The US intervention in Venezuela, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s massacres in Gaza, seems to be the final nail in the coffin of international law. This return to brutality and the law of the strongest on the international stage masks an inability to address the real problems of the present. In response to Trump and all the autocrats of the world, Europe should champion a path of non-violent diplomacy.

The Russian war in Ukraine, the proliferation of Israeli war crimes in Gaza and the West Bank, and, most recently, the US aggression in Venezuela all point to the same conclusion: the principles of international law that were supposed to maintain some semblance of peace and multilateral dialogue since the end of World War II seem more obsolete than ever.

The Charter of the United Nations (of which the US was one of the initiators) – and particularly Article 2 – prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state. For external intervention to be legal, it must be authorised by the United Nations Security Council and carried out in self-defence, or with the consent of the local government. On 3 January, following the US attack on Venezuela and the abduction of its president and his wife by the US military, UN Secretary General António Guterres said he was “deeply concerned that the rules of international law have not been respected”. Guterres added that the action by the US sets a “dangerous precedent”. But Donald Trump couldn’t care less about the UN Charter, Mr. Guterres, or international law, just as he couldn’t care less about his own Congress.

Does this mean we are condemned to stand by helplessly and watch the international legal system and the foundation of our common values, painstakingly built after the horrors of World War II, collapse under the onslaught of the world’s autocrats – or “predators”, as political writer Giuliano da Empoli aptly calls them?

Absolutely not. But we must start calling things by their proper names. We also need to broaden our focus and adopt a different paradigm from the one all these heads of state who advocate violence – Trump, Putin, Netanyahu, and the like – are trying to impose on us. In reality, while these leaders’ posturing and outward displays of machismo cause death and destruction, they also mask their limitations and personal troubles.

A symptom of powerlessness

Some believe diverting attention from Trump’s domestic issues (his falling popularity and the release of the Epstein files) and seizing Venezuelan oil (the country holds the largest reserves in the world) are the real reasons behind the US’s theatrical military “operation” in Caracas.

This term, which has been repeated ad nauseam by the media since 3 January, is reminiscent of Vladimir Putin’s use of “special operation” to describe his invasion of Ukraine. The choice of this medical lexicon is neither new nor insignificant. During the first Gulf War in 1991, US President George W. Bush coined the term “surgical strikes”, now used by Israeli officials to describe illegal, deadly bombings of civilians in Gaza. This vocabulary aims to conceal the violence of an action in order to legitimise it. War is waged to heal, for the good of the populations concerned, in Ukraine, Gaza or Venezuela, as it was in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. As George Orwell wrote, “Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.”

Just like Trump attacks Venezuela to mask his own failures, Netanyahu continues his perpetual war against Palestinians to divert attention from his serious legal troubles, and Putin attacks Ukraine in the face of his own political weakness. Rather than displaying strength, violence betrays the short-termism and powerlessness of those who resort to it. Reaffirming the power of international law against all autocrats requires shifting the focus from subjugation to cooperation – and addressing the real challenges we are facing, chief among which is the issue of exceeding planetary boundaries.

Faced with the total denial of political leaders, we should cling to existing frameworks of international collaboration, such as the Paris Climate Agreement and the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda. These two international frameworks were ratified 10 years ago and should serve as the primary compass for our leaders. The Paris Climate Agreement aims to “keep the global average temperature rise well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels”. As for the UN’s 2030 Agenda, its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) constitute a survival plan for humanity against which each of our public decisions should be assessed. But do our leaders still talk about them today?

So, let us stop being stunned by the current onslaught of Trump-style autocrats and get back to work, starting by breaking out of this outdated paradigm of violence and power struggles.  

Rather than displaying strength, violence betrays the short-termism and powerlessness of those who resort to it.

Peace as a compass, non-violence as a guide

In his latest book, L’art de la paix (“The Art of Peace”), a response to Sun Tzu’s famous Art of War, French political scientist and international relations expert Bertrand Badie offers us some avenues to explore in this regard. He proposes a radical rethinking of peace, no longer as “non-war” – a simple absence of conflict, or temporary truce – but as a positive state, a global common good that needs to be redefined in an era of globalisation, climate threats, and the collapse of the Earth system. In Badie’s view, peace is not simply a technical domain reserved for the military and diplomats, but a much broader social struggle that must be tackled head-on. The proof is that since 1945, the 500 or so major armed conflicts that have taken place across the globe have been mainly due to social and environmental issues rather than competition between powers. For example, increased desertification in the east of Syria contributed to the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. In addition, tensions between India and Pakistan are commonly framed as religious antagonism between Hinduism and Islam, but in fact they largely stem from the division of border lands and the waters of the Indus River, on which Pakistani agriculture depends.

Our compass should be the pursuit of peace as the ultimate goal of international relations, taking into account the multitude of factors that contribute to it, including social and environmental justice for the peoples concerned.

Kant reflected on the conditions for peace in 1795, in his famous work Perpetual Peace. For the Prussian philosopher, peace was not a natural condition but a political and legal construct in which each government had to equip itself with a republican constitution guaranteeing freedom, legal equality, and the separation of powers, united in a federation of free states where nations would renounce their absolute sovereignty in favour of international law. This work remains a major reference in the study of international relations and inspired the creation of organisations such as the League of Nations, the UN, and of course, the European Union.

To best achieve the goal of “perpetual peace” described by Kant nearly two and a half centuries ago, we need a “new” paradigm in international relations, one based on non-violence as a universal principle of international law, diplomacy, and social and environmental justice.   

The major principles of non-violence, as defined and promoted in particular by Mahatma Gandhi in the first half of the 20th century, should not be regarded as ethical principles for individuals. Instead, they should be seen as profoundly political tools with practical implications for modes of governance, particularly at the international level. Swaraj (self-governance), satyagraha (holding firmly to the truth) and ahimsa (non-violence and compassion towards all living beings), the Gandhian concepts that served throughout the struggle for Indian independence, are at least as relevant today as they were a century ago.  We must take non-violence out of its niche as a militant tool reserved for peaceful and environmental associations, to develop and adapt non-violent diplomacy for the current context of conflict and climate emergency.

For example, the links between non-violence and the SDGs of Agenda 2030 – a UN-led global plan for sustainable development – are deep and multidimensional: SDG 16 explicitly aims to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development”, establishing a direct link between peace, justice, effective institutions, and development. This goal recognises that sustainable development and peace cannot exist without one another (regardless of any well-founded criticisms that may be levelled at the concept of sustainable development). Beyond SDG 16, non-violence permeates the entire 2030 Agenda. Inequality (SDG 10), poverty (SDG 1), and gender discrimination (SDG 5) are all forms of structural violence that the SDGs seek to eliminate. Thus, non-violence is not only the absence of armed conflict, but also the absence of economic, social, and environmental violence.

The influence of Gandhi and his thinking on the United Nations is notable in many other ways. For instance, the UN declared 2 October, his birthday, as the International Day of Non-Violence. Gandhi’s vision emphasises social justice, community empowerment, and respect for the environment – principles that resonate with the holistic approach of Agenda 2030. Non-violence promotes the conditions necessary for climate justice and peace: stability, cooperation, mutual trust and citizen participation. Conversely, achieving the SDGs reduces the root causes of conflict by addressing injustice and deprivation.

Armchair Machiavellians will see this as an unrealistic “woke” utopia, advocating instead for a hysterical arms race, which they believe to be the only solution to the madness of today’s world. However, American political scientist Gene Sharp, among others, has convincingly demonstrated the possibility of non-violent action, as opposed to multiple forms of political violence, including institutionalised state violence, bringing about profound political change in the face of seemingly insurmountable forces of oppression and injustice. His work has inspired more than 50 of the 67 overthrows of authoritarian regimes in the last 40 years.

Non-violence is effective, and allows us to move beyond Machiavelli’s famous saying that “the end justifies the means,” and instead apply Gandhi’s maxim: “The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree, and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree.”

The voice of peace, non-violence, law, and reason is what Europe should urgently offer the world today.

This means doing the exact opposite of what Trump and his ilk are currently doing on the international stage. We must start by shaking off our stupor through relentlessly demonstrating the ineffectiveness of violence and power struggles in resolving the major issues of our time.

The voice of peace, non-violence, law, and reason is what Europe should urgently offer the world today. This path begins with a clear and unequivocal condemnation of all violations of international law, including those currently being perpetrated by the United States, Russia, and Israel. We must support the United Nations and the entire international legal architecture in order to guarantee peace.

If the European Union, caught between China and the United States, cannot be a champion of technology, let it be a champion of non-violence, law, and peace. Its usefulness will then be much more real and concrete for the world.  For while the autocrats have weapons, we have numbers: the vast majority of the world’s population, including those in the Global South, who aspire only to live in peace and security. As Simone Weil said, “Peace is the virtue of the strong.”

Met with almost universal condemnation and economic sanctions in the West, Russia’s war against Ukraine received more mixed responses in the Global South. While it is tempting to frame this difference in terms of democracy versus autocracy, the reality is more nuanced. How can Ukraine – and Europe – improve their diplomatic outreach to countries in the Global South without appealing to a supposed moral superiority?

This interview with Polish-Mexican foreign policy researcher Ivan Kłyszcz is part of a series of reflections and conversations around the concept of “neo-idealism”, an approach to geopolitics grounded in values such as human rights and fundamental freedoms, as opposed to great power realism.

Richard Wouters & Sofiia Shevchuk: In a 2023 article on the Global South’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, you highlight the diverging perceptions held by the West and the “non-West”. What explains these differences?

Ivan U. Kłyszcz: The motivation behind that article was to start a conversation on why many countries have chosen not to impose sanctions on Russia, even though they acknowledge that the invasion of Ukraine violates international norms and has created a humanitarian disaster. Some countries decided to keep relations with Russia as they were, others even saw an opportunity to improve them. There’s an existing term in the literature that is being promoted for use in this context by certain academics from Latin America: “active non-alignment”. This label was originally coined in the context of the US-China trade war, which greatly affected Latin America, but is now also being applied in relation to Russia’s war on Ukraine. I think the term captures the sense of a proactive foreign policy that pursues national interests – or some understanding of national interests – without really committing to any of the major powers. We can, of course, find exceptions to this. However, when it comes to the [Ukraine] war, I think this is the approach that has dominated in most countries in the world.

One important driver behind active non-alignment is the fact that power is not what it used to be. The disparity between the major powers and developing countries has diminished to some extent. The wealth gap is still wide and, in some ways, becoming wider. But the power gap has narrowed. The world has changed since the Cold War era; Washington and Moscow are no longer able to behave as they used to. Smaller countries recognise that this development comes with advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is that they are not compelled into alignment; they can push back against the US and Russia, as well as China and the EU. Many countries are now doing what they had aimed to do with the founding of the original Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the Cold War: they are pursuing their own foreign policies.

I’m thinking in particular of the middle powers in Africa, such as Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa. These countries now have greater scope for autonomy, partly because the major powers have become less invested in Africa. Chinese investments have declined, while the EU is changing its approach altogether. These middle powers are therefore gaining relevance as brokers of regional affairs. The same can be seen in South America and Asia.

Active non-alignment became more evident after 2022 – just look at United Nations votes on Ukraine, as well as patterns of sanctions against and engagement with Russia. I believe this was an uncomfortable realisation for Moscow, which likely assumed some countries would be more supportive. Algeria, for example, which maintains deep historical, military, and economic ties with Russia, was expected to oppose measures condemning Moscow. Instead, it abstained in key votes in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), most notably on the March 2022 emergency session resolution calling for Russia to withdraw from Ukraine. This abstention – rather than a “no” vote – signalled hesitation and underscored the fact that Russian influence no longer automatically translates into diplomatic alignment with Moscow.

By contrast, Eritrea stood out as the only African country that voted against the UNGA resolution, joining a small group of states including Russia itself, Belarus, Syria, and North Korea. It also opposed the establishment of a UN Human Rights Council (HRC) commission to investigate war crimes in Ukraine; all other African HRC members voted in favour or abstained. Eritrea’s alignment reflected its strategic affinity with Russia and other authoritarian regimes yet did not result in any formal partnership.

Is there a difference between democratic and autocratic states in the Global South when it comes to support for Ukraine?

The evidence is tilting in this direction: the more democratic the country, the higher the level of support for Ukraine in the UNGA. However, there is plenty of room for nuance. I try to push back against the narrative that this is autocracy versus democracy, in the global picture at least. There are many countries that have been supportive of Ukraine but are not democracies. Take Sudan: there has reportedly been contact between the military junta there and Ukraine, and there has been some coverage of their relations in the military sphere since 2022. Of course, this remains unconfirmed, but it would appear to be traditional foreign policy at play.

