Moldova’s parliamentary elections are generally seen as a key geopolitical moment, where the small state of 2.6 million people bordering Romania and Ukraine will either continue its EU integration process or fall back into Russian hands. While this analysis is not incorrect, on the ground, the understanding of this vote is more split. 

According to opinion polls, the pro-European ruling party PAS is expected to come first but not get a majority, veering somewhere between 30 and 40 per cent. In 2021, when PAS won 63 out of 101 seats in Parliament, the party was seen as an anti-system alternative to the oligarchic rule the country had known in the 2000s-2010s. Their main promises were the reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption. Yet results have been mixed.  

While top figures like the former bashkan (governor) of Gagauzia Evgenia Gutsul received a seven-year prison sentence for illicit party financing and links to a criminal organisation, other prominent political leaders involved in high-scale corruption cases are still free, either in Moldova or abroad, despite being investigated or even found guilty for major crimes. Vladimir Plahotniuc, an oligarch who captured state institutions in 2016-2019 and ruled from the shadows, is currently detained by the Greek authorities for false papers. He is meant to be extradited to Moldova on 25 September, three days before elections. Seeing this once all-mighty political figure in cuffs has been a sensation across Moldova, but many fear that if he comes back home, local corrupt judges may set him free. The mixed results and slow pace of the reform of the judiciary are held against Moldova’s ruling party even by some of its former supporters. 

Ironically, after winning the 2021 elections with the uninspired slogan “Good times”, PAS had to deal with a pandemic, a full-scale war in neighbouring Ukraine, and an energy and cost of living crisis. Many European countries have penalised their incumbent governments​ over the same issues. Despite the challenges, the PAS governments led by Natalia Gavrilița and Dorin Recean maintained peace, managed the ​inflow of refugees from Ukraine, diversified energy resources to move away from Moldova’s decades-long dependence on Russian gas, built hundreds of kilometres of roads, and made key steps towards the country’s EU integration. 

In these elections, PAS went for a less risky but also less catchy slogan that sounds like a series of search engine-optimised keywords: “EU, peace, development”. The ruling party makes five key promises: EU integration by 2028, doubling the income of the working population, doubling exports, 3000 kilometres of repaired roads, and promoting “national culture and traditions” – the last point probably added in order to respond to Russian propaganda and calm down the spirits anxious that joining the EU may mean losing local identity or more conservative values.  

Forces at play 

The government’s promises and results are judged differently by different voters, partly depending on what media they consume. Pro-European voters, including both PAS supporters and PAS critics, follow the national broadcaster, local independent publications sharing European values and – if they speak English or other European languages – Western outlets. The sceptics would cite shortcomings such as arrogance, incompetence, and some politicised rather than meritocratic choices against the ruling party.  

The mixed results and slow pace of the reform of the judiciary are held against Moldova’s ruling party even by some of its former supporters.  

Russian state media and TikTok content dominated by the Kremlin agenda would invoke similar arguments, as well as a series of blatant lies and manipulations trying to link the EU, Moldovan president Maia Sandu and PAS to war, mass emigration, corruption, or some sort of dominance of the queer community (“Gayropa” is a set concept), sowing distrust, division, and confusion. 

In parts of the country dominated by Russian media, such as the southern autonomous region of Gagauzia, or breakaway Transnistria, but also some northern areas, people are likely to overwhelmingly vote for the overtly Kremlin-allied Patriotic Bloc, led by former president Igor Dodon, or one of the smaller parties linked to runaway oligarch Ilan Shor, now residing in Moscow. In polls, the bloc comes second after PAS, with around 20 per cent of the votes. The Patriots’ external promises are vague and aligned with Russian narratives: sovereignty (meaning no “bowing” to Bruxelles), neutrality (read: not joining NATO, and not worrying about the 1500 Russian troops and 20,000 tons of Soviet-era ammunition deployed in Transnistria), Moldovan identity (which is portrayed as opposing European identity rather than complementing it), rule of law, reintegrating the country (with Transnistria). Internally, the Patriots promise to give Russian language an official status as an inter-ethnic language rather than encouraging minorities to learn the official state language, Romanian. They also claim they will support families more, through payments and flexible work arrangements. 

But the bloc has already been marred by division, with one of its leaders, former president Vladimir Voronin, saying on television that Dodon had received an 860,000 euros bribe in a plastic bag back in 2019 from runaway oligarch Plahotniuc. A day later, Voronin withdrew his declaration as a “joke”. 

In addition to PAS and the Patriotic bloc, two other parties are likely to get into Parliament.  

Anti-system voters may be attracted by the direct and colourful language used by the populist Renato Usatîi, the former mayor of the northern Moldovan town of Bălți, who made his money in Russia with the state railways and often makes headlines thanks to secret information he leaks into the public space – which sometimes but not always gets confirmed. Usatîi’s Our Party, which may get between 4 and 10 per cent according to polls, makes an eclectic array of promises, ranging from reducing the number of Members of Parliament from 101 to 51 to removing their legal immunity, creating a government formed of members of all political parties (including extra-parliamentary ones), giving 10,000 euros for every born child, increasing the minimal pension to 250 euros per month (without explanations on the financial backing for these measures), dismantling the national intelligence and anti-corruption centres, and adopting neutrality (a Russian longstanding narrative to prevent Moldova from joining NATO) and ban on “LGBT propaganda” in schools. 

