In December 2025, more than 100,000 Bulgarians took to the streets, blocking major roads in Sofia and other large cities such as Varna, Plovdiv, and Burgas. Initially triggered by the proposed 2026 state budget, the protests quickly escalated into demands for the resignation of prime minister Rosen Zhelyazkov, widely perceived as a marionette of influential political figures such as oligarch Delyan Peevski (leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms – New Beginning, often known as DPS-Peevski) and Boyko Borissov (leader of the GERB party and a former prime minister).

The scale and intensity of the protests surprised the political establishment. Under unprecedented social pressure, the government withdrew the controversial budget. Soon after, on 11 December 2025, Zhelyazkov’s cabinet formally stepped down. If no new political majority emerges, the country is headed for its eighth parliamentary election in just four years.

Given Bulgaria’s limited experience with coordinated democratic resistance, the December protests were arguably one of the largest peaceful, unified civic mobilisations in the country’s modern history. The fall of communism in 1990 occurred through an internal party collapse rather than a mass uprising, and Bulgarian society remained largely atomised and hopeless, struggling to develop the reflexes of democratic participation. But over the 35 years since the transition to democracy, Bulgarian society has undergone a slow transformation, gradually embracing active citizenship and public resistance.

Contested figures

One of the factors that catalysed this shift was the exposure of mafia-style oligarchic structures dominating political life. The recent wave of protests was primarily against the informal political union between Borissov and Peevski.

Borissov served as prime minister three times, holding office for a total of about nine years between 2009 and 2021, making him the longest‑serving Bulgarian leader in the post‑communist era. Before entering national politics, he was mayor of Sofia and earlier held roles in the security services.

Borissov’s tenure was marked by economic stability, infrastructure projects, and strong ties with NATO and the EU, which bolstered his support among many voters who appreciated his pragmatic, results‑oriented leadership. However, he is also deeply controversial. Opponents – including former President Rumen Radev – have argued that Borissov’s governments failed to address corruption effectively and undermined democratic accountability, while supporters portray him as a stabilising force capable of navigating Bulgaria through complex domestic and international challenges. Public opinion remains sharply divided, with some viewing him as an experienced statesman and others seeing him as emblematic of the political establishment’s shortcomings, including entrenched corruption, weak rule of law, and political clientelism.

On the other hand, Peevski, a media entrepreneur and oligarch, has played a prominent and highly controversial role in Bulgaria’s political scene for more than a decade. He has served as a member of the National Assembly since 2009 and, since February 2024, has been the leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) and its successor electoral coalition, DPS – New Beginning.

Peevski’s career has spanned politics, business, and media. Early in his public life he owned and controlled major media outlets. In 2013, his appointment as head of the State Agency for National Security sparked nationwide protests, forcing his resignation amid claims of undue influence. Internationally, Peevski has been sanctioned by both the United States and the United Kingdom for alleged corruption, bribery, and influence‑peddling.

Similar to Borissov, public perception of Peevski in Bulgaria is deeply polarised. Many citizens and civic groups view him as a symbol of oligarchic control, institutional capture, and systemic corruption, while supporters within Peevski’s party portray him as a leader committed to representing minority interests and pursuing political goals.

After a long period of rivalry, the two leaders have shifted towards collaborating in recent years.

New economy, old politics

Following the collapse of communism, Bulgaria experienced a dramatic economic downturn: GDP shrank by nearly 40 per cent in the 1990s, and unemployment reached 15-18 per cent as state industries failed. The introduction of a currency board in 1997 marked a turning point, leading to economic stabilisation and improved growth in the 2000s. By the time the country joined the EU in 2007, unemployment had fallen to around 6 per cent.

Endemic corruption and a judiciary system widely perceived as ‘colonised’ by oligarchic interests have pushed discontent to a tipping point.

Bulgaria benefited greatly from access to the EU single market, European funding, and the free movement of people. The global financial crisis only temporarily reversed these gains, with unemployment peaking again in 2012-2013. From 2014 onwards, however, Bulgaria returned to steady growth, and unemployment dropped below 5 per cent, remaining low even through the Covid-19 shock. Demographic decline due to emigration eventually created labour shortages, prompting the country to attract workers from abroad.

At the beginning of 2025, Bulgaria achieved full membership in the Schengen area. On 1 January 2026, it also joined the Eurozone. Yet economic convergence has failed to translate into institutional trust. Instead, the gap between improving macroeconomic indicators and persistently dysfunctional governance has fuelled further public frustration.

Most recently, endemic corruption and a judiciary system widely perceived as “colonised” by oligarchic interests have pushed discontent to a tipping point.

A post-populist wave?

The factors driving the December protests extended far beyond economic woes. Citizens demanded a fair electoral process, deep judicial reform, and an end to systemic corruption. What was genuinely new, however, was the collective nature of the action.

