The developments of recent years, from EU climate policies to Joe Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, bear witness to the influence of the Green New Deal agenda, even if many of its original proposals have been watered down. Now, as climate action gets caught up in the struggle for geopolitical supremacy and threatened by the MAGA counter-revolution, can greens and progressives regain the initiative?

In the first few days of his second administration, US President Donald Trump explicitly ordered an end to the Green New Deal. The slogan, which had been at the centre of progressive and environmentalist politics for the past five years, has been denigrated as “ridiculous” and “wasteful”. Viewed through the climate denial lens of the new US government, the Green New Deal has become the symbol of all that it seeks to dismantle.

The paradox, as Frida Garza and Kate Yode argued, is that Trump’s war on the Green New Deal is fought against an enemy that does not exist. The Biden administration did not pass any Green New Deal legislation, although it did develop the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), an ambitious package of measures inspired by Green New Deal proposals, supported and campaigned for by US climate movements, and championed by the left wing of the Democratic Party. The IRA is what Trump’s executive order actually suspended.

While it was undoubtedly the most far-reaching package introduced by the Biden administration, the IRA was a far cry from the original programme of the Green New Deal, when its moniker became fashionable at the end of 2018. Over the course of 2023 and 2024, environmentalists seeking radical change became more ambivalent towards the Green New Deal. While it brought historic breakthroughs, it also had its limitations.

This process might be described by Gramsci as a “passive revolution”, in which only time can dictate whether we in the environmental movement lost by winning or won by losing. Many of our demands and arguments were taken on board by Western governments and their legislative agendas. Some governments were already pushing through tangible changes with few precedents. However, this was at the cost of lowering the original ambition and softening the more transformative edges of the project.

In the shadow of Trump’s MAGA movement, the Green New Deal can probably be seen more as a positive defeat than as a flawed victory. Defeat is still positive, because it is not without the capacity for reaction. The very fact that Trump has declared war on what was but a rehearsal of what the Green New Deal could become is proof of the political potency of the idea. Moreover, some key proposals of the Green New Deal persist in the new race for industrial competitiveness between trading blocs, such as the importance that the “Draghi report” attaches to the overall electrification of Europe.

The very fact that Trump has declared war on what was but a rehearsal of what the Green New Deal could become is proof of the political potency of the idea.

In short, the European political class needs to incorporate elements of the Green New Deal to continue to stay in power. This offers the opportunity for environmentalism and the left to tilt the process towards a just and ambitious transition.

What we do not know is whether the original signifier of the Green New Deal can survive the new world in which it finds itself. Perhaps the environmentalism of the second half of the 2020s needs to find a new formula to unify its collective enthusiasm, and even a new name to summon forces for the political battle to come. In terms of the message, we may be at a turning point, but the general strategic direction that the Green New Deal pointed towards is still the right one: a combination of environmentalism, prosperity, and redistribution through a return of the state to make the ecological transition rapid, just, and desirable.

In terms of our programme and our ideas, the current impasse is a political turning point. It forces us to make tactical adjustments to update the spirit of the Green New Deal for much more hostile times.

Post-neoliberalism with climate at its heart

According to Thomas Meaney, in rhetorical terms, the story of the Green New Deal is one of genuine success. Less than fifteen years after the popularisation of the concept in some British and American opinion columns and think tankreports, the entirety of Western left public opinion has embraced it.

In its essence, the Green New Deal is an umbrella that brings together various political themes, led by a strong state interested in economic intervention to accelerate the transition to a decarbonised society with social justice at its heart. In other words, the greening of the economy should at all times be accompanied by a process of wealth redistribution, which would make it possible to overcome the most harmful social effects of the neoliberal era.

The Green New Deal was fed intellectually by an environmentalism revitalised by growing climate impacts, the shock after Trump’s first term in office, and a political current critical of neoliberal globalisation and advocating the role of the state in economic development and industrial policy, among others. This economic theory, born of neo-Keynesianism, which attempted to respond to the banking crisis of 2008, joined the youth climate protests of 2019 (which found their expression in the excellent result of the Greens in the European Parliament elections that year) and growing scientific alarm at the worsening of the climate crisis, as well as the revolution in renewable technology after the Paris Agreement, to form the Green New Deal.

Since then, the Green New Deal has been a contested idea from different ideological perspectives, from a liberal centrism sensitive to climate impacts, to pragmatic eco-socialism, to anti-capitalism.

The Green New Deal in Spain

The idea of an ecological transition with social justice at its heart was not new in Spain, where similar proposals existed from the 1990s onwards, both in environmentalism and post-communism and in the first “100% renewables” reports by Greenpeace. Even the left-wing political party Podemos presented a massive plan for investment in renewable energies in 2015, designed by American economist Robert Pollin, one of the ideological drivers of the Green New Deal. But if the brief history of the Green New Deal in Spain shows anything, it is that for an idea to be politically successful, it must not only be attractive but also have “a moment”. This propitious moment came in the run-up to the green wave in 2019.

It was PSOE, the traditional centre-left party in Spain, that had a better understanding of the green wave to come. In June 2018, after coming to power in the first successful censure motion in the country’s history, Pedro Sánchez appointed Teresa Ribera as Minister for Ecological Transition. This new ministerial appointment was much more than a change of name, as the former Ministry for the Environment now had control of areas like energy. At this time, activists from the Contra el diluvio (“Against the flood”) collective introduced the Green New Deal proposal into Spanish environmental movements, which were strongly marked by a libertarian tradition, with little or no interest in wielding power, anti-consumerist ideas, and a strong distrust of renewable energies.

For an idea to be politically successful, it must not only be attractive but also have ‘a moment’.

A year later, the PSOE included a Green New Deal in its manifesto, albeit not at its centre. Meanwhile, to the left of the PSOE, the idea of putting together a Spanish Green New Deal influenced the formation of two new spaces: Más Madrid, which had a notable regional presence and led the left-wing opposition in Madrid, and Más País. The latter would run in alliance with the Green party Equo in the elections, making the Green New Deal just transition the backbone of its political programme.

2019-2022: Popularising the Green New Deal

While we can take no credit for its rise, as the mass climate mobilisation played the central role and we were only a small part of it, the idea of an energy transition became the defining political ground in 2019. In Spain, administrations of all kinds declared a climate emergency: from city councils as important as Barcelona’s to the Spanish government, whose Ministry of Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenge did so in 2020.

However, the great innovation of the Green New Deal in 2019 was the way it inspired the main thrust of the European Union’s thirty-year economic and technological development strategy, which took shape in the adoption of the European Green Deal. This was reinforced by a series of political turning points, some desired and others in the form of unforeseen shocks, including the Covid-19 pandemic, newfound Chinese impetus on the climate, the end of climate denialism represented by the Trump administration, and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Although the pandemic brought the climate protests of the previous year to a screeching halt when it was on an upward curve rarely seen in the history of social movements, it also cemented the theoretical ruin of neoliberalism. It tested the fragility of our economies and health systems after four decades of offshoring and a decade of sociopathic austerity. The result of all this was that the return of the state (both at the national and EU level, the EU being an institution with a tendency towards statehood) was moving from theory to implementation. And it did so by directing huge volumes of European investment towards the ecological transition, as was the case with the NextGenerationEU funds.

Although the pandemic brought the climate protests of the previous year to a screeching halt, it also cemented the theoretical ruin of neoliberalism.

In September of the same year, to everyone’s surprise, Xi Jinping announced at the UN General Assembly the goal of Chinese carbon neutrality by 2060 and of peaking emissions by 2030 – an insufficient but incredibly important commitment to ensure a climate-safe future for humanity. As it turned out, the announcement was far from a rhetorical gimmick: by 2022, China was already investing 70 per cent more in its energy transition than the EU and the US combined, despite having a GDP comparable to each of them separately.

Biden’s victory over Trump in late 2020 marked the end of the first explicitly denialist administration in US history. With its successes and failures – and its climate failures did exist, such as the opening of oil wells in Alaska, or new gas pipeline concessions – so-called Bidenomics was undoubtedly influenced in many respects by the economic agenda of the Green New Deal that the Democratic left of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Bernie Sanders had brought to the fore in previous years. Anyone who has followed American politics cannot miss the common thread that links Bernie Sanders’ Green New Deal, Biden’s Build Back Better proposal, and the Inflation Reduction Act finally passed by Congress in the summer of 2022. Although far from Sanders’ ideas, the IRA was the most ambitious green industrial policy tool in US history.

Finally, the violation of the international order that was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 taught Europeans, still heavily dependent on Russian gas, that decarbonisation was no longer just a matter of environmental or economic necessity, but also an existential security imperative.

Social democracy in wartime

Russia’s war on Ukraine threw environmentalism and the Left back into a historical pattern that is very difficult for our democratic, pacifist, and multilateralist political traditions to accept: the most powerful motivation for industrial activity and coordination, historically speaking, has always been a military one. World War I did more to show the effectiveness of economic planning than decades of theorising. World War II did more to end economic crisis and stagnation in the United States than years of the New Deal had. There is nothing like a war to discipline a sufficient critical mass of economic interests and convince them, by hook or by crook, to cooperate in the pursuit of certain state-set objectives.

National security and geopolitical supremacy are the ultima ratio available to nation-states, their last ace in the hole to overcome self-imposed constraints in the form of institutional designs and international agreements that prioritise the interests of so-called markets and the accumulation, flow, and profitability of capital. The invasion of Ukraine transformed timid post-neoliberal steps that reacted to climate change and the pandemic into a kind of wartime social democracy in which geopolitical conflict underpinned a drive for national or EU reindustrialisation, energy independence, and fiscal redistribution.

While the advances of the Green New Deal project were worth celebrating, the overall context of progression towards militarism and geopolitical conflict was not. That is why we speak of a flawed victory or a positive defeat. The essential question posed by the co-opting of the Green New Deal is therefore particularly perverse: the high point of the project coincides with the exhaustion of the social forces driving it, and its transformation (run down and distorted) into a programme of modernisation of capital and raison d’état.

The dilemma for the Left and environmental movements at these crossroads, therefore, lies in deciding whether their stance should be that of a precarious “in and against”, to enhance the elements of social justice and climate stabilisation and neutralise the worst bellicose and securitarian impulses, or whether on the contrary the inevitable drift of the project is already one of military confrontation, which must be critiqued sharply from the “outside”. Neither of these two options is easy or costless, because the dangers of military confrontation are as real as those of the climate crisis.

Is the Green New Deal irreversible?

In an essay from almost two years ago, we closed by questioning the relative irreversibility of the Green New Deal and identifying five challenges for its future success:

The first was technical, and had to do with solving problems of energy storage, industrial electrification, and circular use of materials.

The second was ideological: integrating eco-socialist criticisms into the discourse and avoiding a transition focused on growth.

The third challenge was institutional, and was aboutrebuilding state planning and management capabilities after decades of outsourcing and austerity.

Then there was the discursive challenge of framing the ecological transition as a source of security in the face of climate change and social crisis, but also as a positive destination, to counter the passion driving the far right.

Finally, there was the political challenge of fostering public majorities in favour of the Green New Deal, despite societal climate fatigue and local resistance in the anti-renewable movement.

