebellion, court cases launched by citizens and associations, certain companies that are taking the lead, states that are implementing more ambitious policies. These different actions must reach a critical mass so as to reinforce each other. This is ultimately what the COPs should be judged on: do they help these different dynamics to link up to move more quickly towards the decarbonisation of human activity?

We are no longer looking at binding governance but rather at a convergence of several dynamics, still insufficient but in which we can make out trajectories, connections, and synergies.

But don’t COPs fail to discuss the paradigm that is at the root of what is preventing us from effectively fighting climate change – the dogma of growth? Within international conferences, one often gets the impression that growth is even more important than saving the planet.

The dogma of growth does not come from the United Nations; it is deeply rooted in our national political and economic systems, and also in the ideas that shape development patterns around the world. It is often countries of the South that insist that climate policies not be used against their interests in trade negotiations. They fear that the environment will be a pretext for curbing their development and want to separate questions about their development strategies from environmental issues.

That said, the dogma of growth is a problem. We need to redefine what “growth” means and how it contributes to a good life for the majority. Growth in itself is not necessarily a problem. But measuring it in GDP is problematic. It is a very poor indicator for many reasons. But today this isn’t a matter to be articulated in international conferences or at a UN forum. The question of growth must clearly be put on the table at the national level: what would be a just society and how would our various systems (democracy, social security, and so on) function without growth. We should debate the issue of growth first at the national and then at the European level. If we manage to show that prosperity without GDP growth is possible, we could then discuss it internationally. But we’re not going to discuss post-growth with India. It wouldn’t make sense in the current state of affairs.

We need to redefine what “growth” means and how it contributes to a good life for the majority… The dogma of growth does not come from the United Nations; it is deeply rooted in our national political and economic systems.

A new Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty has been put on the table by thousands of scientists and academics from around the world. Is a treaty like this likely to succeed in the current international system?

When Amy Dahan and I published Gouverner le Climat in 2015, one of our hypotheses was that focusing on CO2 alone in climate policies carried the risk of depoliticising the issues by making them too abstract. We felt it was necessary to give a more region-focused and concrete dimension to the transition: to discuss CO2 emissions at the end of the chain but also the chain itself – this “fossil capitalism” that needs to be transformed. In particular, a debate is needed on the nature of our energy production and the hydrocarbon trade. These discussions were already topical at the time. And now we have this initiative for a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty. Unfortunately, I don’t think it will be at the heart of the discussions in Glasgow. But it’s an idea that absolutely has to grow and become more important. It does not necessarily need to be negotiated as part of the Paris Agreement and the COPs. It might be more effective to move forward with a small group of willing countries, before expanding the circle. Because one of the problems of international governance is precisely that all countries are around the table. Negotiating such a treaty with Saudi Arabia, Australia, or the United States has little chance of succeeding unless it loses its binding nature. We therefore need agreements and initiatives of this type, complementary to the Paris Agreement. Another text might concern specific industrial sectors, such as cement or steel. The idea is to have initiatives in these sectors that could create a global transition of such industries towards decarbonisation. Here again, it is not vital that this be done under the Paris Agreement. We can make progress in the form of bilateral or multilateral negotiations, and think about integration into the UN framework later.

Are carbon quotas and, more generally, market mechanisms effective for regulating greenhouse gas emissions?

If we look at Europe, its carbon market is starting to work for the first time in years. The carbon price is, in certain industries, making pollution more expensive. But – and this is essential – it is not because the market is doing things well, but mainly because things have moved politically. Companies are beginning to believe that the European Commission and the member states are serious about their desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. They think that in the future there will be fewer allowances and therefore that the price of the allowances will increase. It is the value of political credibility. This is why a carbon market can contribute to the fight against climate change, but only in its proper and humble way.

Carbon markets must be accompanied by an arsenal of measures including support for renewables and ambitious infrastructure policies such as the development of rail and public transport. It is important to note that this market took 15 years to work in Europe, with a large bureaucracy and solid institutions. And despite this, there have been many criminal abuses. Billions of euros were stolen during the first phase. Imagine these carbon markets internationally, in a context of weak regulation and without any institution with real oversight powers. The risk is of creating huge loopholes. We see this with the Clean Development Mechanism created under Kyoto. All the studies conducted afterwards agree that this mechanism did not help to significantly reduce global emissions.

