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Peace, Love and Intervention

**In memory of Benoit Lechat (1960-2015),
editor-in-chief of the Green European Journal**

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**Peace, Love and
Intervention –
*Green views on
foreign policy***

At a time when conflicts are raging on the very border of the European Union and tensions escalating in some of the most volatile regions of the world, the foreign dimension of European politics is certainly as intense and challenging as the social and economic crisis within the EU. Moreover, the recent victory of Syriza has brought to light a connection between the inner and outer faces of the crisis as the new Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras's critique of the economic sanctions against Russia has threatened to end the fragile consensus so far achieved by his European partners.

We hear warnings of the threat of a new cold war, in the wake of the dismemberment of Ukraine and belligerent Russian policy, making the world seem increasingly polarised. Further, rising instability and sectarianism in the Middle East have resulted in the displacement of millions of people as well as in profound political repercussions within the borders of the EU. Meanwhile, ongoing conflicts in Africa continue to inflict enormous human cost, and the question of intervention remains an issue of deep controversy.

In addition, while the nations of the world keep failing to agree on a new protocol to combat climate change, the growing awareness of resource scarcity fuels a worrying global race for resources, thus contributing to the rise of commodity-driven economies.

While the US pledges itself to a more modest role in international affairs (or as President Barack Obama has put it "lead from behind"), new actors and new powers have emerged. Over the past decade, an ongoing reshuffle in the balance of global power has seen China change scale from regional to world actor, Russia reassert its ambition to be treated like a major player, and calls emerging for Europe to play a more active role in world politics.

The need to formulate pragmatic responses to these developments presents a serious challenge to the vision of peace, human rights and ecological justice espoused by Greens. The aim of this edition of the Green European Journal is to get closer to this goal.

Welcome to the desert of the real

As United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon declared at the opening of the General Assembly in September 2014, "we are living in an era of unprecedented level of crises". A world ridden with conflicts is pushing the Greens out of their comfort zone and their certainties. How do you deal with a violent reality when most of your political practice is rooted in the non-violent opposition to the system; when your message of peace, tolerance, interdependence, and responsibility, both individual and collective, constantly puts you at odds with the general perception of the public? How do you implement ideals in the desert of the real?

Violence, and how to deal with it, ranks very highly in the preoccupations of the Greens when reflecting on foreign policy. The first section of this edition offers

a few reflections on possible solutions, taken mostly from the context of the Middle East (Meszerics, Kara) or the war in Ukraine (Harms), both areas of conflict very close to the EU borders and with specific impacts on the stability of many European societies. These examples raise fundamental questions with regards to the attitude of the Greens when the time for analysing the roots of a conflict is over and real actions are needed to stop a war and mend the peace. Drawing on the concrete examples of Bosnia or Palestine, it seems a sort of federalisation often appears as the preferred green way to solve conflicts (Shemer), while the very lessons of the Dayton agreements might suggest it definitely cannot be an option in the Ukrainian conflict. A thorny issue, indeed.

And there's even more complexity to consider. The nature of the global stage has changed considerably over the past decades. While non-state actors, from criminal networks to terrorist organisations have also contributed to raise the violence to much higher levels, with the ambivalent involvement of thorough, global and continuous media coverage, world NGOs, interconnected civil activists and social movements have also grown in influence, further challenging a world order exclusively based on stable sovereign states. Yet interestingly enough, this additional layer of complexity corresponds better to the Greens' approach to international relations, with the strong support of civil societies as full actors. Some lessons can be drawn, for example, from the social and political dynamics following the famous "Arab spring" (Durant).

Green and European: double the trouble

Living in an increasingly post-Western and post-imperial world – in which the modern state is losing its pre-eminence – should vindicate the green vision of the world. Instead it seems to bring a set of new, difficult questions and uncertainties to the debate. When it comes to global nuclear security (Cronberg), combating climate change (Seijo), assuming responsibility for global development (Schmidt), and engaging with the Maghreb (del Peral) or with the rapidly rising centre of new power, namely South East Asia (Bütikofer), the European Union is the favoured level of action for greens in matters of foreign policy – this is the focus of the second section.

But the EU does not resolve all contradictions. First, talking the talk is not enough. Turning the rhetoric into action remains so far a privilege of established nation-states. The EU often lacks the concrete means and legitimacy to rise above the interests of its member states, which seek to jealously defend the symbols of their sovereignty as represented by foreign policy. Secondly, the EU can allow itself to be easily confused with the broader West, defending the limited particular interests of one perspective rather than those of humanity and global peace. This can be particularly visible when it fails to put human rights ahead of the rights of businesses or when it fails to uphold coherence and consistency between its various external policies.

War is “foreign” to the Greens

The last section tries to offer a more detailed view from within the parties and shows the tools, visions and contradictions Greens entertain when it comes to international relations (Beck). Of course, situations vary from country to country – and the challenges for the different green parties greatly depend not only on their national political culture, but also their institutional order and of course their likely proximity to the actual exercise of power. Compare for example the French, British and German green answers to various aspects of foreign policy (Mamère/Clarke/Nouripour). Of these three major powers, two of them have a legacy of global standing, a nuclear arsenal and a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Yet the distance from executive power makes the responses of these last two seem less immediate than they are for the heirs of the first, and to date the only, green foreign minister.

Indeed, when one asks the Greens what foreign policy actually means to them, invariably the answer revolves around the same preoccupation: dealing with conflict, or the conditions of the use of force, be it for the Dutch (van Ree), the Belgians (Piron) or the German Greens (Schneegass). In fact, the green vision

is in essence so transnational and global that it seems “conflict” would be the only thing “foreign” to them. Development cooperation and a global trade regime that is fair and sustainable are cornerstones of what might be called a green foreign policy. Opposing the evils of globalised capitalism and its worst externalities (global financial markets, unregulated free-trade, global resource race, etc.) is not opposing globalisation in essence. Globalisation is also global interconnectedness and interdependency. As the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk once very aptly put it (In the World Interior of Capital, 2005), globalisation has made a norm of the anthropologically impossible: to include the actual foreigner, the remote stranger, the distant competitor as a standard. Greens are the one political family to comprehensively understand this concept and build their political approach on it: *think global act local*.

They strive for a sustainable globalisation, whose ultimate goal would be a kind of world government with direct global citizens’ participation (Sfeir Younis). Global governance would not mean then end of “conflict”. But it would be the end of “foreign” policy. ■

In the 1970s the Left took sides with “El Pueblo” in South America in its struggle against tyrants like Somoza in Nicaragua and Duarte in El Salvador. In the 1980s it participated in demonstrations against nuclear arms to end the Cold War. And who did not demonstrate in favour of sanctions against South-Africa to end apartheid? For left-wing and (nascent) Green parties, violations of human rights have always been a cornerstone of their foreign affairs policy, just like they have always had a preference for non-militarist intervention in conflicts, as well as showing strong support for civil society.

How to live up to these standards today? Again, Europe is facing war and violent conflict on its soil, in addition to having to react to disturbing conflicts in the Middle East. It is impossible to keep out of them: Europe itself has played a part in the making of these conflicts. Of course, as Greens and Progressives have often done, they can once again accuse the international community of doing too little, too late. But it doesn't seem enough to have the “right ideals” and it does not seem so evident anymore who is on the “right” side, although right-wing parties are trying to make us believe it is.

The authors of the following articles ask these kinds of questions: how do long-term ideals relate to required action in the immediate future? Who is to be protected and who must be attacked? What should Europe do to further sustainable peace in our world? Among many others... For the moment, there might be more questions than answers, but to find the right questions is of the utmost importance in achieving a viable green policy in foreign affairs.



Rebecca Harms

“I never thought it would be easy” – EU foreign policy and Ukraine

In the most recent conflict with Russia, the EU has tried to find a solution that avoids war. The EU considers military action only as a last resort – and that should not change in the future, even if we accept that the world will not become an entirely peaceful place from one day to the next. An interview with Rebecca Harms.

Since the start of the Euromaidan in November 2013, Rebecca Harms has been to Kiev almost every month. She believes the Euromaidan is not only a movement that is pro-European but one supported by young people who want reforms, who want to change the country and to free it from the grip of corruption and oligarchy. This is something the Orange Revolution of 2004 failed to do because it was still steered to a large degree by the parties, by influential figures like Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, and by the Nasha Ukraina bloc. But over this last year we have seen a very different kind of movement. We spoke to the leader of the Greens/EFA parliamentary group about the future for Russia, Ukraine, NATO and EU foreign policy.

GEJ: What are the reforms most urgently needed in Ukraine?

Everything needs to be reformed, but what is certainly not needed now is to invent a whole new structure for Ukraine. It always horrifies me that many Europeans think Ukraine should now be transformed into a federal state. This is an idea that has been planted in Ukraine and in the EU by Vladimir Putin and which doesn't help at all. A country in such need, a country that is under attack, cannot suddenly be decentralised. The country needs good government, it needs good administrative reforms, and Kiev has to see to it that the structures are functioning properly in the oblasts too. This idea of federalisation that is floating around everywhere, that would be a dangerous and entirely wrong path to take.



GEJ: The European Parliament and the Ukrainian Parliament have ratified the association agreement with Ukraine. What does this mean for EU-Ukraine relations?

If it goes well then it means that in many areas of the state we will not only be calling for reforms but will actually be able to push them forward through good cooperation. Ukraine needs lots of money, many people know that, but Ukraine has an even greater need for good cooperation to bring about changes in the justice system and in public administration as a whole, in the health system and in many more areas, so that money is not only spent but that the changes work for the good of the people of Ukraine.

It's important for our neighbours that as Europeans we make it clear to Russia that every country in Europe can decide for itself how it cooperates with any other country or region.

GEJ: What should neighbourhood policy in Europe look like? What should Europe's partners expect from it?

It's important for our neighbours that as Europeans we make it clear to Russia that every country in Europe can decide for itself how it cooperates with any other country or region. And that is the big question at the moment: will Russia continue to allow countries outside the EU (but which in 1989 were still part of the Soviet Union) to freely choose whether they want to align themselves more closely, strategically and economically, with Russia or with the EU? Keeping this possibility open is the decisive challenge for neighbourhood policy. Allied to that is the necessity to make sure that reforms are supported, just like in Ukraine, in all the other countries – regardless of whether they have association agreements or not.

GEJ: And shouldn't we be promising those countries that at some point they too can become members of the EU?

I don't believe that people in Ukraine or in other countries seriously believe they will soon be EU members. You can see that just by looking at how difficult it was to conclude the association agreement. And it hasn't yet been ratified by all the neighbouring countries. I think that step, which we have now taken with some of our neighbours, was a very good one for us to take, and if it works then at some point we will automatically enter into discussions with them about membership. On the other hand, the EU itself is not in good shape just now, and we have so much

difficulty reaching internal agreement on how to carry out certain reforms, and on whether we want to undertake them at all, that at the moment I would say: the EU is not able to take on new members.

GEJ: As a gesture towards Russia, the EU-Ukraine trade agreement is not being implemented immediately – was that a good idea? Why was this compromise necessary?

I think the Europeans have made repeated concessions because they hoped that these would help create peace and security for the Ukrainians. The Minsk Protocol is itself of course a very far-reaching compromise that takes the interests of the so-called separatists very much into consideration. And the decision not to implement the agreement immediately but to defer it for a year was itself a conciliatory gesture towards the Russian side. I didn't agree with the process that was decided here in the European Commission. I was very surprised that such a step resulted in no positive responses from the Russian side, and that the aggressive behaviour which Russia is supporting in the region (which is also directed towards the EU) is continuing unchecked.

GEJ: There has been and remains a lack of unity in the debate over economic sanctions against Russia. What could be done about that?

There must be agreement about how to manage the impacts of these sanctions if they are going to continue. Europeans have to demonstrate mutual solidarity so that countries can deal with the domestic consequences of the sanctions. Economic

Economic sanctions are vitally important because we do not want a military response towards Russia.

sanctions are vitally important because we do not want a military response towards Russia. But at the same time we simply cannot allow one country to attack another country on our own borders just because it has a trade agreement with us. We cannot continue with "business as usual" in such circumstances.



GEJ: Will the sanctions work? Putin could try to secure his domestic position by means of the military aggression in the neighbouring state.

I never thought it would be easy to persuade Russia to abandon this course. I think it would not have mattered what we did. Once the puppet Yanukovych could no longer be maintained in position, Moscow simply looked for another way to destabilise Ukraine and EU-Ukraine relations. As I said, the sanctions are also intended to be a message to Russia that we will not resume normal relations if Russia fails to abide by international rules. If Russia continues in its determination to trample over all rules of

international diplomacy, if Russia continues in its determination to destabilise the regions in the east of Ukraine with terrorists and also with soldiers, then President Putin will have to continue to live with economic sanctions.

GEJ: You wrote on your website: "It will certainly not be easy to formulate a new common security policy. But it has to be done." What should it look like?

Europe has now had an animated discussion about NATO's role, and in Eastern Europe especially it continues to be widely debated. Some people say that the behaviour of Russia is simply a reaction to the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, but people in the Baltic states, in Poland and in other eastern member states say that if we didn't have NATO then they too would be easy prey for Putin, like the Crimea. How to defend the people of Europe will make for an interesting discussion. I think we will soon have to take another look at classical defence policy as well.

GEJ: I suspect you are thinking of the American political scientist John J. Mearsheimer, who wrote a couple of months ago that NATO was creeping territorially ever closer to Moscow's sphere of power and interest, and that it was therefore understandable that Russia had refused to tolerate the Europeanisation of Ukraine. Doesn't he have a point?

I believe President Putin has not reformed the country in the way he promised. And I also believe there are big problems in Russia related to an oligarchic and corrupt system.

I find that far-fetched. Ukraine's decision not to join NATO but instead to sign what is in essence a politicised trade agreement was not the cause. When this was negotiated it was never about NATO. The paragraphs relating to security in the association agreement cover completely different areas of cooperation. They are about Ukraine taking part in specific missions, and not at all about active membership of NATO. All the claims to that effect are simply not correct. I believe there are serious problems in Russia. I believe President Putin has not reformed the country in the way he promised. And I also believe there are big problems in Russia related to an oligarchic and corrupt system. Everything that is wrong in Russia was supposed to disappear behind this new idea, that the Russian Federation should re-connect with the old powerful Soviet Union. This is the really threatening scenario. There has been nothing like that from the NATO side. A couple of years ago, in the case of Georgia, concessions were made to Russia, but it didn't help then because despite that there was a war over this "frozen conflict" in Abkhazia and Ossetia. So I think it is misguided when people in the EU or the West continue to spin this fairy tale of how it is the West or NATO which really bears responsibility for the fact that there is now a war in the Donbass. I consider that to be a fiction.

GEJ: So Putin has been planning this for a long time?

If you go back and read over his speeches, then it is true that ideas and discussions on these topics have been circulating in Russia for a long time.

GEJ: Is the situation in Russia properly understood here in Europe?

There are people here in Brussels who understand it well, but the further away one is from Russia in the EU, the poorer the understanding is. The fact that the sanctions are there to protect us is something that many Europeans have not yet understood in my view.



GEJ: What should happen next with Russia? There are discussions going on around long-term incentives that could provide Russia with an exit from the conflict. For example, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel held out the prospect of talks between the EU and the Eurasian Union over "possibilities of cooperation in a common trade area".

That's an old idea of course. There have been numerous initiatives on the part of the EU to develop closer ties with Russia in various thematic areas. So the German Chancellor Angela Merkel was merely

repeating in Davos a self-evident fact that was already influencing European policy. At the same time, though, she said that the precondition for such cooperation is that Russia ceases to support war.

GEJ: But that sounds as if Angela Merkel wants to reward Russia for finally stopping the war.

I have spoken with correspondents who took part in the background talks at Davos, and they all had the impression that this statement was misinterpreted later. Because it applies to the whole of the EU: everybody wanted good relations with Russia, everybody wanted this European Russia. Nobody in the EU wants to give up on that, but unfortunately Putin and his entourage have already given up on these ideas.

GEJ: What should a common EU foreign policy look like? What would be the EU's role in the world?

Well, what sort of "soft power" does the EU represent in the world? In this conflict with Russia, too, we have tried to find a solution that avoids war. We try many things before we seek military solutions. Now we have this situation in Ukraine where we are saying "We are the 'soft power'", that is defusing this war by

21st century means. We place our faith in sanctions, but we are just discovering that they don't work and that the other side is leaning increasingly towards a military solution. I don't yet know what Europeans will learn from this, but we will always be that region of the world which considers military action only in the context of international law and only as the last option. I'm sure most Europeans agree with that.

GEJ: So we will never take over America's role?

America too is rethinking. Obama is a President who has tried to review whether it is right to play the role of global policeman and what consequences it can have. And I believe there really are good reasons to review the last big campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to come up with new ideas. I don't think the EU is really suited to playing this American role, but nor can we pretend that the world has suddenly become an entirely peaceful place. ■

Rebecca Harms is a Member of the European Parliament for Alliance '90/The Greens. She has been the president of the Greens/EFA since 2009, and is also a member of the Conference of Presidents, the Delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee and the Delegation to the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.



Yoav Shemer-Kunz

From Dayton to Jerusalem – Federalism is the Green way to build peace

While the traditional European way of peace-making was based on separating peoples, the Green European way of peace-building should be based on power-sharing and trust-building. Federalism can be a means of achieving this, in some cases even where the will of those concerned is not yet present, as long as the international community stands together and ensures respect for the fundamental values of justice, equality and mutual tolerance.

This is not about
“peace and love”.

European Greens believe not only in biodiversity in nature, but also among humans. They believe and cherish national and cultural diversity, in humans being “different but equal”. They should therefore propose an alternative path towards ending wars across the world which reflects our political visions and beliefs. Greens believe in sustainable solutions for problems, thinking ahead for the next generations. Conflict resolution and peace-making does not mean simply separating the fighting parties. On the other hand, we should not become idealistic or utopian either in designing our foreign policy.

This is not about “peace and love”. Imposing federalism in a conflict-zone is enforcing a political framework which enables different national groups to live together, not only preventing a new eruption of violence, but also allowing the slow process of trust-building and transitional justice. Federalism is not a short-term cease-fire but rather a long-term political framework in which the different elites learn to share power and find compromises.

The end of ethnically homogenous states

In the past, Europe ended wars by creating new nation-states, with new national borders. This often required a mass transfer of population (or forced “ethnic cleansing”) in order to create geographical areas which were “ethnically” or “nationally” homogenous, without which the creation of the nation-state was meaningless. Millions lost their homes, moving to their new “national home”, while national minorities which remained within the nation-

state of the “other” often suffered from structural and legal discrimination in all aspects of life. Moreover, as nations were separated, mistrust and hatred remained intact, and even growing behind the closed borders. Signed peace treaties were therefore often short-term tactical breaks between wars. Conflicts were not really resolved and therefore would flare up again once conditions were ripe.



Today, after having succeeded in making peace among ourselves, after hundreds of years of mutual killing and destruction, Europeans have some important experience to build on. The secret for long-term sustainable peace in Europe was not more separation between the peoples, higher borders and deeper trenches, but rather the opposite. The way to sustainable peace is a long-term process of integration and cooperation between the peoples’ representatives, the nations’ governing elites. It is federalism.

Multinational federalism is an appropriate tool of peaceful conflict-management in ethnically or nationally divided states, a way to manage the aspirations of different nations within the borders of one state.

Federalism is a particularly useful instrument to manage different nations within the borders of a single state, to consolidate the different national groups sharing one single polity. Multinational federalism is an appropriate tool of peaceful conflict-management in ethnically or nationally divided states, a way to manage the aspirations of different nations within the borders of one state. Federalism is not based on strict separation between the peoples but on power-sharing among the elites, compromise-seeking, consensus and deliberation, learning how to live together. The federal framework should also be accompanied by mechanisms of transitional justice, facing the injustices of the past and the war crimes committed. Imposing a federation on fighting peoples is a long-term process, but it promises to engender trust and enable reconciliation between the rival parties.