Two years later, it seems that the greatest of these challenges is still the political one. Paradoxically, the relative irreversibility of aspects of the Green New Deal, such as the decarbonisation of the electricity mix, seems much more assured by cheapening renewables, and their spectacular technological development, than by our ability to defend the programme. Curiously, as environmentalists who have always emphasised the political rather than technical nature of the ecological transition, we have been more reassured by certain market achievements, technological development, or China’s climate commitments, than by our own political strength, where we have been more modest than we should be.

We have been more reassured by certain market achievements, technological development, or China’s climate commitments, than by our own political strength,

Regaining the initiative, learning to play the political game imposed by the rise of the far right, and unleashing climate counter-revolution across the West are our most immediate tasks. In this context, perhaps the term “Green New Deal” needs to be renewed. Or perhaps it does not. But its fundamental idea remains valid.

Spain is a case in point. It is no coincidence that the only European country where the Left governs has strong economic growth underpinned by a rapid deployment of renewables, and a reduction in inequality thanks to an increase in the minimum wage and the first progressive labour reform in forty years. It is also no coincidence that Teresa Ribera is First Vice-President of the European Commission.

We know that economic growth is a structurally problematic model, which we must overcome with a post-growth vision. We know that Spain continues to suffer from social injustices, such as the housing crisis. But we suspect that, if in the midst of the reactionary tsunami sweeping the West, Spain is a kind of oasis, it is because it has found a formula that closely resembles the one the Green New Deal always sought. And if that formula is still fragile, it is because it has been applied too softly.

This text is the revised and condensed version of a long analysis of the history and future of the Green New Deal and what it means for environmentalism. The original essay, “¿Amarga victoria o dulce derrota?” was written at the end of 2023 and first published in the book Green New Deal ¿Un programa ecosocial para Chile?. An updated version of that text was published one year later in the journal Corriente Cálida. The underlying assumption of the original piece is still valid. However, its emphasis might need to be rethought in light of Trump’s climate counter-revolution.

Translated by Albie Mills | Voxeurop

This will come as no surprise to my more attentive readers. Over the last months, I have been sketching out a theory of mobilisation and change around the idea that a green and progressive programme should contain positive visions of a desirable world, and concrete examples of the steps needed to get there – the “objects of political desire” of the title. I have done so mainly in contrast to the technocratic model of political action that has been dominant in recent decades, at least in Europe.

However, my proposal is not the only alternative to the technocratic model. So while my rejection of obstructionism as a strategy for Greens and progressives might be obvious from the outset, I want to explain how I get there.

There is no denying that the Green movement achieved major tactical successes in its early days by obstructing the construction and deployment of things, from nuclear power plants to ballistic missiles. It is both easier and faster to bring people together in opposition to something than to get them to agree on any detailed policy or proposal. Furthermore, if successfully obstructing a project or plan counts as a political victory for a movement, one may conclude that obstructionism is a sustainable tactic in the long term.

The initial question, however, was whether obstructionism would be a better strategy – not just a tactic – for Greens and progressives than trying to mobilise people through a vision for a better future. A tactic is the planning of actions needed to achieve a short-term goal, whereas a strategy is an overarching vision that animates a movement and allows it to further its ideals, values, and principles in the world. Tactics need to be varied, as what works in a given setting may not work in another, and the multiplicity of events demands different attitudes and responses in each case anyway: it is different to organise a local movement against the building of an urban motorway, for instance, than to do the same in favour of an urban park.

It is both easier and faster to bring people together in opposition to something than to get them to agree on any detailed policy or proposal.

A strategic choice, on the other hand, concerns the very nature and identity of a movement. The Green movement may have initially come to the attention of the media and the masses with acts of obstructionism, but political ecology was born in defence of a future – harmonious, sustainable, peaceful, and based on solidarity – to be built together. The famous “four pillars” at the basis of so many Green parties during this last half-century – environmental sustainability, social justice, grassroots democracy, and international peace and human rights – illustrate how Green politics has been conceived from the start as constructive rather than obstructionist. If we elevate obstructionism from a mere tactic to the strategic core of green politics, we risk creating an opposition between what we are and what we do, and we will be defined more by what we oppose than by what we propose.

Obstructionism is sometimes presented as a necessity rather than a choice, on the basis of the realisation that everything else has not worked. But such defeatism should be rejected: from a long-term perspective, the Green movement has been an incredible success story. Most green ideas and arguments have gone mainstream and have been widely accepted by the majority – and for good reason.

Concerns about sustainability are today much more widespread than in the past, although they have yet to be universally incorporated into policy and economic decisions. Even the most formidable danger we face, climate change, is a debate that we have won in the public square with empirical data, scientific arguments, and a degree of social mobilisation that is incommensurable in scale and nature with the first tactic gains of the 1970s and 1980s.

This does not mean that we have “won” the challenge of climate change, but that from the standpoint of public opinion and civic engagement, this is a debate that is ours to lose, and that we will only lose if we alienate people by thinking that obstructionist tactics could replace a constructive strategy.

Some ten years ago, Greens in Europe launched the Green New Deal as a plan to respond to the twin threats of the financial and climate crisis. A twenty-first-century iteration of Roosevelt’s New Deal adapted to the ecological demands of our time, the Green New Deal was a huge political success, to the point that other political families (such as progressives in the US) and institutions (such as the EU Commission) tried to recreate that success by devising “Green Deals” of their own. In the EU’s case, the social and “just transition” planks of the original proposal were largely left behind.

From a long-term perspective, the Green movement has been an incredible success story. Most green ideas and arguments have gone mainstream and have been widely accepted by the majority – and for good reason.

That, however, should have prompted the Greens to come back to the public offering what they could have legitimately called the “real deal”. Instead, a certain fatigue took over; some in the Green movement have responded to the fact that the plan has not been adopted in full or that it has not been instantaneously effective with a mix of doomerism and despondency.

In these moments, the importance of prioritising concrete improvements in people’s lives cannot be overstated. It’s in times of doubt and hesitancy that showcasing the immediate, positive impacts of sustainability measures becomes crucial in bolstering the momentum of the green agenda while answering to the reactionaries’ stoking of public fears that climate policies are going too far or are too hard for the people to sustain.

This is a lesson that Green parties assimilated from their early history, and that remains valuable for both the Green movement and environmental activists today. Early on, Green politicians realised that following initial tactical successes, people shifted their focus from what they wanted to prevent to what they hoped to achieve. This a political responsibility that we should still welcome and cherish. It means that people are looking up to the Greens to come up with solutions to be applied in practice. Finding a way out of a crisis and being able to explain what it consists of is one of the best remedies – and possibly the only one – to the fears that reactionaries and authoritarians fuel in public opinion.

In a time of multiple, interwoven, and seemingly unsolvable crises, it is only natural to be anxious about the current state of the world. But we shouldn’t let anxiety lead us to believe that we have achieved nothing of worth so far, or that our current situation is desperate.

Individually as well as collectively, the best way to understand and control our anxiety is to review all that we have done and achieved, understand how it has worked among the public, trust the strength of our arguments, and use them as building blocks of a desirable future that will make our present not only more endurable but even enjoyable.

Let others be the movement of fear and gloom. Let us fight in a way that will make people want to join us.

In recent years, the EU has turned crises into opportunities to advance its green agenda. But when it comes to the energy transition, overcoming internal divisions between member states is not enough: the Green Deal cannot succeed without a strong external dimension. Nathalie Tocci explains how the EU should lead the global fight against climate change. 

Edouard Gaudot: In your book A Green and Global Europe, you argue that the EU is a global leader thanks to its climate ambitions and policies. What kind of leadership does this represent?  

Nathalie Tocci: The EU has gone through almost two decades of existential crisis, starting with the rejection of the constitutional treaty in 2005, then the Eurozone crisis, migration, Brexit, the pandemic, and now the war in Ukraine. Because of the magnitude of these crises, it has at times faced the prospect of collapse. But whereas in the first of these shocks, the EU had both lost itself and the ability to transform them into opportunities, that dynamic changed with the pandemic and now with the war. The EU has used these more recent crises to advance its integration journey in ways that are intimately connected to the green agenda. 

The Next Generation EU funds were coloured in green and added real substance to the European Green Deal. A similar argument can be made for the war – and it wasn’t obvious. There was a risk that energy security could have been interpreted exclusively in brown terms. But more than one year on, it’s safe to conclude that this hasn’t happened, and investment in renewables has accelerated. 

The EU desperately needed a new narrative, a new vision, a new way of understanding itself and reconnecting with citizens, especially younger generations. Recreating a new growth model not only based on restrictions and rules but associated with a constructive, productive, forward-looking agenda was a way to do that. 

So the EU’s internal constitution is my starting point. What does it have to do with external leadership? The EU has long been considered a climate leader, but the climate was never really at the heart of the international or domestic political agendas. Now all of a sudden, climate and the energy transition are at the centre not only of EU but also domestic politics. International relations are getting far more politicised and even polarised. In some respects, I consider it good news, because it means that now the green transition becomes real: choices and tradeoffs to make, winners and losers emerge, and inevitably it becomes a much tougher game. This is the challenge for the EU: reinventing what external leadership means – the tools of climate diplomacy of the 1990s and the 2000s won’t do – while it puts climate and the transition at the core of its internal story. 

And who leads the EU? The Council, the Parliament, member states? 

The simple answer would be the Commission and President Von der Leyen. The Commission did not do particularly well in the earlier succession of crises. Its leadership was weak, with the Council and in particular the European Council at the forefront. Since the pandemic, the Commission (and especially its President Ursula Von der Leyen) has done a remarkable job in becoming the face, in “Kissingerian” terms, of EU leadership. 

As for member states, one would have expected Germany to be a prominent leader, especially with the Greens as part of the government coalition. But so far this hasn’t happened, at least not the way we expected, because the coalition struggles to project a strong identity. In the recent turmoil about combustion engines and e-fuels, for instance, Germany objected to green measures and stroke shady bilateral deals with the Commission. In this respect, Germany has been punching below its weight.  

We should think of the transition as something that almost resembles a revolution.

France is interesting. Second in line in the EU executive branch, in terms of prominence, you find Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton. The other commissioners, including Vice-President Frans Timmermans, are somewhat less convincing. I believe this reflects the fact that industrial policies are in vogue worldwide. France has become one of the pivots because it has always pushed for industrial policy and a greater role for the state. Its success on the nuclear agenda is a sign of that too. 

How can the EU overcome the tensions between its member states? Whether it’s Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic on coal, Germany and Italy on cars, or the rising cost of energy for citizens, there are many issues that make internal leadership difficult. Is a narrative going to be enough? 

We should think of the transition as something that almost resembles a revolution. Revolutions produce winners and losers – the main question is how to compensate the losers. Because if you don’t, the resistance to change risks becoming insurmountable. 

There are different ways to make the transition desirable for the many, but part of it always has to do with compromise, and the rest with money. Compromise is necessary if you want to bring everyone along, and this is what happened on combustion engines until someone tried to derail the process. Funding is a key aspect too, and this is why the EU has a Just Transition fund, the European Social Fund, and wants to use the revenues from the Emissions Trading System and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.  