Companies are beginning to believe that the European Commission and the member states are serious about their desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

What international mechanism could then work to really lower our CO2 emissions?

We can think in terms of bilateral aid and investments in projects. A market mechanism can only work with strong institutions to oversee and support it, allowing for clear comparability in terms of emissions in different countries and so on. One of the things we know best and that works, more or less, is development aid. We need to transform investment policies in developing countries – everything that is financed by governments, the World Bank, and multilateral development banks. There is enormous room for manoeuvre here, as these banks often continue to invest in fossil fuels. Changing the investment policies of these institutions is urgent and necessary to move towards decarbonisation in infrastructure, which can last for decades. There are real levers here independent of carbon markets.

Changing the investment policies of institutions is urgent and necessary to move towards decarbonisation in infrastructure, which can last for decades.

Finally, what can we expect from COP26 in Glasgow?

In Glasgow, we will continue to discuss the final details of the Paris Agreement, particularly Article 6. We are already looking forward to the USA returning to the table. At that point, we can hope for joint announcements with China and other states. This is also the last year for the submission of Nationally Determined Contributions [national plans for emissions cuts]. Many countries have not yet submitted their plans. More countries will submit binding targets and more precise climate strategies for 2050 at Glasgow.

Personally, I do not expect a major announcement at COP26. The COPs remain important as occasions where the climate is discussed globally. They also provide tools and resources that can be used in national policy debates and in court. They must be used as a means of pressure, to say: “This is what you promised and it is not enough”. The COPs are opportunities that must be seized upon but what we need most of all is the pressure. The climate movement and civil society needs to regain its strength, now that the Covid crisis is fading. In 2019, just before the pandemic, there was a global climate movement emerging everywhere. We need that bottom-up pressure to make itself felt. Change will come from there. It will not be decreed at a COP.

Since taking office, President Joe Biden has spotlighted climate action nationally and pursued American climate leadership globally. But the new administration’s plans are running up against the reality of a divided legislative system and a political economy hooked on fossil fuels. Nora Löhle analyses the potential for a credible US climate policy and the hurdles that stand in its way.

In April, President Biden opened the Leaders Summit on Climate with exciting rhetoric, announcing the highly anticipated new US climate target. His promise to the world: the United States of America will increase its reduction target to 50 to 52 per cent by 2030 compared to 2005. When calculated from 1990, this goal corresponds to a 43 per cent emissions reduction.

But how likely is it that the USA will make the necessary emissions reductions over the next few years to ultimately achieve this climate target? There is no simple answer. But a closer look at the past, Biden’s current team, government announcements, first heated negotiations in Congress, and the measures taken so far allow us to identify certain trends – and clearly demonstrate what needs to happen for this goal to be reached.

A sobering look at the past

Currently, US greenhouse gas emissions are 4 per cent higher than 1990 levels. A glimmer of hope was seen between 2007, the year of peak emissions, and 2017, when emissions fell by 12 per cent. This development was due to two measures: the massive investments in fracking that kickstarted the shift from coal to gas, and the emissions standards for power plants and vehicles implemented by the Obama administration. The Trump administration went on to put a damper on climate policy.

A bipartisan understanding that climate change must be tackled is yet to be created.

A look at the past shows that the US has so far failed to achieve any significant reduction in its greenhouse gas emissions. President Biden must therefore pull off a tour de force to achieve his climate goals. With his institutional and personnel line-up, Biden has taken an important first step, and his interdepartmental approach is convincing. Climate policy can only be successful if it is implemented by the whole government. With cabinet members such as Deb Haaland, Michael S. Regan, Gina McCarthy, John Kerry, Janet Yellen, and Pete Buttigieg, he has put together a diverse and climate-strong team that will anchor a new justice dimension in climate policy.

Build back better

Biden assumed the presidency under the slogan “Build back better – stronger out of the crisis.” For Biden, economic and climate policy belong together. In his American Jobs Plan he describes how infrastructure investments should generate new jobs and sustainable industries – with a clear focus on green technologies. Over the next 10 years, 2 trillion taxpayers’ money will be channelled into road and bridge repair, clean drinking water, 500,000 electric charging stations, the promotion of electric cars, the expansion of railways and public transport, renewable energies, electricity grid expansion, and high-speed broadband. The plan is to make sure that these projects do not fail for lack of capital. A poll by the League of Conservation Voters and Data for Progress found that 71 per cent of voters support the American Jobs Plan, meaning that a large part of the US population currently backs Biden’s policies to transform the climate and economy for a better future.