Imposing federalism

Europe today, as part of the international community at large, has the power to impose federalism on fighting parties across the world, and to closely follow the implementation of the new federation once it is installed. The international community imposed federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) by the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, and in Iraq with the new constitution of 2005. Other examples of attempts to impose federalism are the Annan plans

of the UN for Cyprus or the discussion on possible solutions to Sri Lanka. In Israel/Palestine, the two-state solution is losing its viability on the ground, mainly due to Israeli colonisation of the West Bank. However, even if a Palestinian State eventually sees the day with 1967 borders, it is difficult to see how to practically resolve crucial issues such as the refugees of 1948, the rights of the Arab minority within Israel (20% of the state's population), or how to practically divide the city of Jerusalem. An imposed federation, based on the right to self-government for the different national entities, together with a thin central level of shared government, sharing one territorial unit from the river Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea, may be a more sustainable solution for generations to come.

The main argument we hear against possible federal solutions in these cases is that the local political elites do not believe in federalism and power-sharing, only in self-determination and separation. What is often missing when we discuss federalism is a clear distinction between federalism and federation. Federalism is the normative political ideology behind federations, while federation is the practical framework, the federal political system in a state. Federalism is not necessarily a goal and a value in itself, but can also be simply used as a tool in order to transform an ethnic or national conflict into a peaceful state.

The fact is when resolving a conflict by creating a federation, we do not necessarily need the willingness of leaders to unite in a common state. The international community can impose a federation as a state structure on warring parties in order to pacify a country and to keep it together. This kind of federalism is not based on volition, the agreement of all parties is not required, and the international community plays a key role in the creation of the federal union. Federalism can be a new form of conflict resolution and peace-building.



Back to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Agreement of 1995, establishing the federation of BiH, was not a voluntary contract, reached in good faith and through co-operation and compromise, but an imposed treaty, reached by international pressure, primarily by the US government and the EU. In fact, the agreement itself was substantially designed by American lawyers. Thus, a very important element of

federalism, its voluntary nature, may be totally absent when federations are created.

Internationally administrated federation

In 1995, there was no will among the three constituent peoples of the federation, Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks, to unite in a federal union. Moreover, the federal system which was imposed on the parties in 1995 has since developed into an internationally administrated federation. Representatives of the international community have had a massive impact on the state. The United Nations' High Representative (HR) is the guarantor of the Dayton Agreements and their final interpreter. In addition, through NATO and the EU, via its Special Representative (EUSR) and the IMF, the international community became part of the implementation of Dayton. Since 1995, competences were gradually transferred from the entity level to the central level. This transfer was not always based on the consent of the Bosnian parties, but rather imposed by the international community as part of its implementation policy of the Dayton Accords.

The most visible examples are the imposition by the Office of the High Representative (HR) of "ethnically neutral" symbols such as a common flag, a common currency, a national anthem, a new coat of arms, and a new law on citizenship, all without any reference to Bosnia's multinational character. Bosnian representatives were always given the chance to find a decision first, but failed to reach a common position. Imposed federalism is also a process, not a static framework. It is a process of centralisation and strengthening of the state-level institutions,

One of the core elements of power-sharing is the focus on moderate elites, who are willing to co-operate and find compromise.

reducing the influence of the entities, as part of the internationally administrated federation.

A need for political will

Federation has also been raised as a possible solution to the current crisis in Ukraine (as Greens-EFA co-chair, Rebecca Harms, mentions in this volume). However, we should carefully consider our own role in a foreign country when imposing federalism on it. Federalism is not simply the decentralisation of a country as we observe in France, Spain or the UK. When a country is in a state of deep crisis, facing a national/ethnic conflict, which is tearing it dramatically apart, with the danger of war crimes and ethnic cleansing, a federal structure is a good tool, but it needs to be administrated and implemented by the international community. In other words, it requires an active political will.

The model of Bosnia-Herzegovina is also an interesting one in this respect, since the country's federalism was also accompanied by a process of international integration into NATO and the EU. This is very different from the case of Ukraine. It is important to highlight that federalism in conflict-ridden countries is not merely a simple decentralisation, where different local governments can be left to govern their own territories and handle their own business. The international community has a key role to play in the implementation of the process on the ground, preventing the security situation from deteriorating and enforcing the federal framework of shared governance.

Start with demilitarisation

The first step in this process is a sort of demilitarisation of the different armed forces which co-exist in the country, transforming them into legitimate coordinated Police Units. This was the case in Israel/Palestine during the 1990s, when the armed Fatah militants in the West Bank and Gaza became the legitimate police force of the newly created Palestinian Authority, controlling security in certain areas in coordination with the Israeli security forces. Furthermore, an important measure to be taken when imposing federalism in such cases is a massive deployment of international troops in order to enforce the cease-fire and the implementation of the peace accords, as was done in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1995.



However, in the case of Ukraine, Russia and the EU do not seem to share a common political will, and therefore are not likely to agree on a joint international intervention of this kind. In Israel-Palestine following the 1993 Oslo accords, the peace process suffered from a lack of international

intervention forces to ensure the overall framework of the agreement, and a lack of imposed implementation of the accords on the ground. When distrust is so high between the parties, the international community's role is necessary. Finally, the Oslo accords turned out to be merely a partial measure of decentralisation of the country, and was therefore not a suitable and sustainable solution to the conflict, which was triggered once again a few years later.

Transitional Justice

What is also often missing in imposed solutions after conflict are effective mechanisms of transitional justice, reconciliation and forgiving the other's atrocities and getting to know better the narrative of the other. One of the core elements of power-sharing is the focus on moderate elites, who are willing to cooperate and find compromise. However, post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina is dominated by fully-fledged nationalist parties which focus on their own national groups and are unwilling to compromise. In fact, the main reasons for the war in the early 1990s

were not addressed in Dayton. Because of a blockade among the national groups' representatives and international imposition, a climate of co-operation and trust has not yet developed.

This is why it is necessary to complement the imposition of a federal framework with a process of transitional justice, a long-term process of people-to-people dialogue and trust-building across communities. This bottom-up, sustainable approach is, after all, the Green approach to doing politics.

I dedicate this article to the late Benoit Lechat, who left this world in January, but left in me the passion for political ecology and a better Europe. ■

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Isabelle Durant

“There is still a long way to go” – Civil society involvement in foreign policy

Great upheavals have occurred and are still occurring in the Middle East: the successive revolutions and counter-revolutions of the Arab spring, the lightning emergence of ISIS, the agonies of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the stagnating civil war in Syria. How do the Greens analyse the situation? In their assessment, how can the people who have risen up gain control of their transition to democracy? An interview with Isabelle Durant, conducted for GEJ by Laurent Standaert.

European support for moderate Islam should have been the keystone of the EU’s diplomatic strategy. The EU completely turned its back on the decentralised political players.

Four years after the spring uprisings of 2011, how have things changed in the region? Has the EU influenced the course of events, before and since?

A cliché has long prevailed in Europe: that in some way the Arabs were not doing so badly under their dictatorial regimes, as if the more arid parts of that region were definitively incapable of nourishing European democratic principles and enabling them to grow. Moreover, much of the European left has joined in, adopting a relativist attitude to the democratisation of the region and considering that dictatorships in the Middle East were probably a necessary evil. Often, in spite of a genuine analysis of the situation and of the counter-revolutions in their various forms, the very same people were soon talking of an “Arab winter”.

During the first decade of the 21st century, European support for moderate Islam should have been the keystone of the EU’s diplomatic strategy. However, the EU shuffled its cards and blurred its image by sending contradictory messages to the Arab opposition movements, flouting its own principles in the name of economic imperatives and short-term financial and electoral interests. Moreover, it was unwilling to identify and form relations with any counterparts other than the leaders of those regimes. The EU completely turned its back on the decentralised political players in those areas, locally elected representatives, sub-regional dynamics and, more fundamentally, their civil societies. It focused on the few players based in the area’s capital cities, those who resembled the EU. Most of them were

secular. It did not succeed in establishing relations with the most representative non-state players, those opposition movements or religious or civilian entities which had not been taken over by the regime.

Reserving its favours for the authorities of the regimes already in place, the EU also failed to share and use the know-how which characterises the European social and democratic model. It would have been extremely helpful throughout the post-cold war period if it had promoted and practised dialogue with and support for the various participants in civil society, as is the case in all the member states according to various terms and conditions. But that barely happened, all of which explains why the EU totally failed to anticipate the January 2011 movements.

Are those mistakes the result of inadequate tools or a lack of political interest?

International questions and the changes in the Arab world are having more domestic effects than ever – on the price of oil and the energy crisis more generally, migrations, security, foreign fighters, the threat of terrorism or our attitude to the otherness of our neighbours. It is now possible for the EU to co-pilot foreign policy politically through the European Council and the Council of Foreign Affairs. Actions involving preventive civil and military diplomacy (and the European Foreign Action Service), humanitarian instruments, entities concerned with human rights and the consolidation of good governance, the legal state and fundamental freedoms, the policy of

cooperation in development... Though the box may be untidy and some of them may be rusting from lack of use, these tools are nevertheless consistent and easy to mobilise.



To which emergencies should those tools be applied as a priority?

The greatest emergency is Syria. That is where the revolution became an immense massacre and turned into a civil war which has been raging for four years. It was that massacre which put an end to the West's enthusiasm for the revolutionary movements in the region. It was from that massacre that counter-revolutions spread to varying extents into countries in the Arab world, from Bahrain to Egypt. Syria is at the region's historical and geographical crossroads. For lack of information and informers, we do not know what is happening there. What we do know about is the unsustainable pressure of the millions of refugees on Syria's neighbouring countries and the progress of the Islamic State there, more than

in Iraq! Progress which, by the “de-jihadisation” of the opposition, is making Bashar el-Assad the rampart against the barbarians! Another emergency is the need to lift the blockade in Gaza and put a stop to Israel's colonisation of the Palestinian territories.

Taking speedy action, including military action, to respond to those two emergencies would make it possible not only to relieve the Syrian population but also to help reduce the power of attraction and radicalisation exerted by ISIS over young European Muslims and their sense of injustice which is impelling some of them to join their ranks. A quick response to those emergencies would suddenly transform millions of Muslim citizens into European citizens who are proud of the European Union! Something with which to drain the swamp of radicalisation and kill the radical and somewhat simplistic rhetoric which claims that “integration has failed”. Considering the obstacles confronting the mere recognition of Palestine and the procrastinations of the international community which, for four years, has refused to recognise the representatives of Syrian civil and political society, flexing its muscles before the Assad regime but never implementing its threats, there is still a long way to go. Even the international military coalition in Iraq, however useful it may be for protecting endangered minorities, also has the effect of enabling ISIS to gain ground in Syria.

However, that is no excuse for not preparing the ground for inclusive diplomatic and political solutions which will involve civil society. Those are the emergencies in the region's most troubled countries where men, women and children are dying in droves every day.

Europe’s biggest mistake, at a time when the expectations of the Arab world were immense, was to limit its counterparts in the discussions to government elites.

And elsewhere, more structurally speaking, what about the Arab revolutions and the EU?

Europe’s biggest mistake, at a time when the expectations of the Arab world were immense, was to limit its counterparts in the discussions to government elites.

Civil society in the Arab world and the Middle East is on the move. The younger generation, people who have implemented their demographic transition (smaller families) and want to build their future and the future of their children, are mobilising, sometimes “under cover” or in defiance of their governments. Women there are extremely active. Social media is a powerful tool for exchanging and sharing information. The EU must reach out to and support this civil society, from its most traditional forms (union organisations, mosques, human rights leagues and universities) to the more innovatory ones (bloggers, women’s groups, local movements, freelance journalists and independent media entities, etc.).



The highly singular example of Tunisia shows us how important civil society has been throughout the constitutional process, particularly at the time of the worst confrontations between the political players. The oldest associations (the unions, the Human Rights League, the Bar) have followed and supported the process since the birth of the revolution, as has the Mourakiboun, an association of young “geeks” who, with the help of an American NGO, created a more productive computer tool than that of the Electoral Commission for collating the results collected by its 10,000 or so observer-citizens during the various ballots.

In Libya, during the first days of the post-Gaddafi era, in a country where civil society had never had civic rights, in a time when “freedom fighters” were guaranteeing collective security, women and intellectuals were the first to consider the question of federalism and to try to lay the foundations of an independent civil society. Alas, we are far from there today.

In Egypt, it was the young members of the movement of April 6th, the spearhead of the uprising against Mubarak, who used the internet as a strike force in order to assemble. They were harshly punished and banned, some of them being sentenced to life imprisonment. This case illustrates the arrival on the scene of citizen players who now meet more or less in secrecy. The handle of the revolutions they had started or in which they had participated was turned again.

And then there are the political – and Islamic – opponents, the business leaders, provincial governors

It is high time the EU gave itself the means to fulfil the expectations of the civil societies of the Arab world and the Middle East, alongside its diplomatic work.

and new political parties which formed immediately after the revolutions and support the potential for the modernisation of their country or region.

The forum for young Maghreb leaders organised by the European Parliament and the many initiatives of the foundations or players in European civil society show the value of exchanges between Arabs and Europeans but also between Arab players of the same region among themselves.

That also applies to the NGO set up to enable Jordanians, Israelis and Palestinians to discuss the management of the Jordan river and its banks, a vital watercourse which is in great danger. Local men and women and dialogue are the precursors of the post-conflict situation.

It is high time the EU gave itself the means to fulfil the expectations of the civil societies of the Arab world and the Middle East, alongside its diplomatic work. Above all, even if the transition to democracy is in its infancy and/or chaotic, its re-establishment and the progress it will make are not under the control only of the more or less properly elected institutional players. The new generation of players is also fully committed to the democratic, political and economic modernisation of their countries.

On the European side, this carefully thought out and more transversal “soft power” should above all gather and weave the link between parliamentary initiatives, civil society and the players in the international business community. It should work to form a network whose configurations and

formats must be adequate and suitable each time (mayoral conventions, women’s associations, groups of members of parliament, diaspora associations, etc.) and of variable forms (virtual or on the spot networks, networks differentiated by discipline or interdisciplinary networks, concerning one or more regions or countries, or inter-regional), alone or in collaboration with non-European institutional players (International Organisation for Migration, International Criminal Court, United Nations Development Programme and Environmental Programme, etc.) or entities (Human Rights League, Anna Lindh Foundation, etc.).

It may involve direct or indirect financial support from the EU or an exchange of know-how for new or existing projects or networks (young and female members of parliament, female and/or young leaders, interdisciplinary exchanges, etc.), support for the free and independent media, democratic and religious freedom, support for the organisation and staffing of parliamentary work, the exchange of experience at regional level and/or between players on both banks of the Jordan or pointing out good practice and supporting it.

This method should be the trade mark of the Union’s projects, so that the associated local players adopt them and take ownership of them. Human rights, the compass of the European Union, are its cornerstone. The local authorities, often ignored in such approaches, ought to be closely associated with them. They are the essential players in both the transition to democracy and development.

And your last word?

The southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean are undergoing severe upheaval. The European Union is their first political, geographical, historical and cultural partner. It now has the tools, inadequate, it is true, but not insignificant, to fulfil their expectations, to overcome, but not deny, the history and political choices of the Member States in Brussels, New York, Jerusalem, Tehran or Istanbul. If the Union succeeds in making progress, it will be politically credited on both sides of the Mediterranean. Although the European Union has to some extent failed to manage the economic

and financial crisis and in doing so has swollen the sails of the nationalists and anti-Europeans, it could demonstrate greater strength in its handling of the crisis among its southern neighbours. However, it will not succeed unless it resolutely commits itself alongside those who are defending the values it is so quick to promote – even when they defend them bearing arms. ■

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Özgecan Kara

Wars will never end wars – Thoughts on the Kurds' fight against ISIS

The Kurds have conducted a remarkable democratic experiment in the north of Syria: Their “Canton-based Democratic Autonomy” is a pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity and democracy led by principles of equality and environmental sustainability. Nevertheless, protecting this area with weapons and the blood of martyrs shouldn't be applauded.

In almost four years of civil war in Syria, more than 220,000 people have died and around 3 million have been displaced. But in the midst of the war, in Rojava (the north of Syria), Kurds have been striving for freedom and have started pursuing a democratic experiment. It was the siege of Kobani, a canton of Rojava, on October 2014 that brought the world's undivided attention to the region, and it was not all for the right reasons. Instead of celebrating a promising democracy in the Middle East, the Western audience ended up cheering the martyrs who gave their life in the fight against ISIS, one of the greatest evils of our times.



From war to a “remarkable democratic experiment”

In order to understand what is going on in Rojava and how suddenly this territory made it to the world's political agenda, it is important to see the timeline of ISIS-related events and the Kurdish factions' role against ISIS.

Kurds refer to themselves as the biggest nation without a state, a community of 30 million people, of whom around 20 million live in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. There are Kurdish factions in each of these countries (as well as in the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan), and these factions have a history of conflict with each other.

However, a big step towards intra-Kurdish co-existence was taken during the Syrian civil war. The Democratic Union Party (PYD), a Kurdish political party in Syria, signed an agreement with the Kurdish National Council (KNC) to create a Kurdish Supreme Committee to govern Syrian Kurdistan on 12 July 2012. People's Protection Units (the PYD's militia) captured a number of Kurdish majority cities in Rojava on July 2012. This de facto autonomous region of Syria declared autonomy in November 2013. Since then Rojava has been the “Canton-based Democratic Autonomy of Rojava” as adopted by the interim constitution in January 2014, and has been referred to as a “remarkable democratic experiment”.

And along came ISIS (armed with US weapons)

On 6 June 2014, ISIS attacked Mosul in the north of Iraq and the US-trained Iraqi fighters (arming and training them has cost the West \$1.3 billion) fled the city, leaving ISIS to strip the main army base of Mosul, release prisoners and seize not only \$480 million from the city's banks, but also a number of US-supplied weapons that were left behind.

The only thing that was able to stop ISIS were the Kurdish forces, eager to defend their newly built democracy.

In 2003, the Western coalition invaded Iraq to bring democracy to the country and stability the region, and for years the coalition spent billions of the taxpayers' money on the war, resulting in hundreds of thousands of fatalities. Now, 11 years after the beginning of the War in Iraq, the West must realise that it not only bears significant responsibility for the instability in the region, but that there is also a rising extremist force, armed with US weapons, which US-trained forces weren't able to stop.

The only thing that was able to stop ISIS were the Kurdish forces, eager to defend their newly built democracy. When the Iraqi army fled, the Peshmerga remained the only force against ISIS's cruelty and they were not fighting a fair fight.

All eyes on the Kurds

When ISIS besieged Kobani in October 2014, the world witnessed the remarkable democratic experiment of Rojava: pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity and democracy led by principles of equality and environmental sustainability. The media had a chance to report on the ethnic and gender balance of the decision-making bodies of Rojava (where the councils are required to represent all ethnicities and have at least 40% gender balance), and soon it became clear that Rojava is more than just the home of Kurdish people, its significance goes well beyond Kurdistan. It is a democracy of people without a state. And its revolution is a genuine revolution.



The global media was of course most excited about the Women's Protection Units who were protecting their new democracy from the destructive forces of ISIS. Women's fashion magazines like Marie Claire and Elle started introducing the brave women of Kobani to their readers, while the fast-fashion clothing line H&M started to produce Kurdish female fighter-inspired jumpsuits. On top of this, leftist academics and writers started publishing articles praising the revolution in Rojava.

The battle for Kobani was not only a fight between the YPG and ISIS, it was a battle between humanity and barbarity, a battle between freedom and tyranny.

Soon the civil war of Rojava was being interpreted as a feminist, ecologist, democratic revolution. Even some anti-militarist objectors declared they were not against holding guns and pointing them at ISIS, as the war in Kobani was a legitimate fight for existence, a right to self-defence, a war to protect innocent lives. Volunteers from the West (or the "Lions" as they call themselves) went to Kobani to join the fight against ISIS. The US and EU were called upon to act to remove PKK and PYD from the list of terror organisations, to provide weapons and ammunition in order to stop heavily-armed ISIS, and even to start a military intervention. Turkey, in the meantime, was called on to open a corridor to let the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga join the fight.

And, indeed, the Kurds needed help, they needed to be saved from the terrorist group that was enslaving children, raping women and beheading non-Sunni Muslims in numerous regions of Iraq and Syria.