The sums we’re talking about may not be anywhere near what is needed. In the last year and a half, European countries (including Norway and the United Kingdom) spent 800 billion euros on utility bills to mitigate the energy crisis. This is the same amount Next Generation EU will spend over seven years, and only 40% of it is aimed at climate. When a crisis hits, governments have to find the money somehow, so we need to convince them to put their money where it is needed – before it’s too late. 

China’s share in the solar panel industry is about 80 per cent and the US’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has caused panic in the EU. Is Europe a credible green leader? Are its industrial ambitions feasible? 

The EU can’t be a climate leader in the way it used to be in the past. It must reinvent its claim. The IRA has very significant limits, especially if you look at it through the lens of climate and the transition. As a piece of legislation, it is primarily aimed at China and only secondarily at climate.  

Moreover, unlike in Europe, the green transition is extremely controversial politically in the United States. The only reason the IRA has taken this shape, form and magnitude was to get Democrats and Republicans to agree on something. But how sustainable is it to address the climate question only through funding? How many 400-billion-dollar packages can you pass in the long term? It is more reasonable to bet on a mix of funding regulation and carbon pricing. In this respect, the EU’s approach is more sustainable. 

The European Green Deal was never about China – it is about the transition. However, it needs now to develop its external aspect. The question is how to reinvent external climate leadership, given that the world – even if we just think about the relationship between the US and China – has changed fundamentally. 

Globally, tensions are growing around critical resources and the raw materials essential for the energy transition. In this regard, there are ambivalences in the way the EU treats its neighbours. Isn’t there a risk that external climate leadership resembles classic resource-based neo-colonialism? 

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, all of the EU’s attention has been focused on weaning itself off Russian fossil fuels. But we’ve ended up in the same position we were in when we were vaccine hoarding during the pandemic. Gas hoarding made gas prices and overall prices shoot up, not just for the EU but for the whole world. So the response to the war and the energy crisis wasn’t all green, it was also brown and expensive.  

So leadership shouldn’t mean that everyone becomes like the EU. The point is to understand that the transition can take different paces and forms.

I’ve been on the board of [Italy’s energy giant] ENI as an independent non-executive member over the last three years. It’s been quite interesting to see the way in which Italy turned from Russia to Algeria for its gas. It was not additional production, so the Algerian gas was taken away from another client. In exchange for depriving Algeria’s local market of its gas, Italy gave it new investments in energy efficiency, renewables, carbon capture and storage. In doing so, we may construct a rebound partnership with the countries in the neighbourhood by inserting in them an energy transition. In non-OECD countries, big investments in renewables have not taken place because the return of an investment in renewables is much lower compared to fossil fuels.  

So there is a real potential in these countries to start inserting green investments as part of a broader partnership away from brown energy. Ideally, what should happen over time is that the green component of the energy mix grows to the point that the brown one is no longer needed. EU institutions should lead this process, not just count on private companies. It requires a policy framework that can induce the private sector to follow.  

If I follow your reasoning, claiming to be a leader requires that you have an idea of where to go. Europe is a rich continent whose economy is stagnating, its population shrinking, and its colonial past brings the suspicion of neo-colonialism to every trade deal it negotiates. Why should Europe aspire to lead anyone, especially in the face of new narratives heralded by China or perhaps the BRICs? 

The EU accounts for under 8 per cent of global emissions. If it were to become fully green while the rest of the world is brown, it would achieve exactly zero – well, 8 per cent, which is not great. This is the obvious first reason why the EU has an interest in leading. A European mission towards a green society only makes sense in the broader global context. Secondly, there has been a lot of talk about “decoupling”, mainly understood as the US and China reducing their economic interdependence. But decoupling green and brown economies carries a risk of higher costs for everyone along the global value chains. 

So leadership shouldn’t mean that everyone becomes like the EU – and this is not easy for Europeans. The point is to understand that the transition can take different paces and forms. In the process, we find out how we can contribute to others’ journeys. The eventual destination is the same, but the routes will be different. This must be a co-development exercise. What Europe can’t do is say to Chile, for example, “We really like your physical minerals. But it’s not possible in the context of our FTA that you protect your domestic industry in order to develop storage and battery capacity.” If it keeps that kind of mentality, the EU will end up in yet another form of extractivism and colonialism. On the contrary, as it makes industrial policy part of the core of what it does, the EU has to support industries in partner countries to help them develop their own features, and move up the value chain in terms of technology and industry. 

This conversation is part of a series of essays and interviews dedicated to the crisis of political leadership and the alternatives Green thinking has to offer. Read all contributions here.

In the aftermath of another close general election, Bulgaria’s commitment to the European Green Deal is on the line. Key political players support reversing the country’s coal phaseout and the way forward is unclear.

In January, the Bulgarian Parliament adopted a resolution requiring the government to submit an important modification of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan. Instead of working towards achieving its commitment to cut the CO2 emissions from electricity by 40 per cent by 2025 (comparing to the 2019 levels), the government will try to renegotiate the national targets. The reason behind it is the ambition to extend the operation Maritza Iztok coal power plants up to 2038.

The resolution was endorsed by the MPs under the pressure of significant social movements. Thousands of coal miners and energy workers protested in front of the Parliament ahead of the vote. In total, 20,000 people will lose their jobs as a result of the closure of the coal plants. Most of these people live in the central Bulgarian city of Stara Zagora (7319), as well as the cities of Radnevo (3347), Galabovo (1717), Nova Zagora (1188), and others. The average age of the workers is 45 years old and 27 per cent of them hold a university degree. 

Many experts are concerned that the closure of the coal industry in Stara Zagora will imply a deep social crisis. The coal industry generates local tax revenues that help to support crucial sectors such as social services and education. Their closure will also dramatically affect the demographic characteristics of the region. Most families will prefer to search for jobs in Sofia or abroad. The closure of the power plants will affect the entire Bulgarian economy. The estimated rise in energy prices will be around 35-40 per cent.

Bulgaria was among the last European Union member states to submits its Recovery and Resilience plans and will be among the first ones to request an amendment. The total amount of the support allocated to Bulgaria is 6.3 billion euros in grants. If the amendment is approved by the European Commission, the country will lose significant funding.

Unending political crisis

The decision to push back the coal phaseout was taken in the context of Bulgaria’s deep political crisis. Bulgaria has been in a cycle of recurrent parliamentary elections (four in a row) during the last two years. Bulgaria is currently governed by a technical government.

The attempt to extend the life of coal plants is inseparable from the political insecurity of national political players trying to prepare their re-election during the next vote. The energy crisis, job losses and the role of Russia as a key energy supplier have made energy and the coal plants a central part of the electoral campaign. The vote is scheduled for 2 April. All the key political players support their extension.

The two coalitions leading the polls for the elections GERB-SDS (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria  and the Union of Democratic Forces) and PP-DB (We Continue the Change and Democratic Bulgaria, which includes the Greens) supporting the extension of the life of the coal power plants. Their leaders and former Prime Ministers Boyko Borissov (GERB – SDS) and Kiril Petkov (PP-DP) are even fighting over who promised that the plants who be closed. Both now support the re-negotiation of the deadline for closure. At the same time, the Bulgaria Socialist Party and the pro-Russian nationalist party Varzrajdane also favour the extension.

The energy crisis, job losses and the role of Russia as a key energy supplier have made energy and the coal plants a central part of the electoral campaign.

A difficult but necessary transition

Bulgaria’s Recovery and Resilience Plan devotes 59 per cent of its total allocation on measures relevant to EUs climate objectives. Among them is setting out a framework for the coal phase-out, now under threat.

Crucial investments are planned to accelerate the decarbonisation of the energy sector, increasing power generation from renewables by 300 per cent by 2026, constructing large electricity storage capacities, and cutting greenhouse gas emissions of the power sector by 40 per cent by 2025. The plan also includes help for energy-efficiency renovation of the building stock and promotes sustainable transport. Important steps are envisaged in the field of water management and biodiversity conservation and restoration.

The possible U-turn is even more problematic in the light of Bulgaria’s general approach of the country to the CO₂reduction targets. The Bulgarian National Energy and Climate Plan  2021-2030 is based on a “Walk now, Sprint later” approach. The plan does not offer a strong foundation for a transformational policy roadmap until 2050. It relies on assets in coal and natural gas. Both of which have a projected 18 per cent share in the total energy mix projections for 2030. In addition, it prioritises megaprojects such as Belene Nuclear Power Plant and the Turkish Stream gas pipelines as strategic elements of emissions reduction policy.

Kicking the can

Bulgaria’s political leaders seem leaving the unpopular decarbonisation decisions to future policymakers. Bulgaria has been ruled by a technical government since inconclusive elections in October 2022. Prime Minister Galab Donev was nominated by the President Roumen Radev. The technical government is focused on a day-to-day management without initiating structural reforms. It is a pattern seen throughout the last 10 years.

Since 2014, four out of seven governments were technical. This vacuum has left many crucial issues without a response. According to the polls, the next elections will not help to overcome the crisis. They will not end up with a clear political majority or a new potential viable coalition. PP-DB and GERB-SDS are both polling around 25-26 per cent. The ethnic minority party, Movement for Rights and Freedoms, is polling around 13-14 per cent, just ahead of the nationalist pro-Russia party Vazrajdane. The socialist BSP is somewhere below 10 per cent.

Bulgaria is not an exception in the region. The Polish government was among the main opponents of the adoption of the European Green Deal. The public support for climate policies is weaker across central and eastern Europe in comparison to the rest of the EU. The reasons are sense of lesser historical responsibility, lower economic development, and the structure of most central and eastern Europe countries’ energy mixes. According to a 2020 survey, 73 per cent of people in southern Europe believe that climate change is a “very serious” threat, only 47 per cent share the same opinion in eastern Europe.

Against a background of heightening geopolitical instability and economic uncertainty, the path ahead for Europe looks far from smooth. Green MEP Ernest Urtasun and co-leader of Latvia’s Progresīvie Antoņina Ņenaševa discuss how Europe will need to make decisive choices. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a stark illustration of what is at stake. To ensure we choose the road that leads to a better quality of life, stronger democracy, and solidarity across borders, Green and progressive forces will have to provide both immediate solutions and a vision for a sustainable and just future.

Green European Journal: The world finds itself in a state of multiple crises from the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis to the economic downturn and the environmental disasters occurring around the world. In this “polycrisis”, it sometimes feels as if we are reduced to spectators rather than actors who can shape events. How can we seize this moment to achieve social and political change?

Ernest Urtasun: We are indeed in a moment of huge change that creates many uncertainties. It is important to be able to convince citizens that we can shape this moment and move towards a progressive agenda. This task can only be achieved at the European level. There are two areas in particular where Europe needs to show leadership and deliver. First, the world is entering a very dangerous era, in which the rules-based order created at the end of the Second World War is at stake. The United Nations is extremely weakened and the long-term consequence of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s invasion of Ukraine will be to challenge that rules-based order even further. At the same time, authoritarian regimes everywhere are growing stronger – this is seen most clearly in a strong China and an extremely aggressive Russia. The rules-based order needs to be protected more than ever. The second area where we need to deliver is climate action. Climate change is a source of massive uncertainty for many citizens and Europe needs to respond quickly, coherently, and efficiently.

