As we enter the post-American world order, the European Union must decide what its role in the emerging international system will be, and how it will balance its response to increasingly concerted efforts to spread illiberalism globally – including from within the EU itself – with its historic responsibility as the home of former colonising states. How can the EU respond to the American withdrawal from multilateralism and build coalitions to uphold human rights without engaging in a form of neocolonialism?

The EU’s global cultural and media action provides a path forward that can be extended to other forms of cooperation – particularly with the Global South.

The end of the American world order

The American retreat from multilateralism and international cooperation has created a space that China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and other illiberal state actors have already begun to occupy. They aim to reinforce their image in the Global South as supporters of multilateralism, while at the same time delinking the idea of international cooperation from human rights, pluralism, and fairness. This risk alone should convince the European Commission, the Council, and the Parliament of the need to boost the EU’s global presence in response to Trump’s destructive foreign policy agenda.

To ­fight back against the increasingly coordinated strategy of illiberal actors – which, across Left and Right, are united by the aim to weaken democracies, oppose women’s and LGBTQIA+ rights, reduce cultural diversity, preclude global wealth taxes, and limit the bargaining power of the global majority – the EU must be bold. However, its efforts should avoid reinforcing a Eurocentric view of the world, which could be met with a rejection of liberal democratic principles (here understood as the combination of democratically elected governments, the rule of law, and human rights).

Instead, it is time for the EU to strengthen the role that it has gradually and implicitly begun to take on over the last decade in the cultural sphere, as a global enabler, a distributor of power, and a serious ally of the Global South.

To fight back against the increasingly coordinated strategy of illiberal actors, the EU must be bold.

A global cultural enabler

The role of the EU as a global enabler – not just in the sphere of culture – has legal basis in Article 3 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. It makes an explicit link between the protection of the Union’s citizens and global cooperation to ensure “peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as [to] the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter”.

This positions the EU as a global actor that must not be guided by its own self-interest alone. Of course, profound contradictions remain between these principles and some of the EU’s actions – for example, its migration policies, the watering down of climate efforts, extractivist initiatives, and the selective championing of human rights. While these realities must not be forgotten, we can build on a parallel set of positive EU actions, as exemplified by the quiet paradigmatic shift in global cultural and media action that has developed over the last decade.

This shift represents a significant transformation. Traditionally, the global cultural action of EU member states is aligned with cultural diplomacy – the efforts to extend cultural influence beyond the limits of a state, namely through activities led by national cultural institutes. These might range from a personal tour of a heritage site by a head of government to demonstrate generosity and open up new government-to-government engagement to cultural events or exhibitions showcasing a state’s culture and are done in support of a state’s foreign policy goals. For example, the French model of rayonnement culturel (“cultural radiance” or “influence”) is implemented by the branches of the Institut français and the Alliance française.

The European Union’s approach to culture in its foreign action is aligned with the British and German model of cultural relations¹ – a bottom-up, two-sided, collaborative model whose emergence in these two countries cannot be separated from their pasts as former colonisers and occupiers – and the recognition of the need to rebuild trust with foreign populations. The adoption of this model by the Union is consistent with the principles underlying the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, published in 2016, which identified ­five priorities for the EU’s global action: the security of the Union; state and social resilience to the East and South (into Central Asia and down to Central Africa); an integrated approach to conflicts and crises; cooperative regional orders; and global governance for the 21st century. The understanding of international relations and of the EU’s global role that was implicit in the document – reflecting the approach taken by Federica Mogherini (then High Representative for Foreign Affairs) – focused much more on collaboration and the development of long-term relationships than on security.

In the cultural relations paradigm, culture is understood as more than a means to open up conversations or increase the visibility and strength of a state in support of its foreign policy interests, as is often the case with cultural diplomacy. Instead, cultural relations understand culture as the catalyst for long-term and, crucially, equal relationship building.