Western support for Ukraine, spearheaded by “neo-idealist” politicians such as EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, is viewed as hypocritical by many in the Global South. They point to Europe’s neglect of conflicts elsewhere. Can Ukraine’s own experience with colonial oppression help bridge the gap between European neo-idealism and anti-colonial perspectives in the Global South?

I have pondered this question a lot – the colonial narrative and the extent to which it connects Ukraine and the Global South. It’s a fascinating and complex area, and nothing definitive can be said about it yet. This is something scholars, historians, and others are still figuring out.

This uncertainty creates something of a dilemma for Ukraine in its efforts to develop strategic communications. Ukrainian officials certainly talk about the war as a colonial conflict: Russia trying to recolonise Ukraine. That argument carries some weight; you only need to look at what Russia is doing to those living in the occupied territories. But in Ukraine’s public diplomacy towards countries that have experienced colonialism, there is more caution. Ukrainian diplomats are hesitant to draw direct parallels between their history and the colonial histories of countries in the Global South. In private, I think they’re more willing to make that connection. Yet publicly, in diplomatic settings and at events, they are very careful.

When it comes to influencing the foreign policies of nations in the Global South, I think the colonial framing has reached its limits. The stance of active non-alignment is locked in. Ukrainian – and European – diplomacy stands a better chance if it appeals to these countries’ interests. We need to learn what these interests are and figure out where they might overlap with ours. It’s a good investment – not just financially – to build connections, make contacts, and bring decision-makers, businesspeople, students, and even artists into dialogue. That whole spectrum of engagement is valuable.

When it comes to influencing the foreign policies of nations in the Global South, I think the colonial framing has reached its limits.

To give a concrete example, about a year ago, the Estonian Foreign Ministry held a meeting with those African ambassadors who cover Estonia from Berlin. Estonia does not have African embassies; they’re usually in Helsinki, Stockholm, or Berlin. So, they organised a meeting in Berlin, where there’s the highest concentration. The foreign minister was there, as well as a lot of ministerial staff. They were trying to spark something. There were already formal diplomatic relations, of course, but this was about making those relationships active and meaningful. The message was very simple: “How do we make this a winning relationship? What can we do for you? Where can we find shared interests?”

It was a very simple gesture, with a message of equal partnership. No “lecturing” African ambassadors about Russia or framing everything through a security lens. I think there was something very sincere about it. Maybe that’s real idealism: the idea that we can transcend historical baggage and the broader geopolitical context by focusing on shared interests. That might sound naïve, but I found the initiative quite refreshing.

Why is it wrong to lecture about Russia?

I will respond to that with a brief anecdote. When I was in Addis Ababa, I asked people for their views on Ukraine. They were mostly very polite, very professional, and gave me excellent answers. But one person responded quite angrily, saying, “Our country, Ethiopia, is constantly at war, and we are constantly facing famine without the help of international donations. We have all these challenges – do not ask me about Ukraine.”

So much for neo-idealism, with its focus on values.

The neo-idealism articulated by various leaders in Central, Eastern, and Northern Europe often gets framed as part of a grand strategy in foreign relations, including by security expert Benjamin Tallis, who coined the term. I don’t see it that way. I see neo-idealism as a response to the West’s longstanding difficulty in translating its enormous economic and technological power into military success. Over the last 30 years, the West – whether we’re talking NATO, the US, or the EU – has struggled to win wars, at least in a strategic sense. We may win initially, but we often lose in the long term. That creates anxiety: why can’t we defend ourselves effectively despite all our power? I think neo-idealism partly stems from that anxiety.

One reason for this lack of success is the way the West prefers to fight wars: minimal casualties, heavy reliance on technology, short timelines. These kinds of wars are palatable to voters. But that’s not how war has traditionally been fought. Historically, war involves sacrifice, taxes, and deep societal mobilisation. We don’t see that now, and as a result, the military has almost disappeared from everyday public life in Europe.

For me, the key contribution of neo-idealism relates to how we think of defence and the role of the military in our societies. It’s about restoring visibility and relevance to defence without making it a partisan issue. In that sense, it is quite centrist – sometimes even called “radical centrism”. It says, let’s debate things like migration or climate policy openly and democratically, but let’s unite around defence. Whether you are right-wing or left-wing, reinvesting in the military and supporting Ukraine is reasonable policy. That’s the essence of the new idealism, in my view. It’s not so much about abstract values as about making defence a legitimate, visible, and shared concern in liberal democratic societies. I think that’s incredibly important.

New idealism is not so much about abstract values as about making defence a legitimate, visible, and shared concern in liberal democratic societies.

I’d even say that neo-idealism isn’t actually that idealistic. It’s a kind of hard-headed realism – especially here in Estonia, where the Russian threat is perceived as very real. For countries like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland, and Norway, re-engaging with defence is not an academic issue; it’s about survival.

Do you have specific recommendations for Green parties?

Firstly, do not be tempted to pit the Ukrainian and the Palestinian causes against each other; they should not be seen as somehow in competition. That is fundamental if we want to find common ground for dialogue. I know that might sound vague, but I think it’s vital.

Secondly, we’re not going to solve the issue of hypocrisy in politics. Governments will remain self-interested; that’s just the reality of international relations. We’ll need to appeal to those interests to a certain extent if we want to build long-term, meaningful connections. That takes us back to traditional diplomacy – a practice that has its flaws and often leads to dead ends, including moral ones. If I had to make a recommendation here, it would be that politicians, especially those involved in foreign policy, take the time to reflect on these issues. They should ponder the weight and complexity of foreign policy and the significance of the ethical dilemmas it contains.

The failure of Israel’s evacuation from the Gaza Strip 20 years ago is now being used to justify permanent occupation and settlement expansion. But that policy was never designed to succeed; disengagement without sovereignty or reciprocity is a recipe for future disaster. The diplomatic efforts of European leaders to recognise Palestine – a surrogate for more decisive steps to hold Israel accountable – risk repeating the same mistake. 

Over the past few weeks, Israel marked twenty years since the “Gaza Disengagement”: the 2005 operation that uprooted 8,500 settlers and pulled out its troops. Presented as a way to ease Israel’s military burden and redraw its borders, the move bypassed the Palestinian Authority and left Israel in control of Gaza’s borders, airspace, and resources. Abroad, however, the withdrawal was seen as a bold step toward the two-state solution. As the EU’s foreign policy chief at the time, Javier Solana, put it, “The successful outcome of Disengagement will offer a momentous step for a peaceful future for Israelis and Palestinians, living side-by-side and enjoying security, economic prosperity and social well-being.” The EU, alongside its fellow members of the Quartet – the US, Russia, and the UN – placed disengagement at the centre of its roadmap diplomacy, effectively endorsing then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s unilateralism as progress. 

Disengagement’s false promise 

Two decades on, however, the promise celebrated abroad has soured at home. Israeli television marked the anniversary with dramas and documentaries that cast the evacuation as national trauma, inviting viewers to grieve with settler families and to see the October 7 attacks as its inevitable consequence. What such commemorations omitted, however, was the political logic of the time, which sought not resolution but deadlock: burying the two-state solution rather than advancing it. 

Indeed, the move itself was strategic misdirection disguised as peacemaking. By tacking on the evacuation of four isolated outposts in the northern West Bank, Sharon could claim it was not “Gaza only”, even as he used the gesture as a shield against mounting diplomatic pressure. Shedding territory that had become a liability gave him the political space to tighten Israel’s grip on the West Bank. As his confidant Dov Weisglass admitted, the plan was meant to pour “formaldehyde” over the peace process – preserving a stalemate while bulldozers pushed new roads and housing deeper into the ridge-top towns. 

Palestinians quickly understood what Israeli officials openly admitted: Gaza was being discarded as a token of flexibility even as settlement expansion in the West Bank accelerated. Israel still controlled Gaza’s skies, seas, and borders – and, with devastating effect, held a veto over every bag of cement required to rebuild homes, schools, and infrastructure after each wave of destruction. 

The disillusionment with unilateral exit was not confined to Gaza. Israel’s retreat from southern Lebanon in 2000 had already shown how withdrawal without agreement risked drawing Israel back in with greater force. The fear seemed confirmed in 2006, when Hezbollah’s abduction of two soldiers triggered a war, thousands of rockets fell on Israel, the ground campaign faltered, and a state inquiry faulted the government for unclear objectives. The lesson many Israelis drew was blunt: further withdrawals, including from the West Bank, were off the table. 

For Palestinians, the lesson was the opposite: militancy, not negotiation, could force change. Israel had withdrawn without consulting Mahmoud Abbas – or the Palestinian Authority – suggesting that diplomacy yielded nothing while Hamas’s rockets forced concessions. If settlers left only when violence made occupation untenable, militancy, not negotiation, appeared to be the lever of impact.  

That belief helped Hamas win the January 2006 elections and seize control a year later. In response, Israel and Egypt imposed a blockade. Factories rusted, while Gaza’s university graduates found their degrees useless beyond the fence. For a generation raised without opportunity, ballots came to seem futile while tunnels and rockets delivered results. For hawks in Jerusalem, every rocket justified the siege; for militants in Gaza, every new restriction confirmed that only force registered. 

For a generation raised without opportunity, ballots came to seem futile while tunnels and rockets delivered results.

The siege, however, was not Israel’s doing alone – or Israel and Egypt’s for that matter; instead, it soon hardened into an international policy. The United States and Europe cut direct aid to the Hamas-led Authority and confined their involvement to humanitarian relief. The EU’s civilian Border Assistance Mission at Rafah, launched in 2005, was suspended in 2007. What began as a regional standoff hardened into a policy of containment. 

Even as Gaza was sealed off, the West Bank was being remade. The separation barrier crept far east of the 1949 Armistice Line (“Green Line”), enclosing settlement blocs. By 2020, the Trump administration’s “Peace to Prosperity” blueprint merely codified what expansion had already established on the ground. 

The cycle of siege and war 

The siege was punctuated by wars – in 2008-09, 2012, 2014, 2018, and 2022 – each framed as an “operation” meant to restore deterrence. Planners called it “mowing the grass,” treating militancy as a recurring task rather than the predictable result of statelessness. This rhythm hardened into doctrine. Each round left Gaza weaker but never quiet. By 2023, Hamas’s assault was less a rupture than a culmination. 

On 7 October 2023, Hamas militants breached Gaza’s perimeter, attacked southern Israeli communities, killed roughly 1200 people, and took 250 hostages. Israel vowed to “destroy Hamas”. After almost two years of bombardment and incursions, Gaza lies in ruins: vast areas reduced to rubble, most of the population displaced, and Palestinian deaths surpassing 60000. Israel frames the campaign as existential self-defence; critics call it collective punishment, war crimes, and calculated starvation. An overwhelming majority of experts claims Israel’s actions in Gaza amount to genocide: a moral catastrophe that recalls atrocities Europe once pledged never to permit again. In bitter irony, Israel has now authorised a full military takeover of Gaza – framed as temporary – exactly twenty years after declaring it had “left” the Strip. 

Disengagement failed because it was never designed to succeed – least of all on Palestinian terms. A genuine withdrawal would have transferred sovereignty together with responsibility. Instead, Israel retained levers of control while disclaiming duty for Gaza’s welfare. Unilateralism destroyed reciprocity, weakened moderates, and empowered extremists. Siege generated resistance, not submission – and security lacking legitimacy proved hollow. On 7 October, neither walls nor surveillance technology could erase proximity or quell resentment. 

Unilateralism destroyed reciprocity, weakened moderates, and empowered extremists.

External actors helped entrench the deadlock. Washington and Brussels, once fluent in two-state diplomacy, reduced Gaza to a humanitarian crisis to be managed, not a political conflict to be resolved. Ceasefires displaced negotiations, and aid displaced political will. By accepting Israel’s self-justification, outsiders lulled themselves into believing the conflict could be quarantined. 

The temptation to substitute recognition for responsibility has now returned in Europe’s new diplomatic choreography. 

Recognition without de-occupation 

As Gaza burns, Europe again reaches for policy gestures. France has said it will formally recognise Palestine at September’s UN General Assembly, joined by the UK, Australia, Malta, and Belgium. In parallel, France and Saudi Arabia co-chaired a UN high-level conference that produced the “New York Declaration”, a time-bound roadmap promising “tangible, time-limited, irreversible steps” toward two states. Yet for now, much of this momentum remains declarative. 