However, the green economic stimulus package still needs approval from Congress and heated negotiations with the Senate have been going on for weeks. Biden is aiming to achieve bipartisan support for his investment plan – in keeping with his conciliatory political style, and because he will need 60 votes in the Senate to pass the budget. Negotiations to this effect are still underway with the Republicans, and it has been proven that finding a bipartisan compromise seems difficult, maybe impossible – the next weeks will show. The central disagreements are how to fund the infrastructure plan and what to spend it on – Republicans are specifically against the massive funding for climate change action, and research and development. Biden has already taken a painful compromise by agreeing to a much smaller funding that is now a little over 1 trillion US dollars – only about a fourth of what Biden had initially proposed during his campaign. This means most climate initiatives are already buried before they even got started. In this light, climate activists and several Democrats in Congress see Biden as already giving up on his ambitious climate plan.

If no compromise is reached, the Democrats could still take an alternative but less ideal course via a process known as budget reconciliation, which requires only 51 votes and under which Biden’s American Jobs Plan could pass the Senate with the approval of all Democrats alone.

Even if the package finds its way through Congress, the following steps remain crucial. Where exactly will the money go? Which technologies will be defined as green and forward-looking? Where can the most significant climate-policy impacts be made, while ensuring greater justice? Voices from science and civil society should be represented within this discussion to identify the most sustainable solutions and set the right priorities.

At the very least, Biden has already announced that 40 per cent of the investments will go directly to poorer neighbourhoods and regions with high levels of pollution. This fulfils his promise of environmental justice and ensures more self-determination for discriminated minorities. The local use of funds could also result in far more efficient and effective solutions that serve the climate and bring about social equality.

Underpin climate policy with legislation and sectoral targets

Investments alone will not be sufficient to achieve the country’s climate goals. The US government must introduce legislation that sets standards for reducing emissions as quickly as possible. Such standards were effective in the past and must be extended. Compared to executive orders, standards have a longer duration of effect and send a clear signal to the economy. Moreover, Biden’s cabinet must formulate milestones against which their success can be transparently measured. Annual targets must be defined for each sector, including sanctions for non-compliance.

However, in every area of climate policy, Biden will face the same legislative hurdles in Congress. States like Texas, North Dakota, Alaska, and Wyoming, whose economies remain heavily dependent on the extraction and production of fossil fuels, are particularly sceptical about his climate agenda. He will also have to communicate his plans for transformation to his home state of Pennsylvania with considerable tact. There, the coal phase-out has led to painful job losses and the hopes of many communities now lie in gas production. Democratic senators and representatives will find it difficult to support climate policy proposals in certain sectors unless convincing promises are made to create new jobs in their constituencies. Moreover, in the Senate, the success of any climate bill hangs in the balance following Democratic Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia’s announcement of his intention to boycott all of Biden’s climate policy efforts.

Public pressure is essential to ensure that the US makes the leap.

The US government recently issued a permit for new oil and gas extraction in Wyoming, while in late May the Biden administration defended the Willow project, a major oil drilling venture in Alaska, in court. Once granted, permits for new fossil fuel projects mean additional greenhouse gas emissions for decades into the future. This approach shows that Joe Biden is willing to make decisions diametrically opposed to climate protection in favour of bipartisan compromise and jobs. Civil society groups and the US’s international partners need to keep a critical eye on the president’s climate policy actions and the extent to which they correspond to his rhetoric. Public pressure is essential to ensure that the US makes the leap.

Transport and power

The transport and power sectors are among those with the greatest potential for emissions reductions in the USA. The US transport sector currently accounts for one third of total emissions, while the power sector accounts for 25 per cent of emissions.

In the transport sector, the US is already on a promising path. States such as California have introduced emissions standards and climate-neutral vehicle quotas for car manufacturers. These measures are already having an impact and should be rolled out across the country. Technological developments in electric mobility are pointing the way to the future, and traditional manufacturers are following suit: General Motors, for instance, is aiming to stop producing petrol vehicles by 2035. Digital applications are also contributing to the mobility turnaround by offering efficient and sustainable alternatives. A massive expansion of public transport and bicycle lanes in cities would save even more emissions.

Investments alone will not be sufficient to achieve the country’s climate goals.

