In February 2019, during Viktor Orbán’s visit to Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu highlighted the strong bond between Israel and Hungary from Jerusalem, addressing Brussels and the international community. This connection, according to Netanyahu, was founded on “many things” the two countries “have shared in the past” and “the present”. Netanyahu asserted that Israel and Hungary are “both small nations, democracies, that share common values and common interests”. 

The alliance between Netanyahu’s Israel and Orbán’s Hungary reflects Israel’s profound transformation into a right-wing populist illiberal power that aligns with European radical-right populist parties and governments. Under Netanyahu’s leadership, Israel strengthened its ties with Europe’s populists and embraced national-interest Euroscepticism to sustain its settlement expansion in the Occupied Palestinian Territories while advancing its broader foreign and domestic agenda. 

United against Islam 

When Netanyahu first came to power in 1996, Jews faced no widespread persecution in Europe and Israel enjoyed a period of diplomatic goodwill across the continent. Nevertheless, Netanyahu and his Likud party sought to cultivate relations with radical-right populist parties and governments – the direct heirs of Europe’s historical antisemitism. These new allies quickly reciprocated through mutual diplomatic overtures. 

A notable example is Belgium’s Vlaams Belang (VB, Flemish Interest) party. Despite its founders’ Nazi collaboration and its past leadership’s Holocaust scepticism, the party now ardently supports Israel. Former VB leader Filip Dewinter claims the party is “very often… the only [one] defending Israel,” though critics accuse it of betraying “nationalism in return for Jewish money” and “kowtow[ing] for international Zionism”. Since the early 2000s, the party has only rarely been accused of antisemitism and positions itself as a defender of Jewish interests. Dewinter argues that “there is a common interest between Jewish and Flemish people in the struggle against Islam in Europe,” urging Jews to join this fight: “Jews are our brothers-in-arms in the battle against extremist Islam… [They] are part of European culture. Islam is not”. 

Positioning itself as Israel’s “ally against radical Islam,” the party joined other European populist parties on a December 2010 delegation to Israel. The group met with a deputy minister at the Knesset and Jewish settler leaders in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. During this visit, Dewinter and his colleagues issued the “Jerusalem Declaration”, pledging their support for “the existence of the State of Israel” and its right “to defend itself against any aggression, especially against Islamic terror”. 

Following the 7 October massacre by Hamas and Israel’s war on Gaza, members of the VB party have shown clear support for Israel. In July 2024, the party expressed serious concerns about Muslim fundamentalism and antisemitism potentially accompanying the large influx of Palestinians to Belgium. Sam van Rooy, VB member of the Belgian Parliament, stated that he intends to question the future Belgian Secretary of State for Asylum and Migration. Van Rooy wants to understand “why so many Palestinians choose Belgium, and how they get to our country from Gaza”. He cited research indicating increased support for Hamas among Palestinians, with 72 per cent reportedly supporting the 7 October massacre in Israel. 

An unlikely German ally 

Israel’s relationship with Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has been more cautious due to the party’s open antisemitism and neo-Nazi ties. Despite this, Israeli figures have occasionally advocated for closer ties with the party. In August 2019, Israel Hayom, a daily newspaper aligned with Netanyahu’s Likud party, called for official dialogue with the AfD, arguing that Israel should pursue its national interests wherever allies could be found. The newspaper claimed that “the biggest threat today to Israel and European Jewry doesn’t come from the Right but rather from the Left and its partner-voters in the Arab and Muslim immigrant communities”. 

In May 2020, Yair Netanyahu, the prime minister’s son, became a poster figure for the AfD after his tweet calling for the EU’s demise. Responding to the EU Delegation in Israel, he tweeted: “Schengen zone is dead and soon your evil globalist organization will be too, and Europe will return to be free, democratic and Christian!”. Joachim Kuhs, former AfD member of the European Parliament, capitalised on this tweet by creating a graphic featuring Yair Netanyahu’s image alongside his message. In mid-October 2023, following the 7 October massacre, Alexander Gauland of the AfD declared in the Bundestag that “Hamas celebration on German streets is unbearable”. The party demanded that German citizenship be revoked from Hamas supporters. 

“We are Israel” 

Unlike its careful approach to the AfD, the Netanyahu government openly embraces Italy’s Lega party. Matteo Salvini, Lega’s leader, regards Israel as “a fortress for the protection of Europe” and a “bulwark of Western rights and values,” while criticising the EU’s “unbalanced” stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its condemnation of Israel “every 15 minutes”. This mutual admiration is evident in Salvini’s self-description as “a friend and brother of Israel” (and Netanyahu’s calling him “a great friend of Israel”). Former Israeli Minister of Public Security, Strategic Affairs and Information, Gilad Erdan, emphasised their shared agenda: “We are partners in the fight against radical Islamic terror, which threatens Europe and Israel”.  

