Richard Wouters: How has the debate on security and defence evolved in both of your countries since Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2022?

Mārtiņš Staķis: In Latvia, the main political shift occurred in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea. Once we joined the European Union and NATO in 2004, we thought that war with Russia was no longer possible. After all, we were protected by the most powerful alliances in the world. In 2014, we came to the realisation that we are NATO; we need to do the protecting. That same year, I enlisted as a volunteer in the Latvian National Guard.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine therefore came as less of a shock to us than it did to many others in Europe. Five years ago, as a parliamentary secretary to the Latvian defence minister, I would warn at international meetings that another Russian attack on a neighbouring country was just a matter of time. A common response was that we should tone it down, be less “Russophobic”, seek peace with Russia instead of war mongering. In 2022, the sceptics admitted that we – Latvia and other frontline states – had been right all along. I don’t want a repeat of that situation. That’s one of my missions in the European Parliament – as a member of the Committee on Security and Defence, and within the Green family.

Latvian society was not fully prepared for war in 2014. To avoid spreading alarm, the government focused its communications on civil protection – dealing with floods, wildfires, or chemical disasters. We borrowed the “total defence” concept from Finland and told people that they must be capable of being self-sufficient for 72 hours in the event of a major crisis. By 2022, the notion of societal resilience had taken root. Citizens started demanding that politicians take it a step further and discuss what to do in the event of war. This is making it relatively easy to increase defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP, as agreed within NATO. Society is calling for it.

Carlos Corrochano: Spain is geographically distant from Russia, and defence is not perceived as a matter of survival. For most political parties, it’s simply another issue to be instrumentalised, a convenient arena for partisan confrontation, rather than for serious, substantive debate.

Within the Spanish Left, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused a huge split in opinion. Some of us call it what it is: an act of imperialist aggression against the people of Ukraine. We may be against NATO’s worldview, but we must be honest about the nature of this war. We’ve spoken with our contacts in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltics, to better understand their concerns and political perspectives. Yet many on the Left still believe there were legitimate justifications for the invasion. This, in part, reflects the movement’s own history: some parties emerged in opposition to Spain’s accession to NATO, and anti-NATO sentiment remains central to their political identity. That historical and even existential legacy often makes it harder to have nuanced debates.

In your booklet Hacer Mundo (“Making the World”), you write that the Left is trapped in a “realist iron cage”. What do you mean by that?

Carlos Corrochano: I used to teach Critical Theories of International Relations at Sciences Po in Paris. Each year, I would begin by introducing my students to the mainstream theories of international relations – the ones furthest from critical approaches – particularly realism. Realism essentially sees the world as a realm of anarchy and perpetual conflict, where cooperation is nearly impossible. It has a rather bleak view of human nature and world politics. Realists are fixated on power and security, leaving little room in their frameworks for ideas such as self-determination or global justice. They are rarely concerned with actual human lives. That’s precisely what makes realism deeply problematic from a progressive standpoint.

I was therefore dismayed when leftists in Western and Southern Europe started explaining Russia’s aggression by quoting and referencing the work of realist theorists – especially John Mearsheimer, who is friends with Viktor Orbán and a lot of other dubious people. Sometimes there’s such a huge gap between how these leftists approach international politics and how they approach domestic politics. At home, you’re allowed to be an idealist: you can discuss ideology, invoke principles, and take moral stances. But once you have crossed national borders, anarchy descends, and pessimism prevails. Your only choice is to be a realist and say that Ukraine doesn’t stand a chance, that it needs to surrender, or even that it is partly to blame for the war. This approach is what I call the realist iron cage.

Mārtiņš Staķis: I recognise this from voting behaviour in the European Parliament. On the issues of defence and Ukraine, The Left group is most closely aligned with groups on the furthest right of the political spectrum.