The EU’s 2016 Joint Communication by the European Commission and the High Representative establishes the bloc’s foreign policy position on culture. Its rejection of the language of cultural diplomacy is highly significant. While it does not question the ability of member states to engage in cultural diplomacy, its emphasis is on strengthening ties among EU actors and reinforcing cooperation with partners – in other words, it accompanies and supplements the cultural diplomacy efforts of its member states.

Importantly, the joint communication also gives international cultural relations projects a clear structure: they are to be designed, implemented, and assessed in a collaborative manner by EU actors, the cultural institutes of EU member states, and local actors. A subsequent document drafted by the Council’s Cultural Affairs Committee and approved by the Foreign Affairs Council foregrounded the centrality of “cooperation of local stakeholders and civil society at all levels (planning, design, implementation) and on an equal footing, aiming at a bottom-up and people-to-people approach, local empowerment, participation and co-creation”.

In practice, the EU’s international cultural relations support and implement a wide range of initiatives. These range from those led by the EU National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) network, to activities funded by the Cultural Relations Platforms or by EU delegations around the world, to cultural projects initiated by the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) and other actors.

Although many limitations and paradoxes remain in the EU’s global action in the cultural and media spheres (such as persistent asymmetries of power, a super­ficial approach to cultural cooperation in some instances, and the EU’s continued tendency to support free trade norms at the expense of cultural diversity), the EU is beginning to emerge as a global enabler of cultural diversity around the world through trade agreements, policy arrangements and paradigms, financial measures, and modes of governance. To give three examples, the EU promotes cultural diversity in the Latin American audiovisual industry through the EU-funded Ibermedia programme, which involves regional stakeholders and receives input from multiple grassroots associations regarding its implementation. Through this policy arrangement, the EU supports cultural diversity not only from the top down but also from the bottom up. At the same time, through ACPCultures+, the largest audiovisual assistance initiative aimed at cultural workers in the Global South, the EU co-produced multiple African ­films in ways that, according to African ­film professionals, were central in their artistic and cultural endeavours and supported their local industries and communities. All ­films that received this fi­nancial support from the EU were shot in – and had casts from – ACP (African, Caribbean and Paci­c) countries.

The international cultural relations approach has been adopted by not only the EU and EU member states’ organisations but also non-EU cultural practitioners, leading to the gradual emergence of a global cultural network that places international cooperation and intercultural dialogue at the centre of its actions. Importantly, enabling cultural diversity requires a redistribution of power, that is, placing European actors and other interlocutors on an equal footing across projects, policy frameworks, and modes of work.

The EU versus the US and China

By design, cultural diplomacy serves the foreign policy interests of a state. The focus of international cultural relations is different: it lies in co-creation and relationship building rather than in the transmission of ideas through pre-established relations. But it would be insincere to pretend that it is disinterested.

Cultural diplomacy serves the foreign policy interests of a state. The focus of international cultural relations is different.

The question is not, then, whether the EU’s international cultural relations serve a purpose but, instead, what purpose they serve. The EU’s stance as an enabler of cultural diversity is in direct opposition to the ways other global powers understand the role of culture in international relations. Until Trump 2.0, the US aligned its international global action with soft power, a term coined by Joseph Nye in the 1990s. The idea was simple: in the context of the Cold War, culture – alongside policies and values – could attract foreign populations and win their hearts and minds. In so doing, it would support the geopolitical alignment of their countries with the US. Soft power was imagined as a new form of power that could be deployed alongside hard power – financial and military – to maintain American global hegemony. That is, soft and hard power worked as aligned pull-and-push forces – the carrot and the stick – to maintain American geopolitical dominance.

China has understood the importance of winning hearts and minds and decided to engage in similar efforts to challenge American domination. In the last decades, it invested significantly in a vast network of Confucius Institutes, and Xi Jinping has mentioned the importance of cultural relations and mutuality in multiple speeches. However, in doing so, China strips cultural relations of a politics of equality and delinks culture from human rights and pluralism. While the US co-opted culture to support its dominating role in global affairs, China co-opted the language of cultural relations to establish itself as an ally of multilateralism – an approach that some would describe as a rhetorical tactic that masks an interest in the establishment of a Chinese-led international order.