Wilders, who spent 18 months in Israel volunteering in a settlement during his youth, has made dozens of visits to Israel and openly expresses admiration for the country.

Salvini aligns with this view by linking antisemitism to anti-Israel sentiment and attributing European antisemitism to Islamist extremists. He has pledged to combat “anti-Israeli bias” at the EU. In mid-October 2023, Salvini declared that the Hamas attacks in Israel were “not war, it’s barbarism”. A month later, Salvini told Italian media that “Hamas uses civilians as human shields,” adding that “it proves the bestiality of these people. […] That said, I hope Israel is very careful in its reaction, which is nevertheless inevitable after what happened.” 

Netanyahu’s Israel has cultivated a unique relationship with Geert Wilders and his Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Party for Freedom), which is known for its anti-Islam stance. Unlike other European far-right parties, Israel does not view the PVV as antisemitic or having fascist roots. Wilders, who spent 18 months in Israel volunteering in a settlement during his youth, has made dozens of visits to Israel and openly expresses admiration for the country. “Israel is a lighthouse and the only democracy in a dark and tyrannical region,” he declares. “It’s part of us, of our European identity. Israel is fighting our war. The struggle against Israel is a struggle against us. We are Israel.” 

For Likud’s leadership, Wilders’s appeal lies in his ideological stance. He argues, “The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not territorial. Those who make this claim have no idea what they are talking about. If you return the West Bank and parts of Jerusalem to the Palestinians, it won’t end the conflict. After a certain period – a month, a year, a decade – they’ll want the rest of the land, because this is an ideological conflict. So the solution cannot be territorial, but ideological.” Following the November 2024 attack on Israeli football fans in Amsterdam by groups allegedly targeting Jewish people, Wilders claimed the attackers were “all Muslims” and “mainly” Moroccans, declaring that “we [The Netherlands] have become the Gaza of Europe”.  

Wilders openly admires Likud’s leadership. He acknowledges that, like himself, former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon “was also greatly demonized by the West, but was a great politician who serves as a role model for me.” 

Undermining the EU 

Netanyahu’s outreach extended to the Visegrád Group of countries (V4), comprising Hungary, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia. His July 2017 visit to Hungary for a V4 summit – the first visit to Hungary by an Israeli prime minister since the restoration of Hungarian-Israeli relations in 1989 – became notable for an unexpected “hot microphone incident”. During a closed-door meeting with V4 leaders, Netanyahu was inadvertently recorded criticising the EU and seeking support to undermine EU consensus on Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Netanyahu’s strategy aimed to forge a diplomatic alliance offering Israel’s expertise in security, cyber, high tech, agriculture, and technology in exchange for V4 support at EU and UN forums. This strategy proved successful, leading to increasingly close ties between Israel and the V4 nations.  

In February 2019, Jerusalem was set to host the first V4 summit outside Europe. However, the summit was cancelled due to a diplomatic dispute between Israel and Poland over comments by the acting Israeli foreign minister regarding Polish antisemitism. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Netanyahu proceeded to host the prime ministers of Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia at his residence. In the period surrounding this cancelled summit, V4 members demonstrated their support for Netanyahu’s government through various diplomatic actions. Diverging from official EU policy on Jerusalem, Czechia established a Czech House in the city, Slovakia announced plans for a cultural and trade office, and Hungary opened a trade office – which it designated as a branch of its Israeli embassy – in Jerusalem.  

For the V4 countries, particularly Orbán’s Hungary, a strong relationship with Israel serves to deflect criticism of their allegedly antisemitic and xenophobic policies, while Netanyahu’s approach aligns with their interests. The V4 leaders, who champion ethno-nationalism domestically, admire Netanyahu’s assertive advancement of Israel’s diplomatic and security interests, as well as his policies aimed at preserving Israel’s ethnic character. Diverging from broader EU positions, the V4 leaders support the Israeli government’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and share Israeli perspectives on contested issues like migration, security, and threat assessment. 

In August 2018, Netanyahu visited Lithuania for the Baltic States summit. As with his Hungarian visit one year earlier, this marked the first time an Israeli prime minister had visited Lithuania – a historic moment highlighting the strengthening ties between the two nations. However, the visit’s significance extended beyond bilateral relations to broader European politics. Upon arriving in Vilnius, Netanyahu effectively acknowledged that under his leadership, Israel had adopted a populist Eurosceptic stance, using relationships with V4 and other Eastern European countries as strategic leverage to influence EU foreign policy. Netanyahu stated: “I want to achieve a balance in the European Union’s not always friendly relations with Israel in order to maintain fairer relations. […] I am doing it through contacts with blocs of [EU] countries, Eastern European countries, and now with Baltic countries and other countries, of course.”  