Some demanded military intervention because it was a "perfect" time for the US and the West to make good for turning a blind eye to Saddam Hussein's massacre of the Kurds. And some demanded military intervention because they blamed the US for ISIS' advance. And many believed that this was also an opportunity for the US to fix their part of what went wrong in Iraq after 2003.

But most demanded military intervention because, as YPG put it, "The battle for Kobani was not only a fight between the YPG and ISIS, it was a battle between humanity and barbarity, a battle between freedom and tyranny, it was a battle between all human values and the enemies of humanity."

Death becomes a spectacle

Unfortunately, the great interest does not lead to a better understanding of wars. On the contrary, when wars are shown in movies and TV shows, the gritty details are wiped away; war becomes a spectacle, a show that portrays a fight between the villain and the hero¹.

In the case of Kobani, the villain was as "evil" as evil can be while the idea of a democratic revolution was so widely celebrated, that it was quite obvious who were the real heroes to cheer for.

Nejat Suphi Agirnasli was a Turkish man from Turkey, who lost his life in Kobani while fighting the troops of ISIS. His friends wrote: Nejat became a martyr in Kobani. Nejat was martyred to defend Rojava, where most of our fights have been fought. Nejat believed in revolution. Nejat devoted himself to freedom, truth, justice, internationalism, revolution; to the fight of Kurds and all the oppressed. For Kobani, for the people of Kobani, for the revolution of Kobani. Kobani didn't fall, and will not fall with Nejat and other revolutionists at its side.

¹ Zeybek, Sezai Ozan "Savaşları Yeniden Yazmak: Şehitler ve İktidarın Seçici Belleği." "Öl Dediler Öldüm": Türkiye'de Şehitlik Mitleri Ed. Değirmencioğlu, M. Serdar. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. pp. 148.

The problem with weapons is they never get lost and they never stay unused. We can never be sure what is going to happen with the weapons that are provided to Kurds in 10 years time.



We often get misguided by these shows. We applaud the heroes and martyrs, while the cause of anti-militarism and nonviolence gets forgotten very easily. Consequently, the debates were distorted, and there was no more need for dialogue.

Picking a side, when it comes to a war like this one, is not too hard. It was definitely not as hard as it is for me to write the following sentences: Picking a side in a war only means siding with militarism. And calling for a “military intervention” to stop terrorist factions that are formed after “military intervention” that are outgunned with leftovers of another “military intervention” just proves that wars cause nothing but more wars.

The problem with weapons is they never get lost and they never stay unused. We can never be sure what is going to happen with the weapons that are provided to Kurds in 10 years time.

This is not a nationalist argument

Being Turkish and making this claim is really hard. First of all, people will criticise me for being a nationalist, because it’s the Turkish nationalists who were most vehemently opposing military aid to Kurds in fear that those weapons would be used against them in Turkey.

Secondly, my arguments will be misunderstood as being against the oppressed. After all the years of civil war and the crimes that the Turkish government has committed against Kurds, it is very hard to claim anything could be seen as going against Kurdish freedom and self-governance – especially when it is an experiment like Rojava, which has come to represent freedom driven by ecologists and feminists; freedom that creates nations without borders...

Thirdly, ISIS was just a kilometre away from the Turkish border and the Kurds were the only force stopping them from crossing. Those weapons have thus saved the lives of many Turks as well.

A time for change can only come when guns are silent

But being Turkish has also allowed me to witness that one can only talk about revolution, peace and freedom once the guns are silent. One of the bloodiest wars of our time, the Syrian civil war, still continues. The death toll in Syria was estimated to be 220,000 last January by the UN, and all of these 220,000 people are “shahid”, or martyrs, for one side or the other, for one cause or the other.

But when the cameras look away, when the glamour disappears, we are left with the cruelty of militarism. War, no matter for what noble purpose, is still about killing and destroying the enemy. And the dead, no matter how long their memory will stay with us, are still people who had to leave this world far too early. In Kobani, the world turned to old recipes of militarism in order to rescue a revolution. However the real revolution will happen when people no longer have to die for peace, for democracy, for their land, or in order to protect each other's lives. The revolution will happen when wars become taboos. ■

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Tamás Meszerics

Revising Green values – For a more effective foreign policy

Medication and water bottles have numerous advantages in a crisis situation, but it's quite sure that they cannot be used to stop ISIS. The greatest dilemmas of European Greens are rooted in a conflict of values, as well as in the difficulty of reconciling theory and practice. To overcome them, Greens need to work on a political solution.

The pacifist values of European Greens can sometimes come into conflict with the immediate needs of populations at risk of serious and imminent violence, for example when Greens oppose arms exports that would help these people defend themselves. In situations like this, many lives depend on how the international community responds to the threat. And Greens have to be prepared to react adequately.

This is not the only dilemma in which the foreign policies, as well as the values, of Green parties are not compatible with the acts that are needed to handle international dilemmas; in this article I will describe two examples that show that Greens still encounter serious problems when trying to harmonise theory with practice.

The problem becomes particularly evident when it comes to the European Union's Neighbourhood Policy and to peace-building during armed conflicts. Neither of these are trivial problems, as they touch on the most current foreign and security policy dilemmas, to which the Greens need to find tangible answers, as soon as possible.

Greens and their international dilemmas

The roots of Green foreign policy can be found in two completely different theoretical schools: on the one hand, we can see the influence of Marxist and critical theorists, and on the other hand of the liberal institutionalist school of international relations. The antagonism that arises between these schools can help us understand what's behind the current Green foreign policy stalemate.

Authors who have a critical attitude towards globalisation tend to argue that all conflicts stem from global inequalities, and these inequalities are reproduced and further strengthened by the system we live in. Many Green politicians and activists agree with this opinion, and their statements are usually correct, but instead of looking at ways to solve problems, they concentrate only on analysing their causes. I accept their virtues: these theories are invaluable when it comes to creating a just and equitable world order in the long run. There is, however, not much they can say on what to do in an actual crisis, and how to minimise imminent damages.

Thus, when it comes to handling a current crisis, Greens have to consult the theory of liberal institutionalism. Institutionalists think in terms of multilateral solutions, in line with the norms and rules of international organisations, such as those of the European Union, the United Nations or NATO. These are the institutions that enable them to make appropriate decisions while keeping member states' great power ambitions at bay.

The conflicts in our immediate neighbourhood, as well as other global challenges, are far too great for any member state's own diplomatic and military policy to deal with.

Greens who want to provide functional solutions to international conflicts, therefore, need to think in terms of a stronger European Union.



This is particularly important, as the conflicts in our immediate neighbourhood, as well as other global

challenges, are far too great for any member state's own diplomatic and military policy to deal with, which is why we regularly witness a group of member states teaming up with EU institutions or the Council of Europe to tackle crises together.

How to take concrete steps?

I have spent the last few years teaching at a university; this task has required me to look at challenges differently than as a member of parliament. As an analyst, I enjoyed the luxury of only making decisions when I am in the possession of all necessary information. In a parliament, however, this is not always possible (and the European Parliament is no exception).

In politics there is less information and more uncertainty. That is why it is particularly important for Greens to agree on how to relate to our values and to realise that the protection of at-risk populations needs quick responses. Only this way can we ensure that we act not as gamblers, but as responsible decision-makers.

If this base is agreed upon, parliamentary debates will become more constructive, too. I come from a parliamentary culture in which there is no tradition of compromise-seeking. The current Hungarian government, as well as its predecessors, have built their politics on conflicts. In comparison, the European Parliament is stunningly cooperative and ready for compromise. This kind of political institution is built on compromise-seeking – maybe even to a greater degree than the parliaments of member states.

In politics there is less information and more uncertainty.

By definition, participants don't get everything that they want in compromises, and if they become frequent, they will lead politicians to believe that they constantly have to make sacrifices.

Nevertheless, I believe that one of the greatest successes of my political career was due to a compromise: this was the resolution of the European Parliament on the recognition of the state of Palestine, in December, 2014. This resolution was widely supported in the parliament: 498 MEPs (71% of those present) from almost every parliamentary group voted in favour of it.

Before getting to the vote, there were, of course, compromises, and some significant changes were made to the text, nevertheless it ended up being closer to the standpoint of the Greens and most leftwing parties than any previous resolution on the topic. This is a great achievement, despite the flaws in the text.

In the end, it was the Greens who made sure that the outcome of peace talks is not a condition of the recognition of the Palestinian State, and that the self-determination of the Palestinian people is mentioned in the text. These are two crucial points that could foster a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The debates on the text and the outcome of the vote have shown that even though there is no Green foreign minister in Europe at the moment,

European Greens indeed have a say in the formation of European foreign policies. Thus, they cannot afford to have no answers to global problems.



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How to make peace?

Since the early 90s there have been constant debates inside European Green parties on armed conflicts and peacebuilding, nevertheless, the possibility of a comprehensive peace-policy is still an open question. There need to be much more concrete ideas regarding the limits of traditional pacifistic views when it comes to humanitarian or human rights issues.

A good example of these limits is related to the advance of the Islamic State. When the Islamists reached the territories of the Kurds in 2014, the international community was confronted with a serious dilemma: the traditional Green solution would have been to send aid to those in need. The Kurds, however, signalled that they needed more than that: they needed weapons, since they were under siege, and water bottles couldn't help them

If we send peace-building troops, what is going to be their authority? What kinds of weapons are they supposed to have? Are they supposed to shoot, and if so under what conditions?

much when it came to protecting themselves from the militants of ISIS.

This is a very serious dilemma for pacifists, as the Greens agreed in the 70s that they would not send weapons to conflict zones, and many of them still want to stick to this agreement.

Since the Bielefeld conference of the German Greens in 1999, when most of the party members present voted in favour of the Serbian NATO-mission – in order to prevent a genocide in Kosovo – the majority of the party's membership has accepted the legitimacy of preventive interventions, even if they necessitate military involvement. But the current armed conflicts are more complex than those of the previous decades, thus agreement on such a simple issue cannot really solve them. The growing number of non-state actors is blurring the borders between conflicts in need of humanitarian intervention, and those requiring armed solutions. Thus, Greens end up with a number of unanswered questions: If we send peace-building troops, what is going to be their authority? What kinds of weapons are they supposed to have? Are they supposed to shoot, and if so under what conditions? Are they supposed to defend a territory the same way the military would? – And so on.

The Islamic State, even though its name suggests something different, is no more than a group of Islamists, thus it's not a traditional actor in international conflicts. In the case of Kosovo we had a state actor, so the Western states had the chance to use traditional diplomatic channels before deciding to intervene militarily.



But in the case of non-state actors there is no diplomatic solution, and intervention is not the last resort: it's the only resort. In this case the pacifist values are overwritten by another moral principle: the protection of vulnerable populations.

Although this might seem obvious, it is almost impossible to come up with a set of rules that would help us overcome this problem. We cannot determine under what conditions one can deviate from pacifist values, because we have no idea of how the next conflict will differ from the previous ones. The only thing we can do in these situations is to look for a political solution, as soon as possible, because otherwise we will have no chance of providing protection to at-risk populations.

A neighbourhood policy in ruins

A second serious problem is the European Neighbourhood Policy, which may only achieve a small portion of its targets, within the current

framework. Although the EU allocates huge amounts to this policy, there have been few signs of a significant increase in prosperity, safety or stability among our neighbours recently.

Out of the six eastern neighbours only three – Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova – have signed an association agreement with the EU, with the remaining three we can currently, in the best case, do business, but other forms of cooperation seem to be less likely.

Fixing this policy is of particular importance for the Greens because thus far they were hoping that the promise of EU membership could create the kind of partnership with these countries that brings about reforms and prosperity. Now it seems like this part of the program has been pushed into the distant future, and thereby has lost its political significance.

In order to solve this problem, Greens, as well as other party groups, need to reconsider whether it makes sense to start membership talks with these countries, or whether the EU is willing to provide them, at least, an intermediate status. In a zone in which countries are not prospective members, but still enjoy the advantages of a partnership with the EU.

The handicaps of free trade

There is another problem related to the neighbourhood policy: most Green parties voice serious concerns when it comes to the principles of international trade, since trade entails drawbacks

as well as advantages. Due to free trade we create conditions that are harmful to local communities, local economies, or even national economies. On the global level Greens have very serious ideas on this topic, nevertheless, when it comes to the European neighbourhood policy, they seem to avoid asking whether or not free trade is beneficial for partner states inside this system.

On the regional level they act as if global dilemmas were not applicable at all. Without trade, a partnership with our neighbours is unthinkable, thus proponents of the policy emphasise, on the one hand, that the partnership is of political value and that the advantages of being part of a political community overwrite the possible economic disadvantages. On the other hand, they argue that economic problems



are only temporary, and free trade will in the longer term lead to economic growth.

In theory, this may sound good, but when we look at the EU's new member states, we can see that not even they have managed to recover from the vanishing of industries, and the vast amount of unemployment this leads to, even with the help of EU structural and cohesion funds.

The situation can be even worse when it comes to the EU's neighbours: when a partnership is only built on trade, being part of a free trade area can mean serious problems for these countries. If there is no promise of EU membership (or the like) then the huge societal damages and growing regional inequalities will not be compensated. In a situation like this we

cannot hope for stability and prosperity, they will never come. If not even Greens acknowledge the existence of this problem, we cannot expect it to make it to the agenda of the European Parliament. However, if Greens manage to finally have a constructive debate on these issues, and find the necessary solutions, they can, in the framework of the EU, find timely and effective solutions to global dilemmas. ■

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PART II – EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES – THE EU BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE

The major foreign policy players remain nation states, as was illustrated again by the Minsk negotiations on a cease-fire in Ukraine, that were facilitated by France and Germany rather than the EU. The reticence to transfer foreign policy competences to the EU supra-national level has profoundly diminished the EU's international standing. Can this trend be continued in the current, conflict-ridden international context? Will this conjuncture completely break the – limited – EU legitimacy on a global stage or could it represent an opportunity for the EU to step up and act as a responsible and unified global player? This section develops the latter point: Which are the crucial matters that the EU can positively shape if acting in a strategic and coordinated approach? Where do opportunities lie for greening EU foreign policy whilst strengthening the EU's international profile?

The following articles offer reflection points on key questions the EU needs to address in order to live up to its commitment to peace and prosperity at home and abroad. The intrinsic link between climate change and conflict comes up in almost all the articles make up this section. Moreover, the authors suggest the EU's foreign policy needs to shift from crisis reaction to a pro-active shaping of foreign affairs, and the Global North – including the EU – needs to assume its responsibility for the devastating and far-reaching effects of climate change on the Global South.



Tarja Cronberg

Why does the EU stay silent on nuclear disarmament?

The European Union professes to advocate a world without nuclear weapons. Yet the number of weapons and their potency seem to be on the increase. So how can we explain the stalling of talks and postponement of real action towards nuclear disarmament, and what are the obstacles holding back the EU from leading by example?

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The European Union strongly supports the idea of nuclear-weapons-free-zones (NWFZ) and has lent its support to efforts to make the Middle East a NWFZ. Yet this political support concerns only regions outside the EU, not the EU itself. There hasn't been a single political debate on whether Europe should be a NWFZ. Even in the European Parliament there has been little discussion, even though two-thirds of MEPs signed the agreement about aspirations for a world without nuclear weapons, which even became the official position of the parliament in this matter.

In principle, everyone supports a world without nuclear weapons. NATO has a mission to create a basis for a future world without such weapons, while keeping up the status of a nuclear-armed military alliance as long as there are still nuclear weapons in the world. Nuclear weapons though, show no signs of disappearing from the world at the moment.

Quite the opposite, nuclear weapons are currently being modernised. Both the United States and Russia are even developing new weapons. The US will in fact fund their nuclear weapons programs for the coming 30 years with more than 1,000 billion euros. The European figures are modest in comparison, but both France and the UK are modernising their weaponry, despite the fact that neither of them is under military threat. Neither by nuclear weapons nor in the traditional sense.

The humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons

To speed up the process of nuclear disarmament, Norway and Austria together with the peace movement have tried to create a new point of view on the matter of disarmament. Their purpose is not to discuss so much about the figures or stability in power relations or even whether the weapons have military significance. Now they are discussing the nuclear explosions, whether planned or accidental; they are talking about their humanitarian consequences.



This approach has brought up completely different angles to the conversation. Those who have been targeted by nuclear tests get to speak in international conferences. Dangerous situations in the past have been researched and mapped. There have been conferences in Norway, Mexico and Austria on the theme of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Over 100 countries have participated in these meetings and they have signed a claim for a world without nuclear weapons. The broad campaign of the civil organisations called ICAN

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(International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons) is also trying to achieve a total ban on nuclear weapons.

The five official nuclear powers, the so called P5 countries (US, China, Russia, France and the UK) have so far boycotted the conversation about the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. These countries have instead said that the catastrophic consequences are in fact the most important feature in this area of weaponry and that is why the fear factor works. The unity of the P5 countries, however, has recently shifted and both the US and the UK participated in the international summit in Austria, which was held last December.

France is swimming upstream

The European Union has stayed silent about the question of nuclear weapons and the explanation for this is simply: France. France resists any discussion concerning nuclear disarmament. As far as France is concerned, the justification of having nuclear weapons cannot be brought into question. They are only strongly against widening the club of nuclear-armed states.

After I was elected to the European parliament, I had conversations with my French colleagues about Europe as a nuclear-weapons-free-zone. The last time this subject had been on table was right after the Second World War. For them though, the subject was a complete taboo. In France, the discussion cannot even be broached. Nor can the conversation about the relation between nuclear weapons and nuclear power.

The parliamentary network of representatives supporting global nuclear disarmament succeeded in bringing up a discussion in the French parliament that sought to address the question of "Whether we can have this conversation in the French parliament." I was there, to witness an expert strongly advising a Finnish MEP: "You do understand that... nuclear weapons are part of French DNA."

France hasn't even replied to any invitations to the international summits about the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Recently I was at a European Parliament meeting, where France was criticised. The French representative answered that the purpose of these meetings was completely unclear, and that was why France refused to participate in them. The Austrian ambassador replied that the goal was very clear: A world without nuclear weapons. "That is exactly why we won't participate," the French representative answered.

2015 Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty Review

Concerning nuclear weapons, the EU's unified position is conveyed through its statements about the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). Every five years, the treaty is reviewed and the EU adopts up its common position towards the treaty.

The EU's statements have showed us the reality, which is the disagreement between the nuclear armed nations and those without them. France and the UK don't want to participate in nuclear disarmament.



The NPT was ratified in 1970, and is based on three principles:

1. The five countries that successfully detonated a nuclear device before the year 1967 have the right to possess nuclear weapons. These countries are France, the UK, the US, Russia and China. According to the treaty all countries are tied to nuclear disarmament and their common goal is a world without nuclear weapons.
2. Every other country that has signed the treaty, which is over 180 countries, agrees not to develop, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. This part of the treaty is supervised by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)
3. The treaty guarantees that the countries that do not possess any nuclear weapons have a right to use nuclear technology to produce energy or to use it for medical purposes.

There are four countries that have not signed the treaty; they have instead developed unofficial nuclear weapons. These countries are India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.

There have been great difficulties in the implementation of the treaty. In practice, the treaty has only been working to stop nuclear arms from spreading. No progress in nuclear disarmament has been made and the current weapons are being constantly modernised. Even a treaty to ban nuclear tests hasn't been ratified. This situation causes tensions between the nuclear-armed states and those who don't have them.

The treaty review summit is expected to be extremely difficult. The question of solving the situation in Iran has been postponed. In 2010 it was agreed that there will be a summit about the Middle East as a nuclear-weapons-free-zone. This meeting hasn't been held. The countries without nuclear weapons are going to demand some evidence that nuclear disarmament is happening. They are going to demand scheduled actions instead of shaky promises.

The EU has always made a common statement for these meetings. They have always been vague general statements which say that the treaty is very important and that we demand that the rest of the countries in the world also join it. The EU's statements have showed us the reality, which is the disagreement between the nuclear-armed nations and those without them. France and the UK don't

want to participate in nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, Ireland and Sweden want strong agreements on nuclear disarmament.

