The Sahel region is undergoing a seismic geopolitical shift with profound implications for the region and the EU’s influence in West Africa. In July, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, three key Sahelian countries, severed ties with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and forged a new group, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

This is more than a strategic manoeuvre; it is a declaration of independence. By promising to bolster security, stimulate economies, and integrate their markets, the AES aims to create a counter-power to ECOWAS. This poses a direct challenge to the bloc’s authority and could be a potential game-changer for the region.

ECOWAS’s success and failures

Since its establishment in 1975, ECOWAS has contributed to advancing economic integration and political cooperation among member states. The group’s key accomplishments include visa-free travel for citizens of the 15 member states and the adoption of a common external tariff.

ECOWAS has also cultivated a strong partnership with the EU, with close dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues, development aid, trade, and conflict prevention. The EU has provided technical and financial assistance to ECOWAS to implement wide-ranging projects in fields of common interest. In 2023, this partnership was further strengthened by a 212.5-million-euro agreement package, which targets critical areas such as peace and security, transportation, health, and education.

However, ECOWAS has faced substantial challenges in recent years, particularly concerning the rise of undemocratic practices within its member states.  For instance, in Benin, the passage of restrictive eligibility laws in 2019 effectively barred opposition parties from participating in legislative elections. In Togo, recent changes have eliminated presidential term limits, with the head of the state now selected by parliament rather than by popular vote.

ECOWAS has struggled to effectively address these issues, often responding inadequately or not at all. The organisation’s meek and inconsistent handling of these crises has already weakened its authority. Now, the rise of the AES threatens to further erode ECOWAS’ standing and diminish the EU’s influence in the region. This can reduce Brussels to a marginal actor unless both the EU and ECOWAS swiftly recalibrate their strategies.

At the heart of the Sahelian upheaval lies a mix of disillusionment and defiance. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso accuse ECOWAS of failing to support their fight against the escalating security threats posed by violent extremist groups plaguing the Sahel. The trio is also critical of the regional bloc’s imposition of “illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible” sanctions following their military coups.

Rampant political instability

Mali was the first to experience a coup in August 2020, when elements of the military ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. A year later, there was a second putsch when the Malian Army, led by Colonel Assimi Goita, detained interim President Bah N’Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, effectively seizing power.

Burkina Faso experienced two coups in 2022. In January, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba led a military takeover, deposing President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. However, Damiba himself was ousted in September by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who cited Damiba’s failure to address the worsening extremist insurgency.

Lastly, members of Niger’s Presidential Guard, led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, detained President Mohamed Bazoum and his family in July 2023. They declared the end of Bazoum’s regime, and other branches of Niger’s armed forces soon followed suit.

These coups d’état and the creation of AES reflect a growing anti-French – and, more broadly, anti-EU – sentiment among the governments and populations of these states. The three countries have accused ECOWAS of being “under the influence of foreign powers” and “betraying its founding principles.” The trio also accuses the regional bloc of being “a threat to its member states and its population.”

These coups d’état and the creation of AES reflect a growing anti-French – and, more broadly, anti-EU – sentiment among the governments and populations of these states.

Following France’s footsteps

As anti-French sentiment surges across the Sahel, the EU finds itself caught in the crossfire. Aligning with the Élysée’s West African policies has reduced the EU to the role of “merely France’s support actor,” with Brussels tacitly endorsing Paris’s controversial security and development approaches in the region.

For decades, France has maintained a neo-colonial stranglehold over its former West African colonies, exerting political and economic control through various mechanisms. A prime example is the CFA franc, West Africa’s main currency since 1945, which remains tethered to the euro and is still printed in France. This has given Paris significant leverage over the region’s economic decision-making, and the EU has failed to challenge the problem.

Brussels’ equally uncritical support for French-led military operations in West Africa has further entrenched this perception of European complicity. Operation Barkhane, a French-led initiative launched in 2014, was complemented by the EU’s Operation Takuba, which involved troops from various EU countries providing specialised assistance, particularly in training and accompanying Sahel forces against militant groups.

When France withdrew its troops from Mali in 2022 in the wake of the military coups, the EU followed suit. This lockstep approach has made both France and the EU deeply unpopular among Sahelian leaders and populations, culminating in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger severing military ties with Paris.

Yet, Sahelian countries’ disillusionment does not end there. Beyond anti-French sentiments, the EU faces growing resentment for its own policies in the region. The bloc’s focus on military aid, migration, and counter-terrorism at the expense of human rights and socio-economic development has fueled public discontent and scepticism about its intentions in the Sahel. Brussels is now seen as being primarily self-centred rather than committed to fostering genuine partnerships.

The EU’s 2015 deal with Niger, exchanging one billion euros in aid for a law criminalising the transportation of migrants from the city of Agadez to Libya and Algeria for onward transition to Europe, resulted in smugglers’ imprisonment or fining. However, many Nigeriens viewed the law as a restriction on the free movement of people and as detrimental to the local economy. At the same time, the EU-funded livelihood programmes – which had been framed as providing alternatives for smugglers through small business funding – have been criticised for their slow roll-out, strict eligibility criteria, and limitations in terms of replacing the income previously generated through migrant smuggling.

Similarly, in 2016, Mali signed an agreement with the EU to deter migration in exchange for 145 million euros. Many people in the African country saw the deal as a betrayal of their interests as it enabled the EU to deport Malians more easily.

At the end of 2023, Niger’s military leadership revoked the 2015 migration law and expunged related convictions. This decision was welcomed by many Nigeriens, who viewed it as a step towards reclaiming sovereignty and reducing the influence of EU policies in the region. As Niger leads the charge in rejecting EU-imposed policies, other Sahelian nations may follow suit, potentially triggering a domino effect that could reshape the region’s relationship with the EU.