The timing crystallises the tragedy. Exactly twenty years after Sharon’s “disengagement”, as Israeli operations continue in Gaza, European capitals prepare to recognise Palestinian statehood. Recognition, absent de-occupation, risks becoming mere ceremony in the shadow of devastation – the same logic that once traded withdrawal without sovereignty for the stability of a siege. The symmetry is unmistakable: where Israel once withdrew settlers while preserving control, Europe now offers recognition while acquiescing to control. 

Recognition, absent de-occupation, risks becoming mere ceremony in the shadow of devastation – the same logic that once traded withdrawal without sovereignty for the stability of a siege.

If recognition is to be more than theatre, it must come as recognition-plus: a binding UN Security Council resolution mandating time-bound settlement evacuation and land transfers; enforceable restrictions linked to settlement growth; transfer of borders, airspace and resources to Palestinian sovereignty; and robust support for Palestinian institutional renewal under a unified, legitimate leadership. 

Disengagement was intended as respite; instead, it deepened despair. Two decades on, the warning is clear: a crisis merely managed will eventually manage us – and Europe, which once championed a two-state solution, cannot afford to stand aside. Recognition, on its own, will not arrest the drift. To matter, it must be anchored to concrete steps that deliver sovereignty and reciprocity rather than theatre. Otherwise, Europe will have rehearsed disengagement twice: first in Israel’s name, then in its own.

As Hezbollah and Israeli forces continue to trade fire in the wake of October 7, the possibility of a full-blown war between Israel and Lebanon has never seemed stronger. Given the extremely high stakes and the gravity of the situation, the EU must do everything in its power to defuse tensions, prioritising Lebanon’s long-standing needs over its own short-term benefits.

On June 19, 2024, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah threatened Cyprus with retaliation if it allowed Israel to use its airports and bases to attack Lebanon.

Cyprus, the European Union’s (EU) easternmost member, is within range of Hezbollah’s missiles. This means that in the event of a spill-over from the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the island nation – and by extension the EU – could be drawn in. Aware of that risk, Nicosia promptly assured Lebanon that it would not allow attacks against it from its territory. 

These developments highlight Lebanon’s delicate position: tensions with Israel have continued to simmer following the Hamas-led attack on October 7, 2023. Since then, tens of thousands of people have been displaced on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border amid a heavy exchange of fire. Recently, with strikes growing more frequent and the Israeli army positioning itself for potential conflict, fears of a full-blown have increased.

These concerns are worsened by the tumultuous and conflict-ridden history of the Israel-Lebanon relationship. The 1982 Lebanon War took tens of thousands of lives and led to the rise of Hezbollah. Nearly 25 years later, an intense 34-day conflict triggered by a Hezbollah cross-border raid on an Israeli patrol resulted in more than 1000 casualties and widespread destruction.

Further escalation could be disastrous for the Middle East and the EU, especially as other countries might get involved. Hezbollah has strong ties to Iran, which has suggested its full support in the event of an Israeli aggression against Lebanon. The Iranian mission to the UN threatened that “an obliterating war will ensue” and warned that “all options, including the full involvement of all Resistance Fronts are on the table.”

The Resistance Front is an alliance of Iran-backed armed groups, including Hamas, Yemen’s Houthis and Iraqi Shiite militias. Iran’s new reformist president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has signalled that there will be no change in his country’s policy towards Israel, while also reiterating the Islamic Republic’s support for Hezbollah.

In addition, Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently said that his country stands in solidarity with Lebanon and urged other regional countries to do the same. Two other important regional actors, namely Syria and Jordan, could also be pulled into the conflict due to their proximity and historical tensions with Israel.

Beyond the Middle East, the US – Israel’s closest and most powerful ally – could also be drawn into the conflict, even though it has warned Israel that it might not be able to defend it against an all-out war with Hezbollah.

For the EU, the stakes couldn’t be higher. While the threat of a Hezbollah attack on Cyprus currently appears more like inflammatory rhetoric than a realistic possibility, if such an attack were to occur, it would have far-reaching consequences. An escalation of this sort would trigger the EU’s collective defence obligations, which would require a bloc-wide response at a time when internal cohesion is already strained, with leaders like Hungary’s Orbán blocking decision-making processes.

To prevent that scenario, the EU has been keen to maintain Lebanon’s stability. In January, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell visited Lebanon to discuss the border situation and stress the importance of avoiding regional escalation. Last month, Borrell further expressed support for the ongoing mediation efforts, “led by the US and France to mitigate confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, and for Lebanon and Cyprus, which have been threatened by Hezbollah.”

Failed diplomacy, displaced people

An Israel-Lebanon war would represent another significant diplomatic failure for the EU and the West, further eroding their global credibility in the wake of the Gaza conflict. Moreover, it would likely trigger a devastating humanitarian catastrophe, with the potential for extensive civilian casualties. The toll could be dramatically higher if additional regional actors join the conflict.

Lebanon would be particularly vulnerable, given Hezbollah’s strategic presence in villages and civilian areas and Israel’s superior military capacities. Civilian infrastructure would also likely suffer severe damage, making post-war reconstruction extensive and costly.

The impact of a war between Israel and Lebanon on the EU would be multifaceted. Beyond endangering the security of Cyprus, an all-out conflict could mean a substantial refugee influx for the EU as Lebanon hosts the largest number of refugees per capita in the world. Apart from Syrian asylum seekers, Lebanon has also historically hosted a large Palestinian refugee population, with around 475,000 registered with the UN in Lebanon. They have been forced into Lebanon in successive waves since 1948, when many Palestinians fled or were expelled by Zionist forces.

An Israel-Lebanon war would represent another significant diplomatic failure for the EU and the West, further eroding their global credibility in the wake of the Gaza conflict.

Moreover, a war between Hezbollah and Israel could also have a domino effect, triggering a massive exodus of refugees – Israeli, Lebanese, Syrian, Palestinian, and potentially from across a destabilised Middle East– towards the EU. This would mirror the Syrian civil war when millions of refugees fled to the EU, challenging the bloc’s ability to manage aid as well as integration and resettlement processes.

The EU’s current diplomatic efforts in the region are narrowly centred on preventing migration. Brussels recently signed a deal with Beirut providing one billion euros over three years to support the Lebanese economy and enhance border management cooperation, in exchange for preventing irregular migrants from coming to Europe. Three-quarters of the funds were earmarked for assisting Lebanon as a host country for Syrian refugees and other displaced people.

The agreement was announced amid a surge of Syrian refugees coming to Cyprus from Lebanon, which pressured the EU to intervene. In the first three months of 2024, over 2,000 people arrived in Cyprus by sea, compared to around 80 in the same time frame in 2023.

Similar agreements with Egypt and Tunisia reveal a broader EU strategy: deflect migrant processing to third countries and keep migrants from entering the EU, as the bloc further tightens its borders.

Critics argue that the EU’s recently brokered migration deal primarily serves its own interests, neglecting Lebanon’s need for significant economic and structural reforms. They warn that “any deal that avoids tackling Lebanon’s deep problems will fail to stabilise the country and will not address the reasons that push people towards Europe.” The deal does not even properly cover the cost of Syrian refugees living in Lebanon: According to the Lebanese Social Affairs Minister Hector Hajjar, handling Syrian asylum seekers costs the country 1.5 billion Dollars a year.

While the effectiveness of the EU’s approach is questionable, one thing is certain: Lebanon urgently needs support for handling its migrant and refugee population. The current level of assistance, with Lebanon receiving only 27 per cent of global funding for the Syrian refugee response in 2023, is woefully inadequate.

Energy turmoil

Apart from a widespread humanitarian crisis, an Israeli-Lebanese war could also lead to extensive and severe economic ramifications by disrupting trading routes and affecting energy supplies. The EU has already taken a heavy hit in this area following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Hezbollah and its allies have the ability to disrupt the Red Sea energy route, which is crucial for international oil and natural gas flows into the EU. Already under attack by the Houthi fighters since the start of 2024, with a full-fledged war, the route could be completely compromised, especially if Iran involves the Houthi fighters in a possible war.

Recent moves from key energy players underscore the gravity of the situation in the Red Sea. In January 2024, QatarEnergy, a major supplier to Europe, quickly halted shipments through the crucial waterway to consider alternative routes. Similarly, the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company temporarily suspended passages through the Red Sea due to the Houthi attacks.

These trade disruptions could fuel inflation by driving up energy costs, similar to what happened after Russia invaded Ukraine.

A struggling state

Lebanon’s problems are further complicated by the fact that the country is teetering on the brink of failed statehood. Beirut has been crippled by a political and economic meltdown since 2019, with the Lebanese Pound losing more than 90 per cent of its value. This has led to soaring prices for basic goods and services and pushed almost 80 per cent of the population under the poverty line.

The ongoing crisis has led to social unrest and a growing sense of despair, leaving Lebanon vulnerable to factions and militant groups. As the government has been unable to provide people with basic needs such as electricity and fuel, Hezbollah has used the opportunity to fill the void and boost its popularity.

The EU’s actions, or inactions, will have a profound impact on Lebanon’s future and, perhaps, the Middle East.

What’s more, Lebanon faces rampant corruption at all levels, ranking near the bottom globally – 149 out of 180 – in Transparency International 2023’s Corruption Perception Index.  For instance, despite international pressure, no government official has been held accountable for the devastating explosion that rocked Beirut airport in 2020, killing 2018 people.

To make matters worse, Lebanon has not had a president since 2022, when former head of state Michel Aoun’s term ended. Since then, the deeply divided Parliament, with different factions opposing each other, has failed to nominate a candidate with enough votes to succeed him. While presidential vacuums are not new in Lebanon, this one coincides with a simmering border crisis with Israel and a devastating four-year economic meltdown, creating a perfect storm of instability.

How can the EU help?

As the spectre of escalating tensions hangs heavy over Lebanon, the EU faces a critical question: can it prevent a devastating conflict that would send shockwaves through the Middle East (and beyond) and trigger a massive refugee crisis?

Without a doubt, Brussels must ramp up its current diplomatic efforts, fostering dialogue between all parties involved in the ongoing tensions. This means that the EU should approach even countries that have proven difficult to cooperate with – like Iran – but which have a stake in the situation nonetheless. These regional actors have an undeniable influence on the developments in and around Lebanon, and their voices must be heard at the negotiating table.

At the same time, the EU should strongly advocate for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. This urgent step must be coupled with sustained efforts towards a viable long-term solution for Palestine. Resolving the Palestinian issue is not only critical in its own right but would also significantly reduce tensions between Israel and Lebanon, averting a potential wider conflict.

However, diplomacy alone won’t suffice. To prevent Lebanon from collapsing entirely, the EU needs to invest in the country’s future. It cannot simply funnel resources into areas of its own interest, like the recent migration deal. Lebanon’s needs must take centre-stage in any cooperation.

The foundation for a stronger relationship already exists. Since 2006, the EU and Lebanon have been partners through their Association Agreement. This deal granted Lebanon free access to the EU market for its industrial goods and most of its agricultural exports. By 2022, the EU had become Lebanon’s biggest trading partner, accounting for nearly a third of the country’s total trade.

Other initiatives, like the 12-million-euro project launched in 2023 to enhance the integrity, transparency, and accountability of the Lebanese public administration, must be further bolstered. The EU should also apply targeted sanctions against the Lebanese elites undermining democracy and the rule of law in the country, as the EU framework for such a move has been in place since 2021.

The EU’s actions, or inactions, will have a profound impact on Lebanon’s future and, perhaps, the Middle East. Whether the bloc will step up and help Lebanon weather this storm remains an open question. One thing, though, is certain: time is short, and the stakes couldn’t be higher. 

A growing proportion of emissions will come from outside Europe. So while the EU is currently focused on decarbonising itself, its resources should also be wielded globally. And from an urgent need for adaptation to a backlash against the European Green Deal, its own house is not fully in order. François Gemenne on how the EU and its Green parties can shift strategy externally and internally.

Green European Journal: How will the impacts of the climate crisis change Europe in the next decades?    

François Gemenne: That depends most of all on the decisions being taken right now in Cairo, Jakarta, Lagos, Mexico City, and Delhi. At least for the second half of this century, Europe’s climate future will depend not on what Europe does but on the development path taken by the countries of the Global South.  The problem is that Europe today is too focused on itself and not enough on the decisions being taken in Cairo and Jakarta. European countries, of course, have absolutely no right or legitimacy to tell these countries how they should develop. We cannot tell any country to keep their fossil fuels in the ground. But we need to work much more closely with them than we do currently. Europe’s priority needs to be stimulating investments in their energy transitions and increasing access to low-carbon technologies globally. If we don’t, they’ll tap into fossil resources to fuel their development.

There is no point in Europe becoming a decarbonised island in a sea of carbon.