In NPT meetings, the EU has always been the silent one. In the upcoming summit in May 2015, the whole treaty stands on a knife-edge. The EU should get itself together, unite and make a concrete first move on how to start the nuclear disarmament. At the same time, we should start discussing Europe as a nuclear-weapons-free-zone and set an example to others. That is the same we demand from them, isn't it? ■

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A “Plan B” for European security: Mitigating climate change through military procurement



Francisco Seijo

Climate change represents a unique opportunity for Europe’s green parties to “lead the way” by developing a sound strategy for “greening” Europe’s foreign and security policy – and in the process revamping this stagnant dimension of European integration.

By altering the planet’s climate human beings have transformed the natural world irreversibly. These transformations will force us to live differently from the way we have been living since the beginning of the Industrial era. As the British conservative magazine “The Economist” notes “Humans have changed the way the world works...now they have to change the way they think about it”. Indeed, it is still largely uncertain how climate change (one of the major transformations of our time) is going to impact humanity. Some environmental activists believe it marks the “end of nature” and the advent of a totally artificial, humanised planet, while others see in it an opportunity to abandon “advanced capitalism” and create new political and economic forms of organisation, more attuned to this new environmental reality.

It is clear that Europe needs to think deeply and seriously about ways to mitigate the large-scale impact of industrial-era carbon emissions on the planet’s natural systems. This need not be a deeply traumatic process. In fact, climate change, perhaps the greatest environmental challenge that humanity has ever faced, could provide an impetus for Europe to find a new purpose for some of the pillars of its faltering integration project. All in all, climate change represents a unique opportunity for Europe’s green parties to “lead the way” by developing a sound strategy for “greening” Europe’s foreign and security policy, while facing up to the challenges raised by a degraded global climate system.

More than just a “market failure”

Climate change has been described by academics, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and most international policymakers as a textbook example of a “market failure”. It is enough to look at the Stern Review, to date the most influential study on the economics of the issue. As Stern puts it, “Climate change is a result of the greatest market failure the world has seen...The problem of climate change involves a fundamental failure of markets: those who damage others by emitting greenhouse gases generally do not pay”.

Thinking about the problem in this way has led international actors to place their mitigation bets on the construction of complex, nested “cap and trade” systems. “Cap and trade”, roughly speaking, seeks to create a rational, regulated market for carbon by trying to entice or coerce polluters and financiers wishing to maintain their profits to simultaneously serve the common good by mitigating emissions.

The time has come to acknowledge that this approach has failed to deliver on its promise. The most notable example of this failure is the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Not only has the EU ETS not met its ambitious emissions reduction goals, it has distorted the price for carbon permits in the market that the EU itself has created (reducing its value to practically unsellable levels) and opened up huge opportunities for fraud for the carbon-intensive business and financial interests that were supposed to be incentivised by the system to solve the problem.

The closest historical example of the successful resolution of a “security dilemma” was the nuclear standoff of the Cold War.



It remains to be seen whether – with deep streamlining – the EU ETS and other similarly ambitious regional initiatives like California’s Air Resources Board Emissions Trading Program (CARB TP) will ever prove to be effective. It is apparent, though, that at this point a critical re-evaluation of both the theoretical underpinnings and the effectiveness of “cap and trade” is sorely needed because soon negotiators in Paris will seek to, in all likelihood, base an international climate change treaty on the idea. This agreement, if enacted, could commit the international community to “cap and trade” for decades.

Given the growing urgency of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions it would be foolhardy to rely only on a “single bullet” approach to solving the climate change problem. The world needs a “Plan B” and the development of such a plan requires a substantial re-thinking of what climate change represents.

Climate change is a security dilemma

Let us for a moment think of market failures not as a cause but as a consequence. This is no doubt a difficult exercise given the “economic” character of our age in which financial and economic interests seem to be the prime movers of all things. What if a supposed market failure were the consequence of an underlying “security dilemma”? The dilemma would emerge when a state seeking to mitigate climate change found itself inevitably trapped in a double bind reasoning regarding the consequences of action or inaction.

Let us imagine that a given state chose to act while other states did nothing. The economic cost of action, given the present cost of low-carbon energy production, would surely make its economy uncompetitive which ultimately would lead to a “security crisis” with regards to its competitors. What if this state opted instead for inaction? This time a different type of “security crisis” would emerge, the result of a deteriorating climate system.

Dismaying as they may seem, these types of security dilemmas are not new in international relations. Humanity has faced similar problems before, so there is no reason to believe that they cannot be solved.

The closest historical example of the successful resolution of a “security dilemma” was the nuclear standoff of the Cold War. A combination of arms races, disarmament treaties and effective “signalling” (meaning that the two nuclear powers were able to credibly convey information about themselves to the other party), prevented a catastrophic nuclear war

The world is now asymmetrically multipolar. Europe, therefore, can no longer simply look across the Atlantic, as it did during the Cold War, for leadership and technological innovation.

from taking place. Indeed, international negotiators have intuitively grasped the similarities between these two "security dilemmas", thus "cap and trade" treaties like the Kyoto Protocol have been inspired by the design of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties of the Cold War.

Learning from disarmament?

However, applying "disarmament" treaty models to climate change may be reasoning through false analogy. Experience demonstrates that disarmament initiatives worked best when negotiated bilaterally. Multilateral disarmament treaties have, in general, fared much worse. Witness the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which, though partially successful, has failed to contain nuclear proliferation in rogue states like North Korea. Proponents of disarmament may have also downplayed the importance of arms races as a successful strategy – for a limited amount of time and in particular contexts – for overcoming the "security dilemma" of the Cold War.

What are, then, the special characteristics of the new "security dilemma" represented by climate change? The biggest challenge raised this time is how to find a way of keeping our civilisation thriving in a post-carbon, post-industrial era. We need alternative energy sources that can both guarantee the material welfare of humanity and preserve the ecological systems upon which our civilisation relies not only for its survival but also for its spiritual well-being. An economically viable technological alternative to carbon does not exist yet. Yet, technology is

what got us into the problem and – though other measures such as curbing "consumerism" and other culturally wasteful systems of political and economic organisation can also help to some extent – it is mostly technology that needs to get us out of the present quandary.



The task won't be easy. We can't simply turn back the clock and regress human civilisation to a pre-industrial era with low carbon emissions, in which the world's population was but a fraction of what it is today. To add to our difficulties, the political environment in which this quest for alternative technologies must unfold has also changed substantially. The world is now asymmetrically multipolar. Europe, therefore, can no longer simply look across the Atlantic, as it did during the Cold War, for leadership and technological innovation. It must step up and face the responsibilities that the relative decline of the US entails.

Let’s give it a P.U.S.H.

So, what can be done, then? When we look at climate change as a “security dilemma” rather than as a “market failure” the solution to the problem no longer relies exclusively on “cap and trade”. Instead the focus shifts to creating an international political environment more conducive to the development of alternative technologies that will drive fossil fuels – and their associated financial and industrial vested interests – into gradual economic and political obsolescence. To facilitate this process the European Union should formulate a foreign and security policy that defines climate change as one of its top homeland security priorities, thereby clearly signalling to both its international allies and rivals that it takes the problem seriously. Moreover, it plans to benefit from the opportunities offered by a post-carbon, post-industrial globalised civilisation in whose creation it plans to pro-actively participate.

For synthetic purposes I have integrated what some of these policies would look like under the acronym P.U.S.H. which stands for “Positive Unilateral Signalling on Homeland Security climate change based priorities”.

1. Reforming the EU’s rudderless security policy
Research & Development (R&D) projects on low-carbon technologies, in my view, need to be financed at the European level, following the cooperative model developed for the military industry and, indeed, detracting resources from some of its most unnecessary projects. Why finance wasteful and ineffective “Eurocopter” and “Eurofighter”

research schemes instead of alternative low-carbon technologies? These could both mitigate climate change and guarantee energy security for Europe. R&D could also produce positive economic effects through “*knowledge spillover*” for the European industry and society. Though this may sound anathema to many “Greens”, military procurement may just be the path to jumpstarting the next technological revolution. It is no secret that many of humanity’s most transformative technologies were developed under military pressure and/or leadership. The internet, for example, was developed by the US military with the mostly beneficial “spillover” effects for the American and global economy.



The EU's foreign policy should be re-oriented towards the prioritisation of climate change mitigation and adaptation. To do so the EU should attempt to foment a "clean energy race" between the great regional blocs existing in the world today.

2. Applying a homogeneous EU "carbon tax"

This tax should be carefully designed to favour business initiatives incorporating quantifiable improvements in emissions and/or low carbon energy intensiveness. The "green" movement, at the same time, should actively oppose "green" taxes that have as their real objective the levying of funds for purposes other than driving the technological transformation of carbon-intensive industries. In fact, these types of industries should be the main target of the new "carbon tax" since most emissions arise from dysfunction at the "supply" rather than the "demand" end of the market. "Green" taxes, finally, are not progressive economically, penalising the poor and the rich equally. This generates hostility and scepticism towards anything "ecological" among the general population including, of course, Green parties which are viewed as caring more for nature than people.

3. A more prominent role for the Commission

Europe also needs to reinforce the executive powers of the European Commission (EC) and particularly the Competition Commissioner. A European wide financial, industrial and energy sector reform is needed that will limit the size of the existing actors and open markets to new "green" business initiatives on a level playing field. This implies curbing EU policies that favour the creation of "European champions" in industry, finance and energy that are supposedly competitive, but, in fact, derive their profits from the oligopolistic exploitation of European captive markets.

4. A need for decentralisation

A fourth measure would require the decentralisation of mitigation and adaptation planning to the municipal and regional level. EU agricultural and cohesion funds could be partially conditioned to the development of "bottom up" regional plans by local communities whose informal governance and economic structures should also be reinforced financially. The goals and achievements of these plans should be quantifiable and verifiable in order to avoid, as much as possible, opportunities for corruption.

5. Climate change should be a priority

Finally, the EU's foreign policy should be re-oriented towards the prioritisation of climate change mitigation and adaptation. To do so the EU should attempt to foment a "clean energy race" between the great regional blocs existing in the world today. Europe must lead through competition rather than "flexible mechanisms"; unbelievable 20/20/20 (maybe 30) unilateral goals and fraudulent emissions trading programs. In parallel, and to fully exploit the foreign policy advantages of this clear "signalling" method, the EU should focus its mitigation efforts on international multilateral negotiations at the G-20 rather than at the United Nations level, since 80% of the world's carbon emissions are produced by countries belonging to this informal governance club for powerful countries. ■

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Meeting our global responsibility – The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals



Frithjof Schmidt

Global inequality has risen alarmingly in recent years. Together with the global climate crisis, this poses a serious threat to our entire society. The Millennium Development Goals aimed to substantially diminish this global injustice by 2015. Yet the current state of affairs highlights serious flaws, which Europe and the other industrialised countries have to learn from if they are to demonstrate that they are serious about tackling global challenges.

Social inequality can destabilise entire political systems and risks spreading conflicts that can quickly engulf an entire region.

Global inequality is rising. A new study by Oxfam shows that the gap between rich and poor has steadily widened in the last 30 years. While hundreds of millions of people still live in poverty and lack adequate food and access to safe water, the number of the world's billionaires has more than doubled since the start of the financial crisis. As the Oxfam report makes clear, this social inequality poses a serious threat to our entire global society. Inequality has an immensely destabilising effect, amplifying other social problems. Murder rates, for example, are almost four times higher in very unequal societies. Social inequality can destabilise entire political systems and risks spreading conflicts that can quickly engulf an entire region. Syria is an obvious example, according to the Oxfam study: alongside various other factors, Syria's rapidly growing inequality before 2011 did much to destabilise the country. Clearly, given the scale of the civil war in Syria today, this is not the decisive explanation, but there is no disputing that reducing social inequality always has a powerful conflict prevention effect.

2015 is a crucial year in the fight against rising global inequality. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) expire at the end of the year. The process to forge a follow-up agreement at the UN level is well underway. Last summer, a United Nations working group proposed a set of 17 goals for consideration by the United Nations. The UN General Assembly is expected to adopt the new sustainable development agenda (Sustainable Development Goals – SDGs) in September 2015, based on a set of goals which will be much more ambitious than those adopted at the

United Nations Millennium Summit 15 years ago. This time, sustainability and development goals will merge to form a universal agenda, thus addressing one of the main criticisms of the MDGs.

Mixed results

Progress on the MDGs themselves has been mixed. On poverty reduction, for example, some impressive successes have been achieved. In 1990, 43 percent of people in the developing world lived on less than US\$ 1.25 a day, but by the end of 2015, this is expected to have fallen to just 15 percent. Major progress has been made on access to safe water as well: in 1990, 30 percent of people living in developing countries had no access to drinking water, but by 2008, these figures had already halved. Similar progress has been made on access to primary schooling and reducing child mortality.

Despite these important global advances, there are stark differences between regions. Progress on the individual Millennium Development Goals has been uneven. What's more, the rise of the newly industrialising countries is likely to have clouded the statistics. The economic ascent of countries such as China and Brazil, which would undoubtedly have occurred even without the MDGs, has boosted the statistics, whereas only very limited development progress has been observed in other regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa, since 1990. So it is right to take the criticism of the MDGs seriously and factor it into work on formulating the new sustainable development goals. I would like to take a closer look at two of these criticisms in particular.

The development progress achieved in recent decades has been accompanied by ever-increasing environmental degradation.

Poverty: not just a lack of income

One of the fundamental flaws in the Millennium Development Goals, it is often claimed, is their narrow interpretation of the Global North's responsibility: they focus too much on development aid instead of addressing structural inequality between the industrialised North and the Global South. Viewed through the lens of the MDG agenda, poverty primarily meant a lack of income. There was a failure to recognise that there are other causes of poverty, such as the denial of rights and lack of access to land, education and social infrastructure. For example, a fair and equitable opportunity for people to work the land themselves is an important factor in preventing famine.



Studies have shown that 50 percent of all people affected by famines live in smallholder families whose land suddenly ceases to sustain their subsistence economy. The causes are, in most cases, social and political. For that reason too, there has been a growing awareness in recent years that

sustainable development is only possible if it also facilitates people's access to public goods and rights. The war on hunger begins, then, by empowering smallholders in developing countries to assert their rights against their governments and major corporations, instead of delaying action until long after a famine has broken out. Let's hope that the new sustainable development agenda agreed in New York in September will recognise that poverty does not just mean income poverty, thus opening the way for a broader understanding of development.

Joining up the social and environmental dimensions

Another omission in the Millennium Development Goals was the absence of any joined-up thinking on the social and environmental dimensions of development. It was recognised at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro back in 1992 that our current model of development is incompatible with planetary boundaries. More than 20 years on, these fears have proved correct.

The development progress achieved in recent decades has been accompanied by ever-increasing environmental degradation. The problem is not the world's growing population but the rapid expansion worldwide of an affluent middle class with, currently, one billion people who aspire to typical middle-class consumption patterns centred around cars, smartphones and designer clothing. Their hunger for resources, land and energy is driving the planet to destruction. If we continue along this development

path, especially in industrialised countries, this will inevitably result in ecosystem collapse. Some regions of the world are already feeling the effects of climate change. Droughts, floods and other extreme weather events mainly impact on the world's poorer and less developed countries. Those who have done least to cause the problem of global climate change are hardest hit by its effects.

And this creates a major conflict which must be addressed successfully in the post-2015 agenda. Many developing and emerging countries aspire to follow the same development path as the industrialised countries, including excessive consumption of fossil resources. If they do, however, it will be impossible to meet the target of limiting global temperature rise to 2°C and thus avert climate catastrophe. This conflict of interests has to be resolved in autumn – but the industrialised countries must make the first move. The European Union and its Member States in particular must take a leading role instead of applying the brakes. The industrialised countries have used the atmosphere as a dumping ground for their CO₂ emissions to a disproportionate extent. They must assume global responsibility now and set a course towards sustainable development. In essence, it is about fair and equitable distribution of social and environmental resources.



Taking global responsibility seriously

The industrialised countries must meet their global responsibility by allocating at least 0.7 percent of GNI to official development assistance. In 2013, only a handful of OECD countries managed to meet this target: the United Kingdom, Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden. The net contribution of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries stood at only 0.3 percent of GNI. In this respect, the industrialised countries have to do much more. But it is not just a question of allocating 0.7 percent of GNI to official development assistance.

The Global North must also reduce their ecological footprint and cut their CO₂ emissions. In order to do so, it is necessary to reduce CO₂ emissions globally to 2 tons per capita a year. According to the World Bank, Germany, for example, is now consuming approximately 9.1 tons per capita every year. Worse still, CO₂ consumption in the USA amounts to

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17.6 tons per capita a year. While in Senegal the CO₂ consumption averages only 0.5 tons per capita a year. These numbers show that the industrialised countries have to lead the way and cannot shy away from their responsibility.

The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities has been well-established in international environmental law for some time. As far as equitable and sustainable development is concerned, this can be spelled out very clearly with reference to distribution issues. The Northern countries bear historical responsibility for the exploitation of the Earth's resources and for climate change and continue to be mainly responsible for the overuse and destruction of the biosphere and atmosphere. So the industrialised countries must pursue a credible course, without denying the Global South scope for development. However, the emerging and developing countries, too, must make a contribution to the fair and equitable distribution of social and environmental resources within their own societies. Everyone has a role to play.

Global inequality, which has risen alarmingly in recent years, and the global climate crisis are interconnected. The major challenge facing the present generation is to join up these two issues and develop a common agenda with viable solutions. It remains to be seen whether the sustainable development goals adopted in autumn have the normative power to initiate a shift in global mind-sets. That will depend, above all, on how seriously the industrialised countries take these goals. ■

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Reinhard Bütikofer

The EU and South East Asia – Why Europe needs to become an active player

Beset by the crises occurring internally and in its immediate neighbourhood, the EU has neglected its relations with South East Asia. This is a major shortcoming, since that region is becoming the epicentre of global relations and will play an increasingly important role for international security.

The German chancellor
Angela Merkel and her
finance minister Wolfgang
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one-sided austerity policy.

Crisis overload seems to have become a permanent modus operandi for the European Union. Actually, there is a kind of pile-up of domestic and internal crises to be dealt with at the same time, with every one of them a big challenge for the European Union. On one side, there is the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and multiple conflicts in the Middle East – from Syria and Iraq to Israel and Palestine to the evolving of an authoritarian regime in Egypt and the perpetual worsening of the situation in Libya. On another side, Europe is confronted with the threats of Islamist terrorism; this hit home more powerfully than before in the attacks on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and a kosher supermarket in Paris.

In addition, the election of a new government in Greece highlights and exacerbates the internal conflicts over the future direction of the EU integration project. Moves by different actors have contributed to undermining the principles of European cooperation. Presently there is too much taste for confrontation and for the idea of national power and sovereignty. Populist and xenophobic movements are successful in many EU member states. In summary, the EU has to deal with crises internally and face a global environment, which questions the very idea of an international order.

Being proactive

How the EU chooses to deal with this huge package of challenges is the key question for the future. I believe such crises could provide an impetus to strengthen a community approach and support the development of a more powerful role for the EU. To achieve this, however, the EU has to switch from a crisis-reaction mode to a proactive mode of shaping politics, internal and external.

Externally, the challenge of developing a proactive role is particularly huge. First, there is a need for strategic plans and, second, for implementing these plans with a real common foreign and security policy. Therefore, becoming a relevant and powerful actor is directly linked to the responses given to the internal crisis. The economic crisis in the south of Europe is not only a catastrophe for the people in the region; it goes hand in hand with the rise of anti-European populist parties, as can be seen, among others, in Greece. Even if the new Greek government hasn't tried to stop the sanctions against Russia yet, it is obvious that a common foreign policy towards Russia will be more complicated with Syriza in government. Thus, a new answer to the economic crisis, especially in Southern Europe, is overdue. The austerity policy of the last years has demonstrated its failure – and it has led to very negative consequences. A change of course is necessary. The German chancellor Angela Merkel and her finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble alone are the last dinosaurs defending the one-sided austerity policy.

The South China Sea is a key region for global trade, especially when it comes to trade with the EU.

The other important condition for a more powerful role for the EU is, as said above, to develop and implement strategic plans step by step. In this context, it is obvious that the EU needs a strategic plan for its relations with Russia, which can no longer be limited to only reacting to the recent developments in Eastern Ukraine. There is also no doubt that the EU needs a strategic plan for the situation in the Middle East.

Furthermore, even if it is not as obvious as in the aforementioned cases, the EU also needs a strategic plan for a common foreign and security policy towards the South East Asia Region – this is long overdue.