Of course, we also have some disagreements within the Greens/EFA group on these issues. To provide some historical context: over the last 500 years, Russia has invaded Finland five times and Latvia six times. Meanwhile, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have never experienced Russian invasions. This partly explains the countries’ differing viewpoints; these are difficult to bridge. If a fellow MEP has a negative view on defence spending or military support for Ukraine, I can’t turn that into a positive view. But maybe I can persuade someone with a neutral position to take a positive stance. Time is limited, so I pick my battles.

Have you succeeded in making the Green group more supportive of defence?

Mārtiņš Staķis: I think so. It’s easy to measure. Just look at how the group voted in the past and how it votes now.

In one of our group meetings, I showed a huge map of the Baltic region and indicated where Russia had placed its armed forces along the border. I explained why the Suwałki Gap is the most vulnerable point on this map, because Russia wants to create a ground corridor to its exclave Kaliningrad in this narrow border area of Lithuania and Poland. I indicated how Russia would move its troops to take the Suwałki Gap and how NATO forces would respond. I think this presentation was a game changer; a lot of my fellow group members realised the scenario it portrayed was realistic. Afterwards, I was invited to meet personally with many of my Green colleagues and their staff. In my opinion, having new members from Latvia but also from Lithuania, since 2024, has certainly made a difference within the Green group.

What are your views on the new NATO defence spending targets: 3.5 per cent of GDP for the military and 1.5 per cent for broader defence-related expenditure?

Mārtiņš Staķis: I’m not happy that the debate is focused on percentages; we should instead be talking about capabilities. If all people hear from the military is “give us more money”, you won’t convince them. Instead, the focus should be on the new capabilities that are going to be delivered. Better air defence, for instance, to protect our critical infrastructure and reduce the risk of power blackouts or interruptions in drinking water supply.

Also, we shouldn’t talk about spending but rather about investing. Take the defence line that Finland, the Baltic states and Poland are building along their borders with Russia and Belarus. The fortifications will be constructed by local companies, which create jobs and pay taxes. Other industries will benefit from the demand for cables, electronic surveillance, and anti-drone systems. The innovations that will ready us to fight – not the last war but rather the next war – will have civilian spin-offs. Strengthening our defence will therefore also boost our economies.

The innovations that will ready us to fight will have civilian spin-offs. Strengthening our defence will therefore also boost our economies.

Carlos Corrochano: GDP indicators distract us from having a real debate around defence. A target of 3.5 per cent seems arbitrary and disproportionate. It’s much more important to discuss better European coordination of security and defence policies, sharing capabilities, and more democratic decision-making.

The emphasis on spending targets has reinforced the old “guns versus butter” dichotomy. This logic comes from a liberal economic framework that assumes a fixed pool of resources available to governments – if you spend on one thing, you can’t spend on another. As an ecosocialist, I find it striking how many on the Left have internalised this framing. Even in Spain, where barely a decade ago we witnessed first-hand the devastation caused by such economic thinking. Yet history shows that investments in security can, in fact, serve as a catalyst for broader social progress. The real question is not whether you spend, but how: how you channel those investments, and how you connect them to social, economic, and climate justice.

Mārtiņš Staķis: “Guns or butter” is indeed a false choice. Look at Finland: it has been investing heavily in security and defence for decades, yet it has one of the best social security systems in the world. In the Baltics, we’re rapidly increasing our defence investments, but we haven’t cut a single cent from our welfare arrangements.

Should governments increase taxation of the rich to finance extra defence spending and support for Ukraine?

Carlos Corrochano: Yes. Some progressives in Europe have already brought this to the table. It’s a smart way to connect people to causes that seem distant from their daily lives. Linking national and international solidarity, security, and economic justice is both intellectually and emotionally compelling. The Spanish government’s approach – that we should finance defence investments through common European debt – is also useful. It resonates with the rest of Southern Europe, so it could help bridge the North-South divide on security.

If there were no defence spending target, wouldn’t we need another yardstick to determine whether each NATO member is doing its part?