In both cases, be it using the language of soft power or cultural relations, and despite the fundamental differences between their regimes, America and China’s approaches instrumentalise culture to maintain or assert geopolitical dominance. Under Trump 2.0, however, soft power has been relegated to irrelevance – as revealed by the closure of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the de facto dismantling of the US Agency for Global Media and, subsequently, of Voice of America. Nonetheless, this should not be understood as a denial of the importance of cultural elements in politics and international relations. The emphasis on limitless free speech that is shared by Trump’s administration and European far-right forces implicitly rejects the principles of pluralism and cultural diversity that are the core of the European project.

In response, the EU could build on its own work in the cultural and media spheres and begin to use its weight to redistribute power. It could redefine itself as a global diversity multiplier and coalition builder. It could recognise its privilege as a historical debt towards the Global South that gives it the responsibility to support the emergence of equal, inclusive, and fair international arrangements, institutions, and multilateral frameworks. This is aligned with calls for the EU to become a “consolidator of global partnerships” as a way “to give birth to a new multilateral order that can tread the path to sustainable peace and development”.

Using the EU’s privilege to reinforce Global South voices that have been hitherto silenced by their economic and trade dependencies on the US, China, or EU member states is the historically right course of action. At the same time, doing so would weaken the relative power of the US and China. Becoming a global enabler that uses its own power to redistribute power would not be easy – but it would serve the global common good rather than just the EU’s own interests.

Beyond great power realism

The idea of the EU as a global enabler of cultural diversity and global justice can push back against the great power realism that dominates geopolitics today. The late 20th century and beginning of the 21st century saw a shift away from a realist understanding of international relations, wherein states are in permanent conflict due to self-interests, towards a liberal school of thought that focuses on the shared benefi­ts of international cooperation and the development of global policy frameworks. The Russian occupation of Ukraine, Trump’s rejection of multilateralism, and NATO’s (and the EU’s) ongoing reinforcement of military capacity reflect a return of great power realism – as is also evident in the EU’s increasing emphasis on strategic autonomy and competitiveness.

The EU could build on its own work in the cultural and media spheres and begin to use its weight to redistribute power.

There is space for a different approach, one that, in alignment with the work of Global South thinkers such as Walter Mignolo, delinks power from domination and uses it not to control others but to reinforce them and their own power. Like the liberal school of international relations, this enabling approach would focus on the co-development of shared institutions that respond to common needs and reject zero-sum logics. However, unlike liberalism, which emphasises state sovereignty and has gradually transformed into a nonnormative and nonideological framework, this new approach would see diversity, mutuality, global justice, and a fair distribution of power as its ultimate goals. There is space for a global politics of allyship and abundance that rejects economic growth and competition for power as its main priorities and, instead, places vitality and regeneration – cultural, geopolitical, and environmental – at its centre. The EU can enable it.

Some might say that there is no desire for such a role among actors in the Global South. The evidence tells a different story. Cultural professionals from countries outside of the EU value its policy frameworks and call for further opportunities for equal collaboration with their European counterparts to strengthen and diversify their cultural ecosystems. The EU could accelerate this process by convening forums linking EU and non-EU citizens from countries whose global policies have been supportive of cultural diversity, such as South Africa and Brazil, to identify common needs and strategies and begin to imagine new international institutions and frameworks in the cultural sphere and beyond. The time is right.

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1. For a summary of the processes explaining the adoption of this model by the European Union, see Mafalda Dâmaso & Andrew Murray (2021). “The EU’s Dualistic Regime of Cultural Diversity Management: The Concept of Culture in the Creative Europe Program (2014-2019; 2021-2027) and in the Strategy for International Cultural Relations (2016-)”. Journal of Cultural Management and Cultural Policy, 7(1), pp. 153–184. Available at: <https://jcmcp.org/articles/the-eus-dualistic-regime-of-cultural-diversity-management/?lang=en> ↩︎