“Get the EU interested”

A few weeks ago, an ambassador of a member state of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) told me: “Perhaps we need a big crisis in our area as well, to get the EU interested in our region”. Well, even without a “big crisis”, the region has seen rising tensions for years. From the European angle, though, the situation in South East Asia is very much out of focus. This is negligent, not only because the EU could play a constructive and positive role towards this region. The EU could support efforts to prevent the escalation of conflicts and could actively help to shape cooperation policies. In addition, the way of dealing with the struggle of interests and the conflicts in this region could be a model and decisive element for the rebuilding of the international order, based on principles of cooperation, multilateralism and the respect of international law.



The South China Sea is a key region for global trade, especially when it comes to trade with the EU. South East Asia has 600 million inhabitants and is economically one of the fastest-growing regions in the world. The EU is the third biggest commercial partner for the ASEAN states (after China and Japan) with more than €235 billion of trade in goods and services in 2012; that is approximately 13% of the total trade volume of ASEAN states. The EU is also by far the largest investor in ASEAN countries. For the EU, ASEAN as a whole represents the third largest trading partner outside Europe (after the US and China).

Moreover, ASEAN is the most important multilateral body in the region, following a logic of cooperation and integration, which can be compared with the EU, even if it is less integrated and integrated in a different way. In contrast to the EU, ASEAN prefers to operate on the basis of informality, consensus, non-binding decisions and non-interference in internal matters. The member states of the

association are Brunei, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. As weak as this association may seem, this structure has massively contributed to peace and stability in the South-East region since its formation in 1967.

Watch out for China (and the US)

For several years now, the South East Asia region and the ASEAN member countries have been under increasing pressure from the evolving power struggle between China and the US. After having followed a concept of safeguarding its own security through beneficial cooperation based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence for many years (which called for the resolution of territorial conflicts through peaceful negotiation, and for the promotion of common prosperity, mutual benefit and common development – as described in “China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept”), China is changing its foreign policy towards more assertiveness, particularly visible since the take-over of Xi Jinping at the end of 2012.

For decades, China had claimed the so-called “nine-dash line”, citing “historical rights”. That U-shaped line reaches 1500 kilometres south of Hainan Island and covers more than 80% of the South China Sea. China acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) in 1996, nevertheless it continues to use the “nine-dash line” to call for its “historical” maritime domain and its desire to control

the fisheries, minerals and other maritime resources, as well as the potentially vast oil and gas deposits to be found there. With rising demand for resources, due to its fast economic growth, the exploitation of this region is evidently becoming increasingly important to China.

On the other hand, the Obama Administration declared the Pacific region a region of main interest to the US. As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pointed out in an article entitled “America’s Pacific Century” in the magazine Foreign Policy in October 2011: “The future of politics will be decided in Asia [...] and the United States will be right at the center of the action.”

Furthermore, Kurt Campbell, the former US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, wrote in August 2013: “The United States government is in the early stages of a substantial national project: reorienting significant elements of its foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region and encouraging many of its partners outside the region to do the same. The “strategic pivot” or rebalancing, launched four years ago, is premised on the recognition that the lion’s share of the political and economic history of the 21st century will be written in the Asia-Pacific region.”

In fact, the importance that the US stresses on its political, security and economic relations with Asia is consistently mentioned by President Barack Obama and other U.S. officials.

Could the EU play a positive role here that might even help change the perspective for a win-win outlook?



A lose-lose situation

In the last few years, both the US (with Japan on its side) and China have tried to strengthen their relations with the ASEAN partners. Even though neither China nor the US is interested in an open conflict, as their mutual economic interests are too important and closely linked, they both try to enlarge their influence in the region, acting in unilateral ways. The ASEAN countries are caught up in this struggle of influence. In different ways, they try to have good relations with both sides. This “sandwich situation” however is not allowing them to fully play their role in contributing to a peaceful resolution of the increasing tensions and conflicts in the region. This could become a lose-lose situation in the region, as neither of the players will get what it really wants (or needs).

Now the question is: Could the EU play a positive role here that might even help change the perspective for a win-win outlook?

Even if EU-ASEAN relations are stable and good on the trade level, the contribution of the EU to the security situation has been dominated thus far mainly by non-regulated arms exports from the different member countries. In the last ten years, military spending in South East Asia increased by 41%, from \$20.7 billion to \$29.1 billion. From 2004 to 2013 the EU was responsible for more than a third (39%) of arms exports to South East Asia, followed by Russia with 29% and the US with 22%.

This extent of arms exports conflicts with the common EU position on arms exports control. It should be a main task of the common foreign and security policy of the EU to change track.

A strategic plan is needed

The newest EU achievement in ASEAN relations has been installing a diplomatic mission to the ASEAN headquarters in Indonesia, but it will not be enough that the EU now has this Head of Mission in Jakarta and that the EU financially supports the building up of ASEAN structures. Beyond this, the EU should develop a strategic plan on how to strengthen the ASEAN as a key player in the region, which could and should contribute to preventing the escalation of conflicts by way of cooperation. The EU could support ASEAN in many ways: By more exchange on the political level, and not only about trade questions, by a stronger political presence in the region, by an exchange of the EU's ideas and experiences in the field of cooperation and integration and by using the possible external financing instruments to support the development of human rights and democracy

Stronger multilateralism in the region would benefit all countries concerned, would contribute to regional security and constitutes therefore a major European interest.

in the region. In addition to that, the EU should also support the development of Japanese and Korean interests in a multilateral security architecture in the region.

In my view, stronger multilateralism in the region would benefit all countries concerned, would contribute to regional security and constitutes therefore a major European interest.

These remarks are obviously just a first sketch. The basic assumption, though, stands. The EU could and should contribute to building up system of cooperation and multilateralism including a shared security architecture in this region – based on the principles of cooperation, mutual respect and respect for international law. ■

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Rafael del Peral

Cooperation to remove the barbed wire: Europe and the Maghreb

Many inhabitants of the Maghreb have no other choice than to leave their homes and start a new life abroad. Instead of treating these people as criminals, the EU should try to work on a functioning policy for the region. This includes looking at problems from an environmental perspective.

Migration and integration: Debunking the myths

“(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” These two statements make up Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Based on this we can say: denying the right of migration is inhumane. This may seem an overstatement, but what other word is there to describe the denial of humanitarian aid and assistance to those fleeing extreme poverty, hunger and violence?

In Europe we are experiencing a regression of the values on which our community was based – the cosmopolitan cooperation of different cultures in order to build a common future. The crisis has fuelled racial hatred and has helped feed the myths on which xenophobic parties thrive¹, such as:

1. The myth of the roots, based on the alleged identity of the various European nations, purportedly invaded by “different” people, who are required to either assimilate and abandon any existing cultural ties or be condemned to ostracism and exclusion. This idea is based upon a lie – our cultures are not homogeneous, and neither are those of the migrants.

2. The statistical myth, which consists in counting intra-European migrants as foreigners in statistics, even though the Schengen Convention establishes that they are citizens. It is sad to think that the

free movement of persons, unlike the movement of capital, is called into question based on a false perception of security concerns whereby our privacy is monitored and our rights and freedoms reduced.

3. The myth of the illegality of people, whereby people rather than actions are condemned as illegal, and the mere act of crossing a border is criminalised.

“No human being is humanly illegal, and still there are many who are legally illegal and indeed should be, and they are those who exploit, those who use their fellow beings to grow in power and wealth.” I echo these words of the Nobel-winning Portuguese writer José Saramago and I reiterate that no one who is in need of asylum should be excluded. As if running away from one’s home were not damaging enough to a person’s inherent dignity, they are then received as criminals.

4. The myth that anything goes against illegal migration. From detention centres where human rights are violated and where there is no health care, to hot returns and the walls of shame in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, due to which Spain accumulates complaints before the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Council of Europe and the United Nations (UN). The radical difference in the protection of the fundamental rights of the poor compared to the rich is huge. Proof of this is the fact that no Western countries are to be found among the signatories of the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

¹ CHUECA, Ángel G. (2005) “Mitos, leyes de extranjería y migraciones internacionales en el Mediterráneo”. In FLECHA, José-Román & GARCÍA, Cristina. El Mediterráneo en la Unión Europea ampliada. Salamanca: Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, pp. 89-116.

Environmental refugees are invisible to international statutes, despite being estimated by Norman Meyers to reach 250 million by 2050.

An interdependent world

The West must accept two premises: that one cannot hold a different conception of human rights based on economic capacity; and that in an interdependent world our actions as countries and as individuals have global consequences. Poverty and environmental degradation are closely related, as becomes clear when cross-referencing variables from the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Ecological Footprint.



Yet environmental refugees are invisible to international statutes, despite being estimated by Norman Meyers to reach 250 million by 2050. Including them would require accepting the intrinsic relationship between pollution, ocean acidification, resource scarcity, salinisation of irrigated land and desertification with hunger, shortage of drinking water, loss of biodiversity, social unrest, war and migrations.

Advocating a green and cosmopolitan Europe implies bearing in mind this relationship and revitalising a *ius migrandi* (the right to migrate) in its three perspectives: the right to remain in our home in dignified living conditions, including the right to emigrate as well as the forgotten right to settle peacefully wherever one chooses. This would be of particular importance for the people of the Maghreb.

The green solution: no more neoliberal models

The creation of green policies between the Maghreb and Europe implies understanding the problems of the region from an environmental perspective. A development model is not feasible if environmental collapse is to be avoided. Therefore, the Maghreb's future does not lie in imitating the "Angola model" of exchanging raw materials for "mega-projects" built by China, which has found in Africa a resource pool to satisfy its growing consumption.

There is no denying that Africa is in need of economic decolonisation. The income sources of the Maghreb countries are either limited (gas, oil, iron or phosphates) or closely linked to environmental and social balance (farming, tourism and horticultural exports). Therefore, short-sighted neoliberal or neo-Keynesian models are unable to allow for the reality of finite resources and do not take into consideration the region's environmental deterioration.

The environmental problems of the area generate social problems that also impact its economy. The drought that plagues Mauritania and keeps 12 million people at risk of malnutrition is proof of this delicate

Short-sighted neoliberal or neo-Keynesian models are unable to allow for the reality of finite resources and do not take into consideration the region's environmental deterioration.

balance. Meanwhile, desertification threatens the Maghreb's coastal areas, a region where there are still non-degraded areas and one that is already dependent on exports of grain.

Moreover, the introduction of fracking in Algeria prompted strong protests, since it requires large amounts of water, a scarce resource in the country. This should remind us that ecological thinking is present even among the poorest sectors and those more strongly dependent on energy exports. It should also remind us that wherever there are people living under draconian business practices, there we will find allies to generate awareness and amplify calls for change committed to the planet.

“Vicious circles”

We tend to forget that the causes for shortages in countries emerging from colonisation often go back to the abuses committed by extractive social elites that plunder the resources on which the global North thrives and concentrate power, promoting what the development scholars Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson called “vicious circles” – that is, problems that exacerbate the existing problems.

For example, Morocco and Algeria are politically stuck in their progress towards democratic systems, being dependent on “strong men” such as King Mohamed VI of Morocco or President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Institutionalised corruption and the absence of democracy create instability that makes the rule of law impossible since it prevents institutional changes,

condemns these societies to poverty and inequality, and makes them a hotbed of fundamentalism and conflict, rather than fostering an education that respects the culture and religion of the different regions, that promotes the emancipation of women and creates the conditions for developing a strong civil society.

In addition to this, Libya is embroiled in a second civil war, and its HDI continues to decline; a fact that has been forgotten now that the oil flow to the North has been restored. Furthermore, Western Sahara is still illegally occupied by Morocco, due to Spain's lack of political will and the distrust in the relations between Morocco and Algeria – the king of Morocco owns the phosphate mines in Western Sahara, whereas Algeria defends the territory's independence by echoing the demands of the Polisario Front (the liberation movement of Western Sahara). Meanwhile, refugee camps in the region, such as Tindouf or M'Bera, continue to grow in size and await a solution that never comes.

In this context it is no wonder that regional cooperation projects such as the Arab Maghreb Union are frozen due to bilateral conflicts. Morocco is trying to distance itself from Algeria and position itself as a salient ally of the European Union by partaking in common security policies, fisheries agreements or through the MEDA programme for financial aid. This forces supranational organisations like the EU to cooperate with each nation separately, rendering it impossible to develop interregional projects.

Cooperation implies reciprocity, and an understanding that our best interest is in the welfare of not only our country but the world; not only for the current generations but for the future ones too.



The West needs to listen, as well as act

We need to radically rethink our understanding of foreign policy if we want to cooperate with the Maghreb. Cooperation implies reciprocity, and an understanding that our best interest is in the welfare of not only our country but the world; not only for the current generations but for the future ones too. To this end, we must rethink the traditional formulas, we must reduce resource consumption in countries with a higher carbon footprint, and enforce the effective observance of human rights in the most devastated regions.

The formula of the Washington consensus, based on the premise that introducing a neoliberal market economy guarantees the development of democratic institutions, has been proven false. Failing to treat non-Western cultures as equals who are able to dialogue and fit for problem solving reeks of Eurocentrism and prevents exchanges of culture and know-how between North and South.

It is not acceptable that the dreams of the people of the South are crushed on the barbed wires of Ceuta and Melilla or that thousands of them are drowning in the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, the North must commit to reducing the carbon footprint, foster a culture in which citizens are empowered and ecologically aware, and demand fair treatment from Europe towards the Maghreb, its migrants and the global South. In the words of Seville's Muslim poet Az-Zubaidi, "The whole Earth, in its diversity, is one, and all its inhabitants are human and neighbours." Let us cooperate today to remove the barbed wire. ■

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The five articles in this section present some of the major foreign policy dilemmas that are still intensely debated among European Greens. An interview with three Green politicians (French, British and German) illustrates just how divergent the stances of different members of the “Green family” can be, depending on their national cultures and experiences. The three articles which follow provide a detailed account of one of the most controversial internal debates of the ecologist parties: the clash between those arguing for a pacifist stance and those in favour of military intervention in the event of massive human rights violations, such as those witnessed in the former Yugoslavia, or more recently in Mali.

This debate reached boiling point among the ranks of the German Greens during the red-green coalition government (1998-2005) and after. However the rest of Europe wasn’t immune either, as illustrated by the crisis of the Dutch Greens in 2011, which arose due to a Parliamentary vote on sending further troops to Afghanistan and which in turn led the party to innovate and recreate the internal consensus-building processes.

The debates are still ongoing, and, if those fundamental values that provide the basis of the Greens’ foreign policy vision are to remain relevant for the future, their translation into concrete policies will most likely remain an ongoing challenge, as all the authors seem to recognise.



Charlotte Beck

Greening our foreign policy – Of visions, principles and contradictions

While the spectrum of ideas defining a Green foreign policy remains wide, several overarching tenets have emerged over the past decades: the normative framework is built on a strong commitment to support for popular movements and “agents of change” fighting for human rights, democracy and gender equality worldwide.

2014 was not exactly a year of good news. Fifteen years into the new millennium, the world seems to be out of joint. Bloody, intractable wars are being waged in the heart of Africa and the Middle East – some in the media spotlight, others forgotten by the world. Democracy and human rights are challenged all over the world by old and new forms of authoritarian rule and repression. Climate change advances, unhindered by the international community's cumbersome and ineffectual efforts to stop its progress. Income and wealth inequalities are on the rise in many countries. And a virus is killing thousands of people in West Africa, exposing the hidden risks posed by weak and failing state institutions.

Within this mayhem, Europe is no longer an island of peace and stability. While the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 should have been a warning sign, Europe has reacted with stubborn disbelief to the return of war to its soil by Russia's invasion of Crimea and the ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine. With the European Union surrounded by a ring of fire or simmering tensions that can easily be ignited, immediate crisis management tends to overshadow a thorough reflection on a holistic foreign policy critical to addressing the causes of instability. What, then, are the overarching tenets of a Green foreign policy? What are the international norms, political actors and concrete initiatives breathing life into a Green vision for peace, social justice and environmental stability?

The Greens have, of course, never been a political movement of quick and easy consensus (which,

given the incomplete, albeit daunting, list of the challenges listed above, seems reasonable). While the spectrum of ideas defining a Green foreign policy remains wide, several overarching tenets have emerged over the past decades: the normative framework is built on a strong commitment to support for popular movements and "agents of change" fighting for human rights, democracy and gender equality worldwide. Green politics support the practice of multilateralism, increasing the relevance, democratisation and transparency of international and regional organisations, particularly the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU); strengthening international law and its institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC); supporting ambitious disarmament and non-proliferation regimes as well as restrictive weapons export policies; developing the concept of civil conflict prevention and resolution; striving for an ambitious, fair and internationally coordinated climate policy; a trade policy geared towards social justice beyond national boundaries; an increase in humanitarian and development assistance; and a humane refugee policy within and beyond Europe's borders. The protection of persecuted and vulnerable minorities from mass atrocities and genocide, if necessary against the primacy of state sovereignty, strikes a chord with Green values as well. Military interventions on humanitarian grounds, however, remain deeply disputed. The position closest to a common denominator within the Greens sanctions only UN-mandated military intervention embedded in a wider political strategy to address the conflict.

No panacea has yet been found for supporting nascent democracy movements and human rights defenders abroad.

Human rights and democracy

Even among EU member states, which rightly take pride in their commitment to human rights and democracy, actionable support for those ideals beyond their borders has often taken a backseat to economic interests and concerns for “stability”. Four years after the beginning of the Arab uprisings, the lesson of the false dichotomy between stability vs. democracy are now at risk of being unlearned. This is frankly absurd as the only deep and stable relations we have are those with other democracies. Repression and state brutality foment popular uprisings and violent infighting, while inclusive governance, the rule of law and democratic transfers of power increase the prospect for stability and economic prosperity.



Granted, no panacea has yet been found for supporting nascent democracy movements and human rights defenders abroad. While recognising the limitations of external influence on democratisation, a Green foreign policy is fully committed to using the whole political toolbox to

extend a hand to those striving for their inalienable rights to liberty, protection under the law, and human dignity. Vis-à-vis foreign governments, such tools include meaningful incentives in the form of trade, market access, foreign aid and political legitimisation to support reforms for more political and social inclusiveness and a more balanced civil-military relationship. At the same time, much more rigour should be applied when dealing with governments responsible for massive repression and major violations of human rights. At least of equal importance, however, is direct support for political activists and civil society groups outside of the elite through knowledge transfer, capacity building and exposure to democratic values. Lastly, meaningful support for democracy demands patience and endurance even when the media has long moved on to cover the next “fairy tale revolution”.

Multilateralism and international organizations

The vast majority of today’s pressing social and security challenges do not stop at national borders. The global nature of these challenges demands an internationally coordinated response. The Green movement supports multilateralism designed to harmonise political action and increase the political weight of small nations. In order to overcome the democratic deficit and lack of political capital prevalent in many international organisations, a Green foreign policy supports a range of reform initiatives aimed at adjusting the structure and procedures of international organisations to reflect greater civil society participation and a changing global balance of power.

We may see Russia's war in Ukraine as an exceptional opportunity and motivation for a reduction of energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions in both the EU and Ukraine.

The UN Security Council (UNSC), for example, which has remained essentially unreformed since its first session in 1946, does not do justice to the economic and political rise of nations such as Brazil, South Africa and India. Some European Greens, such as the Swedish Green Party Miljöpartiet de Gröna, go as far as striving for the eventual abolition of the veto power of powerful individual nations altogether. Others, such as the French Greens, are in favor of introducing more gradual reforms, e.g. by introducing unified regional seats instead of those of individual states (in Europe's case, the EU would eventually take over the seats of France and Britain).



With regard to increasing European integration, the Greens have come a long way in the past decades. A general preference for decentralised decision-making on the one hand, and the need for supranational solutions to address our most pressing challenges on the other, remains an unresolved tension for some European Greens. Miljöpartiet de Gröna, for example, openly declares its ambivalence

towards further integration and increasing transfer of political powers to the EU in its platform. The majority of European Greens, however, have moved beyond their scepticism towards further integration and since shifted their focus to making the EU more democratic and transparent instead.