So Europe needs to be thinking about a global green transition rather than becoming the “world’s first climate-neutral continent”, as the EU Commission has boasted?  

Europe thinks that it will lead by example on climate change and all the other countries of the world will follow. But it doesn’t work like that, especially in the current geopolitical context where the European model is not seen favourably. Many countries – I’m thinking of some African governments, for example – see renewable energies as a way for Europe to maintain dominance over countries of the Global South. Very often Europe and other industrialised countries think that they should do their share, and that their share is limited to the proportion of greenhouse gas emissions that they represent. This approach will never work. By 2030, Europe will represent around 12 per cent of emissions. By 2050 it will be less than five per cent. There is no point in Europe becoming a decarbonised island in a sea of carbon. But if Europe doesn’t pay attention, this is what will happen.  

Enabling climate action globally is therefore not about altruism but is very much in Europe’s interest. What levers does Europe have at its disposal?  

For developing countries to be able to pursue a different development path, we need to offer some alternatives. At the moment, investments in low-carbon energy in the Global South remain dramatically low. Europe should commit to working with countries around the world to grow these investments. Europe has plenty of money, investors, major banks, and technology: it has the levers at its disposal. The problem is that Europe is focused on developing climate technologies for itself. It is the same with nuclear energy and artificial intelligence. It is not enough to improve European energy systems. It is crucial to make these technologies available across the world.  

To what extent are countries and global leaders rallying around climate issues?  

The simple existence of the COP (the annual UN global conference on climate) and the Paris Agreement is testament to the fact that countries around the world have rallied around what they perceive as a global issue that needs to be addressed collectively. All countries agreed to do something and made a formal commitment to do so, even if what has followed has proved insufficient. What isn’t clear is how the divisions of geopolitics right now will play into the climate negotiations. At the time of the Paris Agreement in 2015, the global community was much less divided than it is today. I doubt the Paris Agreement could be successfully negotiated today. You can complain that COPs are too heavy and too costly or that they emit too much carbon and are held in Dubai surrounded by lobbyists. But that gathering remains a small miracle.  

If Europe wants to develop its climate diplomacy, should it be investing more political energy in COPs or should it focus on different smaller initiatives?  

Bilateral or smaller multilateral initiatives are not contrary to the existence of COPs. Alliances between countries, but also companies and civil society organisations, are the most efficient ways for COPs to move forward. COPs should be judged not just by the consensuses reached by governments but also by the other initiatives that are enabled to flourish. Here, Europe can be an example. If the European Union had waited around for unanimity before introducing the euro, we’d still be paying with Belgian francs. Instead, what paved the way for the euro was a smaller coalition of countries moving forward, with others joining progressively. We need to let the pioneers speed ahead rather than wait for the laggards.  

Europe will not be spared climate impacts, and it is increasingly clear that it is wildly unprepared.

Going back to climate impacts, how will they transform Europe?  

There will be an increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as flash floods, droughts, and heatwaves, and a truly major shift in the climate overall. Brussels will enjoy the climate of Lyon today, while Lyon will have the climate of Tunis or Rabat. Stockholm will have a climate comparable to the climate of Brussels today. What we will see is a shift northward, which will have an impact on agriculture as well. These shifts will require responses across the board, from rethinking the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy to new measures to protect working conditions and maintain productivity, as well as protection from new risks to infrastructure.  

What does Europe need to do to adapt to the changing climate?  

For a long time, Europe thought that it was immune to the impacts of climate change. That it was in a way invulnerable, that adaptation was for countries of the Global South, and that the task of Europe was to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Now we know otherwise.  

Europe will not be spared climate impacts, and it is increasingly clear that it is wildly unprepared: floods in Belgium and Germany in 2021; fires and drought in France in 2022; fires and floods in Greece this year. We have seen how extreme weather events soon get out of control, and how capacities such as basic equipment and training are lacking.   

Adapting the European continent is also not only about climate extremes. We will need to invest in infrastructure against sea level rises, work with farmers to transform agricultural processes, and help industries transition and secure their supply chains. On adaptation, Europe also needs to realise that there are many lessons to learn from the Global South, which has been thinking about some of these problems for much longer.  

Four years into the European Green Deal, how would you evaluate it overall?  

There have been drawbacks, but, overall, it’s been ambitious and rather successful. The Green Deal is an opportunity to craft a new model for the European economy. Today, however, the Green Deal is facing a populist backlash, which European institutions should be taking much more seriously. Many people, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, perceive the Green Deal as a constraint rather than an opportunity.  

If the EU is keen on transforming the Green Deal into the impetus for a new economic model, it needs to communicate more effectively so people see something other than red tape and regulations. Of course, some of the shortcomings of the Green Deal are the result of political compromises and negotiations. But a huge effort needs to be made in terms of publicity. If not, the danger is that the real backlash against environmental politics will put the Green Deal at risk and then the whole building comes tumbling down.    

The Greens have been struggling with this pushback against environmental politics. Why are they particularly vulnerable?  

Green parties were formed around consensus, around a diagnosis: the environmental situation was bad, and something had to be done. But when it comes to what needs to be done and especially to the linkage of environmental policy with social and economic policy, there is a lack of consensus in Green parties. There is a paradox that you would expect Green parties to do better when the situation looks worse. But the reality is the exact opposite, because many of their preferred solutions are seen as top-down and insufficiently linked with economic and social measures.  

You need to make climate action visible to people, with major investments in public transport and in renewables.

There is also the fact that where the Greens have been in government, they haven’t achieved much. In Belgium, the Greens have the transport, energy, and environment ministries. As a Belgian citizen, I have not seen much of a transformation aside from some interesting initiatives at the local level. In Germany, Robert Habeck set up a giant ministry that brought together the economy ministry and the climate ministry. What we have seen are new coal mines and other policies that the electorate has struggled to understand. We’ve ended up with climate activists campaigning against a government where Greens play a major role.  

If the green transition is at risk because it is perceived as an imposition, how can it be made more desirable?  

For now, to convince people of the need for climate action, we have focused a lot on what would happen if action is not taken. We have focused on disastrous visions of what Europe would look like. The problem is, people know very well that there is a long gap between the emissions at a given time in a given place and the impacts at a given time in a given place. People know that impacts in Europe depend on past emissions and on emissions in China and the US as much as on anything that Europe can do today. So it is wrong to try and prompt people into action by emphasising what can go wrong.  

I think that the way to prompt action is to show people why it is in their best interest. For that, you need to make climate action visible to people, with major investments in public transport and in renewables infrastructure to make energy bills cheaper.  

Do we need to take inspiration from US President Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act?  

What is interesting about Biden’s plan is that it is successful precisely because it is not labelled as the Climate Action Plan but the Inflation Reduction Act. Many people perceive climate action as something they don’t want, but everyone is concerned about inflation. When people see that the Inflation Reduction Act brings new jobs to the American economy and builds new infrastructure, then Biden can say, “Look, see how climate action is in your best interest.” Tragically, Europe had to wait for the war in Ukraine to realise the importance of a European vision for energy policy.  

Climate action will cost a lot of public money, and there are already plenty of demands on government spending. How should we finance the green transition?  

We should do more to mobilise private money. Europeans have a lot of savings in banks. In France, the total amount of household savings is between 4000 and 6000 billion euros. It’s huge – the equivalent of around five per cent of global GDP just in French savings. If the EU Commission were to provide some bonds or major opportunities for investment, I’m pretty sure that Europeans would be willing to contribute and put their money to good use.  

Environmental movements have long rallied against megaprojects and the environmental damage that comes with large infrastructure projects. Do we now need an environmentalism that builds?  

In French, we say that you cannot have “le beurre et l’argent du beurre”. It’s the equivalent of the English saying: “You can’t have your cake and eat it.” We need to accept that climate action will require massive infrastructure projects, and that there will sometimes need to be a balance between climate policies and biodiversity policies. For the Greens this means not just saying that we need to ground planes or phase out cars. Green thinking needs to stop focusing on the world they don’t want and show what the world we do want looks like.  

What do you think about climate policies that target the disproportionate carbon consumption of wealthy people, such as banning private jets or restrictions on SUV drivers?  

These policies make a lot of activists feel good about themselves because they reinforce the idea that you are fighting the good fight. The effect for most people is to reinforce the idea that climate action means limitations and restrictions. When people hear that climate activists want to ban jets, cars, even golf, they think, “What’s next? Am I next? Is meat next?” All these slogans create anxiety and mean lost votes and less support in public debates. They are not about convincing people about the benefits of the transition.

We need to think more about reaching out to people from different social classes.  

 I don’t think we should ban private jets for business people. We should make high-speed trains more attractive. The Greens love night trains. But I travel a lot for work, and I’m not going to take night trains and neither are most business people. I have kids at home and I already work a lot, so I’m not going to spend a night away if there is an easier option. Paris to Berlin by night train is not for businesspeople, it’s for young people. Paris to Berlin in six hours by high-speed train with high-speed internet – that will appeal to business people.  

We need to cater to different groups when we think about train policies, and we need to do the same with all policies. Sometimes it seems like the Greens are too eager to please their core electorate. We need to think more about reaching out to people from different social classes.  

If you think that by bashing the rich, you are going to attract the working class, it’s not true. Most people want to do well. They want to be rich. By attacking the rich, you appeal most to the upper middle class – the people who already have enough money and know that they are probably never going to make much more than that anyhow.  

How did the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis change the climate question in Europe?  

The war in Ukraine provided a way to reconcile those concerned with the end of the world with those concerned about the end of the month. Suddenly, that dilemma between climate action and affordability no longer existed. The dilemma was not solved. It was just eliminated.  

In many respects, it is easiest to convince people of the core benefits of climate action when you are looking at it through a different lens. With more renewable energy capacity, Europe would have never been in the crisis situation we were in the year after the war in Ukraine escalated. Many people who are not sociologically close to the Greens or who simply aren’t that concerned about the environment realise that as well. The same logic could be the starting point internationally too. Europe needs to develop its green diplomacy, and I think that there is so much potential there.  

What should be at the centre of the European Green Deal after 2024?  

First, public investments. So far, the Green Deal has been mostly about regulation. It is only with investments in public services, transport, and infrastructure that people will realise that climate action is in their best interest. We need to make sure that climate action offers something more than restrictions, taxes, and cuts.  

Second, Europe needs to make the Green Deal visible to people. People across Europe need to know what the Green Deal is doing for them. They need to know that the new train station is paid for by the Green Deal.  

Public investments, properly communicated across Europe, can convince people that the Green Deal is something for them.  

How can an increasingly vulnerable nuclear deal remain on the table amid regional unrest, arms development, destabilising sanctions, and counter-allegiances? 

Relations between the European Union and Iran, already put to the test in recent years, have reached a new low in the context of the Israel-Hamas war. Iran’s financial backing and training of Hamas terrorists, and the EU’s staunch support of Israel’s retaliation on Gaza, even with mounting evidence of war crimes, are driving Tehran and Brussels further apart.  

Bilateral relations have been on a downward trajectory since the US’s unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, and the EU’s failure to carry forward the deal – bartering sanction relief for curbed nuclear weapons development – without Washington’s lead. Since then, Iran has increasingly drifted away from the West, forging stronger alliances with China and Russia, actively supporting Putin’s full-scale war on Ukraine.  

Amid these geopolitical tensions, Jina Mahsa Amini’s death in police custody in September 2022, after being arrested for allegedly violating Iran’s forced veil law, and the huge country-wide protests that the theocratic government forcibly repressed, sparked a wave of indignation among the European public towards Iranian leaders. Some EU voices have claimed that this incident and ensuing discontent across the EU fortified its decision to limit engagement with Iran and impose sanctions.  

Given these challenges, the prospect of engaging in meaningful dialogue with Iran appears slim. Yet seeking avenues of cooperation with Tehran is vital, now more than ever, for nuclear non-proliferation, and European and regional stability.  

Failed nuclear brokerage  

In 2015 the EU’s relationship with Iran seemed to be heading in a positive direction. The E3/EU+3 countries (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and the US) had just reached a landmark agreement with Iran: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The plan, commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, sets out limitations on the Middle East country’s nuclear programme, aimed at guaranteeing it remains peaceful, in return for lifted UN, EU, and US sanctions from several economic sectors, including key trade in Iranian oil.   

A decade of diplomatic effort, led by the EU’s High Representative, went into establishing the JCPOA. It marked an important victory for the EU’s multilateral negotiations. However, the deal took a blow when the US, under Donald Trump’s administration, withdrew in 2018. Trump argued that its structure was “decaying and rotten” and could not prevent “an Iranian nuclear bomb”. 