In the electricity sector, the use of renewable energy sources must be expanded and massively accelerated through support schemes and quotas. While solar and onshore wind are already on the rise in some states, the potential of offshore wind farms is just being discovered. To achieve a carbon-neutral power sector, the US government must also announce the phase-out of all fossil fuels. This elementary building block remains elusive. The US continues to produce, burn, and export oil and gas in large quantities. Here, Biden is pursuing a debatable course of action: he has placed his hopes on carbon capture and storage [read more on CCS technology] and will pump large amounts of public money into this technology over the next few years, which will leave other budget lines lacking.

Another major problem is methane which is many times more harmful to the climate than CO2 emissions. Methane emissions from oil and gas production are much higher than previously thought, and are increasing annually. The US government urgently needs to adopt a strategy to curb methane. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is currently drafting a bill on methane emissions standards.

Climate policy as an opportunity

While the US is yet to prove its actual emissions reductions, Biden already has a few achievements under his belt. He has succeeded in building a broad alliance to support his climate policy, including industry and trade unions won over to the cause by the promise of sustainable jobs and global leadership in green technologies. The president also consulted climate activists during the drafting of his climate agenda and adopted several their demands. With this type of alliance and a new unifying message that reframes climate change as an economic and social opportunity as opposed to simply being a costly problem, the necessary systemic change and a far-reaching transformation could become possible.

The Biden-Harris administration has had remarkable success in recent months in fighting the pandemic thanks to bold investments, pragmatic crisis management, and a call for civic engagement. This style of governance, coupled with a spirit of innovation, could bring about a much-needed climate policy breakthrough. For it to be far-reaching and continuous, this climate policy needs to be implemented by respective law that needs broad support by Congress. However, a bipartisan understanding that climate change must be tackled is yet to be created.

One of Joe Biden’s first acts after he entered the White House was to sign a series of climate-related executive orders, signalling a clear intention to waste no time in reversing the destructive policies of his predecessor. Many citizens of the US, a country that is regularly affected by severe natural disasters including wildfires, hurricanes, and floods, are expected to support these moves. In 2020, two-thirds of Americans thought that their government should adopt stronger climate policies. In its latest report, the US Federal Reserve for the first time identified climate change as a serious threat to financial stability. Reflecting the urgency of the matter, the new US president has presented the most ambitious climate plan to date. What has he promised, and which measures can be implemented – and how quickly?

President Joe Biden has announced that combating climate change will be a priority for his administration and plans a cross-agency approach to tackling this challenge. His climate plan centres on the decarbonisation of the power sector by 2035 and the climate neutrality of the entire economy by 2050, and he has pledged a first-term investment of 2 trillion US dollars in order to achieve this.  

Biden has proposed a broad package of climate policies affecting numerous sectors. A key priority is the electrification of the transport sector. To achieve this, Biden’s government plans to introduce higher emission standards, following California’s example, and to build 500 000 new charging stations for electric cars to create corresponding market incentives. Coupled with an offer of retraining and good jobs with a minimum wage of 15 US dollars, the transformation of the domestic auto industry is expected to create 1 million new jobs.

Besides the electrification of the automotive sector, Biden’s most ambitious campaign promise in the transport sector is the construction of the world’s most sustainable, safest, and fastest train system. After decades of focusing on individual mobility and virtually ignoring rail transport in the US, Biden’s plan represents not only a paradigm shift but also a mammoth task.

To reduce the large amounts of energy consumed in heating and cooling buildings in the US, Biden plans to weatherise 2 million homes (making them resistant to cold weather, through insulation and other means) and upgrade an additional 4 million commercial buildings to increase their energy efficiency, in addition to constructing 1.5 million new homes and public housing units to the highest efficiency standards. Since energy supply is a state responsibility in the US, Biden has not formulated a target for the share of renewable energy sources in the electricity mix.

A federal research agency, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA-C), is to be established to drive innovation in the new, advanced technologies needed to achieve climate neutrality. Research will be funded in areas such as sustainable energy, battery technology, carbon capture and storage, new building materials, hydrogen, and modern nuclear power. This should spur a wide range of innovations and lead to the creation of new industrial sectors. Biden’s vision is to make the US the world leader in and top exporter of green technologies, with a clear emphasis on their domestic production – thus boosting the US economy. In order to ensure that climate policy is an industrial policy success, Biden has announced not only investments in infrastructure and research, but also necessary tax and trade policy reforms. However, he leaves the details open. Public procurement is seen as another building block to promote sustainable technologies that are produced in the US.