Mārtiņš Staķis: Yes and no. Let me use a metaphor. If you live in a village and a single house is on fire, you don’t send firefighters all over the village; you concentrate them where the problem is. The same goes for Europe’s defence. The problem is on the eastern border, so we should concentrate our armed forces there. The question of whether countries such as Spain achieve the 3.5 per cent target is therefore less pressing. Spain would make a bigger contribution to deterring Russia if it increased its defence investments by 0.5 per cent in order to send more troops and equipment to the Baltics. There are already Spanish forces in Latvia, and we are very grateful for that. But we would welcome more of them.

That said, I do believe that we should go for the 3.5 per cent target. Not all countries need to achieve it at the same time, however. In Latvia and other frontline states, we need to reach this target within three years at the latest. Countries like Spain could move towards it more gradually.

We must bear in mind the price of war. In Ukraine, but also in Russia, the war is costing 40 to 50 per cent of GDP. Investing 3.5 per cent now – in order to avoid paying a much higher price in the future – is therefore the wisest choice.

Carlos Corrochano: I don’t believe that sending more Spanish troops to the border with Russia would be supported at home, whether by public opinion or among the political class. Making such a proposal would be a mistake.

Mārtiņš Staķis: When Italy, Spain, and Greece were facing a migration crisis, we – the Baltics, Poland – made a huge mistake in saying that it wasn’t our problem. A decade later, faced with the weaponisation of migrants by Russia and Belarus, we were the ones asking for solidarity. Our Southern European partners responded by asking, “Where were you when we needed your help?” My message to my Spanish counterparts would be: “Please don’t repeat our mistake.” As politicians, we must emphasise day in, day out that Europe is a solidarity-based project. If we cling to our national positions, it’s a hands-down win for all of the dictators in the world.

Carlos, there is support in Spain for European strategic autonomy. Doesn’t that imply stronger European defence?

Carlos Corrochano: I’ve tried that approach during my time in active politics, as have others on the Left. Current Minister of Social Rights Pablo Bustinduy became the head of the international office of left-wing alliance Podemos shortly after it was created in 2014. Under his influence, Podemos took a smarter stance on NATO. Instead of saying that we need to leave the alliance immediately, Podemos advocated a gradual shift from a NATO to an EU security umbrella, based on the Treaty on European Union’s Article 42(7) on mutual defence. How to attain strategic autonomy through European defence coordination – that was exactly the debate that the Left needed.

When I became head of the international office of Sumar, a new left-wing alliance founded in 2022, I tried to continue along this path. But foreign policy soon became a battleground for political infighting between leftist groups. The debate on what European strategic autonomy actually entails, in terms of decision-making and capabilities, came to a standstill. It has become a token phrase, an excuse for not talking about concrete issues such as investment in defence.

But I’m not ready to abandon the concept of strategic autonomy. Europe can no longer rely on the US, even if the Democrats come back into power. In an increasingly complex, polycentric world, Europe must become a geopolitical actor in its own right. Progressive forces would do well to link strategic autonomy not only to military security but also to other forms of security: climate, social, and economic. The quest for strategic autonomy is why we need industrial policy, and it offers an opportunity to revive the European Green Deal. A comprehensive approach would make European strategic autonomy more relevant to progressive voters.

Europe can no longer rely on the US, even if the Democrats come back into power. Europe must become a geopolitical actor in its own right.

Mārtiņš, do you agree that Europe can no longer rely on the US?

Mārtiņš Staķis: We still need the US. I think it’s a bit unfair to blame Trump for all the mistakes Europe has made. Already in 2004, George W. Bush said that it was time for Europe to take its security into its own hands. This should have been an incentive to work towards greater strategic autonomy, but nothing happened. In 2014, Barack Obama said something to the tune of: “Guys, if you don’t go for 2 per cent, there’ll be problems in the future.” In the Baltics, we heeded the call, but some NATO countries are still below the 2 per cent mark or have only just reached it. The problem is a lack of political leadership. Trump is very vocal on the need for Europe to spend more on defence, but we have already been aware of this for twenty years. Because we dragged our feet, we are now facing huge expenses. The trade deal that Trump and von der Leyen concluded last summer would have been much more favourable for Europe if we weren’t so dependent on American security guarantees.