The then US president urged EU signatories to follow suit, but they refused. Instead, EU foreign ministers committed to preserving the JCPOA. This showcased the EU’s ability for independent regional policy shaping, setting an important precedent.  

The EU proceeded to adopt some remedial measures, demonstrating its commitment to Iran. It updated its blocking statute, which overrules the law of a foreign jurisdiction: in this case, prohibiting European companies from complying with US sanctions imposed on Iran that violated the JCPOA. It also created a special purpose vehicle (SPV), a financial mechanism to enable trade between Iran and European companies, bypassing US sanctions.  

However, the EU’s efforts to ease the economic pressure on Tehran did not yield the expected results. Despite the statute, European companies largely abandoned their plans in Iran. In 2018, German car manufacturer Daimler halted operations in Iran to avoid being barred from the US market. French carmakers PSA and Renault, as well as Airbus, reacted similarly, defying EU leaders and their efforts to keep business ties with Iran open. 

The EU’s requests for the US to rejoin the nuclear deal went unanswered for years, making the Union appear less influential. It wasn’t until 2021, when the Biden administration took over, that the US showed an openness to possibly returning to the JCPOA. Despite EU mediation, efforts collapsed in March 2022 due to mutual accusations between the US and Iran, and Iran’s backing of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

Iran dismisses the EU  

The EU’s failure to reengage the US in the nuclear deal and alleviate economic burdens left Iran dissatisfied. In 2019 Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, contested the EU’s intentions with the deal, viewing the Union as an irrelevant antagonist. He asserted that, just like the US, the EU is deceitful and fuelled by animosity.  

Iran started to breach the JCPOA’s stipulations. In 2019 the UN nuclear agency confirmed that Iran had installed advanced centrifuges for enriching uranium. Its production of enriched uranium to concentrations higher than those agreed – up to 60 per cent purity, close to weapons grade – is growing.  

Bypassing the EU, Iran has opened indirect bilateral talks with the US. In September 2023, the two stakeholders agreed on a prisoner swap: five people were exchanged on each side. This followed the release in June 2023 of a Danish national and two Austrian citizens. Several European citizens are still being detained in Iran, including a Swedish diplomat, detained in 2022 on alleged espionage charges. Alongside the prisoners, Washington simultaneously released six billion dollars of frozen Iranian assets but retracted the funds after Hamas attacked Israel. 

Current unrest in the Middle East is deepening mistrust between Iran and the West. While the West sees Iran as a supporter of terrorist organisations and regional instability, Iran’s suspicion of the West – rooted in the US and European powers siding with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 – is being rekindled by unwavering Western support for Israel. 

Iran’s breach of the JCPOA could have far-reaching consequences. Saudi Arabia has already announced that, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it would too. If Turkey and Egypt follow suit, this could lead to a nuclear arms race in a highly volatile region.  

Iran’s nuclear advancements may still be reversible, but the EU faces a narrowing window in which to revive the JCPOA. The Union may need to shift from sanctions to incentives, as Iran has started forming strategic partnerships with other world powers.  

Finding partners elsewhere  

Frustrated by the West’s unreliability and retracted promises, Iran has sought new partners. After facing decades of heavy US and EU economic sanctions, Iran is now orienting itself towards countries facing similar challenges – namely Russia and China. This shift further complicates its relationship with the EU, as Iran becomes increasingly less interested in dialogue.  

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Iran was one of the few countries officially siding with Russia. Since then, their partnership has expanded, with Iran becoming a crucial player in Russia’s persistence, supplying combat drones used to target key infrastructure such as power grids and radar stations. 

Iran’s support, prolonging the conflict, aimed at enabling a potential Russian victory, poses a direct security threat to European countries. The partnership between Moscow and Tehran could also shift the balance of power in the Middle East, as Russia may support Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In addition, Russia and Iran are strengthening economic and energy ties to counter Western sanctions. For instance, they have connected their interbank communication and transfer systems, facilitating trade and financial transactions, bypassing the SWIFT system.  

Iran has also deepened its ties with China having signed a 25-year cooperation programme in 2021. The agreement, outlined in a 2019 draft, involves a 400-billion-dollar Chinese investment in Iran’s economy in exchange for a steady and heavily discounted oil supply. China welcomed Iran into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2023. Trade between Iran and SCO countries, which surpassed 651 billion dollars by 2021, is expected to increase further. Iran joining the SCO has strengthened its resilience against Western sanctions, providing leverage in negotiations, access to markets, and investment opportunities.  

Iran has also been invited to join the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) bloc of emerging economies. It will become a full member in January 2024, alongside Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates. BRICS will then represent about 46 per cent of the world’s population and around 37 per cent of global GDP (purchasing power parity).  

Joining BRICS will open trade opportunities for Iran and align it with like-minded nations facing Western pressures. BRICS discussions on de-dollarisation and a common currency, though in their early stages, could impact global financial dynamics. Membership in SCO and BRICS will enhance Iran’s global image, elevating it to the status of emerging nation.  

Where does that leave the EU on Iran?  

Internationally, Iran is rebranding; domestically, the Islamic regime faces rising dissent. The regime’s violent crackdown on mass protests, sparked by Mahsa Amini’s death, including arbitrary executions and torture, has intensified the population’s desire for change. A Gamaan Institute survey of 116,000 participants in the country at the end of 2022 revealed that about 80 per cent of Iranians would prefer a democratic government over the Islamic Republic. 

Through its 2021-2027 Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for Iran, the EU supports civil society organizations (CSOs) in areas like culture, tourism, and education. The EU could strengthen its contribution to empowering Iran’s civil society by creating a CSO Country Roadmap. Potential areas for deepening cooperation include gender equality and youth empowerment. However, to collaborate with Iranian non-profits, the EU must maintain a dialogue with the Iranian government and not bypass it.  

During the 2022 protests, when the EU expressed support for demonstrators, the Iranian government advised the Union and the US against “opportunism and instrumentalisation of human rights”, citing abuses within their own borders. If Iran’s concern persists, it may impede EU funding and support for Iranian non-profits, which would ultimately have a negative impact on Iranian citizens and their rights. For now, however, the EU seems committed to engaging with the Iranian government as per the 2016 Joint Statement.  

Relations could be enhanced if the EU prioritises newer avenues of collaboration, like climate cooperation, included in the MIP. Iran’s interest in joining the Paris Agreement, contingent on lifted sanctions, provides an opportunity for EU support in climate initiatives while working to ease key sanctions. 

The current Israel-Palestine crisis also provides a backdrop for cooperation. Despite Iran’s historical opposition to a two-state solution, the EU must respect Iran’s regional significance and engage in dialogue. The only durable solution for Palestine is one acceptable to Iran. So far, the EU has done the opposite: it has kept Iran out of ongoing discussions. A turnaround is needed: the EU has to engage Iran on the matter and encourage the US’s involvement as well.  

Acknowledgement of the profound impacts of Iran’s shifting alliances, notably with China and Russia, on the global political and economic landscape is imperative for the EU. As these alliances steer Iran away from Western engagement, the EU must persist in building a counter initiative of goodwill, dialogue, and partnerships with Iran. 

Climate change is currently regarded as the most serious existential threat. Many experts believe that global extinction is equally dangerous. Should we leave half of our planet to the wilderness?

The climate crisis is often considered to be the main existential threat humankind is facing in the 21st century. Recently, it has become a more visible topic – not only due to mass media but also because of its direct impact on people’s lives, even in Central Europe. Nowadays, not seeing the climate crisis is only possible for those who intentionally ignore it – especially for ideological reasons. Nevertheless, the term “climate crisis” does not fully capture the pathological and self-destructive relationship that modern industrial civilisation has to other life on our planet.

Global heating of the planet is the most visible outcome of a relationship with nature that sees it as merely a resource for industrialisation. What is less visible globally is what scientists call the “sixth mass extinction”, or the “biodiversity crisis”. In fact, many species die out without ever being noticed by humans. Biodiversity means the rich diversity of biological species, and it is vital for the stability of ecosystems and therefore the entire life.

Mass extinction is currently defined as the loss of at least three-quarters of all biological species within less than three million years (a short geological time). While the past five mass extinctions were due to natural causes, the one occurring now has been caused by unsustainable human activity. For this reason, some prefer to talk about the “mass extermination” of species by humanity.

The population of biological life is falling dramatically. More than 500 terrestrial vertebrate species are almost extinct and we will probably lose them within the next 10 years. Moreover, one in five reptile species and one in eight bird species are in danger of extinction as well as 40 per cent of plant species. In the last 50 years, the world’s wildlife population decreased by 69 per cent.

We could all go extinct

Concern for biodiversity should not be a matter relegated to ecologists and nature protection activists alone. Mass extinction may have dramatic impacts on all of us.

According to the Swiss Re organisation’s estimates, more than half of the global GDP is dependent on high-functioning biodiversity and ecosystem services. At the same time, many world regions rely on ecosystems that filter water – these are mainly wetlands and forests that are very vulnerable to biodiversity loss. Another threat related to mass extinction is an increased frequency of pandemics.

Food systems also heavily depend on biodiversity which means food security hangs in the balance as ecosystems disappear. For example, the collapse of insect populations (especially pollinators) and ecosystems dependent on them could trigger a food crisis. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) published a warning that the decline in bees poses a serious threat to global food security. Insects pollinate more than three-quarters of crops in our agriculture and more than 80 per cent of wild plants. Up to 95 per cent of our food comes from the land, but approximately 40 per cent of the global soil is heavily degraded by unsustainable farming practices, according to UN findings. The food crisis could deepen as significant micro-organisms in the soil go extinct and affect agricultural yields. Despite depending on biodiversity, agriculture is accelerating this decline.

Biodiversity loss tends to be permanent and irreversible; once a certain species is lost, it cannot be brought back.

Besides agriculture, human activities that endanger biodiversity include overexploitation of marine environments, unsustainable use of natural resources, climate crisis, pollution, traffic, light pollution, and invasive alien species that enter local ecosystems directly due to human activity or indirectly, because of human-induced climate change. Altogether, these issues pose threats to more than one million wildlife species that are nearing extinction. 

Even if we managed to put an end to mass extinction overnight, it would take five to seven million years for nature to recover and reach its previous level of biodiversity. Unlike climate which can be, at least in theory, returned to the original state, the loss of biodiversity tends to be permanent and irreversible; once a certain species is lost, it cannot be brought back. The statement that the sixth mass extinction is a real tragedy happening right before our eyes is only partially true because we don’t even have a chance to see the actual extent of the losses.

Insect apocalypse

There is an aspect of the current mass extinction that requires special attention. It is the “insect apocalypse”, a rapid decline of insect species and also insect populations. The insect is the most diverse group of organisms on the planet, constituting two-thirds of zoological species. This group is facing the most serious risk of extinction; insect populations are undergoing an unprecedented decline with a drop of two per cent every year, on average.

The main causes of this drastic decrease are deforestation, pesticides, excessive use of nitrogen fertilisers, light pollution, and climate change. The impacts of a warming climate on insect populations have been dramatic recently. Some areas that were typically wet have been getting dry, and so their ecosystems which used to be ideal for many insect species have been becoming uninhabitable. Such development is disastrous for insects.

Due to climate change, there can also be outbreaks of some insect species to the detriment of other species and even whole ecosystems, as we witnessed in the case of bark beetle outbreaks in Czechia. As many local forests consist of spruce monocultures that lost their resistance to insect pests, their existence proves to be unsustainable. Long-term extreme temperatures accelerate the development of common bark beetle species enabling higher numbers of generations or spreading as well as the spreading of those species that used to be less frequent, for example, the northern bark beetle. Historically, the European spruce was the main commercial species, but the situation seems unsustainable and untenable nowadays.

One species that has felt the “insect apocalypse” acutely is the bee. A decline in bees in the last decade has been caused by a combination of factors including the loss of genetic diversity and the occurrence of certain viruses. A quarter of bee species are endangered, and the number of bee colonies in North America decreased from 6 million in 1947 to 2.7 million. The experience of bees confirms a trend among biological species; not only are they facing extinction, but shrinking diversity is also making them less resistant and adaptable to ecological and anthropogenic stressors.

Paris Agreement for biodiversity

What can be done about this? There are – at least formally – efforts to solve this situation. One of the most important ones is the UN Biodiversity Conference, a counterpart of the UN conferences on climate. COP15, the fifteenth international conference of this type, took place in Montreal at end of last year after China’s zero covid policy caused it to postpone hosting the conference.