Biden’s plan represents not only a paradigm shift but also a mammoth task.

A plan with social justice at its heart

Inspired by Roosevelt’s Civilian Conservation Corps, Biden has proposed the introduction of a national civilian service programme – the Civilian Climate Corps – in which young people can get involved in nature conservation and environmental projects. In addition, 250 000 new jobs are to be created in the restoration of abandoned coal fields and oil fields. Taking a lesson from the Democrats’ lost election campaign in 2016, Biden has explicitly emphasised the key contribution of the coal-mining regions to the economic rise of the US and promises to support their transition with the help of a new Task Force on Coal and Power Plant Communities.

Although Biden has distanced himself from the Green New Deal in the past, his policy proposals draw on its principles significantly. The central new feature of Biden’s climate agenda is that it links climate policy and social justice. This is made clear by his promise to make 40 per cent of the investments in sustainable energy and infrastructure available to disadvantaged and low-income communities. For Biden, social participation also means that all citizens have access to high-speed internet and that schools in poorer neighbourhoods are modernised. He recognises that those on low incomes and people of colour are disproportionately affected by pollution, and as a result, they suffer financial and health disadvantages. By doing so, he introduces a new dimension to climate policy in the United States: environmental justice.

He recognises that those on low incomes and people of colour are disproportionately affected by pollution, and as a result, they suffer financial and health disadvantages.

Biden’s climate policy narrative is a combination of reducing CO2 emissions and simultaneously carrying out massive infrastructural investment. The policy should result in the creation of new jobs, “made in the USA” green technologies, the development of sustainable industries, and improved social justice.

Climate 21 Project

The Climate 21 Project, a group of over 150 high-level climate experts, has developed recommendations for Biden’s climate policy and advocates a broad interagency approach to address this challenge of the century. The Climate 21 Project does not formulate any substantive goals; rather, its proposals make recommendations on structures and measures to be implemented. They set out how the White House, together with 11 federal departments and agencies, should pursue and execute climate policy in order to “hit the ground running” and succeed in implementing the fundamental pillars of its climate policy in the first 100 days of Biden’s term in office. In order to avoid a situation in which no one takes final responsibility due to the number of actors involved, a high-level national climate council is to be created within the White House.

Putting the plan into action

It will be possible to implement certain elements of Biden’s new climate policy relatively quickly, while others will take longer. Some, however, will be difficult to implement at all. Trump’s environmental rollbacks, including emissions standards for power plants and the transport sector, the regulation aimed at reducing methane emissions, and protection for water and land, will be relatively straightforward to reverse, restoring standards to their original levels. Following Biden’s signing of the executive order for the US to re-join the Paris Climate Agreement, it is expected the US will regain its membership within a month. The court cases pending against states including California that embraced higher emission standards could also be withdrawn with the appropriate political will.

The drafting of new laws, on the other hand, could easily take two years or more. Biden’s executive order halting construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, an extension to the massive oil pipeline running between the US and Canada opposed by many indigenous communities affected, is likely to be followed by numerous lawsuits from the companies affected, delaying the final decision for years.

In order to pass the budget, tax reforms, and trade agreements, the president needs congressional approval. With the election win in Georgia, the Democrats now have the same number of seats in the Senate as the Republicans. In the event of stalemates in the Senate, the vice-president will have the deciding vote, meaning that Kamala Harris will play a decisive role over the next two years. With a majority in the House of Representatives, the Democrats can thus theoretically organise majorities in Congress. Such a majority would be wafer-thin, however, and could not be relied on – particularly when coupled with the broad range of positions represented within the Democrats, especially in terms of climate policy.

In the event of stalemates in the Senate, the vice-president will have the deciding vote, meaning that Kamala Harris will play a decisive role over the next two years.