For over two decades – particularly since 2001, when populism firmly entered Bulgarian politics – citizens repeatedly delegated the “fight” against oligarchic capture to charismatic leaders. That year, they elected the former king Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, who promised prosperity within 800 days but failed to deliver. In 2009, his former bodyguard Boyko Borissov became prime minister, embodying similar populist hopes. The promised miracle never came.

Although Borissov’s party, GERB, remains an important political actor, it no longer commands sufficient support to govern alone. Other right-wing populist parties – such as ATAKA and There Is Such a People – likewise campaigned against corrupt elites, only to later support oligarchic arrangements in parliament. As a result, they lost public trust.

Now, Bulgarians appear to be shifting from a passive public to a collective political actor, embracing a form of bottom-up mobilisation that may be described as post-populist. While this post-populism reiterates familiar anti-elitist and anti-corruption discourses long associated with populism, it represents a substantive transformation, with significant segments of the population now actively engaging in protest. Previously, this was not the case.

Nevertheless, the mobilisations are chaotic and lack structure or leadership. Therefore, they cannot be considered a movement. At present, social tensions manifest as a “wave”, suggesting that a deeper social change is taking place.

This transformation required more than generational replacement. Despite the formal end of totalitarianism, patterns of social disengagement persisted long after 1990, shaped by decades of repression against collective resistance. Political freedom could not be immediately internalised.

A decisive change occurred when people born well after the beginning of the democratic transition became politically active. Generation Z played a particularly visible role in the December 2025 protests. Their mobilisation combined a new sense of freedom, a demand for moral politics, and – crucially – the desire to remain and build a life in Bulgaria. Like many post-communist EU member states, Bulgaria suffered massive emigration and brain drain for decades.

For Gen Z, political engagement was shaped not only by ideology but also by technology. Social media proved central in enabling rapid mobilisation through decentralised, plural networks of influencers rather than a single charismatic leader. Protesting became “trendy”, offering social identification with a collective struggle against amoral elites. Traditional forms of political socialisation – particularly party-based structures – were largely rejected due to deep mistrust in leadership and entrenched nepotistic practices.

What next?

Despite the awakening of civic society, social mobilisation remains chaotic and largely reactive – defined more by opposition than by constructive alternatives. No new political leadership or trusted representative structures have yet emerged to channel public energy into stable governance.

Political instability has become the norm in Bulgaria. Since 2021, the country has held seven parliamentary elections, with voter turnout declining steadily over this period. Participation started at approximately 50.6  per cent in the April 2021 election and fell to 38.9  per cent in the most recent vote, which took place in October 2024. The lowest turnout was recorded in the June 2024 election at just 34.4  per cent. Bulgarians are simply fed up with fragmented parliaments, short-lived governments, and frequent snap elections.

New elections are to be scheduled probably for March 2026, but so far there is no clear majority, no credible leadership, and no coherent political project capable of meeting citizens’ expectations.

Despite the awakening of civic society, social mobilisation remains chaotic and largely reactive – defined more by opposition than by constructive alternatives.

According to the latest Market Links poll, Bulgaria’s upcoming parliamentary vote would be highly fragmented: the centre-right GERB–SDS leads with 18.1 per cent support, followed by the centrist PP–DB coalition, which was one of the leading voices behind the recent protests, at 14.2 per cent. Right-wing nationalist Revival and the ethnic minority party DPS are close, with around 9 per cent each. Finally, the traditional left-wing BSP and the smaller MECH party barely surpass the 4 per cent threshold for entering parliament.

Another factor that could affect the election is the potential formation of a political party by former president Roumen Radev. He resigned on 20 January, almost a year before the end of his second term in office, and is also expected to join the political competition with a new structure. Previously nominated by the weakened Bulgarian Socialist Party, Radev is demonstrating a pro-Russia orientation.

For Bulgaria, reaching political stability is crucial. Despite having resigned, and without consulting the parliament, Rosen Zhelyazkov’s outgoing government recently joined Donald Trump’s Gaza “Board of Peace”. This puts Bulgaria alongside countries like Hungary and Belarus and demonstrates the risks of continued political instability.

In the short term, the most effective response to Bulgaria’s amoral politics appears to be sustained, direct civic involvement – though in more structured and strategic forms than the chaotic mobilisations observed so far. Active citizen-led electoral monitoring to prevent fraud is also crucial.

At the same time, immediate and credible judicial reform – particularly addressing the independence and accountability of the Prosecutor, the concentration of power in the office of the Chief Prosecutor, and the persistent perception of selective justice – is essential for breaking long-standing patterns of impunity. Complementing these institutional measures, bottom-up efforts to construct legitimate political representation, including new civic movements and reform-oriented parties, could help reconnect citizens with the political system.

Together, these processes offer a pathway toward rebuilding mutual trust between society and state institutions, which has been deeply eroded by decades of corruption scandals, elite capture, and repeated cycles of political deadlock. Only by translating unprecedented civic unity into durable democratic practices can Bulgaria move beyond protest and reach a true tipping point in its democratic development.