Kunming, China, which was originally supposed to host the conference, was replaced with Montreal where representatives of national governments met from 7 to 19 December 2022 to discuss stemming mass extinction and biodiversity loss. So far, most negotiations have been conspicuously similar to those of climate conferences; there are complicated discussions leading to agreements that are promoted as breakthroughs, although they are not ambitious enough and are rarely implemented.

In each decade, however, national governments agree on new objectives for the preservation of biodiversity. This previously happened in 2010 in Nagoya, Japan, where the parties set their commitments to halve the loss of natural habitats and expand protected areas by 17 per cent. Although rather modest, these objectives were unfulfilled. Moreover, none of the declared measurable objectives was met in the last decade. The achievements of environmental diplomacy and shared commitments have thus been mostly theoretical.

Nevertheless, the hopes were quite high for the COP15 as some expected it to be a ground-breaking event that would result in the “Paris agreement for biodiversity”, i.e. a paradigmatic document confirming that governments are fully aware of risks related to biodiversity loss. However, the resulting document titled Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is a compromise and somewhat vague. Its calls for urgent action to halt and reverse biodiversity loss. The rate and risk of extinction for all species are set to be reduced by 20 per cent by 2030, and eventually tenfold by 2050 compared to the current situation, but there is no clear commitment that might lead to increases in populations of endangered species by 2030. Furthermore, the document lacks specific, measurable criteria that could turn general goals into concrete plans.

Many participants and observers saw the main priority in the 30 by 30 target which stands for the effort to make 30 per cent of the Earth’s land and waters protected areas, especially in regions vital for global biodiversity such as Amazonia, the Congo basin, and Indonesia. This shows that some countries bear more responsibility for biodiversity protection than others, and what is more, this often concerns developing countries whose GDP has largely depended on expanding agricultural production. If they are expected to redefine their position in the global economy, they can hardly do it on their own – and this is where the question of the Global North’s financial support becomes relevant.

At the practical level, the reform of the subsidy system is a necessary condition for any solution to the biodiversity crisis. Research shows that more than 1.8 trillion dollars is spent globally every year to subsidise environmentally destructive activities. This mostly applies to funding for high-emission agriculture, industrialised cattle breeding, massive cutting of forests, and polluting industrial fertilisers. Henceforth, a large part of this funding should be used for nature protection instead (ideally 200 billion dollars a year), improving soil sequestration potential, production of healthy food, and massive tree planting. Harmful subsidies should be reduced by at least 500 billion dollars by 2030. There is also an important part of the agreement related to the restoration of at least 30 per cent of areas degraded by intensive industrialised farming. None of this can happen without significant funding from the developed countries which often take advantage of importing cheap food, but they are often reluctant to financially support the transformation of unsustainable agricultural production.

The document also aims at strengthening the rights of indigenous peoples. In the context of nature protection, they often face an absurd situation: according to some interpretations, wilderness preservation might exclude the presence of humans in the given ecosystems which may result in the repression of indigenous peoples living in such natural areas. The new agreement thus respects their rights as well as their legitimate position in such areas because their presence in these ecosystems may be beneficial in many regards. They can also play the part of “guardians” alerting to violation of rules for ecosystem protection, typically by the mining or agricultural lobby.

Another important point of the agreement applies to pesticides: the overall risk posed by their use should be reduced by half by 2030. On the other hand, there is no mention of the necessity to change dietary habits – even though noticeable progress in biodiversity protection is hardly possible without a considerable reduction of the meat industry and thus meat consumption. According to some studies, we should reduce global meat consumption by approximately 90 per cent, but at this point, such policies do not seem feasible anytime shortly. At the best, we can hope that at least partial reductions in the meat industry will succeed and the direction towards a change in dietary habits may be approved at the COP16 which will take place in Turkey at the end of 2024.

Half of the planet to wilderness…

So far, environmental diplomacy has seen a lack of success or partial achievements only, but it cannot be said the efforts have borne no fruit, quite the contrary. Our current experience proves that biodiversity protection works. Recent studies show that without the implemented measures for biodiversity protection, the advancement of mass extinction would be three to four times worse. The measures can thus be efficient; the problem is there are few, and their implementation is slow.

Nowadays, some form of protection applies to 17 per cent of terrestrial and 10 per cent of marine areas, which is not enough. We should follow sociobiologist E. O. Wilson’s proposal to leave half of the planet to the protected wilderness. It is not that radical or extreme if we realise that formerly there was nothing but wild nature on the Earth. The fact that we only have a few per cent of protected wilderness left is evidence of how much we have transformed the biosphere in the past centuries. What truly is extreme is the way we have treated the planet so far and considered it “normal”, not the proposals to determine sustainable limits to human activity.

If we fail to, willingly and consensually, set such limits for ourselves, nature will eventually set them for us.

If we fail to, willingly and consensually, set such limits for ourselves, nature will eventually set them for us, and perhaps in a rather cruel way. It might as well happen that we leave the whole Earth to the wilderness if humankind were to die out. Half of the planet for wilderness is not a mere moral appeal of those who protect and love nature, but simply a self-preservation measure for our own good. Such measures would be beneficial not only to halt mass extinction but also to deal with carbon emissions, which will be an essential part of the efforts to stabilise climate and keep the planet inhabitable. Becoming aware of the climate and environmental reality is like waking up from a dream or hypnosis induced by the consumerist society which gives us a convenient but completely false sense that everything is all right. No, it is far from all right.

As if the climate crisis is not alarming enough, the biodiversity crisis is sounding a louder alarm. Even if we managed to get the climate under control, that would not be sufficient. It is vital to see current existential threats in their complexity: there is a risk of environmental, climate, and social collapse because of our unsustainable civilisation model.

…and the other half to green socialism

We should thus take the suggestion to leave half of our planet to wilderness seriously. That is what the authors of Half-Earth Socialism also do; they develop E. O. Wilson’s idea through the lens of socialist theory. Their vision is straightforward: half of the planet for wilderness, the other half for socialism. What they understand as developing a “scientific utopia” may sound like a promise of a great future to some, while others may see it as a dystopian nightmare. Let’s have a look at their conclusions for the sustainable world vision: first, widespread veganism and thus reduction of land used for farming (as a condition for re-wilding a half of the Earth), second, energy quotas, third, non-market planning as a green transformation strategy, and fourth, socialist democracy as the foundation for the political life.

Such attempts can be considered “speculative socialism”: in a classic debate between utopian and scientific socialism, the authors have tried to take a third road and make a thought experiment within the limits of the material reality. Above all, in the era of fragmentary and insufficient solutions, they try to be in touch with the reality of the climate and environmental crisis instead of obeying the capitalist “realism” that leads us down the paths of the free market, competition, and unlimited growth presented as the ultimate form of the economic life.

The ongoing devastation of life on our planet is a strong indictment against capitalism that has led the biosphere to near collapse and extinction for centuries. Being in this situation makes a realistic claim to demand the “impossible”. It is the idea that we can keep following the same direction without interruptions that seems dangerously utopian and unsustainable. The Half-Earth Socialism proposal is immensely rational in terms of the continuation of our life on the planet. If it proves impossible to reach a sustainable society and inhabitable planet via a market economy, we cannot insist on keeping this economic model. Leaving half of the planet to wilderness and the other to socialist vegans is not as crazy as it might seem.

This article was first published in Czech by A2larm.

In a world increasingly divided by rising tensions between the US and China, what of relations between India and Europe? From their democratic traditions to shared interests in technological development, Europe and India have much in common and to gain from cooperation. We spoke with Jagannath Panda on India’s role in the hegemonic conflict between the US and China, its position on the upcoming climate change negotiations, and the role of democracy in its outlook on the world.

Roderick Kefferpütz: During the Cold War, India was part of the non-aligned movement, refusing to formally align itself with or against any major power bloc. Today, tensions are growing between the US and China. Where does India stand?

Jagannath Panda: Let’s be clear: China is the biggest national security threat to India at this moment. We have a long-standing border dispute with China and fought a war in 1962. There have always been ups and downs in our relations with China, but under Xi Jinping’s presidency the situation has become more worrisome. Tensions have mounted, with China increasing its troops along the border, and India is vigilant about this threat. China’s rising military and economic power gives more global influence abroad and affects India’s strategic interests in its neighbourhood.

Though India prefers not to indulge itself in a US-China power struggle, Delhi’s choices are still very much drawn within it. India’s strategic interests in world politics are more aligned with the United States hence the strong interest in strengthening its relationships with the United States as a natural partner. In October 2020, both states concluded the fourth in a series of military pacts, highlighting their growing security partnership in the Indo-Pacific. While India is not likely to take a direct stance in the US-China hegemonic struggle in the near future, New Delhi has growing ties with the US and has come to recognise the threat posed by China to its strategic security.

Would India be interested in closer alignment with other democracies?

Indian foreign policy is multivariate, engaging with all countries and regions. It is not about putting all your eggs in one basket and aligning with one power against another. Instead, India espouses the notion of “inclusivity” across all spectrums. Unlike a majority of the strategic partners of the United States, India does not envision an anti-China arrangement. Of course, China is a threat but that makes engagement more necessary and it does not mean that we cannot simultaneously cooperate on other issues. We have strong ties with China on economic cooperation in multilateral domains. This partnership, however, has taken a backseat considering China’s conduct towards India and the recent border incidents.

In this context, India has improved its ties with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region, such as the US, Japan and Australia going as far as concluding a number of mini-lateral and trilateral arrangements with these partners. Cooperation in the maritime domain and maintaining a “free and open Indo-Pacific” have emerged as central aspects of India’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Moving forward, these partnerships will imbibe a post-Covid-19 outlook with a focus on strategic integration, infrastructure cooperation, information technology collaboration, and enhancing institutional inclusiveness. Nevertheless, India would not like to build an alliance at the cost of China. India holds a pragmatic interest in maintaining a diplomatic relationship with China – albeit with power parity and equilibrium.

China is increasingly active in Central Asia and South-East Asia. Is India also increasing its ties across the regions?

You cannot compare India’s influence and capacity to China’s; we are not at the same level. China’s economy is roughly four times ours. Their massive economic power alone provides greater geopolitical influence. New Delhi must play a different game which is why it has opted for a “good-will strategy”. India, unlike China, is not building a Communist empire. Rather, Delhi is building partnerships to protect its national interests against hegemonistic tendencies.

India does not intend to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. We engage on a soft power connection, promoting good relations and highlighting our democratic character. The strategic dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia and India and its potential institutionalisation, is an endeavour in this direction. India’s soft engagement in the Indian Ocean is also driven through a security lens. Located at the centre of the Indian Ocean Region, India is a key part of the maritime region that has become one its topmost foreign policy priorities. Initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative¹ have become a significant forum through which China’s mounting presences and assertive military-maritime posturing can be balanced. India is also actively involved in the institutions and mechanisms like the Indian Ocean Rim Association² and the Quad Plus³ framework on a broader scale. New Delhi’s Covid-19 vaccine diplomacy vis-à-vis South Asia and other Indian Ocean states is an extension of such a soft power approach.

You cannot compare India’s influence and capacity to China’s. New Delhi must play a different game which is why it has opted for a “good-will strategy”.

India and China are both carbon-heavy economies but that have historically low carbon emissions and low per capita emissions. To what extent do India and China cooperate on climate change?

India has always supported the international climate negotiations and indeed, has stood alongside China on the issue of climate change. On many occasions, we have partnered with countries such as South Africa and China. However, given the way that China has developed under Xi Jinping and its attempted nexus with the United States on climate issues, India has been forced to review its collaboration with China. So New Delhi has decided to also go its own way when it comes to climate protection and it is doing so very successfully. We are one of the very few countries that are meeting the Paris agreement and overachieving its nationally determined contribution target.

India is meeting its Paris obligations but has provided mixed signals on how it will move on with its energy transition. It’s pushing towards a higher share of renewables, but it also keeps planning for more coal capacity. What interests does India have in the climate negotiations?

India has one of the most ambitious renewable energy programmes. Yet, it continues to push for coal-fired plants, which are projected to play a vital role in the country’s pandemic recovery package. This is something countries often question India on; however, it is important to remember that the Indian coal industry employs millions of people and is a major source of revenue. Coal still powers almost 70 per cent of India’s electricity.

Weaning off coal dependency will therefore need to be a gradual and strategically planned process. This is something the government is building on. Recently, India set up an implementation committee for Paris Agreement with representatives from fourteen Indian ministries whose main directive will be the reduction in coal use. This, coupled with India’s on-track position to meet the Paris pledge, shows not only New Delhi’s active focus on the environment but also the crucial place it holds in climate negotiations. Setting up a coalition on solar energy and disaster-resilient infrastructure show that India is not only focusing on domestic environmental improvement but also taking a leadership role amongst economies worldwide to further the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement. India is performing even better than its developed counterparts like China and the USA. A new index by climate analysts from international climate think tanks Germanwatch, New Climate Institute and Climate Action Network place India 10th, China 33rd and the US last in their assessment of 61 large world economies vis-a-vis their Paris pledge completion track.