Global engagement for social justice

Mirroring the range of opinions on domestic economic and financial policy, there is no widespread consensus within the Greens with regard to trade policies. Most Greens would, however, agree that trade agreements should be designed to achieve equitable and mutually beneficial outcomes rather than one-sided profits at the expense of social, environmental and economic exploitation of the weakest link. The Greens encourage trade between nations on the basis of high environmental and social standards.

With regard to the regulation of international trade and finance, the Greens strive for a reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in order to increase their transparency and enable fair access and participation of states from the Global South. In the negotiation process for bilateral trade agreements, such as the much-cited Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a Green foreign policy strives for the inclusion of civil society as well as of nations affected that are not part of the agreement. Further, the Greens strongly oppose any arrangements that put the sovereignty of democratically elected bodies

of political representation at risk in favour of multinational companies (cue: Investor-State Dispute Settlement).

International law and its institutions

A Green foreign policy aims at developing and strengthening human rights law as well as humanitarian law, partly through its support for judiciary institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICC was established in 2002 to try individuals suspected of crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and crimes of aggression. While the Greens view the ICC as a milestone in the fight against impunity for perpetrators of the gravest human rights violations, its territorial jurisdiction remains far from universal. Well over a decade since the ICC was established, its constituting Rome Statute is still awaiting signature by 41 states (among them China and India), and ratification by 31 (among them the U.S. and Israel). The refusal to become a member of the Rome Statute effectively prevents a country's national from being tried by the ICC. In addition to devoting more resources to strengthen the ICC, the Greens therefore demand much more serious diplomatic efforts to convince China, Russia, the U.S. and others to ratify the treaty.

As with any system that is a result of international bargaining, international law is not without flaws: above all, there is a serious lack of global enforcement mechanisms. The ICJ was founded as

the UN's primary judiciary branch in 1945 to settle disputes between states. But while it can refer a case of non-compliance to the UNSC, any resolution or enforcement against one of the P5 or its allies would be vetoed. Further, allegations of the use of international law for political motives or according to political power dynamics are at times difficult to refute. Nonetheless, in a world in which national jurisdiction is often biased, incapable or highly corrupt, an imperfect international system of rule of law is certainly better than none.

Disarmament and weapons exports

Undoubtedly, it takes some wild imagination to conceive a million people coming together to demonstrate against nuclear weapons in New York's Central Park today as they did in 1982. Meanwhile, the centre stage for disarmament and non-proliferation debates has shifted from the streets of the US and Europe to international conference rooms and executive offices. Despite decreasing public engagement, several ambitious proposals are currently on the international agenda, including the Humanitarian Initiative and Global Zero, which strives for a global ban on nuclear weapons. And while efforts for further bilateral disarmament between the US and Russia have now stalled, we have come a long way since the first generation of Greens were ridiculed for demanding a world free of nuclear weapons. Who would have thought that, after all that, this vision would have been formally embraced by the world's most powerful president less than three decades later?

Whether it is legitimate to send weapons to crisis and war zones under particular conditions remains hotly debated within Green foreign policy circles.

With regard to weapons exports, the Greens stand for a policy guided by maximal scrutiny and transparency, particularly with regard to exports to repressive governments and conflict zones. Whether it is legitimate to send weapons to crisis and war zones under particular conditions remains hotly debated within Green foreign policy circles.



There are, of course, no easy answers. Concerns regarding the ability to track and control the flow of weapons in conflict zones are well-founded, and most war zones obviously suffer from an excess rather than a lack of weapons. At the same time, these arguments miss that it is not the overall sum but the distribution of weapons that determines whether a particular group will be able to defend itself or not. Particularly given the decreased appetite in the West to send its own troops abroad for combat missions, others within the Greens therefore argue that arming those groups that are defending themselves against external aggression or mass atrocities is a legitimate measure in exceptional circumstances.

Military intervention on humanitarian grounds

One of the most contested issues in Green foreign policy debates is, of course, the question of military interventions on humanitarian grounds. Many Greens have come to the conclusion that the damage inflicted by external military intervention is mostly greater than the overall good, with recent experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya serving as daunting examples (though each of those cases have of course very distinct features). A vast majority of Greens, however, differentiates between UN-backed peacekeeping missions and interventions by single states or “coalitions of the willing” without an international mandate.

Insisting on a UN mandate as a precondition for military intervention is not only a question of the sanctity of international law. It is, as history has shown, also an indicator of the likelihood of achieving sustainable positive outcomes. How to reconcile this principle with a reality in which the UNSC is increasingly paralyzed and great power politics override any concerns for human suffering remains an open question.

Development assistance and conflict prevention

Undoubtedly, wars between and within nations will remain an ugly feature of human existence for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, in order to break the cycle of hasty reactions to a conflict already in motion, the Greens aim at increasing the awareness, understanding and implementation of conflict and mass atrocity prevention. Thanks to an abundance of research, early warning signs of mass atrocities are fairly well known by now. Against this background,

Thanks to an abundance of research, early warning signs of mass atrocities are fairly well known by now

the Greens fully support the strengthening of Pillar II of the Responsibilities to Protect (R2P): to engage with states and civil society through preventative diplomacy, capacity building, and concrete assistance to protect a population at risk before mass atrocities are committed.

In the 21st century, the scramble for natural resources, often exacerbated by more extreme weather, mixed with social and political exclusion and weak institutions drastically increase the potential for instability. A holistic Green foreign policy puts the interface of different policy areas at the heart of its development agenda. A call for a quantitative increase in funding to meet the promise of dedicating at least 0.7 percent of GDP to Official Development Assistance (ODA) is therefore not enough. As part of a much more ambitious vision, development cooperation must emphasise cross-cutting priorities like environmental sustainability, civil society engagement and social inclusion.

Appreciating interconnectedness

Many of the individual components outlined above are not exclusively “green”. In fact, most of them have found their way into mainstream political discourse over the past decades. Taken in sum rather than in their individual parts, however, they merge into a holistic foreign policy approach with clear green features. One of the outstanding characteristics is an appreciation for the interplay of political, social, economic and environmental factors forming a mosaic of social justice and human security. In a world of increasing interconnectedness, indifference and disengagement from world affairs are not an option. The process of greening our economy is already under way throughout Europe and beyond. Let’s green our foreign policy, too. ■

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A Green New World – French, British and German perspectives

Although Greens tend to agree on most issues, they don't always think alike. We asked politicians from France, the UK and Germany about their stances and those of their national parties on the military industry, drones, Afghanistan, the legacy of Joschka Fischer, among other thorny issues...



Noël Mamère



Tony Clarke



Omid Nouripour

When Joschka Fischer became Foreign Minister of Germany in 1998, the representatives of the peace movement had, for the first time, an opportunity to participate in a national government. To what extent was German foreign policy of that time “Green” foreign policy? Germany participated in two wars in those years: in 1999 Germany took part in airstrikes on Serbia, and after 9/11 the Bundeswehr sent troops to Afghanistan. Similarly, Pascal Canfin (as French Minister for Development, 2012-2014) had to justify, and participate in French intervention in Mali. Do you think Fischer’s and Canfin’s stints in government represent a paradigm shift? Or are they simply examples of “realpolitik”?

Omid Nouripour (Germany): Green foreign policy is always a policy for peace. The preamble to the German constitution imposes this responsibility on us, for reasons of painful historical experience. We take the duty to “promote world peace” more seriously than the CDU/CSU (the two main Christian democratic conservative parties of Germany) or than many in the SPD (the social democrats), with all the challenges which that brings with it in the world of realpolitik. That is why we fought such a bitter battle over the course of our foreign policy at that time under Fischer, and still do today. But economic criteria or power politics barely play a role in these disputes. What we argue about is the right path to spread peace in the world. And that brings with it quite specific differences in realpolitik. This could be seen quite clearly at that time, under Fischer: we said “No” to engagement in Iraq, we put a lot of effort into the Middle East peace process and we regulated arms exports in a very different way to how it is done today.

Tony Clarke (UK): Well to simply say they were “realpolitik” can be depressing and defeatist, but perhaps understandable to a point. Of course any move from any European government towards a less reactive and more hands off approach to international conflict (and in not always supporting America’s military ambitions) will take time and far more than one or two ministerial appointments. The three conflicts mentioned in the question of course were very, very different. Kosovo could be seen in retrospect as a humanitarian intervention to protect innocents, however, whilst many in the Green movement across Europe were disappointed particularly at Joschka’s complicit support for military action in Afghanistan and similarly with Canfin’s decision on Bali, the lessons from both France and Germany are that Green foreign military policy in government needs to be developed more quickly and more precisely out of office to ensure more proactive – and not, as is too often seen, reactive– responses to world issues, once elected.



A Green defence policy
will be democratic,
accountable, sustainable,
and life-affirming.

Noël Mamère (France): There is no Green foreign policy doctrine. However, there are some fundamental principles including, but not limited to, non-violent conflict resolution, respect for fundamental rights, with special attention paid to minorities, cooperation, food sovereignty, and protecting the planet against the ecological crisis. These are all enshrined in the Global Greens Charter. Pacifism has been a pillar of the Green movement in Germany, nonetheless, Greens do not define themselves as pacifists as such. In Germany and France, the specific example of the conflict in Kosovo forced the Greens to re-evaluate their vision of foreign policy by integrating the notion of the right to intervene in defence of human rights. Personally, I was opposed to military intervention in Afghanistan and Mali for political reasons. I maintained that the United States was hauling the international community off into a pre-emptive war against the Taliban, which was inevitably going to turn into a war on the Afghani civilian population, and that it was not a police mission meant to nullify Al Qaeda. As for Mali, my feeling was that France, much like with its involvement in Libya, was simply sustaining *Françafrique*. Airstrikes, without ground troops, could have stopped the jihadists. In both cases, it is not an issue of paradigm or realpolitik but a real analysis of a real situation carried out on the basis of principles.

How should the European community deal with foreign conflicts? What role should Europe play in international politics?

Mamère: Europe does not have a common foreign and defence policy. In the case of Libya, for example, Nicolas Sarkozy, and then Great Britain, organised a military intervention, which was backed by the United States and approved by the United Nations. There was a specific mandate that was not respected. Rather than doing everything to save Benghazi, military intervention turned into an effort to destroy the Gaddafi regime, which in turn opened the door to the weapons spreading throughout the region and the destabilisation of Libya and the entire sub-region.

Nouripour: It is always better to act through supranational organisations rather than on a purely bi-national basis or in a coalition of the willing. That is why we also have to strengthen the EU in the areas of foreign and security policy. The current challenges, whether Ebola, the crisis in the Ukraine or the growth of Islamist groupings, all demonstrate one thing: individual states cannot deal with challenges of this magnitude on their own.

Clarke: The UK Green Party believes that any defence policy, nation-state- or EU-wide, must be consistent with the values of the society it seeks to protect, or else it undermines those very values. A Green defence policy will be democratic, accountable, sustainable, and life-affirming. We are totally opposed to policies based on mass killing or threatened mass killing. It is contradictory to seek to defend a Green society by such means. Any defence policy must be consistent with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. We still view the EU as the civilian organisation to which matters that cannot be dealt with more locally should be brought. We feel it is deeply regrettable that the EU has taken the first

The problem with NATO resides in its legitimacy and objectives. Since the cold war came to a close, NATO has been searching for a role and consequently an enemy.

steps towards militarisation, by the formation of the so-called Rapid Reaction Force. Our primary aim is to reverse this process. In doing so, we anticipate the reduction of tensions between the EU, its neighbours and other countries. Our vision of the EU is not that of a global power bloc or broker. However, maintenance of peaceful external relations is a common concern of the countries of Europe and any outward facing EU policy is de facto foreign policy.

Due to the current crisis in Ukraine, all three of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) core tasks – collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security with non-NATO states – need to be rebalanced. How should this be done? In your opinion, what should be the role of NATO regarding the stability of Europe and its neighbours?

Nouripour: I think it is an exaggeration to say that the Ukraine crisis has changed everything for NATO. It is true that some members want to give more weight to the task of collective self-defence. Here, NATO has an important and difficult role: to send out a message of clear and unquestionable support for the members of the alliance but not to pursue a policy of escalation. Because a political resolution of the Ukraine conflict remains central, and that will not take place within the framework of NATO.

Clarke: NATO is a military-oriented body, which imposes conflict cessation rather than encouraging peace-building. As such, it is not a sustainable mechanism for maintaining peace in the world. We would take the UK out of NATO unilaterally. Therefore

it is not possible for UK Greens to see any positive future for engagement with NATO. We would also end the so-called “special relationship” between the UK and the US. The Green Party sees the OSCE as the most suitable existing forum for developing peace across Europe and we believe that increased effectiveness and development of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) requires a transfer of resources to it from other security institutions such as NATO and the EU.



Mamère: The problem with NATO resides in its legitimacy and objectives. Since the cold war came to a close, NATO has been searching for a role and consequently an enemy. De facto, NATO has turned into the armed branch of the West, more specifically of the United States, in Europe and the rest of the world. NATO thrives on the inability of the European Union to establish a veritable common defence policy. When it comes to Ukraine, this prevents us from playing the role of political mediator vis-à-vis Russia because Russia views any European Union

and/or NATO effort as a façade for the United States desire to side-line them. NATO has turned into a political problem for the Europeans.

What is your vision for European defence? Could you envision your country as a pillar?

Clarke: No, on inspection, there is little or no threat of direct invasion of the UK by any nation. Commitment to a large standing army, a navy of large warships around our coastline, squadrons of fighter planes and a crippling expensive missile defence system is therefore unnecessary. Any threat of invasion that might arise in the future is so remote that realignment of the UK military and defence preparations would be possible long before any invasion occurred. Similarly, the unhelpful and aggressive concept of nuclear deterrence (with the inherent dangers of handling concentrated radioactive substances) is also redundant. As such, immediate nuclear disarmament would be a priority of a Green government. It is arguably unhealthy for any EU state to identify or promote itself as a pillar for European Defence.

Mamère: There is no European defence policy. This holds true both in terms of military intervention capability – specifically in terms of deployment of ground forces in protracted conflict – and in terms of a common defence industry. France should advocate for a Eurozone of defence, i.e. a core group of countries (France, UK, Germany, Poland, Italy, for example) that would pool their capabilities and finances to establish a common defence system. It all

comes down to political will. In the case of the Central African Republic and Mali, we recently witnessed that some countries that would otherwise ally themselves with France were loathe to overstep the boundaries of current nation states.

What should be done with your country's arms industry? Is it important to maintain it the way it is?

Nouripour: We Greens want above all to make the arms export business more transparent and to involve society and parliament more closely in the decisions. Europe has been spending progressively less on arms for years now, and we support moves towards more sharing of military capability, and thus more savings, within the framework of the EU and NATO. The arms industry, with the help of the conservative-liberal and conservative-social democrat coalition governments, has reacted to this by seeking out new markets abroad and exporting weapons to authoritarian states that do not uphold human rights standards, such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia, lately. Arms exports and the strengthening of authoritarian states should not be the hallmarks of German politics.

Clarke: The UK Green Party is committed to the early conversion of economic, scientific and technological resources, presently used to support the arms race, to socially useful and productive ends. An imaginative programme of arms conversion could use many of the skills and resources at present tied up in military industry to create new jobs and produce socially useful products. Conversion would also free research and development expertise and capital.

New renewable energy industries, for instance, could be set up in the same area and use the same skills and resources as the existing arms industries e.g. wave power (shipbuilding), wind power (aerospace) and tidal power (power engineering). However, an acceptance of military means of defence and peace-enforcement requires an acceptance of the existence of arms manufacture. Hence, although weapons of mass destruction will not be made under a Green government, moderate quantities of conventional weapons and vehicles will. A Green government will have less commitment to protecting either the UK or the EU arms manufacturing industries. Sales of military equipment to other countries will be tightly controlled by a stricter licensing system. Equipment exported will be of a defensive nature only, or strictly and verifiably for use in international campaigns sanctioned by the UN or its regional organisation. Such a licensing system will take proper account of social sustainability criteria, human rights and regional stability issues. There will be a presumption against supply unless an export fulfils all criteria.

The EU and its member states are among the greatest donors of international development funding. Is Europe doing enough in this field?

Clarke: No, aid has often been conceived in a paternalistic and economically colonialist fashion. Instead of serving the needs of the poor in poor countries, it continues to be used by donors as a means of furthering political, economic or military objectives, including the promotion of business interests. The recent history of economic conditionality applied to aid flows, particularly



under the so-called Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus, has been disastrous, in some cases decimating infant industries and public services, extending environmental degradation and entrenching poverty for millions of people. The preponderance of donors, each with its own agenda, has also tended to reduce coordination and transparency, increasing the politicisation of aid, heightening the risk of corruption and placing a significant management burden on aid-recipient countries. Genuine participation of local people, let alone local control or oversight of aid expenditures, rarely occurs in practice, despite donor rhetoric. Similarly, while “sustainability” has become a buzzword within the aid system, it is generally framed in terms of “sustainable economic growth”; defining poverty in terms of income alone and failing completely to prioritise equity and environmental quality, or to address ecological limits in the design and implementation of aid programmes. Across the EU we would campaign for 1 percent of each state’s GNP within ten years being committed to overseas

aid. Emergency aid, aid to dependent territories and debt relief should be an addition to this.

Nouripour: It is clear that in development policy the problem lies not in the size of the budget but in the cooperation between the states. The bigger member states of the EU all have their own ministries and agencies for development work. These often follow very different philosophies and priorities. Then alongside them there are also the EU's own programmes. For the people on the ground this is confusing, and in many instances unfortunately it can also become counter-productive. The EU's "Joint Programming" is a start here, but far too little use has been made of it so far. Especially for small countries which cannot afford their own implementation organisations, the EU provides a good means of engaging on a shared basis.

Mamère: It does not all come down to money. Here is another case where there are country-specific approaches. Europe essentially does not have a full-fledged common development agency where it can consolidate all of its efforts. The result is a divvying up of geographical areas: French speaking African countries to France, for example. It is true that public development assistance has never reached the targets set in the Millennium Development Goals but the real crux of the question is elsewhere: the relationship with countries to the South. Yet there exists an ever increasing structural inequality in our Common Agricultural Policy and in our relationship to ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, to the detriment of the poorest countries. The primary

objective of development policy in Europe should be to make sure that aid gets where it is needed most, i.e. the least advantaged members of society.

How can the presence of the UK and France as permanent members of the Security Council contribute to the resolution of conflicts? Wouldn't it be about time to replace these two countries by a permanent EU seat?

Mamère: The UN is the only international body in a position to contribute to stability and peace in the world. Unfortunately, it is structured poorly for today's challenges. Built at the end of WWII and in the Cold War World, this entity is not an adequate expression of the expectations of countries that were former colonies. Therefore, the system needs an overhaul. The European Union should have one or two full-fledged seats on the Security Council in place of Great Britain and France. And all other regional bodies (African Region, ASEAN, Alba, Arab league) should be represented.

Clarke: The United Nations is based on the principle of national sovereignty. While recognising that the old concept of sovereignty and the nation state has its limits and problems, erosion of this principle, however, carries the danger of legitimising international intervention, which is neither invited nor strictly defensive. Any erosion of national sovereignty within the UN Charter must therefore be on very limited and closely controlled criteria such as the prevention of genocide. The current structure of the UN Security Council, with permanent

seats for France, the UK, the US, Russia and China, is undemocratic and unworkable due to the right of veto. All permanent seats on the UN Security Council should be abolished, all nations should take a seat in turn, continents should be represented in proportion to their populations, and decisions should be made by a two-thirds majority. In the absence of this reform, we would accept a mandate given by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and by the relevant regional organisations of the UN.

How should the international community proceed in Afghanistan?

Clarke: It shouldn't (not in Afghanistan!). The war in Afghanistan was, according to all informed military sources, an unwinnable one. Furthermore, it has had the effect of destabilising the entire Afghanistan and Pakistan region, with the remaining consequent danger of the collapse of the Pakistani state itself. It has taken the lives of countless UK troops and diverted resources at a time when the government should have been concentrating resources into job creation, health and the educational sector, among others. Continuation of western intervention increases the risk significantly of a terrorist attack on the UK and a massive increase in refugees fleeing from war and oppression. There remains a need for a new regional peace agreement as, without the co-operation of the regional powers, peace and a functioning administration will be impossible to secure in Afghanistan. We should continue with the support from the EU, UN and other international bodies to support the rebuilding of Afghanistan and the provision of international aid. The protection

of women and minorities in Afghanistan and the upholding of human rights must remain an essential part of any future agreement reached with the regional powers, the UN and the people of Afghanistan. The issue of Afghan refugees in neighbouring states and elsewhere, and their long-term settlement and humanitarian support should also be made a priority.