In contrast to Biden, Democrat proponents of the Green New Deal are in favour of a phase-out of all fossil fuels, including gas. Many of them are also critical of technologies such as carbon capture and storage and nuclear energy. In recent years, many more progressive Democrats have entered Congress, and in many policy areas they have advocated much stronger reforms compared to Biden as a moderate Democrat. On the other hand, Biden emphasised during the presidential race that he was running as a president of reconciliation and wants to bridge the growing division within society. In order to create broad consensus and muster support for this project, he will have to reach across the political aisle to certain Republicans and make compromises with them. Given the significant hostility between them, Biden faces a difficult balancing act, both within his own party and in Congress, to unite the different camps as well as he can. This task would require time to build trust, but this is in short supply. From day one, Biden will be required to tackle numerous challenges, among them the pandemic, the economic crisis, and climate change. This will include passing legislation with wide-reaching implications. The strong emphasis on economic policy in his climate plan could, however, help him win broader support for his policies in Congress and within society over the coming years.

A winning team: Biden’s key players

Biden’s predecessor, Donald Trump, cut many government posts related to environmental and climate protection, leaving them unfilled. The new president must therefore not only redirect the administration in terms of content, but also re-staff it with experienced personnel. Biden has appointed former Secretary of State John Kerry as Special Presidential Envoy for Climate. A diplomatic heavyweight, his task will be to regain the trust of the international community. Kerry, who played a decisive role in the Paris Climate Agreement, will be tasked with convincing other nation states to adopt ambitious climate goals. But this will only succeed if the US itself sets an appropriate example. This includes ambitious national climate goals, appropriate measures to achieve them, and a responsible commitment to international climate finance. Kerry will also sit on Biden’s National Security Council, highlighting the threat to national security posed by climate change.

Central to the implementation of climate policy is the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Michael Regan, currently head of the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, has been named as the new head. He is the first person of colour head the EPA. He is expected to strongly promote the issue of environmental justice.

Biden faces a difficult balancing act, both within his own party and in Congress, to unite the different camps as well as he can.

A further member of Biden’s climate team will be avowed Green New Deal supporter Deb Haaland. The New Mexico representative has been nominated as Secretary of the Department of the Interior, which holds responsibility for the management and conservation of most federal land and natural resources. She will be the first Native American in the cabinet and will be a strong advocate for environmental and minority interests.

According to statements by Biden’s political advisors, a convincing climate policy profile and being considered an ally in the fight against climate change were essential for the top jobs..

Not all good news

The numerous hopeful announcements aside, Biden’s climate policy also has problematic aspects and will take a different course to the EU. He does not fundamentally question fracking, merely refusing to grant any additional permits for drilling on federal lands. Biden sees gas not only as a medium-term bridging technology but also grants it a place in the energy mix in the long term. He will continue with the US approach of wanting to export its liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Asia, Europe, and South America and to see it as an industrial sector for the long term. The US has invested large sums of public and private money in fracking technology, which must now pay off.

Pinning all of its hopes on carbon capture and storage, the US will fail to make a clean break with fossil fuels and will create false market incentives

Biden is pinning all his hopes on carbon capture and storage in order to make the extraction and burning of gas justifiable in terms of climate policy. The US will pump massive investments into this technology in the next few years, leading to capacity constraints in other areas. The US will thus fail to make a clean break with fossil fuels and will create false market incentives despite major climate policy concerns about carbon capture and storage and its questionable economic viability. Such a policy trajectory fails to give the impression of a consistent US climate policy. Lastly, Biden sees modern nuclear power as a climate-neutral energy source but fails to come up with a solution for the unresolved and cost-intensive final storage issue. Nor does he address the security concerns of nuclear power.

In this together? The outlook for international climate policy

In addressing the climate crisis during his first conversations with world leaders and announcing an international climate summit for the spring, Biden’s climate diplomacy has already begun. But overall, Biden’s climate policy rhetoric has a clear national focus. The extent to which the new US president will participate in international climate financing remains to be seen.

From the outset, the EU should approach the new US administration proactively as a renewed ally in the fight against climate change and make concrete proposals for transatlantic cooperation. The EU’s progress with its European Green Deal is being followed with great interest in the US. Since Biden is also committed to massive investments in infrastructure and green technologies, an exchange between governments on both sides of the Atlantic could be valuable and inspiring. There are prospects for the creation of transatlantic working groups bringing together different ministries or departments to learn from each other’s policy measures and to strengthen transatlantic cooperation. The EU Commission’s proposal to introduce a climate tariff on products from countries without a (compatible) CO2 price has caused some unrest on the Hill. A large majority in Congress wants to avoid a trade policy dispute if possible. This example shows that the EU, as an important trading partner, has the weight to set climate policy standards and to push the US to take more ambitious climate action.

This is an updated version of an article originally published by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (boell.de)