India’s relationship with China, based on conflict and cooperation, has similarities to the European Union. Of course, the EU is firmly rooted in the transatlantic alliance, but it is also economically heavily invested in China and not keen on joining Washington in an alliance against Beijing. To what extent could Europe and India build on such similarities?

Europe has been re-discovered as an important region for Indian foreign policy. In the past, we did not really pay much attention to Europe as geographically this region is far away and India has traditionally emphasised its immediate neighbourhood. In addition, there’s a big gap between the way Europe and India thinks. However, the rise of China has brought India and Europe closer together. Europe has experienced deteriorating ties with China over the pandemic. Beijing’s “wolf warrior” and “charm offensive” diplomacy has added to Sino-EU tensions. Beijing is recognised as a “systemic rival” in Europe and Chinese aggression in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the South and East China Seas has only brought about an emerging consensus in Europe.

India holds a pragmatic interest in maintaining a diplomatic relationship with China.

India-EU interests are now more aligned. Europe has realised that India is arising economic power that stands for liberal democratic principles such as transparency and the rule of law. India in turn sees Europe as an important part in its power-building exercise. So there’s a great willingness on both sides for greater engagement. India has been focusing on France and Germany on defence and security issues. The India-France-Australia trilateral is one recent mechanism to emerge from India’s budding synergy with Europe.

Technological governance can also emerge as a key area for India’s collaboration with the EU. With China currently writing the rules by which the future of the internet and technology will be governed, India and the EU are fostering deeper cooperation in innovation and research of cutting-edge, sustainable digital infrastructure, which can further translate to cooperation in formulating global tech governance norms.

A range of European countries have adopted Indo-Pacific strategies. How does India see that increased European interest and engagement in the Indo-Pacific?

India welcomes these initiatives. The Indo-Pacific strategies of France, the Netherlands or Germany are in New Delhi’s interests, because they allow India to engage with these countries in one of the most important geopolitical regions of the 21st century. This strengthens the democratic spirit in the region. India’s synergy with the EU is also critically driven by France, Germany and the Netherlands’ new Indo-Pacific policies (or outlooks) that demonstrate the EU’s emerging focus on the region. New Delhi sees the EU (as well as the UK for that matter) as a key middle power partner. Their shared focus on sustaining a rules-based, liberal institutional regional and global order makes them like-minded partners and gives them a foundation to drive their partnership further.

You mentioned that India can’t counter China’s Belt and Road strategy, but perhaps it could join the EU in its Connectivity Strategy that is investing in infrastructure and networks in the region. What do you think?

They have convergence vis-à-vis their shared rules-based, sustainable and mutually beneficial conception of connectivity. The EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy is a fresh and promising avenue to promote not just economic but also a political partnership between the EU and India. Much like Japan’s partnership for quality infrastructure – of which India is a vital partner – the EU-Asia connectivity outlook was not designed to compete with China. Furthermore, the strategy is not limited to physical infrastructure connectivity; digital, services, research and innovation are sectors that also figure prominently. Programmes such as Erasmus+ have already been expanded to India to promote academic collaborations. While individually neither can match China’s funding patterns, together EU and India can provide alternatives to the Belt and Road initiative for small Asian and European economies.

In the EU there is a lot of talk of “strategic autonomy” although the EU is militarily dependent on the US. What does the future of Europe in the world look like from an Indian perspective?

The EU’s place in the world has long been established; it is the single most important trading bloc that has shaped the politics and policies of one of the world’s most important continents for years. However, with the “Asian Century” in place, the emergence of Asia as a pivotal –if not most crucial – geography has put Asia in tandem with Europe. Furthermore, due to a surge in the power of Asian economies like India, Japan, China and South Korea, the playing field between Asia and the rest of the world has been further levelled. The creation of regional and trans-pacific trade pacts has further strengthened the Asian narrative. The most important step for the EU to take must be focused on determining a consensual policy on China, if not a unified EU policy on China. The development of a consensual EU policy on China and a coherent Indo-Pacific outlook could transform India-EU relations into a comprehensive strategic partnership for the new era.

With the “Asian Century” in place, the emergence of Asia as a pivotal – if not most crucial – geography has put Asia in tandem with Europe.

As the world’s largest democracy India certainly has a role to play in curbing the rise of authoritarianism. From the United States, President Biden has announced that he wants to convene a Summit for Democracy. How does India see such proposals?

One of the key pillars of India’s rise in global affairs has always been its democratic character. New Delhi supports democratic regimes across the world and is committed to promoting democracy. So in that context, India would strongly welcome Biden’s proposition of a Summit for Democracy or Britain’s proposition of a Democratic 10 Summit. However, details matter. India would want to know what exactly this summit or forum wants to achieve. If this will remain just a goodwill summit, then it will have limitations and would not benefit democratic countries, including India.

What we need is a forum that goes beyond a mere talking platform or making few headlines and rather finds a common approach of democratic nations on issues such as maritime rights, freedom of navigation, defending the rules-based order or democracy promotion in the Indo-Pacific. India would support such an approach and can take on a leadership role in this regard.

Simultaneously, the Modi government has been under a lot of criticism with regards to democratic backsliding.

In democratic countries, there are always vibrant debates and protests. That is what democracy entails. Only authoritarian countries don’t have protests. The farmers’ protest is a case in point that showcases India’s democratic spirit. Of course, there are always issues between the ruling party and the opposition parties. That is just part and parcel of India’s multiparty system. There is no democratic country in the world that does not have protests and whose governments do not face protest movements.

But this isn’t just about the farmers’ protest, it’s also about how democratic governments handle such protests. Democratic political leadership should be about bridging divides and bringing people together and not driving them apart, by – for example – suggesting that protesters are Sikh separatists, arresting a 21-year-old environmentalist for sharing a protest toolkit promoted by Greta Thunberg, or asking Twitter to block hundreds of accounts.

Well, India has always been in the limelight for ethnic to religious to caste-class politics. In a free and open society that allows absolute media freedom, small matters look bigger on a storyline. Nevertheless, the ruling party or the government of the day needs to handle protests in a democratic society with care. It is also an absolute responsibility of the opposition party to not colour or politicise such issues so that a healthy, democratic environment within the country can be sustained. Likewise, the media, intellectual classes and civil society all bear a responsibility to be vigilant and not indulging in politicising the matters. What you are asking concerns a political manifestation of farmers protests where a lack of responsibility is visible across the political spectrum and that is not a good thing for a democratic society like India. However, if history can be a lesson, incidents or protest movements like this only strengthen the political resilience within the country to challenge any facets of political authoritarianism – that has been one of the key pillars of India’s democratic success.

In the last few years, Europe’s security assessment has changed dramatically, but our immediate responses to today’s crises should not divert attention from the necessity of constructing a long-term vision, which puts great emphasis on joint European efforts, and the deployment of soft and smart power. A new approach to international development is also key in order to keep Europe and its neighbourhood safe.

In the ‘good old days’, prior to the breakout of the global financial crisis, the Arab Spring, and the Ukrainian crisis, the security assessment for Europe, in terms of most urgent threats and answers, would have been easy to describe. One of the priorities would have been to foster further integration within the EU and, additionally, to pursue a policy towards Europe’s immediate Eastern and Southern neighbourhood that would rather gently insist on democratic reforms (while appreciating a certain stability guaranteed by authoritarian regimes). Secondly, there would have been a need to counter the growing gap between rich and poor within developed and emerging countries to avoid social and economic upheavals. And, thirdly, we would have had to address the challenges posed by global warming and climate change through a variety of multilateral measures.

Obviously, none of these challenges resulted from an immediate crisis or disruption (one caused by political decisions or by quickly unfolding dynamics and/or events), but are rather long-term problems that require long-term measures and broad cooperation.

Europe is confronted with a political and ideological crisis that became visible with the rise of populist governments within the European Union

In the last few years, however, we have seen that the security assessment for Europe has changed dramatically. The financial crisis and later the Greek crisis unveiled the unfinished architecture of the European common currency and undermined trust in a global economic system that has rewarded those responsible for the crisis. The Arab spring, which promised to bring the authoritarian states of the Middle East into the fold of a slowly but surely evolving democratic world, soon enough turned into yet another winter. Moreover, with the annexation of Crimea and with its support for the so-called separatists in Ukraine, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin showed all too clearly that he was not interested in participating in a global liberal order – one that would still be dominated by Western liberal democracies – but would instead prefer to follow his own rules.

Europe today is thus confronted with the strong leader of a weak state (Russia) who is trying to compensate for his country’s economic and soft power weakness by undermining the strength of his Western, liberal competitors, as well as by his willingness to use military force in order to achieve his goals. Moreover, there is a deep crisis of leadership and legitimacy in the Middle East that has resulted either in political turmoil, civil war, and humanitarian catastrophe, as in Syria, or in the return to a (seemingly) powerful authoritarian state, as in Egypt and Turkey, and a range of (semi-) fragile states in between those poles. Finally, Europe is also confronted with a political and ideological crisis within Europe and the Western alliance that became visible with the rise of populist governments within the European Union, namely in Hungary and Poland. The need to find a solution that helps tackle this trend became particularly urgent with the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the election of a new U.S. administration that is, for the first time in 70 years, calling into question the Western alliances and its most important security structure, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Don’t overlook the short-term needs

All of these crises require immediate measures due to their quickly unfolding dynamics – be it a flaring up of violence in the Donbass, or, even more pressing, the huge waves of migration from the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa into Europe.

None of these crises can be resolved merely by military means, but the solutions to each of those crises have to involve hard power tools as well, be it in the form of deterrence against Russian intervention or strengthening security forces in potentially fragile states. Here, the Readiness Action Plan, which was approved at the NATO Wales summit in 2014, and with it the establishment of a 5000-strong, so-called Very High Readiness Joint Task Force within NATO, is a necessary first step for deterrence, and the concept of Ertüchtigung, loosely meaning a policy of ‘help for self-help’ that would enable fragile states to take care of their own security.

Moreover, none of these crises can be solved by one power alone. Multilateral approaches are inevitable, even if deepening ideological differences – even within the Western alliance – make it ever more difficult to act jointly. Thus, we need to tackle these crises with a carefully calibrated set of hard, soft, and smart power tools – and we shouldn’t shy away from deploying vast political, economic, and also military resources.

A long-term vision is needed

Whilst Europe’s security environment has changed dramatically and the EU put under unprecedented pressure from external and internal forces, the top priority of European security has not only remained the same but has become ever more urgent, with only a slight change of emphasis: not “further integration”, but “making European integration work”; or, to put it more bluntly, keeping Europe together has to be Europe’s top priority. In order to be successful, building up ‘European capacities’ is the most promising approach, even if this has to be done via a few detours.

In order to successfully manage the threats Europe is facing in the long-term, policy-makers need to take into consideration the following four priorities:

I. Take the 2% goal seriously: on a European scale wherever possible

Europe had heard about the necessity of increasing its defence spending towards a 2% GDP target even before Donald J. Trump came to power, and while the messenger may be problematic, the message is nevertheless true. Europe cannot rely on U.S. support forever; it has to build its own capacities, preferably within NATO (even if it’s only to keep the Brits on board). Needless to say, the goal of ‘spending more on defence’ has to be done through ‘building capacities’.

Europe still acts on a ‘Mac versus Windows’ blueprint from the old days of the computer age. Capacities are wasted because systems are incompatible. ‘Pooling and sharing’ has been a buzzword for years – it is high time the concept was taken seriously. After all, hard power measures have to include diverse concepts, such as ‘deterrence’ (including nuclear) and ‘anti-terror-measures’, which require vastly different means and capabilities. Deterrence only works if the means that can be employed are not only impressive, but can also credibly demonstrate that they can be deployed within a considerably short time. Despite the agreement to establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force inside NATO, much is to be desired in this field.

It would be impossible, or worse – a wrong-headed waste of resources, for European countries to build these capacities on their own, instead of pooling their resources. Considering that security is still thought of mainly in terms of national sovereignty, an ‘island to island’ or ‘bilateral cooperation growing into something bigger’ approach might be helpful for the time being. At the 2017 Munich Security Conference,German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen pointed out how well established French-German and Dutch-German cooperation worked. This approach should be broadened so that European countries can act together when it comes to defending their borders.