Antoņina Ņenaševa: Focusing on multiple problems simultaneously is not easy. We are human beings and multitasking is not our most natural condition. We are much more comfortable pinpointing one problem and dealing with it. Over the past 20 years, the increased flow of information has also contributed to a sense of global interdependency. So we now feel that a crisis somewhere else in the world is also our crisis. That is why there is this feeling of uncertainty that affects politics as well as everyone as individuals. What can we do in this situation? I think that we need a clear agenda for the short-term centred on responding to the needs of citizens through income support and global coordination to avoid a generalised crisis. Whereas in the long term, governments need to come up with viable strategies that can tackle our interconnected problems. The Greens are well positioned here because the movement has always connected the fight for the climate to social justice and the struggle for human rights worldwide.

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The rising cost of living is forcing many people into poverty and squeezing the household budgets of much of the middle class. What political risks are coming down the line from declining living standards?

Antoņina Ņenaševa: Inflation is now above 20 per cent in Latvia. For some products, prices have risen by 50 per cent or more. It is a huge increase and it’s very visible: you see and feel it every day in the grocery store. People are feeling the effects and the crisis is very worrying, even if energy prices have not stayed as high as they were and the alarmist political forces who said that Europe was not going to survive the winter appear to be mistaken.

To address the cost of living crisis, global and European coordination is essential. First, countries need to provide relief to low- and medium-income households because for many this crisis is a question of survival. In the long term, Latvia like all European countries needs to be investing in renewables and renovation. The poor condition of our building stock is a huge problem for us as a post-Communist country with many badly insulated apartments and harsh weather conditions. Without renovation, all our energy is essentially spent on heating the streets. The same goes for our public transport system; this crisis is showing why an environmentally sustainable public transit system is both a short-term and a long-term priority. But to maintain the public investment that we need while avoiding currency difficulties, we need that global cooperation.

Ernest Urtasun: Inflation is a phenomenon that throughout history leads to the defeat of governments. It could yet have a terrible impact on our political systems. If you look at the elections since inflation became a problem in Europe, every time a country goes to the polls, the sitting government loses. That is why we need the European Union to develop what I would call a “social shield” that can protect the most vulnerable in society.

In general, we are in the middle of an economic shift. This crisis, along with the two previous ones – in 2008 and the pandemic – have made it clear that leaving everything in the hands of the free market was a bad idea. After years of failed neoliberal policies, the only way to keep our welfare systems functioning and protect our democracies is by massively reinforcing public services and social protections while making sure that the costs of inflation are fairly distributed. The Greens in the European Parliament are calling for windfall taxes on the corporations that have profited in the past year, banning evictions to protect those most in need, and guaranteeing that basic goods on shelves remain affordable. The European Union has taken some positive steps, the windfall tax on energy firms for example, but the progress is very slow on reforming the electricity market, which is the root of Europe’s current problems, as some European governments are dragging their feet.

Our environmental programme is a solution for many of our great societal ills.

Antoņina Ņenaševa

Antoņina Ņenaševa: I agree with what has been said about the political implications of inflation. In the Latvian elections in October, the consequences were clear: two-thirds of the seats went to MPs who had never been elected before and four out of the seven parties in Parliament are new. While part of this development is positive, as the progressive green vision is now finally represented in Parliament, we have also seen the comeback of oligarchs and their shady businesses, as well as wins for other radicals

In Latvia, it feels as if the 1990s are back – which is no good thing. Of course, Latvia gained its independence and built its democracy in the ’90s, but they were also years with many dark sides: a growing shadow economy and powerful players bending the rules. I would like to say that Green and social democratic parties can make progress at the current moment but the political reality is that it is radical and populist forces who benefit most. For the rule of law, it is a major concern.

How can Greens become the political force to whom struggling citizens turn in a moment of crisis?

Ernest Urtasun: I think that we can be the force that provides certainty and optimism to the people if we continue to offer a social and political project for the majority. If we look at recent elections in Italy and Sweden, the main problem was that progressive forces were not capable of offering an attractive societal project. This failure creates space for the far right to step with their societal project. The far right wins by looking to the past and exploiting a sense of nostalgia that can contrast with the uncertainties of the future. This explains Brexit. It explains Trump. And I think it explains Meloni as well. For the Greens, this challenge means looking to the future with optimism, continuing to be ambitious in terms of fighting climate change while strengthening the narrative on social justice.

Antoņina Ņenaševa: The most basic step is talking about the problems and not pretending everything is fine. Many citizens still believe that Green parties are about waste management and nature conservation, so we still have to work on the right narrative that can connect these dots. A crucial and challenging task is also to explain that green solutions are not expensive solutions; that the environmental approach is way cheaper in the long run and will benefit people much more than the status quo.

With the war in Ukraine and the increased focus on our dependence on Russian gas, it should be possible to explain why independence from fossil fuels is crucial for many reasons: to foster social justice, to fight climate change, and to protect human rights. We also need to highlight the need for real energy independence – switching from one dependence to another should not be an option. Not even if it means switching from Russian dependence to American. In the longer term, we need public ownership over strategic sectors such as energy.

Some politicians are reluctant to turn to European solutions because there remains a perceived distance between European countries. The war in Ukraine might feel distant to some; others might think that economic troubles in a different country are not their concern. How can Greens build solidarity across European borders?

Ernest Urtasun: I think it requires a political and cultural change, in the sense that we Europeans need to understand that youth unemployment in Greece is as much a Baltic problem as the threats to the Baltic borders are a Spanish problem. This is the culture that we need to build. And we have progressed on that front: I truly believe that the security concerns that the Baltic countries express are everyone’s concerns at the EU level.

The best way of building a common sense of what one could call the European interest is to constantly try to bring European solutions to different sets of problems. The good news here is that, compared to the Eurozone crisis, the geographical divisions today are much less significant. Previously, some member states were massively affected by the sovereign debt crisis, while others were not. Today, all of Europe faces the problems of a badly designed electricity market, energy shocks, and an unfair tax system. Nevertheless, even though this is not an asymmetric shock, there is still the risk of member states thinking they can play it solo.

Today, there is a major risk of a backlash against the European Green Deal.

Ernest Urtasun

Antoņina Ņenaševa: The war is a huge event that is relevant for all of Europe. For me, this issue is of course very emotional. The war is very close geographically speaking. I have refugees from Ukraine in my home. I have friends and family members who are affected. At the same time, we need to be clear that it is not a unique phenomenon. Europe is facing different kinds of global crises each year, so we will need greater cooperation, strong interdependence with joint policies, and shared responsibilities.

Latvia and the Baltic states have taken on a strong leadership role when it comes to supporting Ukraine. We have emerged as strong geopolitical players that are confronting the vulnerabilities highlighted by Russia’s aggression. What the Baltics have achieved on a regional level is also possible on a pan-European level. After all, preventing war on the European continent and minimising Europe’s vulnerability in the face of global interdependencies are the reasons why the European Union exists.

Many economists are worried that a European and possibly a global recession could be on the way. The European Central Bank and central banks around the world have raised interest rates. Have we learnt the lessons of the previous crisis or do we risk a return to austerity?

Ernest Urtasun: I do not see that risk in the short term. There is a cultural change in economic thought that is weakening the influence of neoliberal ideas in Brussels, the member states, and generally on the international level. The European Union has learned its lesson about austerity. After almost blowing up our common currency, I do not see an immediate return to that idea. But the political battle over the reform of the EU’s fiscal rules has begun and it will have extremely important consequences for the economic policy mix that the members can develop. If the current rules were to be reapplied in 2024, we would indeed enter a new round of austerity everywhere in Europe. However, I do not expect that to happen and I think there will continue to be public support for our economy. At the same time, the decisions of central banks to raise interest rates will make life very difficult for many households and families.

After 2008, the Greens put forward the narrative of the Green New Deal. Ten years on, we can see the influence of that vision. It shaped both the European Green Deal and the Biden agenda even if its social aspects were much diluted. Is there a similarly transformative vision that can answer our current crisis?

Ernest Urtasun: Our Green Deal remains a valid narrative for the coming years. We don’t need to reinvent the wheel. The Green Deal always had two legs: the ecological transition of our economy and decarbonisation and a strong social reform of our economy and our welfare systems. After all, there will not be any transition if we do not manage to secure social cohesion. Today, there is a major risk of a backlash against the European Green Deal. At the European level, the European People’s Party is doing its best to water down legislation linked to the Green Deal. Our role as Greens is to argue for both of these aspects, decarbonisation and the construction of a fair society. The Greens will be there to push the European institutions to keep their ambition.

Antoņina Ņenaševa: I agree, we have to reform and strengthen social protection and act as leaders on questions of inequality, combining this with our climate policies and the central place of human rights in our political narrative. This point leads me back to the notion of connecting our key topics, as the problems we face are increasingly interconnected. Climate change is creating ever greater inequalities. Fossil fuel extraction drives many human rights violations. Ukraine’s loss would be a loss for all of Europe. In these ways, our environmental programme is a solution for many of our great societal ills. We need to make this clear to the people with a vision both locally and at the European level. The Russian invasion is so vivid that we have to keep emphasising it in our narratives and explain what a non-democratic, fossil-driven system of governance and society leads to.

With the world still reeling from the pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 unleashed a new level of suffering and horror. Not only is its human cost incalculable, with the people of Ukraine the first victims, the war has deepened the global energy and food crises, though both precede the invasion. The disasters keep on coming and even the weather has taken on a new, menacing role. The droughts and floods in Europe and many world regions are reminders of the dangers of a changing climate. Combined with an economic system that allows an outsized role for financial speculation, the collision of these events has forced the cost of living upwards across Europe and the world. The effects have proved cumulative, tipping economies into generalised inflation that risks becoming recession.

A break with 30-year trends, the return of inflation to European economies has plunged many people into poverty and put pressure on household budgets for much of the middle class. Driven in particular by energy and therefore also transport prices, the distributional effects of the rising cost of living reignite the conflicts most visibly expressed by the gilets jaunes movement in recent years. Will the poorest have to pay the price for Europe’s energy transition? These stresses are all the more acute considering that life has become increasingly insecure in recent years, with soaring rents in major cities and the hardships that many people, especially the young, experienced throughout the pandemic.

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More than a simple monetary phenomenon, price rises contribute to an uncertainty that pervades people’s outlook on the future. Sri Lanka was the canary in the coal mine. In July, protestors driven to revolt by unaffordable fuel prices stormed the presidential palace. A photo of a face-masked protestor, waving a loaf of bread and standing before flames lit outside a government building, encapsulated the mood. European countries may be rich enough to shield much of their societies from the full extent of these shocks – at a cost for the rest of world – but even with this support many people cannot meet their basic needs. In this context, a sense of impoverishment can prove politically toxic. In September 2022, far-right parties were the main winners of the Italian and Swedish elections, tapping into widespread dissatisfaction with promises of hard borders, energy security, and a firm hand.

Explaining the economic situation comes with political stakes. A focus on inflation leads you down the road that central banks are already taking: raising interest rates and thereby risking the jobs of some for the purchasing power of the majority. On the other hand, a framing based on the “cost of living” politicises inflation, pointing to how rising prices undermine access to essentials such as food, housing, transport, and energy. Nevertheless, talking about the cost of living still implies that access to these essential rights should be a matter of budget balancing for households.

