Brazil will host COP30, the United Nations’ annual climate change conference, from 11 to 20 November. The event comes at a time of geopolitical upheaval. It is the first COP since the re-election of Donald Trump, who has announced – for the second time – the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement. Although the decision will not take legal effect until January 2026, he has declined to send a US delegation to the conference. The COP will test the international community’s ability to maintain and intensify climate efforts in the face of opposition from the US, which has emitted more CO2 than any other country.

The European role is also in doubt. Historically the main driver of climate agreements, Europe is now experiencing setbacks in environmental policy due to the growing political influence of the far right. Furthermore, at last year’s COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, developed countries showed their reluctance  to commit the necessary financial resources for mitigation and adaptation in the Global South. The role of China will also be closely watched, as it leads in some key technologies for the energy transition but is also now the world’s largest emitter. For its part, president Lula da Silva’s Brazil will try to ensure that the COP, which will be held in the Amazonian city of Belem, pays special attention to the protection of tropical forests.

Once again, the different geopolitical blocs have a duty to increase their climate ambition, as the critical decade of the 2020s reaches its midpoint and the likelihood of avoiding catastrophic climate change is diminishing, according to calculations from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). A recent report from scientists and conservationists warned that the planet has reached its first tipping point, with warm water coral reefs facing long-term decline.

Climate negotiations one year after Baku

The COP29 summit in Baku was dubbed the “climate finance COP”. Its main challenge was to agree on a substantial transfer of financial resources from developed states to the Global South to, in the words of the UN, “drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions and protect lives and homes from the worsening impacts of climate change.” 

The most developed countries only offered 300 billion US dollars per year by 2035, a figure described variously as a “joke”, “insultingly low” and “abysmally poor” by Global South negotiators. The Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance had calculated that one trillion dollars per year is needed by 2030, more than triple the amount agreed in Baku.

The failure of the financial chapter at COP29 was a clear example of two dynamics that have been hindering climate negotiations for decades: first, the lack of unanimity on any ambitious agreement, with single states or small groups of them holding back action; second, the selfishness of the most developed countries, which refuse to incorporate climate justice as a guiding principle of global climate policy, despite the Council of the EU having recently advocated for “a just and equitable transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems which ensures that no country is left behind.” The Global North is responsible for 92 per cent of “excess global carbon emissions”, according to an investigation by The Lancet.

The Global North is responsible for 92 per cent of ‘excess global carbon emissions’.

The most novel agreement at the Baku COP29 was on the creation of the carbon markets envisaged in the Paris Agreement. These are a mechanism intended to provide financial incentives for climate change mitigation actions, turning emission allowances into credits that can be bought and sold. According to the COP29 presidency, carbon markets “could reduce the cost of implementing national climate plans by 250 billion US dollars per year by enabling cooperation across borders,” as they should facilitate the transfer of financial resources to impoverished countries without sacrificing global emission reduction goals. 

However, existing carbon markets – used by large companies to offset their emissions – have been heavily criticised for their lack of real effectiveness and their often catastrophic environmental and social impacts. Therefore, Cristina Alonso, head of climate justice at the NGO Friends of the Earth in Spain, considers these markets a “false solution”. The Brazilian presidency of COP30 intends to “harmonize standards and link existing carbon credit trading systems to boost liquidity, predictability, and transparency.”

A COP without the US

Many eyes in Belem will be directed towards the empty chair left by Donald Trump. The Republican was re-elected in 2024 with the promise of scrapping climate goals and promoting the massive exploitation of hydrocarbons, summarised by his slogan “drill, baby, drill”. Trump began fulfilling his promise immediately after his inauguration in January, by ordering that the US once again withdraw from the Paris Agreement after former president Joe Biden had reversed Trump’s first withdrawal in 2017. 

Trump has repeatedly denied the climate crisis, and turned his rhetoric into action: he terminated funding for the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 – Biden’s main climate law – and has approved new oil and gas exploitation, even in protected areas. According to Carbon Brief estimates, Trump’s re-election will result in the equivalent of an extra 4 billion tonnes of CO2 being emitted by 2030. This would “negate – twice over – all of the savings from deploying wind, solar and other clean technologies around the world over the past five years.”

Paradoxically, Washington’s absence from COP could be positive for the outcome of the summit. “Their not being there could facilitate agreements between countries and allow others to take the lead; one would expect Europe and China to do so,” says Clàudia Custodio, an expert at the Observatory on Debt in Globalization (ODG), a climate justice research network. Alonso agrees that the absence of the US removes a drag on the negotiations.

Paradoxically, Washington’s absence from COP could be positive for the outcome of the summit.

European leadership in question 

The European Union has traditionally been the main defender of global climate policy, pushing for increased emission reduction targets. Furthermore, the bloc reduced its emissions by 37 per cent between 1990 and 2023, the largest relative drop among major polluters. Its official target is a 55 per cent reduction by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050. However, this apparent leadership obscures actions such as the outsourcing of emissions, and is further called into question by the growing influence of the far right in European politics.

European leaders have agreed to a last-minute common emissions reduction target. The previous engagement to a 90 per cent emissions cut by 2040 has been watered down, replacing part of it with the purchase of international carbon credits. In the shorter term, the agreement is to slash EU emissions between 66.25 per cent and 72.5 per cent by 2035. While revealing internal divisions, this also reflects the new power balances within the EU. The new Commission that formed after the 2024 European elections includes, for the first time, a member of the far-right European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, which is hostile to environmental policies. Additionally, the European People’s Party, the largest in the European Parliament, has distanced itself from the Green Deal, the package of environmental legislation approved during Ursula von der Leyen’s first term as President of the European Commission (2019-2024). In fact, she has suggested weakening the current 2040 emissions reduction target as part of the EU’s “simplification” agenda, casting doubt on the bloc’s ability to drive climate negotiations in Belem.