Centrist voters may veer towards the National Alternative bloc, led by Chișinău’s mayor Ion Ceban. Ceban declares himself to be pro-European, despite protesting against Moldova’s EU Association Agreement in Brussels in 2014, when he was a leading member of Dodon’s Socialists’ Party. The Alternative’s programme is also vague, pleading for peace, more jobs, justice, and stopping emigration. The last point is a painful one in Moldova; every family has someone living abroad, in the large diaspora of one million (which will be able to vote as well). Much of the Alternative’s programme tries to build on Ceban’s successes in refurbishing Chișinău’s pavements.  

But Ceban’s popularity has been falling since he was banned from entering Romania (and, by extension, the Schengen area) in July due to unspecified national security concerns. The interdiction has alienated some of his supporters, making it unclear whether the bloc will even get into Parliament. 

According to polls, no (clearly) pro-European party or bloc other than PAS is likely to pass the threshold – 5 and 7 per cent respectively – to enter parliament. Having focused on criticising the government in talk shows and on social media over the past four years, they haven’t grown their national networks to secure enough votes. Instead, PAS has invited Dinu Plângău, one of its main critics and the former head of Platforma DA – a party with which PAS briefly ruled in 2019 – to join its parliamentary list. Plângău only comes 42nd on the list. 

Hybrid warfare 

The great battle is still on for the voters who declare themselves undecided – around a third of the electorate, according to some polls. Among these are centrists and pro-European Moldovans disappointed by the PAS leadership. Many of them are caught in the information war between the Kremlin-linked and pro-European Moldova.  

It is particularly fascinating to be faced with some of the contradictory beliefs these people hold. Some would say they are for the EU, but Moldova cannot become a member because the bloc will dismantle within three years – a Kremlin narrative. Others would emphasise that they cannot see where all of the EU funds are going, while recognising the roads or water pipe system recently built within their village. Others still would have partners, relatives or children making a living in Western Europe, while they oppose the EU. These cases show how powerful Russian narratives are in the Moldovan information space. But they are being challenged. 

In an undercover investigation, the Moldovan newspaper Ziarul de Gardă got inside a Russian troll farm working to influence elections and thus undermine the country’s EU integration process. Winner of this year’s European Press Prize for revealing how exactly Shor paid protestors in the lead-up to the presidential election and referendum on European integration last autumn, journalist Natalia Zaharescu joined the oligarch’s communication efforts for the upcoming parliamentary elections under the same code name, Irina Zahar.

The great battle is still on for the voters who declare themselves undecided – around a third of the electorate, according to some polls.

“Now a war is taking place, literally a war is taking place between globalists and realpolitik,” one of the troll farm coordinators told Zahar/Zaharescu and her “colleagues”. “Trump represents realpolitik, and these people, Sandu, Zelensky, are representatives of the globalists, the ones who had these projects of democratising power…”. The network leader admits that the impact of their “bot army” relies on “money and fear”. It is also good at exploiting Moldova’s weaknesses, whether that is economic instability or mixed political identities. 

Zaharescu and the other 300 people employed in her unit in Russia’s information war in Moldova had a series of tasks to perform, such as praising Russian poet Alexander Pushkin – who spent three years in exile in Chișinău – to emphasise the links between Moldovan and Russian culture, or producing TikTok dance videos with political captions such as “gas for one Leu” and “ban LGBT”. The orders, and the money, came from Moscow, in Russian, as Zaharescu’s recordings prove. 

Like last year, several television channels, including the national broadcaster, re-streamed the investigation. Influencer actor Cătălin Zerodoi launched a counter-trend on TikTok, where pro-European Moldovans danced and added their own slogans, “for free”, out of civic duty. Captions included “energy independence”, “reforms at European standards”, “modern schools and kindergartens”.  

(Curiously, Russia’s troll farm in Moldova was also asked to make posts in support of Romanian presidential candidate Călin Georgescu, who is being investigated for challenging the constitutional order and promoting far-right ideas.) 

In last year’s journalistic investigation, the pensioners involved in the pro-Kremlin protests seemed motivated by the sense of community and purpose the network provided them, on top of the fee. The police investigations that followed scared some of them. More recent recordings by Moldovan law enforcement reveal less involved individuals, who make a five-minute show and quickly take a video to get the bucks. A leaked Kremlin document published by the portal deschide.md claims some of the Shor leaders are being accused of stealing the money destined for paid protestors and communicators. In the presidential elections last autumn, the Shor network was asked to oppose the referendum on Moldova’s accession to the EU, and support, or vote for, several candidates, including Victoria Furtună, leader of the Great Moldova party, and Alexandr Stoianoglo, of the Alternative – both of whom are now aiming to become MPs. 

Alternative paths 

We will see which camp proves stronger on 28 September. The scenarios for post-election include a small PAS majority or a coalition government formed by PAS, Our Party, and/or the Alternative, which would, at best, continue reforms and join the EU, and at worst, degenerate into corrupt rule and infighting. If a Russian-allied coalition is created by the Patriots, the Alternative, and Our Party, Moldova may follow in Georgia’s unfortunate footsteps, copying Russian legislation and stopping the EU integration process. If no government is formed, snap elections may bring a change in either direction.