Who do people turn to in such times? The classic conservative answer is to tighten our belts until the economic situation improves. Whereas for the traditional Left, fighting falling living standards is a simple matter of pay packets and redistribution. On the extremes, far-right and populist forces are always present to offer easy answers to whoever will listen (helping Ukraine is too expensive; blame the migrants).

Green politics has always sought to be radical – in the literal sense – understanding and tackling problems at their roots. This summer, French president Emmanuel Macron proclaimed the “end of abundance”, seeing our confluence of crises as signs of coming scarcity. For some ecologists, his analysis rang true. Indeed, the current economic turmoil cannot be explained without factoring in resource constraints, unpredictable climatic conditions, and disrupted global flows. In short, planetary boundaries. But what the diagnosis fails to offer is the emancipatory vision that has always been at the heart of green politics. For Greens, achieving social justice and ecological sustainability relies on defining new approaches to prosperity.

The long-awaited social core of the Green New Deal is more urgent than ever.

Amid a cost of living crisis, the Greens should not bring a message of austerity and hard times ahead but stand up for social protection and redistribution, as well as asserting the possibility of providing for our needs differently. For public services, think of the rail fares slashed in many countries. For households and businesses, subsidies provided to renovate and save energy just when people need it most. At the level of communities, those renewable energy cooperatives supplying cheap electricity in decentralised and democratic ways. From precarious individuals depending on vulnerable systems over which they have no control, the Greens can reclaim rights and protect living standards by building shared institutions based on resilience and abundance.

Throughout history, social rights have often been extended in times of war. Europe’s firm solidarity with Ukraine is now driving the continent’s efforts to break free from fossil fuels. This transformation cannot succeed without deepened solidarity within and between European societies. More than temporary relief, they need a new direction. After 2008, the call for a Green New Deal was not immediately taken up. But it went on to inspire an investment-led approach that continues to shape the green transition in Europe and the United States. The long-awaited social core of the Green New Deal is more urgent than ever. In driving this point home, the Greens can take up that leadership role once more. Investment in the common good and the green transition go hand in hand. Europe’s future hinges on radical solutions to uncertain times.

With the social question burning, parties across Europe are striving to respond to the urgent needs of citizens. The task brings what are at once challenges and opportunities for Green parties. Whether in power or opposition and across levels of government, the first is the window to force through change with speed and urgency. The same logic may require compromise on red lines, as the extension of nuclear power plants in some countries speaks to. But the current moment is a chance to make leaps towards establishing new solidarity mechanisms and social rights while accelerating public investment in the green transition. It is a matter of finding the openings and seizing the moment. Relationships with other forces and allies are a second challenge. Trade unions and climate activists have pivoted to new forms of militancy. Green parties will have to navigate and channel the demands of these constituencies to achieve their own objectives, thus entering a more conflictual terrain. A third challenge is to be the political force that connects the levels of European politics and builds a real sense of European solidarity between societies. The social agenda at the European level has gained renewed momentum but its success rests on national support. The capacity of local, national, and European authorities to respond to social challenges also depends on effective cooperation across borders. Coordination is the only way to manage the tensions and imbalances between European member states. If the Greens do not do it, then who will?

While the European Green Deal is setting the environmental regulations that Europe’s green transition needs in stone, its social dimension is patchy and weak. With a difficult winter ahead, Bela Galgóczi of the European Trade Union Institute argues that Europe’s social challenges are more urgent than ever.

This article is published in cooperation with Das Progressive Zentrum. The Green European Journal is a media partner for the Progressive Governance Summit organised in Berlin on 13 October 2022.

The European Green Deal is clearly ambitious. The transition to a net-zero-carbon economy by 2050 will mean the fundamental revision of our linear, extractive and fossil fuel-based growth model. It will have major effects on jobs and livelihoods, working conditions, and skills. And the European Climate Law has set a binding interim target of 2030 for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 per cent (compared to 1990 levels).

The Commission has declared from the outset that these ambitious climate and environmental policy objectives should be backed by comprehensive social policies – nobody should be left behind. But is this really the case?

On the one hand, the Fit for 55 climate policy package announced by the European Commission in 2021 dissolved doubts that the Green Deal would amount to little more than ambitious objectives followed by no concrete action. On the other hand, it also brought the transition’s severe social and employment impacts in sharp relief.

In just one year, the Commission tabled over a dozen legislative proposals for measures to achieve the binding climate targets laid down in the European Climate Law. Existing legal instruments such as the Emissions Trading Scheme and the Renewable Energy Directive, which mandates the shift to renewable energies, will be revised. New measures such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism will be established. These measures are intended to drive forward the most significant transformation of the European economy since the Industrial Revolution. However, they will not be without social consequences, which can in turn compromise climate targets too. Take the emission performance standards for cars and vans. The standards are weight-adjusted to allow bigger and heavier cars to emit more CO2. As a result, cars have become heavier, more powerful, and more expensive, compromising a significant share of the achieved emission reductions and making new low-carbon vehicles less affordable thus creating new inequalities.

A new direction?

Despite their ambition, this raft of climate policies does not yet add up to a new direction for EU economic policy. The Green Deal and its concrete policy packages in particular stick to a growth-centred narrative. The Commission’s Circular Economy Action Plan from 2020, for example, promises continuing economic growth decoupled from resource use, long-term competitiveness, and business opportunities. The Commission’s Fit for 55 package refers to the Green Deal as “our growth and competitiveness strategy”.

The European Green Deal also bears the stamp of liberal market economics. The Fit for 55 package was published with an accompanying Commission document warning that “an over-reliance on strengthened regulatory policies would lead to unnecessarily high economic burdens”. By relying on carbon pricing as a central lever for economic and societal adjustment, the European Green Deal trusts that existing market dynamics will react to price incentives in a predictable manner. Moreover, the EU economic governance framework remains dominated by strict fiscal policy rules. While the European Semester process has opened up to integrate social indicators linked to the 20 principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights, overall it is dominated by a neoliberal policy agenda.

Next to the Green Deal’s legislative instruments, other European policy domains are expected to align with the European Green Deal. As part of the EU Next Generation Recovery Plan, member states are expected to spend 37 per cent of their recovery funds on projects that contribute to the green transition. Similar streamlining is applied to other parts of the EU budget but has not always been uncontroversial. The consistency of important policy domains, most notably the Common Agricultural Policy, with the Green Deal remains questionable.

By relying on carbon pricing as a central lever for economic and societal adjustment, the European Green Deal trusts that existing market dynamics will react to price incentives in a predictable manner.

The missing social dimension

What about the social dimension of the green transition and specifically the Green Deal? Climate change, as well as mitigation and adaptation measures, will create winners and losers and can exacerbate social inequalities. Recognising this, the announcement of the Green Deal in 2019 included pledges to “leave no-one behind”. But while policymakers have declared that just transition should be an integral part of the EU climate policy framework, social and employment policy initiatives have in reality remained fragmented and additional. This shortcoming was exposed with the announcement of the Fit for 55 package in July 2021 when European policy debates realised that some elements of the package would have very direct effects on households.

The EU does have a Just Transition Fund, the first pillar of the Just Transition Mechanism under the Green Deal. The fund has limited resources (17.5 billion euros at 2018 prices) that are mostly dedicated to helping coal regions manage the social effects of coal phase-out. This goal is very important but represents but a small fraction of the people affected by the green transformation. Highly affected sectors, such as the automotive industry and energy-intensive industries, lack dedicated instruments and funds.

The newly announced Social Climate Fund has a very specific target, namely to reduce the detrimental distributional side-effects of a new emissions trading system for buildings and transport. It is intended to explicitly address social challenges by supporting the most vulnerable households and citizens in the transition, but even for that goal it may not be enough. 72.2-billion-euro capacity spread over 7 years – to be financed by 25 per cent of the prospective revenues will be insufficient to address the problems ahead. Furthermore, its administration is likely to pose challenges for the institutional capacity of some member states. The Commission proposes that member states double this amount (144.4 billion), with a part of their auctioning revenues.

The Commission has also proposed a non-binding Council Recommendation on ensuring a fair transition towards climate neutrality to provide guidance to member states on tackling the social and employment effects of the transition. While it is a welcomed sign that the employment and distributional aspects of climate policy have been recognised at the highest policy level, the recommendation is vaguely worded and leaves much discretion to member states, which may choose to comply accordingly. Whether it has any effect on member states will inevitably depend on political pressures within the framework of the European Semester, which will be used to monitor its implementation.

The importance of social dialogue to supporting and managing the deep restructuring that a circular net-zero economy requires has also been recognised by the Commission. In contrary to the neoliberal policies pursued in wake of the Eurozone crisis, when social dialogue and collective bargaining structures were dismantled as a crisis management tool, strengthened social dialogue has become a priority. The Council Recommendation and the recent European Minimum Wage Directive reflect this change.

Discussion of fundamental rights as such is, however, largely absent from the Green Deal. Reference is made to the European Pillar of Social Rights, but there is no link made to the EU’s own Charter of Fundamental Rights, nor to other international legal norms and frameworks such as the European Social Charter or the core Conventions of the International Labour Organization.

A just transition is more urgent than ever

All this is a far cry from the comprehensive just transition framework that the EU needs. Unlike hard-law environmental and climate policy measures, the social elements of the Fit for 55 package are fragmented and the proposed Council Recommendation does not have binding legal effect. To date, these patchy efforts to ensure that the transition is “just” or “fair” are not up to the huge task of addressing the social challenges ahead on the way to achieving a net-zero carbon economy.

The tragedy of Ukraine is a game changer and the EU has woken up and realised that only by speeding up its energy transformation can it put an end to its fossil energy dependence on Russia. This is the logic of the REPowerEU plan. While there is no doubt about this direction in the medium and long term, the short-term effects of the energy crisis threaten the livelihoods of tens of millions of Europeans and risk jeopardising and derailing Europe’s transition away from fossil fuels.

Europe faces the ultimate test this winter, a stress test for both the European social model and the European Green Deal. Europe has no choice but to speed up the green transition and avoid compromising on climate policy objectives at the same time as addressing the triple injustice: namely that those with the lowest carbon footprint suffer most from the effects of transition, facing rising energy prices with the least capacity to adapt. All this in a new geopolitical context.

The impacts of the pandemic and rising inflation are putting further pressure on a housing system that is already in crisis in many countries across Europe. A chronic lack of access to affordable housing is worsening social inequality, while a failure to prioritise sustainability also creates long-term challenges. Solutions such as increased public investment in green and affordable housing and financing low-carbon renovation have been brought to the table, which could be boosted by stronger regulation at a European level.

A perfect storm is brewing for the increasingly limited access to decent, sustainable, and affordable housing. With a decades-long trend of house prices and rents rising faster than inflation, the share of household income spent on accommodation rose on average by five percentage points between 2005 and 2015, amounting to 31 per cent of income for middle-income households across most OECD countries. The situation worsened during the pandemic, with house prices rising 7 per cent on average across Europe. London, Dublin, Amsterdam and Paris are among the least affordable cities, and apartment costs in the Visegrád countries – Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – have risen to 12 times the average annual salary.  