Custodio criticises the EU for opting to attract private resources to fulfil its financial commitments, given that this could worsen the Global South’s debt. “Europe should be super ambitious and put unconditional public funding on the table to repair the damage caused to other countries suffering from the climate emergency,” she says. A recent report by Oxfam and the CARE Climate Justice Centre has revealed that “developing countries are now paying more back to wealthy nations for climate finance loans than they receive,” as most of the existing funding consists of loans.

China: COP30’s great unknown

For the first time in COP’s history, China has presented a specific emissions reduction target prior to a summit – of 7 per cent by 2035, from the peak of emissions. This takes into account all economic sectors. China has been responsible for over 60 per cent of global emissions in the last decade, and the CO2 emissions of the Asian giant now represent almost a third of the global total, more than all developed countries combined.

However, Alonso from Friends of the Earth points out that “a large part of China’s emissions are derived from the production of goods that are exported to other countries, by companies from the United States and Europe and for consumers in those countries. They have outsourced their emissions to China.” An example of this is Belgium: the offshoring of emissions accounted for 17 per cent of the overall reduction achieved by the country between 1995 and 2007. Therefore, Alonso considers that “from the perspective of differentiated capabilities and historical responsibility, China is fulfilling its obligations” due to its lower level of economic development and the small share of its historical emissions.

China’s traditional stance in climate negotiations has been to reject emission reduction commitments, relying on its definition as a developing country within the UN climate change framework, which gives it different commitments to developed countries. Meanwhile, Beijing has signed dozens of bilateral climate change agreements with 42 countries in the Global South, as part of its global influence strategy. The recent pledge to cut its emissions suggests a shift towards a more active role in climate diplomacy. Furthermore, says Alonso, “the absence of the United States could reinforce China’s role. In other COPs, the geopolitical conflicts between the two countries were transferred to the negotiations.”

The Chinese state’s strong capacity to plan the economy is a factor in favour of the green transition, as demonstrated by the huge and rapid development of the photovoltaic panel industry. In 2023 alone, China installed more solar panels than the US ever has. However, its decarbonisation is hampered by its heavy dependence on coal – which still generates over 50 per cent of China’s electricity – as well as the construction sector and exports.

A large part of China’s emissions are derived from the production of goods that are exported to other countries, by companies from the United States and Europe.

Brazil’s contradictions

The three previous COPs took place in Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Azerbaijan, all authoritarian regimes highly dependent on gas and oil exports. No major protests were allowed around the official conferences, which were used by the three governments to polish their human rights records. Custodio welcomes the fact that in Belem “there will be more presence of civil society than in the last three COPs,” although she decries the participation of “fossil fuel industry lobbyists”.

Hosting COP30 is an opportunity for Lula to reinforce his diplomatic prestige. The event comes just as the centre-left leader tries to smooth over tensions with Trump, who imposed tariffs and sanctions on Brazil in response to the prison sentence against former President Jair Bolsonaro for attempting a coup in 2023. The arrival of dozens of heads of state in Brazil will increase Lula’s visibility on the international stage (and, if the COP ends well, his global standing). Brazil is a key member of BRICS, the alliance that, with China at the helm, is emerging as one of the main geopolitical counterweights to Trump’s US.

“It’s not insignificant that the COP is being held in Belem, right at the mouth of the Amazon, when it would have been easier to hold it in Sao Paulo,” notes Alonso. Lula wants to use the summit to attract international attention to the protection of tropical forests and the indigenous communities that inhabit them – a critical issue for Brazil, which hosts 65 per cent of the Amazon, and for the global climate agenda. A NASA analysis in 2021 revealed that the CO2 absorption capacity of forests is decreasing because of deforestation, to the point that the Amazon now emits more greenhouse gases than it absorbs. During his presidential term, Bolsonaro dismantled Amazon protections and promoted massive deforestation, a legacy that Lula has radically distanced himself from, proposing a global fund to finance forest protection.

However, Lula’s commitment to protecting tropical forests and fighting climate change can appear thin. At the 2023 Amazon Cooperation Treaty summit, Lula didn’t back the proposal by Colombian President Gustavo Petro to ban oil and gas extraction in the region. And in October this year, Brazil’s state oil company Petrobras was granted permission to drill for oil near the mouth of the Amazon River. Custodio warns that “Lula’s plans for the expansion of Petrobras to continue extracting oil create distrust in the presidency.” 

At the same time, Lula did commit to ending deforestation by 2030 – a difficult target given the opposition of the powerful economic interests of agribusiness, timber industry, and mining. 

In spite of its many contradictions, Lula’s Brazil represents an example of  progressive leadership for the Global South, which could influence the outcome of COP30. Both Custodio and Alonso hope for progress on a just transition, a priority for Brazil and the Global South as a whole.

A precarious crossroads

The United States’ turn to denialism and the wavering of the EU do not inspire great expectations for change at COP30, given these are the main parties responsible for the climate crisis. However, at a time of profound geopolitical transformations, the role of China, BRICS, and the Global South could have more influence than ever on the outcome of the summit.

The Chinese government’s presentation of an emissions reduction target suggests a willingness to fill the diplomacy gap left by the US, while Lula will use the COP stage to assert his role as a progressive leader of the Global South. On the other hand, there will be more space for civil society activists in Belem, which could influence the debates.