Open door for Russia

While discontent with France and the EU grows, the three Sahelian countries have opened the door to closer cooperation with non-Western actors, especially Russia.

Russia has wasted no time in positioning itself as a champion for the Sahel. While the EU remained silent on the formation of the AES, Moscow enthusiastically welcomed it, framing the alliance as a bold step towards “restoring independence” and “liberation from the Western colonial yoke.”

This is not mere rhetoric. Russia is rapidly solidifying its presence across the Sahel through a combination of military cooperation, economic partnerships, and strategic diplomacy. In January 2024, Russia and Niger agreed to deepen their military cooperation. At the same time, despite the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Russian paramilitary group Wagner, around 1000 mercenaries continue to fight in Mali.

Even more tellingly, Mali – followed by Niger – severed diplomatic ties with Ukraine in July 2024 after accusing Kyiv of backing militant revolts by Tuareg separatists that killed dozens of Wagner mercenaries and Malian soldiers. This move highlights the deepening alignment of these countries with Russia.

The economic dimension of this pivot is equally significant. Russia is reportedly in talks to take over the uranium assets in Niger held by the state-controlled French company, Orano. Two weeks after the start of the discussions with Russia, Niger’s military government revoked the French firm’s license, cutting another link with its former colonial power. Besides granting Moscow valuable uranium assets,  such a deal would also represent a symbolic transfer of power from the old colonial order to a new, assertive Russian presence in Africa.

Since Niger is the EU’s second-largest uranium supplier after Kazakhstan, the EU would be forced to seek other sources of uranium if Russia were to gain control of the West African country’s resources. This would also be a strategic victory for the Kremlin, as it would support Russia’s economy and increase leverage over countries wishing to cut energy ties with Moscow, including EU members.

Russia has also signed several deals to build nuclear power plants in African countries including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Algeria, further enhancing its economic and political presence on the continent. Niger’s uranium could play a crucial role in these projects.

Cracks in ECOWAS’s power

The EU’s interests in the Sahel could also be affected by AES’s weakening of ECOWAS, a key partner in West Africa. This would risk diminishing collective regional responses to security threats and disrupting regional trade, among other pressing challenges. By creating a parallel security framework competing with existing ECOWAS initiatives, AES also risks fragmenting regional efforts at a time when unified action against insurgencies and cross-border threats is desperately needed. This fragmentation leaves West African states, like Togo, Benin and Ghana – which neighbour the three Sahelian states – increasingly vulnerable to extremist groups exploiting their porous, unprotected borders.

The economic fallout from this political rift is already apparent. ECOWAS’ sanctions against AES countries have disrupted trade routes, with consequences for both sides. Niger, a landlocked nation heavily reliant on imports through Benin and Nigeria, is facing a food security crisis, with vulnerable groups being most affected, as supplies dwindle. Citizens of coastal countries, like Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, which depend on the Sahel for livestock, meat, and onions, could also face increased costs if AES countries no longer benefit from ECOWAS tariff privileges.

The ports of Togo, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire risk significant revenue loss as a result of tensions between ECOWAS and AES. Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso accounted for over 92 per cent of Togo’s Lomé port’s transit alone. If the current favourable terms no longer apply, the landlocked nations may seek alternative port options in countries such as Mauritania and Algeria.

In the long term, the standoff between ECOWAS and AES could fuel growing resentment against both blocs, weakening state institutions in the three Sahelian countries and ECOWAS members, destabilising the region, and creating fertile ground for extremist groups to thrive.

What should the EU do?

AES’ creation is not just a challenge; it is also a key opportunity for ECOWAS to reinvent itself and replace its outdated, heavy-handed approach with a more nuanced strategy.

ECOWAS’s knee-jerk reaction of imposing sanctions on AES countries in the wake of military coups has been nothing short of disastrous, punishing innocent civilians and widening the rift between nations. Moreover, it has failed to reach its objective of reinstating democratic governance in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Dialogue, not punishment, is the way forward. This approach could build stronger relationships and foster a sense of unity among members.

ECOWAS also needs to revisit how it promotes democratic governance. The bloc must adopt more flexible, context-sensitive approaches to be able to successfully respond to the specific challenges faced by its members, especially in countries grappling with insecurity and political instability. It should, furthermore, find ways to tactfully but effectively address military and constitutional coups in its member states.

The EU could play a crucial role in supporting ECOWAS through this process by providing technical assistance and financial support. Strengthening the existing partnership with ECOWAS is essential for addressing the Sahel’s complex challenges. Simply throwing money at the problem won’t be enough. The 212.5-million-euro agreement package reached in 2023 is a start, but without strategic implementation, it is just another drop in the ocean of unfulfilled promises.

While ECOWAS should remain the EU’s primary regional partner, Brussels must avoid further alienating AES. Engaging in diplomatic talks with the military leaders in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, while steadfastly advocating for democratic principles, human rights, and the organisation of free and fair elections could open avenues for cooperation and de-escalation.

To rebuild trust, the EU must decisively distance itself from its colonial past – particularly France’s shadow – and abandon its outdated approaches. In cooperation with the three Sahelian countries, the EU could rethink its priorities in the region, shifting from its hitherto primarily self-centred model to a more equal partnership. Instead of withdrawing aid and imposing punitive measures, the bloc should invest in initiatives that allow African nations to build their own democratic institutions. By supporting development projects in education, infrastructure, and other fields, the EU can create the foundation for sustainable growth and governance while respecting African countries’ sovereignty.

The creation of AES should be a wake-up call for the EU. It underscores the growing assertiveness of African nations, even if this means giving long-standing partners the boot. The EU now faces a stark choice: evolve its approach radically or become irrelevant.