More than 60 per cent of low-income households spend over 40 per cent of their income on housing, and less than half the populations of OECD countries report being satisfied with the availability of good quality, affordable housing in their locality. Housing markets are proving inefficient, in terms of their generalised failure to ensure sufficient housing supply in job-rich urban areas where affordability gaps are the widest. Public investment in housing development has shrunk from 0.17 per cent of GDP in 2001 to 0.06 per cent of GDP in 2018 on average across OECD countries.

The drop in public investment is a result of a widespread policy shift away from social housing construction and towards housing subsidies for low-income renters, according to Boris Cournède, deputy head of OECD’s public economics division. This shift took place over 2000-2010, although “since 2010, housing allowances have edged down too,” he explains. Although post-pandemic recovery packages include the provision of social housing as a priority for several EU member states, including Greece, Ireland, and Luxembourg, there remains a significant funding gap of 10 billion euros per year to meet the objective of low-carbon renovation of the existing stock of affordable homes by 2050.

Greener housing could make all the difference

Alongside the provision of housing, decarbonisation is essential for effective climate action. Residential housing accounts for 17 per cent of energy and process-related emissions of greenhouse gases and 37 per cent of emissions of fine particulate matter globally. Decarbonisation of the building stock has the potential to make a decisive impact. Leading buildings sustainability thinktank Buildings Performance Institute Europe (BPIE) estimates that “moderate” policies could reduce emissions by 42 per cent by 2030. More ambitious policies promoting deep renovation combined with renewable energy targets could cut emissions by 60 per cent, according to BPIE’s analysis.

The OECD has recommended a number of actions that policy-makers can take to tackle these cross-cutting challenges and make housing both greener and more accessible. First, investing in building green social housing, and second, subsidising the retrofitting of the existing housing stock. More investment in social and affordable housing brings the dual benefit of protecting low-income or vulnerable households, while directly expanding the housing supply, thereby alleviating upward pressure on house prices. Oliver Rapf, executive director at BPIE, argues that, “There should not be a distinction between green and grey social housing. All public funding should support the green transformation of society, and a large share should be dedicated to vulnerable groups in society.” Regarding the public investment into retrofitting, Rapf highlights the potential for wider economic stimulus: “The right mix of financial support schemes, well-designed for specific target groups, can trigger private investment by a factor of 5 to 10 for every euro spent from public funds.”

The cost of living crisis as well as the fossil fuel import dependencies highlighted by the war in Ukraine  add further impetus for national governments to invest, and set appropriate frameworks for private sector investment, in affordable and sustainable housing. “High energy prices, while weighing on purchasing power, also increase the return on energy-saving investment. The question of funding this investment is very important to address, starting with low-income, liquidity-constrained households,” says Cournède.

At the European level, the main policy drivers under the EU Green Deal include the Renovation Wave strategy that aims to double the renovation rate. Although it is not binding legislation, the Renovation Wave sets priorities (including decarbonisation of heating and cooling and tackling energy poverty) and highlights available European funding for renovation. Connected to this, the EU-level Affordable Housing Initiative is creating 100 lighthouse projects based on small district approaches, ensuring social housing providers also benefit from the renovation wave.

Another key policy instrument is the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD), the keystone of EU building legislation, a revised version of which is currently being debated in the European Parliament. The revision includes drivers such as “minimum energy performance standards” regulating the energy use in buildings. Such standards are already proving effective in driving decarbonisation in several buildings sectors in the UK and the Netherlands, for example by requiring rental properties to achieve a reasonable energy performance. Advocacy groups such as Housing Europe, however, warn that these tools should be used with care to avoid worsening the affordability crisis.     

Stronger regulation can change the game

Green Party Member of the European Parliament, and rapporteur for the EPBD revision, Ciarán Cuffe is confident that the draft legislation will help to set a strong regulatory framework for affordable and sustainable housing.

“We’re looking to expand the incentives for investing in social housing by ensuring that member states implement minimum energy performance standards that target the worst-performing buildings and low-income households”, explains Cuffe. 

This ambition must be matched by the member states. National governments will have to oversee the increase in energy performance standards of their building stock as well as provide targeted funding schemes for vulnerable households and reporting on the measures they are taking to decarbonise the building stock in their national building renovation plans.

For Cuffe, the role of finance in the draft revision is vital: “We want the member states’ reporting (via the national renovation plans) to include the measures that they are undertaking to attract financial investments from the private sector.” Using public finance to offer subsidies, zero-interest loans, and tax credit schemes to stimulate the renovation market have proven effective in triggering private investment, with public-private investment ratios ranging from 1:2 to 1:83 for every euro of public money spent.  Article 15 of the EPBD sets out the financial incentives for renovations and references existing EU-level funding streams include the Recovery and Resilience Facility,  the Social Climate Fund, and the European Regional Development Fund.

Ambition at the European level must be matched by member states.

Cuffe reckons that major players in public finance are gearing up for large-scale financing of retrofit. He says: “My office has been in touch with both the European Investment Bank (soon to be rebranded as the “Climate Bank”) and the European Central Bank in order to get an understanding of the financial institutions’ perspective and I believe that there is support for increasing renovations across Europe once we have a solid regulatory framework in place.”

The view that legislation has a crucial role to play is shared by Dominic D. Keyzer, global sustainability lead at Dutch multinational and global financial player ING. Keyzer and his team are responsible for the global integration of ING’s sustainability strategy into retail banking and ING’s sustainability activities across 25 markets. “ING has been actively involved in the sustainable housing agenda since at least 2017,” says Keyzer. The bank offers green mortgage loans in the Netherlands and Poland, as well as eco-renovation loans in Belgium. In Germany, ING is collaborating with the German state-owned KfW, the world’s largest national development bank, to deliver a new set of KfW subsidy programmes with a focus on financing energy-efficient real estate.

Clearly, for overall decarbonisation of the residential buildings stock; “there is already significant interest from banks – and commitment – as we ourselves are aiming for net zero,” says Keyzer. “However, without firm regulation to enshrine the EPBD and other Green Deal targets, that can encourage homeowners towards sustainable renovations, we predict that customer demand will not deliver the required change in the next few years. Regulation can play a key role in moving the demand, and that would be a game-changer.”

Local and national initiatives are blazing a trail

Many worthwhile programmes supporting the provision of sustainable and affordable housing are already operating at local and regional level across Europe . In Ireland, the Better Energy Warmer Homes scheme has provided free energy upgrades to households in receipt of social welfare payments since 2000. The Renovatieversneller (renovation accelerator) in the Netherlands has a budget of 100 million euros (2020-2023) and provides subsidies and technical support to social housing providers. In Denmark, a fund established in 1966 finances renovation and new builds for social and affordable housing. These initiatives are in part due to a long-term trend of national governments allocating more housing responsibilities to the local level, coupled with local governments’ rising ambition for sustainable and affordable housing, particularly in city administrations where housing shortages are most acute.  

The OECD report Brick by brick notes that, “Over the last 30 years, many national governments have implemented policy reform to allow local governments to assume a larger role in developing, coordinating and implementing housing policies, including those focused on the social housing stock and affordability challenges.” Subnational governments play a critical role in the provision of social housing along with responsibility for the bulk of housing expenditures.  But with the overall decline in public investment in housing, local government may not be able to access adequate financing from central government to be able to respond to local housing needs.   According to the recently published OECD report, Decarbonising Buildings in Cities and Regions, these administrations are often more ambitious than national government when it comes to sustainable buildings. The report highlights that, “88 per cent of the cities and regions surveyed demand higher energy efficiency standards than the national level in building energy codes, and 25 per cent even call for a net-zero energy level”. However, capacity gaps remain, with lack of finance identified as the leading challenge (see figure below).

It is clear there is a need for more coherent, streamlined action between national and subnational governments, as well as within national governments as in most countries housing policy involves several ministries. In Europe, the affordable housing sector ranges from 4 per cent of the national stock (in Hungary) to 35 per cent in the Netherlands, with the public, cooperative, and social housing sector forming an average of 11 per cent of the total housing stock across the bloc, making it a key player in driving the market demand for sustainable housing.

Against this disparate background, “we see that collective solutions are required to create change,” says Keyzer. “That’s why we intend to partner and innovate with other actors in the housing market.” As the primary bank for larger housing associations in the Netherlands (where 1.2 million homes are owned by housing associations), ING is providing advice and 50 million euros in low-cost financing for retrofit via the “Warmtefonds” (national heat fund).

From crisis to lasting change

The war in Ukraine adds yet more momentum to the broader decarbonisation agenda due to the political necessity of reducing Europe’s dependency on Russian fossil fuel imports.  As to what this means for prioritising low-carbon housing, Rapf sounds a note of caution: “I definitely observe more political attention on solutions to decarbonise buildings, but I also see an imbalance in favour of certain technologies. What’s lacking is a comprehensive approach which would reduce energy waste in our buildings so that the reduced energy demand could be supplied exclusively by renewable energy. There seems to be a lack of political understanding that energy conservation and growth of renewables have to go hand in hand.”

The housing shortage, rising costs of living, and the need to limit fossil fuel import dependency together make a powerful case for radical public intervention.

From a political perspective, Cuffe is unequivocal: “All the money we spend on fossil fuels helps fund Putin’s murderous war. This is the opportunity to make the switch towards a renewables-based economy both from an environmental and moral perspective. More fossil fuels is not the answer to a crisis made worse by our over-reliance on fossil fuels. The best way to isolate Putin is to insulate our homes.”

Every crisis contains within it the seeds of opportunity. The widespread housing shortage, rising costs of living, and the political necessity of limiting fossil fuel import dependency combine to make a powerful case for radical public intervention in the housing market. Aptly described by Housing Europe as “the soul of the Green Deal”, the provision of sustainable and affordable housing is a central component of a truly just low-carbon transition for Europe.

Faced with the colossal challenge of the climate emergency, the leading figures of the European Union are saying all the right things. But the voices across the world calling with increasing volume for change will only be satisfied by real action. With the United States flip-flopping on its commitments and China showing disregard for democratic principles, the EU has an opportunity to show real leadership on climate and environmental issues. Such a stance could imbue the EU and its institutions with renewed momentum and legitimacy, both at home and abroad.

When Ursula von der Leyen staked her claim to becoming the next head of the European Commission, addressing the European Parliament in July 2019, she put the Green Deal at the heart of her vision. It was an idée-force, a central pivot. The concept broke with the spectre of austerity policies and acknowledged the strong Green results at the May 2019 European elections. It also opened up the political game. In the European Parliament, the Green Deal had long been supported by Green MEPs, particularly the German Greens. It was even more popular on the Left in Europe (through DiEM25’s Green New Deal for Europe manifesto, for example) and in the United States, championed among the Democrats by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. The European Green Deal combined international ambition, the transformation of European societies and economies, and a unifying project. Indeed, von der Leyen herself emphasised that the coming period would be marked by profound geopolitical changes linked to ecology and digital technology.