Dismissing European Jewish concerns 

In 2015, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) adopted “Guidelines on Communication with Populist Radical-Right Parties in Europe”. While the document remains classified, the Guidelines stipulated three major conditions: first, Israeli government ministries and agencies were prohibited from communicating with antisemitic and neo-Nazi populist radical-right parties whose leaders and/or members called for the destruction of Israel and European Jewish communities; second, the Israeli government would not initiate dialogue with a radical-right party if the local Jewish community opposed such engagement; third, the Israeli government would consider the positions of “like-minded countries” towards the relevant radical-right party. 

Under Netanyahu’s current government, these MFA Guidelines were not merely ignored but officially abolished. Diaspora Minister Amichai Chikli explicitly announced the end of Israel’s boycott of radical-right parties in Europe. 

Pragmatic interests and ideological affinities  

The Arab-Israeli conflict has shaped Israeli-European relations since 1967. Israel has consistently viewed European positions on the conflict as hostile to its security interests and as uncritically aligned with Arab perspectives. Over the years, Europe attempted to mediate these tensions through multilateral initiatives, notably the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and its successor, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). However, Israel’s isolation within both the EMP and UfM frameworks has paradoxically pushed it towards closer ties with European radical-right populist parties and governments. The irony is striking: while the EMP, UfM, and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) were designed to foster dialogue among Mediterranean partners, one of their most significant – though unintended – outcomes has been facilitating Israel’s alignment with Europe’s radical right. 

The alliance between Netanyahu’s Israel and European populist radical-right forces transcends mere “realist” interests, encompassing shared values and ideological affinities that often conflict with core EU policy norms. At a pragmatic level, their relationship operates on a quid-pro-quo basis: European radical right populist parties and governments leverage their Israeli connections to counter accusations of antisemitism, xenophobia, and anti-human rights stances, while gaining Israeli expertise in security, cyber technology, agriculture, and high-tech sectors. In return, Israel utilises these populist and illiberal allies to legitimise its colonial endeavours and advance its interests in national parliaments, EU institutions, United Nations agencies, and other international forums. 

Beyond these practical exchanges lies a deeper ideological convergence. Ironically, these partnerships reflect shared values and objectives specifically aimed at challenging the liberal norms that have traditionally underpinned EU policies. 

Israel’s alliances with European radical-right populist forces primarily aim to undermine the core norms of “Normative Power Europe”. As these norms face internal contestation within the EU, Brussels’ ability to implement a “normative power”-based approach – both domestically and in foreign policy – becomes increasingly compromised, diminishing its capacity to influence Israel. Under Netanyahu, populism and Euroscepticism evolved into strategic tools for advancing Israel’s political objectives and reshaping EU foreign policy to align with Israeli interests. 

Netanyahu’s Likud and its European radical right populist allies share core ideological positions

Netanyahu’s approach offers a paradoxical arrangement of mutual legitimisation: European radical right populist parties and governments overlook Israel’s colonial activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories – even supporting Jerusalem as Israel’s capital – while Netanyahu’s Israel disregards their neo-Nazi ideological roots and contemporary antisemitic tendencies.  

Like European right-wing populists and illiberals, Netanyahu identifies the European Left and Arab-Muslim immigrant communities as the continent’s primary challenges and the main European threats to both Israel and European Jewry. For Israel, European radical-right populist parties and governments – who profess commitment to fighting antisemitism across Europe – serve as ideological allies in terms of ethnic nationalism in the overarching struggle against “Global Islam”. Both parties oppose immigration broadly, with particular emphasis on Arab and Muslim migration. 

This shared perspective was evident when Netanyahu and Orbán met in Jerusalem, declaring: “We both understand that the threat of radical Islam is a real one. It could endanger Europe. It could endanger the world. […] By being here, at the frontline of the battle against radical Islam, in many ways Israel is defending Europe”. 

Netanyahu’s Likud and its European radical right populist allies share core ideological positions: rejection of multiculturalism, resistance to media criticism, hostility towards minorities, and disdain for international law – evidenced by Netanyahu’s dismissive response to the International Criminal Court arrest warrant against him. This alliance is fundamentally grounded in shared racist and nativist positions. 

Polypore states 

Ultimately, Netanyahu and his radical-right populist allies in Europe seek to establish what Hungarian historian Andrea Pető terms an “illiberal polypore state”. The polypore – a parasitic fungus that grows on and hastens the decay of rotting trees – serves as an apt metaphor for this political transformation. Like the fungus consuming its host, Netanyahu’s Israel and European radical-right populist governments parasitically exploit their liberal democratic predecessors’ resources while creating dependent state structures. This governance model co-opts existing liberal democratic institutions, mechanisms, and funding channels, redirecting resources from secular, modernist civil society towards an illiberal support base to secure and expand its influence. 

In this sense, the relationship of Netanyahu’s Israel with European radical right populist forces extends beyond mere instrumentalisation to counter external pressures and divide EU member states and UN agencies; it reflects deep ideological affinities and shared values with Europe’s polypores.