Mamère: This is a case of a failure of policy in every sense of the term. The Taliban are reoccupying whole swathes of land and are knocking on the door of Kabul. Corruption and drug trafficking are rampant. Regional warlords are ever so powerful. The coalition has run itself into a dead-end because of its failure to have understood the importance of Pakistani meddling in Afghani home affairs, its inability to establish a policy of reconstruction of the country beyond the military aspects, etc. The only viable solution will necessarily have to include the entire region and will be long term in nature.

It is essential that we learn from Afghanistan the over-riding importance of engagement with the civilian population.

Nouripour: It is essential that we learn from Afghanistan the over-riding importance of engagement with the civilian population. The biggest failures of the Afghanistan mission were our half-hearted and underfunded efforts to strengthen the police force, to support the rule of law and to create employment. And we have to learn that it is important to keep people in Germany on board. Foreign policy can only succeed if it gains the support of the public, if it sets out the premises on which it is based and if it is evaluated in terms of its commitment and effectiveness. It is also important for many Afghan women and men that the new government offers them the prospect of a better life. This involves not only improving the economic situation but also – as President Ashraf Ghani promised – combating corruption and human rights abuses. There is a young, hopeful generation who must be supported. And of course that applies to the international community too. It has to show that it can be depended on to maintain its involvement in Afghanistan, politically and with military support. But whoever gets involved must also be able and willing to demand reforms from the Afghan government.

In Afghanistan (as well as in Pakistan, Yemen, etc.) the media has reported a large number of drone strikes. The unmanned aircrafts are employed for the precision of the strikes, however, in terms of international law they raise a number of concerns. What's the Green stance on this issue? Are there any alternatives to drones when it comes to eliminating threats to European security without putting civilians and soldiers in danger?

Nouripour: The Greens have always unequivocally condemned the unlawful drone war and will continue to do so. It is a breach of international law. It hurts innocent people. And it will not help combat terrorism. It results instead in radicalisation and continually drives new recruits into the arms of the terrorists.

Clarke: The Green Party in the UK has not developed a separate policy statement in relation to drones outside of its general views on the use of similar military technologies in conflict, but we believe that like other such devices drones cannot be used effectively without significant risk of death or injury to the civilian population, either during or after a period of conflict. Whilst accepting that such weapons may be precise in the nature of their strike we remain unconvinced that the targeting and deployment of such weapons within the theatre of war is at all precise and share the concerns raised by many as to indiscriminate and unlawful use.

Mamère: I believe in an international convention on the use of drones for military purposes. I would even go so far as to advocate banning them on the premise that their deployment is an act of piracy. Drones are used absent of any international oversight and result in summary execution of people on lists that have been compiled without any legal grounds. Again, the solution is not technical. Targeted drone strikes have not put an end to the emergence of jihadists. First, the causes of terrorism must be eliminated, their funding lopped off, resistance to islamo-fascists, like in Kobane, must be supported. ■

Noël Mamère is a French journalist, and the mayor of Bègles in Gironde. He was a Member of the European Parliament from 1994-1997, and presidential candidate of Les Verts in 2002.

Tony Clarke joined the UK Green Party in March 2013. He was the Labour MP for Northampton South from 1997 to 2005. During his time in Parliament, Tony chaired the Northern Ireland Select Committee (devolved affairs).

Omid Nouripour is a member of the Alliance '90/The Greens, and has been a member of the Bundestag since 2006. He took the vacated seat of former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer. Since 2013 he has been foreign policy spokesman for his party.

Between pacifism and human rights – The Alliance '90/ The Greens and the Balkan conflict



Johanna Schneegass

After the end of the Cold War and the renaissance of nationalism and of the concomitant abuses of human rights of the worst kind, the pacifism that had been one of the German Greens' founding principles came into increasing conflict with its active defence of human rights.

This is an abridged version of a presentation given at the symposium Burgers beschermen: GroenLinks van Koude Oorlog naar humanitaire interventie, on 11 September 2014 in Utrecht.

The protection of human rights as a fundamental element of foreign policy was – even more for the civil rights campaigners of Alliance '90, and at a more existential level, than for the Greens – an undisputed and central concern.

“For me, Auschwitz is unique. But I adhere to two principles. Never again war! Never again Auschwitz, never again genocide, never again fascism! For me, both belong together!” (Joschka Fischer, at the Federal Delegates’ conference, Bielefeld, 13 May 1999)

Several characteristic features of the internal dispute within Alliance '90/The Greens can be inferred from this much-quoted statement by the former Federal Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer.

- 1) The special legacy, with regard to the use of military weapons, of German history, and the special responsibility for the protection of civilians which follows from that, especially in the eyes of the political left.
- 2) The passion and the authority of the man who was probably the most influential Green personality in the history of the joint party, and his ability to change the political landscape around him.
- 3) Above all, it illustrates the impossibility of reconciling the rejection of military options with a refusal to tolerate serious breaches of human rights or inhuman regimes.

Alliance '90/The Greens was officially constituted on 14 May 1993 by the merger of two parties. It was a fusion of The Greens, which had been established in January 1980 by the merger of a number of different civil rights movements, with Alliance '90, a party officially founded in September 1991 which had emerged from the civil rights movement in the

former GDR. To characterise the founding Greens, one would think on the one hand of their ecological, social and bottom-up democratic principles, but also and perhaps especially of their aspiration to offer a non-violent, pacifist alternative to the established parties in the Federal Republic. In the context of the Cold War, they belonged – as did the parties from which the Dutch green party GroenLinks emerged – to the political core of the peace movement, which advocated nuclear disarmament and a peaceful resolution of the confrontation between the power blocs. The protection of human rights as a fundamental element of foreign policy was – even more for the civil rights campaigners of Alliance '90, and at a more existential level, than for the Greens – an undisputed and central concern.



After the end of the Cold War and the renaissance of nationalism and civil war and of the concomitant abuses of human rights of the worst kind, right up to genocide, the pacifism that had been one of the party's founding principles came into increasing

conflict with its active defence of human rights. For the principle of pacifism meant a rejection of the use of armed force on principle, whereas the defence of human rights, in view of the scale of the conflicts arising at the beginning of the 1990s, demanded it when necessary.

Three tendencies

According to Ludger Volmer, later State Secretary for the Greens in the Foreign Ministry, whose doctoral dissertation examined the difficulties foreign policy posed for the Greens, in those years Green pacifism could be categorised into three tendencies:

- 1) "Radical pacifism", which rejects the use of violence of any kind, under any circumstances, on principle. Adherents of this tendency can be counted as belonging to the so-called "Fundis".
- 2) "Nuclear pacifism", which rejects atomic weapons, but in principle accepts conventional forms of defence. These people can be counted among the "Realos".
- 3) The "political pacifism" found towards the left end of the party spectrum, which aspires to a world without weapons, but which recognises that this will be a long journey requiring intermediate steps of de-escalation, integration, arms control and disarmament. These people, loosely speaking, have moved from the Fundis to the Realos.

In the context of the war in Bosnia, during which Croatian troops and, above all, Serbian troops committed horrific human rights abuses on the

Bosnian population from 1992 onwards, members of the German Greens spoke out for the first time in favour of a large-scale military intervention by the West. Two moments during this conflict are worth highlighting in the context of the debate within the party.

At the meeting of the party's States Council in June 1993 a resolution calling for the use of military force to protect the civil population in Bosnia from a threatened genocide achieved a majority. This was the first time in the history of the party that a call of this kind was endorsed by an organ of the party.

Some Realos, especially former GDR civil rights campaigners, were influenced by delegate visits to Bosnia and by media reports about rape camps, ethnic displacement and the systematic cutting off of the Muslim civilian population from food supplies, and called for stronger intervention from the UN to protect the civilian population in Bosnia – if necessary by force.

Even though this resolution was only one of many similar ones, the resulting declaration of support for the use of military measures led to a dispute in the party. The radical pacifists especially, but also a large proportion of the political pacifists were appalled at this call for military intervention from their party colleagues.

At an extraordinary conference of Federal delegates (the party's supreme governing body) in October 1993 it proved possible to smooth over the internal turbulence, as a very large majority at this meeting supported a resolution which – though

it acknowledged an act of genocide against the Bosnian Muslims – rejected intervention on the grounds that human rights could not be won by military means. The Realos, who argued for military intervention in Bosnia, thus represented for the time being a small minority, but they had sparked a debate which in the following years was to be played out again repeatedly.



Barely two years later, in the summer of 1995, Bosnian Serbs committed what was later officially classified by the UN as a massacre of the male Muslim population of Srebrenica in what had originally been designated a UN-protected Safe Area. Deeply shocked by these events, the then leader of the parliamentary party and later Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer addressed his party in a letter in which for the first time he openly called on the party to change course and support the deployment of military force. After the publication of this letter, a heated debate broke out again over what in Fischer's letter was postulated as the duty of the international community to intervene in cases of genocide. At the following conference of

the Federal delegates in Bremen in the late autumn, although those rejecting intervention remained in the majority, the internal balance had shifted, with as many as 40% of delegates now supporting it.

The Red-Green coalition

Let us jump forward now to the year 1998: Gerhard Schröder's SPD emerged as the winner of the September Bundestag elections, and he formed the first Red-Green coalition for the parliamentary term which followed. Joschka Fischer, who, after his four-year period as leader of the parliamentary party, had meanwhile risen to become the leading figure of the Greens, became Vice-Chancellor and took up the office of Foreign Minister.

The new government faced its first test even before the coalition negotiations were completed when in 1998 the conflict in the former Yugoslavia flared up once more – this time in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Ethnic displacements carried out by Serbs were being witnessed once again, following patterns already familiar from Bosnia. With the benefit of the experience gained from the earlier conflicts in the 1990s, the international community reacted more decisively and more quickly. The story is well-known: after Russia had used its veto to block the UN Security Council, the NATO Council, without a mandate from the United Nations, first issued an Activation Order (ActOrd) for the Supreme Allied Commander. When this increased pressure failed to have any impact in the negotiations taking place with Serbian President Milosevic, coordinated allied NATO flights began carrying out bomb strikes against the Serbs in March 1999. Alliance '90/The Greens, with their Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, were centrally involved.

Inside the hall, the internecine anger of some members towards the Foreign Minister exploded in warlike cries of “murderer”, “warmonger” and “criminal”.

The incoming Federal government, and Gerhard Schröder above all, were under enormous international pressure to demonstrate their credentials as reliable partners within the alliance. In a Bundestag session convened at short notice, the parliament, with the votes of the Red-Green coalition, gave its approval to ActOrd. This brought out into the open once more the already widely-known divisions within the party. For even though a majority of Greens voted in favour of approving the NATO order, some, especially the radical pacifists, distanced themselves from the parliamentary group's decision. Although it seemed at first as if the efforts towards political de-escalation might begin to work under the pressure created by the ActOrd, within a few months the optimism turned out to be mistaken; and when on 24 March 1999 the first NATO fighter jets took off, the Federal Republic, with a small contingent of planes, found itself taking part in its first active combat mission since the end of the Second World War.

Justified by history

Joschka Fischer, who at this time dominated the party's (foreign) policy-making both as party chair and through his roles as Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, justified the German position primarily by referring back to German history. His maxim, cited earlier – never again war, but also never again Auschwitz – became from this point on the most striking statement of belief within his argumentation, one which became famous above all because of his speech at the extraordinary conference of the Federal delegates in May 1999 in Bielefeld. The aerial

war against Serbia had by then been in progress for almost two months without the Serbs capitulating, and emotions within the party were reaching boiling point. There were tumultuous scenes outside the hall in Bielefeld and a large police presence was needed to protect the party congress. Inside the hall, the internecine anger of some members towards the Foreign Minister exploded in warlike cries of “murderer”, “warmonger” and “criminal”.



The Foreign Minister, roused by this to even greater anger and motivation, eventually brought his party round by dint of a committed, passionate and emotional speech to passing the motion of the Federal executive for a continuation of support for the NATO mission against Serbia by 444 votes to 318. That day can certainly be seen as the culmination of the internal party dispute over the balancing act between the two fundamental party principles of its traditional pacifism and the defence of human rights. This debate over principles, which had been

Legitimacy must be assured under international law on the basis of the relevant chapter of the Charter of the United Nations.

conducted over several years and which in the context of the Bosnian war had served to polarise the tendencies within the party, had almost torn it apart. But it was down to Fischer – in part, indisputably, because of the pressure exerted by the responsibility of being in government – that for the first time a majority in the party voted in support of military intervention at a conference of the Federal party delegates.

What stands out?

1) The internal party conflict over the dilemma between the two fundamental principles of human rights and non-violence was always played out in the 1990s and the early 2000s in a full and frank debate; this went as far as open conflict and even included physical attacks, as shown by the events at Bielefeld in 1999, and it brought the party to the brink of a split. However, the bitter debates were also conducted very thoroughly, and eventually, after a very painful journey, the party rose to the challenges presented by new global political conditions and conflict patterns.

2) Clear-cut conditions were formulated and attached to the approval of military operations. For example, all non-military options must be exhausted, and they must in any event be given priority. Legitimacy must be assured under international law on the basis of the relevant chapter of the Charter of the United Nations. Missions take place in a multilateral

framework and must be clearly defined and approved by the Bundestag. The rejection by Alliance '90/The Greens of the military operation in Iraq in 2003 (which is not covered in this shortened version) should be understood in the context of these clearly-formulated conditions.

3) The fact that the party, as stated in its manifesto, remains committed to meeting the challenge presented by the conflict between non-violence and violations of human rights is demonstrated for example in the annual renewals in the Bundestag of the mandates for the OEF and the ISAF in Afghanistan. Although neither mission was granted a free ride by Alliance '90/The Greens, as demonstrated at the extraordinary conference of Federal delegates in the year 2007, the operation itself was not fundamentally questioned, not even by the more critical grassroots membership – and that at a time when the party had returned to the opposition benches. In the context of a deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and an imminent Bundestag vote on whether to send Tornado fighter jets into the area of operations, a further militarisation of the German role in Afghanistan was rejected. The party congress supported a step-by-step demilitarisation of the mission, but a total and immediate withdrawal from operations was not on the agenda for discussion.

The party's new perspective, especially regarding the period of government responsibility from 1998 to 2005 – more pragmatic, shaped more by Realpolitik – can be summed up with the words of Joschka Fischer on 11 September 2001:

“But whatever challenges and tests the future might hold for us, we held responsibility and we had to act, and especially on that day.” ■

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Tamara van Ree

Dutch Green Party and R2P: Soul-searching over military intervention

The use of military force is a sensitive issue for the Dutch Greens. Last fall, the Dutch Green Left party GroenLinks conducted a comprehensive open party debate on the subject, an endeavour to further develop the party's thought and communication on the subject. A rather daring and progressive project, that became a triumph of party democracy.

Under what conditions can military interventions be supported? – asked the Dutch Green Left party GroenLinks last fall, in a party-wide debate. This is a particularly sensitive subject for GroenLinks, as traditionally its members are highly interested in international issues, are torn between compassion and a sense of duty towards people in conflict areas, and a deep distrust of violence as a means to solve problems. This is, in part, due to the origins of the party. GroenLinks was founded in 1989 as a merger of four parties, which brought together green, socialist, evangelical, and pacifist principles. Since its founding, the party has been very critical about the use of military violence and the platforms whose primary task it is to organise coalitions for such events, notably NATO. However, the party has never taken a fully pacifist position, and wasn't rejecting all military interventions. Thus, for many years it has struggled with decision making about the use of military force.

This indecision led to a crisis in the party in 2011, when Dutch green MPs supported a plan to send troops to develop and protect a police training mission in Kunduz, Afghanistan (only one green MP – Ineke van Gent – voted against the mission). Their support was decisive in letting this plan of a very unpopular and controversial government pass in parliament. Many members were highly critical of the possible support for the mission, yet the relatively new party leader Jolande Sap committed herself to supporting it.

The following election resulted in a huge defeat with the party losing six of its ten seats in parliament. Not long afterwards, the party leader and party board both resigned and a process of soul-searching began in the party.



The “open party debate”


In order to successfully manage the crisis inside the party, an inquiry committee was established, that carried out a thorough investigation. Among other things, the committee recommended searching for new and better methods to develop the party's internal democracy. Logically – but also daringly – Bram van Ojik, the new party leader, suggested military intervention as the first topic to debate with the green party members during this pilot initiative that came to be known as the “open party debate” method. The pilot was considered fairly progressive as, like other parties across Europe, Dutch parties often shy away from true internal debates on controversial topics.

Many members were convinced that the use of military force can only be considered when it is part of a bigger strategy including prevention of violence and post-conflict reconstruction.

The so called “party talks” started in September 2014 and continued until November. The kick-off to the debate was provided by an initial debate document, which was developed by the party board and the green party think tank (Bureau de Helling) that brought into focus the central topics up for discussion. The forum for members to meet was provided by the green party county committees that organised nine meetings throughout the country. Green MPs and senators were invited and were explicitly instructed to focus on listening and discussing with members, and not on delivering a speech. The meetings were complemented by an online debate and a poll, in which members were asked whether they found the dilemmas outlined in the initial debate document important enough to be included in the MPs’ decision-making process, and how they weighted the dilemma compared to other issues. The results were used to compose a final document that was put to a vote among all party members in a referendum.

With a voter turn-out of 24.9% , and 86.7% of the votes in favour of the document, the referendum was considered a success by the party board. The final document is an assessment framework, that is meant to support the Dutch green MPs to examine future political initiatives concerning military intervention for consistency with party thought on the issue. It comprises five main points: protection of civilians against violence; legitimacy in international law; integration in a broader plan of diplomacy, humanitarian aid and reconstruction; long-term commitment; and finally, demonstrated insufficiency of non-violent options. In addition, the MPs in

cooperation with the party board set out guidelines on how discussions with members should be held on the application of this assessment in concrete cases of military intervention.



“Diplomacy, defence and development”

Some topics and considerations were frequently mentioned during the party talks. First and foremost, many members were convinced that the use of military force can only be considered when it is part of a bigger strategy including prevention of violence and post-conflict reconstruction. And even in this case they would need to act in accordance with the so-called 3-D approach of diplomacy, defence and development. This matches the green party members’ desires to tackle the structural causes of conflict. In this respect, on several occasions the importance of the geopolitics of energy (specifically oil) was mentioned. Otherwise, the ecological/environmental effects of military intervention did not play a very prominent role.

In the members' poll, only 14% of respondents said to reject any support of the use of violence,

During the party talks, it became apparent that the conviction that conflicts can and should be solved by peaceful means alone was a "view held by a small but passionate minority" within the green party. "Pacifist" members contributed heavily during the meetings and to the online debate. Yet, in the members' poll, only 14% of respondents rejected all support for the use of violence, and in the referendum a more or less equal number of members rejected the final document, although of course this could also be for other reasons. The party talks showed the importance of making a real effort to include these and other minority views in the party's deliberation processes. Not only because taking minority views into account is part of the green party's roots, but also because these minorities help to ensure that the party is forced to make deliberate decisions on the use of military force. This consideration is what members and voters felt was missing during the party crisis of 2011.

Probably the other biggest minority view is held by advocates of a compulsory UN Security Council mandate, as a precondition for military intervention. The poll showed 36% of members in favour of this criteria. The subject was heavily debated during the county meetings, with proponents warning that the perils of self-righteousness, revenge and self-interest increase when international law is disregarded. Opponents of this criteria were concerned that the abuse of veto power in the Security Council would lead to deadlocks preventing the opportunity to protect civilians against gross human rights

violations. Experts were consulted and a provisional compromise was reached in the referendum document. The possibility of an exception to a Security Council mandate was added to the criteria with an asterisk, which could be seen as a symbol of it being an issue that is on the members' radar, but requiring institutional change within the Security Council and international law, more than it needs members agreeing on it. After all, more than 86% of members voted in favour of the text with the asterisk.