Europe must strengthen its defence, but I’m not ready to give up on NATO. Developing our military capabilities will be cheaper – and deterring Russia more effective – if we keep the US on board. Fortunately, there is still massive support for NATO in the US Congress.

Do you have any other proposals for bridging the North-South divide on security?

Mārtiņš Staķis: It will be difficult to persuade people in Southern Europe that they are under military threat, but they have experienced the dangers of climate change first-hand. We can find common ground in the need to make our societies more resilient to large-scale disruptions, whether from war or wildfires. Civil defence was my brief when I was parliamentary secretary to the Latvian defence minister, so I know it takes a lot of effort to get people prepared. Civil society plays a key role in this. True preparedness begins with trust between people, with NGOs and community groups who know the names, numbers, and needs in their neighbourhoods. They can organise training and build resilience from the bottom up. I believe that North and South can agree on the need to support this type of human infrastructure.

Carlos Corrochano: We need more progressives to join the conversation on security. Hopefully we can then move beyond the “campism” that still has a hold on parts of the Left. According to this logic, we live in a bipolar world, we are obliged to choose a side, and therefore Leftists should always be against what the US does – even if it means justifying Russian aggression. This logic must be denounced and replaced by new and more nuanced frames of thinking on international relations.

True preparedness begins with trust between people.

In Hacer Mundo, you put forward the concept of “strategic universalism”. What do you mean by this?

Carlos Corrochano: Strategic universalism could be a new guiding principle for an autonomous foreign policy. Universalism has a bad reputation in leftist and progressive circles, mainly because universalist rhetoric has often been misused, not least to underpin colonialist and imperialist actions. But I’ve learnt from feminist and postcolonial thinkers – especially Gayatri Spivak – that concepts have no immutable essence. Just like sex and gender, universalism is a malleable object that can serve various ends. We can construct new values that we want universally applied. In the field of global politics, our guiding principle should be that we always stand with the aggressed and against the aggressor, regardless of the camp they belong to. In the words of James Baldwin: “Every bombed village is my hometown.” In the context of Spanish politics, this means standing with the people of Palestine, Ukraine, and Western Sahara. This may sound obvious, but it isn’t – not even for the Left.

There may be some overlap between strategic universalism and the neo-idealism promoted by Benjamin Tallis. I support his endeavour to bring moral principles into geopolitical pragmatism. Idealism and pragmatism are always in tension – and rightly so.

Mārtiņš Staķis: If the choice is between realism and neo-idealism, then I am a neo-idealist. As I said, I’m not only a politician; I’m also a volunteer with the Latvian National Guard. You don’t spend days with the army instead of your family if you’re not motivated by ideals. If you have no ideals, you have no place in the military – or in politics.

To what extent is the EU hurt by its double standards – support for Ukraine, lack of action on Gaza?

Carlos Corrochano: The paralysing divisions over Gaza are very damaging, both to the EU’s internal relations and to its credibility on the world stage. European leaders would have had an easier time had they centred their discourse on international law, humanitarian law, and human rights from the outset and held all parties involved to these standards. It may then have been a smaller step to recognising the genocide committed by Israel and acting on that recognition.

I’m not saying that we should approach Ukraine and Gaza in the same way, as they are clearly different conflicts, but we should always stand with the aggressed.

Mārtiņš Staķis: I fully agree with Carlos that these are different conflicts. After the attacks by Hamas on 7 October 2023, sympathy for Israel was high in Latvia. The turning point came when Israel started using famine as a weapon. That’s not targeted punishment for terrorists; it’s collective punishment in violation of international law. In such cases, we must clearly state that a red line has been crossed.

If someone crosses a red line and does terrible things, they should be brought to justice. I believe that day will come.