II. Build and strengthen European political capacities and institutions

Entities can only survive if there is a certain sense of cohesion. If the number one goal is to keep the EU together, then the EU has to demonstrate that it can provide its citizens with a sense of security. Nothing gives populist parties a bigger boost than a very simplified message, in which they claim that it is the nation states alone that can protect people from terror attacks and successfully mitigate the effects of migration waves. And it is the ‘bureaucratic, cold-hearted’ EU that contributed to their feeling of a ‘loss of control and identity’.

In fact, exactly the opposite is true. Europeans have gained a sense of security over the years because the EU was, and is, the number one provider of wealth through open borders and markets. The task, therefore, is to keep Europe’s internal borders open while visibly (!) securing Europe’s external borders.

A whole range of measures is therefore necessary: strengthening European border controls, especially in the Mediterranean; supporting countries logistically, politically, and economically who have to carry the main burden of receiving and registering migrants and refugees; and strengthening the cooperation of European intelligence services in their fight against terror and (see point one) move it slowly into the direction of a truly European intelligence.

III. Take ‘nation-building’ seriously and define it broadly

Fragile and failing states in the European neighbourhood are Europe’s main security challenge. They are breeding grounds for jihadi and terrorist groups, cause huge migration waves, and contribute to growing poverty. No doubt, the concept of nation building has suffered a serious blow after the invasion of Iraq and an ongoing engagement in Afghanistan that required vast resources, but did not provide satisfying results – because no stability is possible without a political order that provides legitimacy and security for its citizens.

Multilateral approaches are inevitable, even if deepening ideological differences – even within the Western alliance – make it ever more difficult to act jointly.

While ‘nation building from outside’ is a very difficult endeavour, there are different measures that would enhance this long-term goal. An example would be strengthening institutions where they already exist, as they do in Tunisia, through a range of ‘soft power’ measures: economic cooperation, exchange programmes and trainings for parliamentarians, the executive (police and military), and ‘young leaders’,
as well as ongoing dialogue and cooperation with the civil society.

Such a multi-layered, long-term approach requires an apparatus that can sufficiently coordinate different efforts and provide logistics and strategic planning. While European nation states could become stake-holders in this process, it should be a vastly strengthened and reinforced (and financially beefed-up) European External Action Service that would provide the logistical guidance.

IV. Thinking ahead and supporting intelligent growth

Climate change and global warming are no longer on top of the European foreign policy agenda due to the perception of other crises as currently more pressing. However, these are and will be the biggest potential disruptors. There has been a whole set of political issues – the lack of civil and political freedoms in Syria, the spark of the Arab Spring, and President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal oppression of any call for reform – that have led to the biggest humanitarian catastrophe in the 21st century. However, according to a study published by Atmospheres, the Journal of Geophysical Research, a massive drought – in fact, the worst drought of the last 900 years in the Middle East (and the inability of an authoritarian regime to acknowledge the problem, let alone tackle it) – might very well have contributed to the break-out of political unrest and the ensuing civil war.

Long-term challenges will not go away just because most of our attention is spent on solving immediate crises. Poverty, a lack of perspectives (combined with a spread of real or supposed ‘information’ about life in the Western world through global media), violent conflicts, and environmental disasters are still the biggestdrivers of unrest or migration into Europe. Very often, causes are intertwined and have to be tackled in a multi- layered, multilateral approach through ‘intelligent growth’, investments in renewable technologies and energy sources, and smart development aid that enforces and rewards ‘bottom-up’ approaches wherever possible. Diplomacy and supranational organisations should also play an important role. The United Nations or the World Bank are indispensable partners in the field, with enormous expertise, logistical infrastructure, and vast experience.

Slashing tariffs, cutting down on subsidies for European agricultural products, and boosting exports from Africa into the EU would definitely be a smart part of an overall European security policy.

“Wrapping your head around current crises and thinking ahead of developing crises” should be the slogan of the day. In that context, it should  come as no surprise that Chancellor Angela Merkel declared last fall that we need to do much more to “help Sub-Saharan Africa develop”. Most policy makers in Germany understand that the biggest migration waves are expected to originate from Sub-Saharan Africa, and most decision makers understand that almost no other issue could have such an unsettling impact on the political landscape in Germany and the European Union as an uncontrolled or uncontrollable wave of migration. Germany could be in an extraordinary position to contribute to the ambitious goal of ‘helping to develop’ Sub-Saharan Africa’s vast potential; as a strong believer in multilateralism, it could be a leader in multilateral, diplomatic efforts to fulfil the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.

As a leading nation in the field of environmental technology, it should be a key provider of smart, green technology.

And finally, as a strong European power, it could work for a much smarter EU policy towards our southern neighbours. Slashing tariffs, cutting down on subsidies for European agricultural products, and boosting exports from Africa into the EU would definitely be a smart part of an overall European security policy.

Riding the tricycle

For decades, the answer to crises within or outside Europe was the never-ending mantra “More integration, please”, sung the loudest by us Germans. Facing a multitude of different challenges that rapidly develop, this answer still holds true – in a certain sense. But Germany
has to sing a slightly different tune. It will have to be a leading voice yet still ensure that all other voices in the chorus are equally heard. It will have to push for more integration in necessary fields, such as intelligence sharing, common European defence, a common policy towards the southern and eastern neighbourhood, as well as show its willingness to contribute considerably politically, economically, and militarily.

Being the one nation in Europe that most urgently wanted to leave nationalism behind and find comfort in a European identity, Germany needs a much deeper understanding of an almost banal truth: Europe, or the EU for that matter, is not – and will not in any foreseeable future be – a Political Union, nor a European super-state in the making. It will be a federal entity that consists of nations with different interests, national histories, specific perceptions, deep historical traumas, and fears of losing control of their own destiny. Germany’s push towards more integration has, therefore, to be determined yet sensible. Berlin would have to signal that strengthening the ‘Paris-Berlin Tandem’ is of utmost priority. This strengthening of the tandem could even lead to a switch to a more stable vehicle. For years, I would have preferred a ‘European four-wheel drive’, consisting of France, Poland, Germany, and Great Britain; with the UK having voted for a Brexit, this has turned into a pipe dream – however, a tricycle still seems to be a possible solution, and one that is more stable than a tandem…

After all, a common European foreign policy will not evolve par ordre du mufti, but through the shared experience of successful cooperation.

The feeling that something serious has changed after Trump’s election is palpable. The sombre mood generated by the election hasn’t been shaken off. Certainly, Europeans are also indulging in the entertainment value of the day-to-day surreality of Trump, but the unexpected triumph of a far-right politician is a bit too close for comfort. With Brexit quickly becoming a reality, it’s impossible for Europe to write off the US election as an isolated event, particularly with elections looming in several European states this year.

Yet beyond the rise of right-wing populism that has many rightly feeling uncomfortable about the future of their own countries, the election of Trump to the White House also puts into question the future of Pax Americana. Is anyone comfortable with Donald Trump being the ‘leader of the free world’? Many assume that US foreign policy won’t change all that much; it rarely does from one president to the next. Yet, never has a president been elected to the White House who is so poorly regarded by the rest of the world. This begs the question, could American soft power be at risk under a Trump presidency?

The US has traditionally been the master of soft power. They literally wrote the book on it, as the term was first coined by Harvard’s Joseph Nye in 1990. The concept of soft power assumes two types of power: the traditional hard power, consisting of military and economical might, and soft power, denoting the ability to influence the culture and ideology of other nations. For the US, its ability to promote its values and culture abroad has been as integral a part of their foreign policy for over the past two centuries as their hard power. For instance, while many Europeans didn’t agree with many aspects of Obama’s foreign policy in regards to Syria or the TTIP trade negotiations, according to the Pew Research Center Obama’s approval rate in 2016 was as high as 86% in Germany, and 84% in France. In Italy, 72% reported a favourable view of the US, compared to only 32% in China. Most European countries have similar figures. As Foreign Affairs succinctly put it, “U.S. security hinges as much on winning hearts and minds as it does on winning wars.” But can we really expect Europe to embrace the values of Trump’s America?

One clear indication of Trump’s lack of regard for the typical instruments of US soft power was his decision to immediately dismiss all politically appointed US ambassadors, with no concrete replacements in line. There are two types of American Ambassadors: career diplomats, and political appointees. The majority of ambassadors to Europe are political appointees, who change with each president. So whilst all the politically appointed ambassadors had anticipated having to leave their positions at the end of Obama’s term, there is usually a grace period giving the outgoing and incoming ambassadors time to transition to their new roles. The approval process for politically appointed ambassadors is lengthy, as they must be approved by Congress and go through an intensive background check by White House personnel staff and the FBI. For instance, most of the Obama appointees in his second term (2013-2016) didn’t begin until the summer of 2013.

The role of ambassadors is largely ceremonial, someone to add a personal touch to US relations with their host country. In European countries, they are usually fairly popular among the local population and maintain the usual friendly relations between the nations. However, if we can assume that the Trump-appointed ambassadors are anything like the members he chose for his Cabinet, that is, a cadre of morally dubious figures, and factor in that ambassador positions go to donors or political allies of the incoming President, the esteem and prestige that many US ambassadors are held in in Europe is likely to be reconsidered. Considering Trump’s few political allies, many American pundits assume the posts will go to some of his many business allies.

Furthermore, what will happen to the activities of the US Embassies? They have long been a financial supporter of various civil society movements and events, and considered a reliable funder for projects as long as they “promoted American values.” That has been a relatively broad blanket covering a myriad of causes promoting human rights, democracy, freedom of speech, and so on. But if Trump stays true to many of his campaign promises, it seems that the US government itself would no longer embody many of those ideals. Whilst American hypocrisy is nothing new, Trump seems to particularly revel in it. Whether he uses embassies as a tool to push forward his own ideology is not yet sure, but it is certain that he has the power to. He has already shown a tendency to use state institutions for his own political and personal gain, so can we really believe that embassies will be immune? His campaign promise to move the Israeli Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, which he seems likely to fulfil, indicates that instrumentalising US Embassies is already on his radar.

Additionally, the legitimacy of projects like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty could be under threat. RFE/RL was founded during the Cold War by the US government for countries behind the Iron Curtain and still exists today. Their mission is to “report the news in 23 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established,” which includes countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Given Trump’s demonstrable disregard for the impartiality of media and RFE/RL’s role in often dispelling misinformation spread by Putin and his media machines, the entire mission and integrity of RFE/RL could be compromised. It’s hard to envisage the continued impartiality of RFE’s Crimea broadcast under a president who has defied his own party by repeatedly defending Russia’s claims to it.

There are other tools of US soft power which might not be of much interest to Trump, who doesn’t seem too interested in details, but that will certainly not be immune to the ire of a Republican Congress hungry for spending cuts. One example is US government sponsored programmes for Americans to go abroad like the Fulbright Scholarships or the Peace Corps. Nary an Eastern European who hasn’t met a Peace Corps volunteer, nor a European professor who is not familiar with the Fulbright. These programmes are widely beloved by those who have participated in them and have been a global model, replicated across the world. Regardless they have been scrutinised during budget hearings in the US Congress before, and with a Republican Senate, House of Representatives, and President, future budget cuts seem plausible.

Whilst US soft power in Europe does not rest solely on state sponsored activities, these certainly play an important role. It’s likely that American corporations will try to counterbalance some of the negative effects of a more isolationist US government. Even if the US government decides to stop investing in soft power abroad, US corporations still have a great vested interest in ensuring consumers abroad have a positive image of their brand. So if there does prove to be a gap in funding opportunities for civil society organisations that the US government used to provide, corporations could see this as an opportunity to insert themselves, and American corporate sponsorships for civil society in Europe could increase. For NGOs in the US, government funding alone is rarely enough to survive and there are few without multiple corporate sponsors. This will doubtless not change in the US under the upcoming Republican government; and it may also spread abroad.

The end of American hegemony and the soft power associated with it might be welcomed by many. It’s not as though European weariness towards the US hadn’t been visible before; the anti-TTIP movement wasn’t always just about trade. But if we do see this soft power dismantled, is there someone ready to fill in the role that the US had played? Asking for a new hegemonic rule is a tall order. Plenty of Europeans would like the EU to fill that role, but this doesn’t currently seem seriously feasible given the current state of politics on the continent. The EU has plenty of tools and expertise at its disposal and the rolling back of US involvement in Europe could be a huge opportunity for the Union and Member States alike. But this would necessitate serious reorientation of vision and solidarity within the EU. Until we get there, a welcome first step would be for Europeans to start adjusting to the practical reality of a Trump presidency, despite the surreality of it which until now might have been easy to laugh at. Just as many Americans are wishing they had done, before it was too late.