It is an illusion to think that these party talks settled the Dutch green party's opinion about "just war". On the contrary, it showed the importance of continuing the dialogue with members every time these criteria are used by green MPs to decide whether to support or oppose a military mission. This is demonstrated in the title of the collected contributions of the debate, that Bureau de Helling published in January 2015: "Vrede, daar blijf je aan werken" ("Peace, a continuous work in progress").

So what work lies ahead for the Dutch green party? On the issue of military force, some of the external experts that contributed to the party talks – like military historian Dr. Christ Klep – suggested that maybe the party should reconsider and elaborate its vision for the Dutch army in the twenty-first century next. Party leader Van Ojik – a former diplomat himself – similarly expressed an interest in further developing Dutch green party thinking on contemporary security issues, such as drones and conflicts caused by climate change.

No need for shady evidence

Another important issue which came to light during the party talks was the importance of obtaining reliable information on conflicts as a basis for MPs' decision-making. They emphasised the need to avoid the kind of "shady evidence" that was put forward to justify the start of the Iraq War (2003-2011). This case, but also more recent examples like the conflict in Ukraine prove that framing is complicating the gathering of reliable information: for example, nationalists and rebels both often use social media to claim and denounce attacks making it hard to know who to blame and how to protect civilians. Since the political challenges concerning armed conflict – whether it be prevention and resolution, or actual military intervention – are highly transnational in many aspects, it would be a good idea for the Dutch green party to seek collaboration on these topics with its sister parties in other countries.

Moreover, since many green parties in Europe advocate more European military collaboration, it would only be logical to expand the knowledge of fellow green parties' dealings with these issues, and start a dialogue amongst Greens all over Europe on these issues. Right now, the knowledge of each other's national challenges and involvements in the subject sometimes seems haphazard, or at least limited. This also became apparent during the party talks. Hardly any members mentioned fellow green parties, whilst many more emphasised the importance of European collaboration. On a practical

level, this could be tackled by establishing a standing working group on peace and security under the European Green Party where the international secretaries of member parties can meet to exchange viewpoints, experiences, knowledge and best practices.



Although it is a challenge to democratically develop common views on a European level among Greens on this sensitive subject, the possibility of expanding knowledge and relevant actions is too important to pass up. By bringing together knowledge and peacebuilding initiatives, we might be able to shift the debate in national parliaments from escalated conflict situations and possible military actions, to early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms. ■

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Pacifism, non-violence and international law – Green parties and the use of force



Jonathan Piron

The intervention in Libya, the refusal to intervene in Syria and the denunciations of the interventions in Mali and Central Africa show that the use of force is up for discussion again. Traditional theoretical approaches to conflicts are ineffective. This article describes how the Belgian, French and German greens reacted to this problem.

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Grey areas are becoming the norm in territories where political borders no longer have much meaning.

Since the September 11th attacks, the philosophy of war and the terms and conditions according to which force can be used have been the subject of intense debate. Conflicts, that appear now less and less frequently between states, present many new characteristics, meaning that traditional theoretical approaches to conflicts are ineffective. Among other factors, the privatisation of violence, tensions between communities, serious infringements of human rights and the deconstruction of states are redefining the nature of these new conflicts. Grey areas are becoming the norm in territories where political borders no longer have much meaning.



In the face of this international turmoil, new reading lists have appeared which aim to explain as best they can the links they believe will govern the world from now on. However, many simple explanations result in simplistic arguments in which the complexity of the situation is denied and a new Manichean approach is preferred.

Beyond that, sometimes rightly, critics also have much to say about a “West” which, they allege, is selectively compassionate: there are, they say, some causes the West supports (Libya), others it ignores (Israel-Palestine, Yemen, Syria) and lastly some – the “worst” – which it conceals behind active neutrality for geostrategic reasons (for example Bahrain). The refusal to intervene in Syria and the denunciations of the interventions in Mali and Central Africa show that the use of force is up for discussion again.

“Make war on war”

In that context, the green parties seem to be torn between two virtually irreconcilable attitudes. Claiming a pacifist history, many ecologists have stressed the dangers of military interventions and how few positive results they produce. This pacifist tendency is demonstrated in an idea which is both simple and strong: “make war on war”!

Conversely, the views of another tendency stress the defence of human rights and threatened populations, highlighting the responsibility to protect them from the risks of genocide or massacres on an immense scale. Each side presents the basis of its moral and pacifist arguments and the need to defend human rights but they have been tearing themselves apart since the military intervention in Libya in 2011, leaving a deep and painful wound.

Before investigating the new frames of reference, which may define green parties’ proposals concerning conflicts and the use of force, we should review the positions taken over the last 30 years.

During that time, green parties have swung between anti-militarism, pacifism, non-violence and peace through law.

Initially, during the 1980s, it was through the fight against nuclear weapons that green parties first stepped into the international arena. That concept, which helped unify the movement for the German Greens, later manifested itself in their opposition to not only nuclear weapons, but also the “civilian” uses of nuclear power. Followed by the French and Belgian Greens, that position was apparent in their participation in the many anti-Euromissile demonstrations which shook Western Europe in the early 1980s.

Antimilitarism is a preliminary stage

Opposition to nuclear weapons is not the only mainstay. Antimilitarism is also a green concern. After 1983, French-speaking Belgian ecologists called for the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. For their part, the French Greens have been involved in actions such as opposing the expansion of the military training camp at Le Larzac in South Western France, while the German Greens have invested their efforts in opposing armed combat, of which they would have been the first victims in any conflict between the USA and the USSR.

Ecology and pacifism thus seem to have been associated with the Greens during the 1980s. According to some Greens, such as José Bové, the commitment to antimilitarism is supposed to be a preliminary stage before the adoption of the green agenda is pursued further. However, in recent years Belgian and German ecologists have had little to contribute to these international discussions: in their opinion, the question of military intervention barely arises because neither country intervened outside European borders throughout the 1980s.

The 90s: a completely new era

The accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev and the global disarmament agreements, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, ultimately changed the way ecologists perceived armed conflict, as well as the perspective from which the green movements decided to join the critics of neo-liberal globalisation and the economic development of north-south links. Support for the promotion of human rights and respect for international law began to gain the upper hand.

However, tension developed between the supporters of anti-imperialist pacifism, who were opposed to NATO's operations in general and those of the United States in particular, and those who supported humanitarian intervention framed by respect for international law and the resolutions of the United Nations.

Gradually, the French Greens started supporting military interventions, of which Kosovo is an emblematic example.

Various events crystallised those diverse attitudes. Gradually, the French Greens started supporting military interventions, of which Kosovo is an emblematic example. Going further than their Belgian counterparts, French ecologists called for the continuation of the bombardments and the “installation of an international police force charged with intervening on the ground to re-establish peace and the territorial integrity of Kosovo”. Their adoption of such a bold stance was justified by the rejection of cowardice in the face of the violence exerted against civilians.



When the population really is in danger...

For Ecolo, the green party of francophone Belgium, the change of attitude was more decisive, and very sudden. In September 1998, the party still declared itself against any military intervention in Kosovo, while demanding that “Belgrade call an immediate ceasefire, withdraw its special forces from the province and arrange the safe return of the refugees” and embarked on a process of peaceful dialogue with the Albanian population of Kosovo. The party denounced the hold of NATO and the United States

over the settlement of the conflicts, emphasising the necessity of accelerating the introduction of a true European policy of security and defence within the institutions of the European Union.

The September 11th attacks, however, radically changed those attitudes. Although opposition to the war in Iraq was unanimous (Ecolo in particular considered it a “useless, absurd, dangerous, unjustified” use of force), the situation was interpreted in various ways and the idea of a “just war” – based on the defence of international law – took centre stage. It was this time when French greens confirmed their change from “militant antimilitarism” to realism in international relations. As Denis Baupin emphasised in 2011, “When the population really is in danger, we support intervention”.

The German Greens were also affected by that change. Thus, on the initiative of Joschka Fischer, then Foreign Minister of Germany, the green party acknowledged that, as a last resort, the defence of human rights could involve the use of force. “Force must not replace policy, but we also know that the use of violence legitimated by the law of the State and international law cannot always be ruled out” – he said.

The snowball effect

It was those ideological positions which led the Greens to declare themselves in favour of the intervention in Libya in 2011. Faced by the threat of mass crimes against the Libyan population, the Greens supported the use of force. Yves Cochet, a green member of parliament for Paris, summarised the position as follows: “Yes, we do approve it.

We may be divided – people don't like war – but we must intervene in this case. It's a sort of right to intervene". Not much later, however, events snowballed. The military operation ended with the fall of the Gaddafi regime, and many observers believed that the intervention exceeded the mandate issued by the United Nations, ultimately causing severe international trauma.



The anxiety of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) quickly turned to resentment towards Western nations which they accused of not only exceeding the UN mandate, but also of using their "responsibility to protect" in order to intervene in the internal affairs of countries they wished to control. That resentment was shared by many pacifist associations in the West, which denounced the naïveté, or even the lies, of the political parties which had supported the use of force, including the Greens. The drama in Syria, the

destabilising events in Central Africa and Mali but also the conflicts in Israel/Palestine, Ukraine and ISIS will continue to accentuate their anxiety about the settlement of conflicts, or even simply about their comprehension. Traditional formulas continue to be proposed, despite the fact that the world is changing, and with it its points of reference.

New elements of war are arising

The denial of the complexity of military interventions, shared by many movements, does not exonerate the green parties from a gap in their understanding of the international system. The route markers enabling them to reach that understanding are absent or even disregarded, and Greens often still believe that power resides in the nation-states. The wars which followed September 11th 2001 call into question the notion of the theory of the "just war" and its criteria. New elements also revived the question of ethical considerations regarding states' commitments: migratory and financial flows, environmental risks, increased inequalities and many other issues raise the stakes regarding the causes and terms and conditions of conflicts and thus influence responses to them. To many observers, it was no longer a question of adopting the "least bad" policy but rather a "non-nuisance" approach and the conditions governing the use of force are part of that.

The reassessment of the conflicts, their resolution and the terms and conditions governing intervention therefore present a new challenge for the ecologist parties, because new threats are looming: for example, privatisation, computerisation and the

The ultimate goals, always shared by the ecologist parties, are still world peace and global disarmament.

causes and environmental consequences of wars. The fight against impunity must once again become an objective to defend.

The promotion of international justice – making each state, group or person responsible for their actions – is a fundamental stage in the process at local and global level, as is tackling the warmongers of tomorrow. Moreover, the question of the public reappropriation of armies and conflicts must become the skeleton of new pacifist movements which will need to judge both their allies and their enemies objectively because the ultimate goals, always shared by the ecologist parties, are still world peace and global disarmament.

Future debates will therefore have to concern recovering the balance between violence and the law and the law's capacity to frame violence. Only if that aim is achieved will it be possible to simultaneously avoid international anarchy and the splendid isolation of nations and/or opinions which prefer comfortable blinkers to difficult undertakings. To do that, the green parties in Europe will have to make their views about those new challenges heard and, above all, they will need to listen to and understand one another. ■

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True Green foreign policy: From advocacy to human empowerment



Alfredo Sfeir-Younis

Today, we witness an anachronistic pattern of foreign policy: incoherent, homocentric, far removed from the reality of people, and dominated by economic and political interests (the neoliberal system). The EU needs to become a driver of change. The ultimate goal should be a Global Government with direct global citizens' participation, with a form of governance that is truly democratic, cooperative, and transparent.

Global citizens demand and experience a completely new form of life without the political frontiers of the past: they live in a planet with no borders. There are no borders for the problems of climate change, ozone layer depletion, destruction of biodiversity, pollution of our oceans, conservation of our global public goods (including culture, arts, music, stability, and security), transmission of diseases, effects of an external economic crisis, pressure of migration, global security, peace or conflicts.

Transport and communications have significantly contributed to humanity's inter-dependent form of existence. We have become a human collective. However, this must be understood as being within a life collective, which includes all forms of life on the planet. This is what must redefine the core of a country and of a global foreign policy. We have to consider the welfare of all living beings. The key tasks of foreign policy today are to include all forms of life and to make "global welfare" greater than the "sum of its parts".

The above raises important demands at the institutional level – on both bilateral and multilateral activities and organisations. This implies a foreign policy that evolves and responds to the realities we will face in the 21st century.

Today, we witness an anachronistic pattern of foreign policy: it is incoherent, homocentric, far removed from the reality of people, and dominated by economic and political interests (the neoliberal system), a cold war mentality, governments' egocentric global views

(including military concerns), and the notion that we need to be governed by a "super power", and not by people's individual and collective interests.

We must revise drastically the content of this foreign policy. For the moment it is biased and not aligned with the interest of the collective, nor does it represent the regular citizens of the world. This is a huge democratic deficit and demands a structural change in the international organisational architecture, diminishing the excessive power we are subject to from international organisations. This situation is happening as we see the strengthening of private corporate power at the global level (a move away from a citizen-based foreign policy and an accelerator of inequalities), the ever weakening power of the state, and the blooming of citizens' global activism. Certainly, environmental and human rights issues have been part and parcel of this activism.



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We see that the greatest challenge today is to live as a human collective, as “one world” on this smaller and smaller planet.

The true meaning of foreign policy

In this context, people are asking about the true meaning and purpose of a “Green foreign policy” (GFP). What is it? What are the real differences between traditional and Green foreign policy? What are the thematic and strategic issues that should become central to GFP that are not yet included in existing frameworks? These are very important questions to ask, even if we do not know the full answer to them. I have asked them a hundred times, with no satisfactory answers coming back to me.

While the answers are not easy to portray, it is fundamental that GFP embraces the above-mentioned dimensions and goes far beyond issues of the environment and ecology. It is understandable that the beginning of a GFP be defined and oriented by ecological issues and concerns. But today, we must also acknowledge many other issues, like human development and health (ecological depletion and diseases), ethnic inclusion and self-determination (the rights of indigenous peoples and our natural capital), social integration and development (clean environment and family cohesion), macro-policies for sustainability (environmental macroeconomics), anthropological and cultural issues (understanding motivation, behaviour and welfare), inter-generational concerns (the rights of our children), spatial externalities (trans-boundary pollution), public-good-based conservation and management (our common heritage), energy conservation and management (new and renewable energy sources), and many others. These are all dimensions of the new GFP.

The new state of play

We are living in a world where the major constraints are ecological, notwithstanding the importance of the social dimensions of human transformation. We are witnessing the important role that civil society plays in world affairs, in contrast to the traditional role played by governments. We know that material welfare alone is not enough to attain higher levels of human advancement. Non-material welfare has become equally important.

We are fully aware that technology is not the answer to all our questions. Nor is it the solution to all our problems. The key to change is the level of our human consciousness. We see that the greatest challenge today is to live as a human collective, as “one world” on this smaller and smaller planet. However, the incentives to do so are not there, and existing foreign policy insists on defending individual national positions (as on climate change). The world’s citizens perceive that a sustainable society is not just another option: it is our only destiny.

A GFP is not just about governments, it is also about citizens. This brings to the table the limits we observe in material, socioeconomic, and human development: ecological constraints and the level of our collective consciousness. These are accompanied by population growth and density, migration, city expansion, pollution of all sorts, destruction of biodiversity, etc., creating an ever more complex global scenario.

We must construct the Global Government with direct global citizens' participation, with a form of governance that is truly democratic, cooperative, and transparent.



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Democratic deficit and international institutions

Today, we need a Global Government more than ever, with a global form of governance. None of the current international organisations are truly “global” in scope. Not even the United Nations system, in which national interest still is the main driving force. This applies to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organisation. They were all founded nearly a century ago under rules of engagement that no longer apply.

We must construct the Global Government with direct global citizens' participation, with a form of governance that is truly democratic, cooperative, and transparent. We must carry out a democratic election of the UN Secretary General, with billions of global citizens participating in the nomination. We have to create a Global Organisation for peace and environment as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) does not have the stature to govern our global public goods and services. We need to drastically change the goals, structure and activities of the World Bank and the IMF, which must be managed by the Global Government and not be, as they currently are, a system of self-government or institutions that follow their own interests.

It is crucial that the Greens not only advocate for ecology and environment, but that they present to world citizens another socioeconomic model for human transformation. Thus, we must change the impressions of what constitutes the boundaries of the Greens. In order to achieve this, we have to make clear to the people what it means to be Green. The meaning of the word Green needs to be extended. It has to embrace all aspects of life, including macroeconomic, institutional, cultural, ethnic, and spiritual issues. People need to see that sustainable development is not just another option or just another topic, but the only destiny of humanity. This understanding is not yet widespread in most countries. People are still bonded to neoliberal views and practices. People still think that Green proposals are not real, that they will not promote growth and employment, and that a paradigm shift of that nature will demand too many structural changes they are

unwilling to go through. A GFP has to prove them wrong.

A new superpower?

The notion of a superpower has dominated the foreign policy framework of developed and developing countries. Today, it looks like a new superpower is rising, and we have to know what type of superpower it will be in relation to a GFP. Superpowers create political dependency, alliances or their opposite, a social and political grammar that dominates world views and institutions, and unique patterns of economic growth and human development. Today's crisis is the mirror image of the existing superpower(s). This is the context within which the EU role must be defined.

The EU is fundamental, particularly in the transition to a new GFP, to any new superpower and the formation of a Global Government. We know that, if taken together (votes/resources supplied by the EU) it has significant power in most international organisations. Several EU countries are listened to; thus, they are essential for forming new coalitions for change at the global level.

Nevertheless, we see an EU moving inwards rather than outwards. The Greens may play a critical role in fostering the formation of a new Global Government with EU support, not as an advocate but as the presenters of a unique view of life on this planet. The Greens may enrich and nurture new values, aims and horizons for Europe and the whole globe. A GFP may become its immediate instrument.

Private sector responsibilities

The private sector is as responsible for the state of global affairs as governments are. For centuries it has been the major cause of environmental destruction. Thus, today, it must become an organic part of the processes described above.

For once, it is essential that the private sector makes a contribution to the collective welfare of humanity, and not just to itself. Job creation is insignificant in relation to other components of collective welfare. We need a new industrial revolution that passes from the steam engines to human consciousness. It is not possible to have a foreign policy that chases free trade agreements only. We ought to create the necessary spaces for production and consumption systems that do not destroy human lives or any other form of life on the planet.



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Green values are collective values: justice, cooperation, solidarity, love, compassion, inter-connectedness, inclusion, interdependence, peace, security, and more.

Green empowerment: “We the people” not “We the governments”

The fight for global change must transition from advocacy to human empowerment. This is a fundamental change, which is far from trivial in its implementation. This model is not just an economic model of a sustainable development society. Sustainability must be accompanied with an empowered citizenship. These two dimensions are one. Today’s economic system focuses only on expanding material opportunities and not on creating a space for empowerment, active participation, human security, and democratic citizenship. The engagement of civil society in GFP is fundamental. GFP must not be top-down; and the EU has a unique opportunity to lead this shift in paradigm.

Greens should play an important role in the process of empowerment. A true GFP is the framework needed to pass from advocacy to human empowerment. But in order to achieve this, Greens should not only advocate values (Green values), they need to actively empower the people. “Values” are not words, they are “states of being” that must be self-realised. Human empowerment is born out of the self-realisation of those collective values. One important Green value is “interdependence”. This concept is essential in order to understand the true meaning of sustainability. Also, sustainability is not just a word. It is an experience, a human right, and a state of consciousness. If the value of interdependence is not self-realised, there is little we can do to save the planet.

Green values are collective values: justice, cooperation, solidarity, love, compassion, inter-connectedness, inclusion, interdependence, peace, security, and more. All these values must be self-realised, which implies thinking of new forms of education, civil engagement, and spirituality. People will truly understand the meaning of ecological justice when it becomes something real in their consciousness! This is a form of justice that involves all living beings.

We are to decide

This is a time of deep and structural change; not of marginal change. GFP is not another suite of different economic interests. Thus, a sustainable society is not a well-behaved and nice child of the neoliberal system. It is something completely different. Will the EU lead the shift in paradigm, or will it be hung up on more of the same? A Global Government is not just about economics. A Global Government is not about governments but citizens. This is not a marginal adjustment. Only a new collective consciousness will create a new GFP. ■

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