Two years on, the Green Deal is the keystone of the Commission’s programme. It commits to a carbon tax at Europe’s borders; a veto on trade agreements with countries that do not respect the Paris Agreement; transition funds worth 100 billion euros for coal-dependent regions; a rail plan to provide alternatives to flying; strengthened environmental standards; the transformation of the agricultural model; and an end to fossil fuel investment by the European Investment Bank, which promises to devote 50 per cent of its financing to climate projects by 2025. The Commission has stayed the course despite the pandemic, publishing ambitious proposals for a new Farm to Fork food strategy and plans for a circular economy in 2020. In July 2021, it released its Fit for 55 climate package including 12 legislative proposals and policy initiatives. It aims to adopt EU policies to reduce net emissions by at least 55 per cent by 2030 and make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050.

The intention is clear: for the EU to assume a form of climate leadership by example, to challenge itself internally in order to build influence internationally.

A green power?

At present, no one holds the key to effective and convincing climate diplomacy, either at the multilateral level, or in bilateral or regional relations. The meetings of the United Nations

Conference of the Parties (COP) are essential occasions for negotiation, but they have not produced any binding multilateralism up to the task of tackling the climate emergency. While the Paris Agreement sets the objective of limiting climate change to between 1.5 and 2 degrees of warming, the current policies of nation-states tend towards 3 degrees. The drumbeat of warnings from scientists has sharpened the disappointment of citizens, who denounce governments’ cynicism and lack of courage. The Green Climate Fund, formally established at COP16 in Cancún in 2010 to help the most vulnerable countries, is still struggling to reach the agreed amount of 100 billion dollars.

Today, the climate emergency is unfolding in a more unstable world. China and the United States in particular are in a state of “cold peace” and illiberal democracies are flourishing. China is proclaiming its ambition to be a green power while simultaneously stepping up its territorial and economic offensives. The US is seeking to fight the Chinese incursion in the Indo-Pacific region (via the Aukus naval pact with Australia and the UK, for example), while its relations with its European allies are in crisis. Ecological awareness is growing, but the threat of conflict remains, hegemonic ambitions are on full display, and uncertainty prevails. The EU is in a different situation to the US or China, but must still take the international context into account.

To be credible, the EU must resolve the contradictions and tensions between member states that the Green Deal has revealed. 

The debate on European power has returned to the fore with recent shifts in the transatlantic relationship linked to NATO and the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The subject is not new. As early as the 1970s, Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung spoke of a superpower in the making. Numerous concepts arose to represent a quest for influence that stays true to founding principles such as peace and the promotion of democracy through doux commerce: normative power, civil power, peaceful power, soft power. None were entirely convincing, no doubt due to the absence of a fully developed plan and a lack of political will on the part of the member states. Can the climate emergency create that necessity?

Climate issues escape the classic geopolitical vision as they are inherently borderless, even if people – and, more broadly, living things – are affected differently depending on the societies, location, and ecosystems in which they live. Hence the notion of the “shared but differentiated responsibility” in global climate negotiations. This idea recognises the universal nature of climate disruption as well as the specificities of each country’s history, financial means and power, and geographical and economic situation. From this perspective, the fact that the EU is not a state but rather a community of states – its hybrid nature is somewhere between federal and intergovernmental – can be an asset. For example, the EU is able to mediate between the most vulnerable states and others. After all, it is already engaged in a constant mediation exercise between its members.

But to be credible, the EU must resolve the contradictions and tensions between member states that the Green Deal has revealed. For although the Green Deal raises familiar questions in terms of legal and procedural provisions and the reality of national practices, their scope here is unprecedented. First of all, there is the challenge of converting economies that are heavily dependent on coal such as Czechia, Germany, and Poland. It will also be necessary to break with a certain quid pro quo culture (echoing Margaret Thatcher’s “I want my money back”) in which the interests of the most powerful states and economic actors prevail over a common project. This requires strong and active alliances between the Commission and the European Parliament, but also between the member states that wish to move forward. Such an outcome cannot be taken for granted. Although France has supported the Green Deal from the outset, it has maintained a contradictory position on the Common Agricultural Policy that essentially undermines it.

Beyond the tensions between national interests and the ecological imperative, there is still much work to be done to link the Green Deal to social justice. For example, building a true European rail network means reconciling public investment, competition rules, and national contexts (to prevent the kind of backlash seen in France in spring 2018, when massive strikes broke out in response to a European competition action against regional train lines). Similarly, there is no magic formula for the creation of green jobs, despite considerable optimism. Today’s urgent needs include providing appropriate training for millions of people, setting up a proper industrial ecosystem, relocating certain kinds of production, and rethinking globalisation. From the very start, the green transition must be linked to social priorities to avoid France’s gilets jaunes spreading across Europe.

Is the complexity of relations between states, the diversity of interests among Europe’s cast of actors, an opportunity to assert a form of know-how? Could the European Green Deal be a laboratory for wider climate negotiations? These are central questions. As the difficulties in implementing the Paris Agreement have shown, the main challenge is bringing climate diplomacy down to earth. If we can first believe in it and then actually do it, the EU could provide a promising landing site.

Climate leadership

The European Union’s credibility as an example and mediator on climate issues must also be considered in comparison with the ambitions of other nations. Since the Paris Agreement, China has gradually asserted its climate ambitions with the overt goal of taking advantage of the American withdrawal under Donald Trump. The term “ecological civilisation” even made its way into the Chinese Constitution in 2018. In September 2020, before the United Nations General Assembly, Xi Jinping announced that his country had set two goals: to reach peak CO2 emissions “before 2030” and to achieve carbon neutrality “before 2060”. In 2021, at the same forum, the Chinese president confirmed these choices, this time committing to end financing for new coal-fired power plants abroad. Xi Jinping has presented the transformations linked to the ecological transition as opportunities and not just a crisis or threat. According to Chinese environmental policy expert Coraline Goron, the Chinese government has made the transition “a positive narrative, a key element of the ‘Chinese dream’ and of the ‘new era’ of renewal for the nation”.

It is true that China is still the world’s leading polluter, and that the Chinese state often has difficulty imposing its decisions on the

provinces. But China’s determination to develop renewable energies remains impressive, and it has reaped significant benefits from its exports. The Chinese example is even fuelling questions in Europe about the supposed links between ecological urgency, authoritarianism, and efficiency. Given its desire to interweave a strategy of influence, an economic offensive, and political authoritarianism, China’s commitments cannot escape contradictions of an economic nature (the trade-offs between growth, consumption, and the sober use of energy and resources). But the main question posed by the Chinese model remains that of the disconnection between society and political strategy: how viable is a top-down green transition, deployed at a breakneck pace and in the absence of democratic dialogue?

As for the United States, following Joe Biden’s election, the US immediately sought to rejoin the Paris Agreement and promised to double aid to developing countries to deal with climate change. On the domestic front, the focus is on decarbonising the US economy by linking it to the post-Covid-19 recovery. US commitments will undoubtedly have ripple effects on the commitments of other countries. But the US government’s position seems to be guided mainly by economic considerations: creating jobs in sustainable and renewable energies, reducing the bill for extreme weather events, and competing with China by becoming a leader in new sectors such as electric cars, batteries, and charging stations. Ultimately, given the strength of climate scepticism as represented by Trump, the American position is fragile. What might happen in the event of a future Republican win remains uncertain.

Global calls for change

Internationally, the climate issue is no longer limited to the position of states. More than defence or even foreign policy, climate issues have given rise to the emergence of new forms of democratic remonstrance that resonate on a global scale. A new alter globalisation is afoot, the intensity of which is fed by a sense of urgency and frequent scientific warnings. Youth mobilisations have become a common sight across the world. “System change, not climate change,” chant the demonstrators. Beyond just young people, a real cultural battle is playing out around the climate issue, calling into question growth, productivism, and our understanding of globalisation.

These calls upon states have become impossible to ignore. Increasingly, they include ideas on what public policies or institutions would look like if adapted to the ecological emergency.

The EU could be a mediating institution and set an example through the Green Deal. 

In November 2020, a group of young people from the Fridays for Future movement held a mock COP26. “We’re going to show the world what would happen if we were the decision-makers, and what a COP should look like,” explained an organiser. The meeting resulted in the drafting of a treaty to change public policy. Ramping up pressure on institutions, climate grievances are increasingly heard in courts in both the US and Europe. Such legal action is often welcomed by judges.

The climate emergency is thus creating an unprecedented mix of diplomatic negotiations and democratic mobilisation. Within the institutions themselves, supporters of more radical measures are making their voices heard. Large corporations and governments are challenged, accused of neglecting intergenerational solidarity and the choices that need to be made. In the face of these movements, the EU could once again be a mediating institution and set an example through the Green Deal. Provided, of course, that it remains unified and honours its own climate commitments. The prominent place of law in the challenge to states is reminiscent of the EU’s institutional culture, which closely associates law and politics. For a Europe that is not well-liked by its citizens, this situation is an opportunity to renew its legitimacy.

Unlocking the EU’s potential?

It is striking that, in the matter of a few months, ecology has provided the European Union with the vision and impetus that it had been lacking for some time, both internally and in relation to the rest of the world. At a time when climate protests are taking place from Australia to Sweden to the Americas and are mobilising millions of young people, the Green Deal links institutional ambition with powerful social momentum. The project is not only an economic and social programme; it is a potential locus for democratic aspirations that exist well beyond Europe.

But a project to build European credibility cannot be based solely on the Green Deal. More broadly, Europe must allow itself to have a historical vision and imagine its own future around climate issues. This is a difficult exercise for an EU that was created precisely to turn its back on world wars. The objective of building peace has led it to develop an apolitical narrative to escape the bellicose values that dominate relations of power. But the project of climate leadership calls for Europe to take the risk of entering fully into the world as it is today. The Green Deal can be a means of exerting that leadership, but not an end in itself.

Where consensus is required but difficult to achieve, the European Union has often been fond of fudges that hide disagreements. Legal pathways become the only means to face up to internal conflicts. Averse to division and disagreement, the EU takes refuge behind the unanimity rule, preferring to practise morality and law rather than politics. How then can the concert of European nations play its part in the face of the conflicts inherent to climate issues? Can Europe take all facets of the issue into account – society, migration, economic confrontations, support for the most vulnerable? Undeniably, this presupposes a re-politicisation of Europe and the creation of a dynamic combining efficiency, democracy, and openness towards the world.

Rather than imagining a state that goes beyond states, we should see the European Union as an association of multiple histories, the interweaving of different peoples who agree on a shared idea of the future. This is what the Green Deal can encourage, if it is based on genuine social considerations, and on an engagement with the world that leaves the idea of fortress Europe behind. Paradoxically, because of its reliance on intergovernmental concertation, the EU is an institution that can claim to play a decisive role in the new climate order that is yet to be built. But it still needs to find the meaning within its story, and to set out on a new path to building a common future. This is what more and more of its citizens are asking of it today.

Today, climate change and its real effects on our world are undeniable. Confronted with this reality, even the US fossil fuel industry has changed tack: from supporting outright climate change deniers to influencing the inevitable policies to mitigate climate change. In her new book, Overheated: How Capitalism Broke the Planet – And How We Fight Back, Kate Aronoff describes how a new type of denialism is taking hold in the fossil fuel industry, a bid to ward off systemic change and protect the business model. As a staunch defender of the Green New Deal, she also aims to show how to fight back.

Olaf Bruns: Your book discusses how capitalism, and specifically its neoliberal variant, has first led us to push the planet’s life support systems to the brink, and now keeps undercutting our very efforts to save them. This leads to a double question: How has capitalism broken the planet? And how does it scupper our current efforts to save it?

Kate Aronoff: Capitalism demands endless extraction: of land, of labour, and of people. It has this constant hunger to explore new frontiers for profit, which precedes any school of neoliberalism. In the case of the United States, we had an expansion into the continent of North America that was based on slaughter and genocide and a development of capitalism that was based on slavery. There are indeed particular faults of neo-liberalism, but there is also a broader dynamic of capitalism: fossil fuel capitalism develops as a logical consequence of capitalism’s dynamic of boundless extraction.

But it is neoliberalism, in particular, that has destroyed our efforts to deal with the climate crisis. I describe in the book how James E. Hansen, a NASA scientist, gave his testimony before the US Congress back in 1988, exposing realities about climate change that are common knowledge today. But in the US, those facts were taken off the table by a 50, 60-year project on behalf of the neoliberal right. It started before the Reagan and Thatcher era in the 1980s, with the creation of institutions like the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, which undertook a very ambitious and elaborate project to take certain ideas out of the public discussion and present a radically new economic doctrine. It’s crucial to understand the political project of neoliberalism, which is both to shrink the state but also to redistribute it among the institutions that protect capital and markets and insulate them from democracy.

We’re not going to dismantle a 300-year-old system of production and distribution in time to solve the climate crisis […]

In parallel, fossil fuel companies have done a similar job to undermine climate science, before changing tack and concentrating on influencing climate policies.

Exactly. For so long, the climate conversation in the US – and we exported these ideas to Europe and Australia – has revolved around questions like whether the climate is actually changing or not, whether we believe in it or not, which is like asking if you believe in gravity! Fossil fuel companies have funded think tanks to cast doubt on the science of global warming.

But over the last 15 years, these companies have rather attempted to present themselves as good-faith partners in the debate about climate policy. We see this in a very particular way in the US, where companies such as Exxon were very aggressive in the past about, if not denying climate change or funding climate deniers, then ignoring the problem. But that has shifted. Now, companies like ExxonMobil and Chevron have started to behave a bit more like the European producers who were already present at the UN climate talks in the 1990s, looking to fight off carbon taxes in favour of a carbon pricing mechanism, to avoid any radical shifts in their business model.

And even the myth of “personal responsibility” as a way to combat climate change, which has been shown to be ineffective, was entirely cooked up by the industry.

Indeed! BP really taps into this, when, in the mid-2000s, they put this carbon calculator on their website that asks you whether you drive or bike to work, and tells you to turn off the lights when you leave the house. As if the responsibility of any individual person could be comparable to that of a multinational fossil fuel company, which is drilling for oil and warping politics around the globe to keep doing so.

But it also taps into something deeper – the very spine of neo-liberalism – which is this notion of individual responsibility, and individuals as the prime units by which society operates. Because, as Margaret Thatcher said, “there is no such thing as society” – there are only individuals! So, BP didn’t invent that framework out of nowhere, but it’s been a very convenient one for the fossil fuel industry to tap into, to shift their responsibility on to everyone else.

The book contains the line: “denialism is dead [the full-on denialism], long live denialism”. It’s a new denialism that denies what needs to be done now.

There are several facets to the new denialism. One is this idea of individual responsibility that fossil fuel companies are trying to propagate, but another is simply that fossil fuel companies can never be good-faith actors in the climate fight. As if they did not have a business model whose prime directive is to continue to dig up and burn as many fossil fuels as possible, which are killing the planet! That is denialism as it denies the basic fact that the business model of the fossil fuel industry is directly at odds with the future of humans on a habitable planet.

A further aspect is the scale of what needs to happen, to meet the very ambitious target of the Paris Agreement to keep warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius. The scale of what we need to do to achieve that is massive, including bringing vast amounts of activity onto the electric grid: the combustion engines of cars and the heating systems that in many places run on natural gas for example. It’s a thorough transformation of society that needs to happen to displace what has been built by industrial capitalism. There is simply no way to meet the 2-degrees target without radical changes in our use of fossil fuels.

A myth has developed over the last couple of years that individual companies can put out targets to get to net zero and that these very soft commitments will somehow be enough. Even if every major company, and every government, says in 2021 that they are going to get to net zero in 2050, it’s denialism to think that that is going to happen. There is no evidence that it will!

At the level of policy, there is also a radical difference between cautiously incentivising and radically reining in.

Especially in the US, things are changing a bit: there is a move away from some of the market mechanisms that have been core to the conversation here for so long: that we could just tweak markets, send the right price signal, and that will encourage fossil fuel companies to give up fossil fuels like coal, oil, and gas. Or that at least that it will create a more competitive playing field for solar and wind. But that, as we now know, hasn’t worked. The implementation of emissions trading systems, or carbon pricing, where it has happened, has not defeated the fossil fuel industry.

I’ve talked to climate scientists who say that perhaps 20 years ago there was a point at which we could have done these sorts of subtle market tweaks – a little carbon pricing here, a couple of more stringent regulations there – and that might have dealt with the problem. But now we have wasted far too much time in failing to deal with the problem, and we really need a very radical transformation.

Some see at least a mild transformation: against the backdrop of the failed austerity response to the 2008 crisis, and the more state-interventionist attempts to stem the Covid-19 crisis, many now argue that neoliberalism is dead. Do you agree?

Certainly not! The neoliberals of today are probably in the European Union. It’s true that the US Republican Party is not anymore as doctrinaire neoliberal as it was under Ronald Reagan. And the Democrats, who were the originators of a lot of neoliberal policies in the US, are not as fond of neoliberalism as they were under Bill Clinton. So, there’s some more acceptance that we can spend a lot of money, at least in a crisis, and some of the big neoliberal doctrines are fading away. But there is still this latent attachment to have markets doing the planning. Any talk of state planning is still very, very far off. This wasn’t the case in the New Deal, nor during World War II. Talk of neo-liberalism being dead is unfortunately a bit premature.

But you also say we need to be realistic: we won’t overthrow capitalism with the speed required to save the planet, so we’ll have to do the job with it. But what would be your recipe to tame it?

I think in the long run, the logic of capitalism is really ill equipped for a sustainable society. But I also think that we will have capitalist markets that produce, for example, solar panels, wind turbines, and electric cars, and which perform types of electrification. But what we can’t do is to leave those sorts of planning decisions up to private markets. We have 30, 40 years of evidence that they will not plan a way out of the climate crisis.

We’re not going to dismantle a 300-year-old system of production and distribution in time to solve the climate crisis, but there needs to be a very different relationship between states and the private sector in order to handle this crisis.

We have 30, 40 years of evidence that private markets will not plan a way out of the climate crisis.

You also have a strong warning about a future without this kind of radical transformation, where the people that are the hardest hit by climate change, whilst having contributed very little to it, increasingly lose out. You use the term “eco-apartheid”, what do you mean by this?

The simplest definition of eco-apartheid would be continuing the social relations we have today into a climate change future. All the racism and xenophobia that have been present in US history, but which have really surged in a very ugly way the last couple of years, are setting us up for a very scary next couple of decades! Eco-apartheid can sound like a scary dystopian future, but here in the US, Republicans have been carrying out eco-apartheid policies for a long time, for example by hardening our borders and passing regressive anti-immigration legislation.

There is no legal definition of “climate migrant” yet, and it’s hard to draw those lines, but we are already seeing a militarised immigration system being enforced against people who are being forced by floods, fires, hurricanes, and drought to come to the US, people who, by most definitions, would qualify as climate migrants.

The US has such a massive footprint all over the world – not only a carbon footprint! As an empire, we have driven all kinds of regressive trade policies, certainly throughout South America. It is precisely our extraction of land and labour elsewhere that has made the US such a wealthy place. E. Tendayi Achiume (Faculty Director of the Institute for Human Rights at the University of California and special UN rapporteur on Racism), suggests that the US should offer citizenship to people who have been on the losing end of US politics. The US – among others – has played a big role in rendering parts of the planet uninhabitable and that uninhabitable stretch of the planet will grow immensely in the next several decades. At the very least, we should be offering a safe and habitable place to these people.

The second part of your book’s subheading is: “how we fight back”, and you advocate the Green New Deal (GND). How does the EU’s “Green Deal” measure up in comparison to the demands for a GND?

I haven’t followed it as closely as some of your readers might have. But in Europe, you still see the idea of incentivising private capital as an approach to green finance, of which the EU Green Deal is an example. There is still a reluctance to use state planning and a real deference to the private market to provide for decarbonisation and conduct the energy transition.

But I also understand why, from the US perspective, people are excited about something like the European Commission’s “Fit for 55” plan. It’s certainly more ambitious than anything we have here. The US has never had a comprehensive climate policy. So, it’s obviously good to have governments aligned around the basic idea that climate policy can happen.

Turning to “how we fight back”: the Green New Deal has been around since at least 2008, and gained prominence when Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez introduced it to the US Congress. But what would be the essential building blocks of the GND?

On the one hand, the Green New Deal is a large-scale programme of public investment, like the New Deal in the US, that responds to a crisis with the scale and speed it requires. It’s about massive investments in renewable energy, electrification, and the deep decarbonisation necessary to tackle the climate crisis.

It’s a pretty big intervention, but it’s desperately needed at a time when so much of the conversation about climate change has been about shrinking our individual carbon footprint. The GND says it’s not about sacrifice but about redistributing the abundance! The US is the wealthiest country that has ever existed in the history of the world, and there is no shortage of cash around. The question is: how do we put this cash in the right places?

At the same time, the GND is also a political strategy. What happened after the Obama administration’s answer to the 2008 crisis, which was similar to austerity? By 2016, Democrats had lost the House, the Senate, and the White House. So, what is needed is a political strategy to carry out the decarbonisation – which will outlast any presidential term – but which ensures majorities at the same time.

What the GND says is that climate policy needs to make a credible promise to improve people’s lives: giving people jobs, making real investments in communities, as well as ensuring Democratic majorities for years and years to come.

It’s the basic logic of the New Deal in the 1930s: if you give people stuff, they’ll probably vote for you. But that idea got lost due to the triumph of neoliberalism over the course of the second half of the 20th century in the US. The GND is attempting to bring that very basic political logic back: making climate policy something which people have a reason to support

How does your conception of a “low-carbon populism” come in here, and how do you save the concept of populism, which has a bad reputation in the public debate – certainly in Europe?

It’s about the basic realisation that politics happens from below. There are movements of people that are the engines of history. When I talk about low-carbon populism, I’m referring to a much more expansive definition of what a lower-carbon world could look like, including proposals like a four-day workweek, so that people have more time to undertake forms of consumption that are usually less carbon-intensive than activities like online shopping.

Activities that people really enjoy tend to be low-carbon intensive. I’ll speak for myself, but I can spend a long day in the park with friends drinking wine. Low-carbon populism is a vision for how this transition can actually make life better in ways that are not very utopian, but rather pretty common sense. It’s a route to making our lives better, more pleasurable, and more leisurely!