NOTE: This article was published shortly before the first round of the presidential elections. Călin Georgescu, an independent far-right candidate, unexpectedly won the largest slice of the vote, and will face Elena Lasconi of the centre-right USR in the second round.

Romania is gearing up for two highly consequential elections. On 24 November, voters will cast their first ballots in the presidential race. Then, on 1 December, Romania’s National Day, they will vote in parliamentary elections. If the presidential race produces no winner, there will be a runoff on 8 December between the top two candidates.  

This comes after two other crucial elections in June: the local elections, and the European elections. In both of those, the two major parties – the leftist Social Democrats (PSD) and the centre-right National Liberal Party (PNL) – dominated, winning around 35 per cent and 30 per cent respectively of mayoral offices. The far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) party came in third, but with only 6 per cent. 

In the parliamentary elections, the leftist PSD is expected to retain its lead, while the far-right AUR could rise to second place, surpassing PNL. This would grant AUR substantial legislative influence as well as solidify the growing appeal of its ideology. This shift would push PNL down to either third or fourth place, where it will compete with the Save Romania Party (USR) – a smaller, newer centre-right party. 

The presidential race presents an equally grim outlook. The current frontrunners, according to several polls, are Marcel Ciolacu, the social-democratic leader and current prime minister, and George Simion, the far-right AUR candidate. Ciolacu is mired in controversy and has struggled to articulate a forward-looking vision for the country, while Simion brings an extremist agenda that risks further polarising and radicalising the electorate.  

Romania’s system of government combines elements of both presidential and parliamentary systems. The president holds significant powers, including the ability to appoint the prime minister, command of the armed forces, and final authority on foreign policy issues, while the latter leads the government and handles domestic policy and daily governance. 

These elections are unfolding at a time of profound distrust in Romania’s political parties. In a survey from March 2024 conducted by independent think tank IRES, 62 per cent of young people aged 18 to 35 reported strong distrust in political parties; only 4 per cent expressed strong confidence in them. This crisis of faith leaves Romania more susceptible than ever to anti-establishment forces who will be eager to harness the deep frustration simmering across the country.  

Turbulent times  

Since Romania’s last presidential elections in 2019, the country – like much of the EU – has been rocked by economic and social turmoil. The dual shocks of the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with whom it shares a border, have exacerbated Romania’s challenges, especially around inflation (inflation hit nearly 17 per cent in November 2022, one of the highest rates in the EU). 

While inflation decreased to 4.6 per cent in March 2024, the effects of the crisis continue to play out. As of September 2024, food prices were 4.72 per cent higher than the previous year, with items such as vegetables (13.79 per cent) and canned goods (9.8 per cent) seeing huge hikes. This has strained household budgets, particularly for low- and middle-income families. 

These elections are unfolding at a time of profound distrust in Romania’s political parties.

The rising costs have sparked waves of protests. In January 2024, Romanian farmers took to the streets, voicing their frustration over the escalating prices of transportation, fertilisers, and energy, as well as the cheaper Ukrainian grain flooding the local market. The protests culminated in the government providing grants to offset the increased costs of production, transport, and storage for the 2023 harvest. 

Romania’s educators also raised their voices. In May 2023, teachers staged the largest sector-wide protest in two decades, with over 150,000 educators demanding a 25 per cent wage increase to cope with the rising cost of living. The government promised a gradual increase, with plans to reach 25 per cent by 2026. 

Promise or populism? 

This tense backdrop of rising costs and social unrest sets the stage for the upcoming elections. Despite the problems facing Ciolacu, polls indicate that he remains the candidate most likely to advance to the second round of the presidential election. 

This is no surprise, as PSD has long been one of Romania’s most popular parties. Although nominally left-wing, PSD is socially conservative and pro-business, just like PNL. Ciolacu recently unveiled a presidential plan that reflects this, emphasising re-industrialisation to boost exports and investment to grow business. The proposal is, however, laced with more social democratic policies, such as raising pensions and investing in education and healthcare.  

These are areas that have long struggled in Romania. The Romanian education system has undergone numerous reforms since 1990, but many have been poorly implemented or reversed due to political instability, with consequences for the students. A 2022 national literacy study revealed that 42 per cent of Romanians from grades 1 to 8 are functionally illiterate, while school dropout rates were at 15 per cent in 2021, the highest in the EU.  

Romania’s healthcare system is meanwhile fragmented and poorly coordinated among various authorities and ministries. It struggles with inefficiencies that impede the effective management of healthcare resources across regions. Many hospitals remain outdated, lacking essential equipment, and fail to meet European safety standards. 

Critics argue that Ciolacu’s plan lacks specificity and is overly ambitious, addressing areas that fall under the Prime Minister’s purview rather than the president’s, such as education and healthcare – the type of projects he should have pursued as prime minister, but has not. 

Critics also argue that he is putting forth a populist programme to appeal to a broad electorate, without providing concrete solutions or a clear vision for presidential duties. They question whether his agenda genuinely aims to address Romanian citizens’ pressing needs, like education and healthcare, or whether it only serves as electoral posturing. 

The controversies and scandals of his government have not helped. Soon after becoming prime minister last year, private retirement homes run by an organisation linked to a former PSD associate were found to have subjected elderly residents to horrific mistreatment, including starvation and physical abuse. The scandal prompted two of Ciolacu’s ministers to resign. One of them, Gabriela Firea, was politically rehabilitated within months, resuming her role as PSD Bucharest president and first vice president in the party leadership.  

Although Ciolacu publicly promised “no mercy for the scoundrels”, the owners of the abusive homes were only placed under house arrest. 

The far-right contender 

When it comes to the contender in Romania’s presidential race, many recent polls place the far-right Simion right behind Ciolacu.  

The AUR first burst onto Romania’s political scene in 2019, promoting a strong nationalist ideology that aimed for the unification of all Romanians, including those in neighbouring countries. Positioning itself as a defender of the Christian Orthodox Church, the party rejects atheism and same-sex relationships. 

The AUR also holds a Eurosceptic stance. The party views the EU as a “socialist empire of federal order” and a “nefarious hegemony”. Simion has criticised the EU’s green transition policies as “crazy”, arguing they harm Eastern European countries still struggling with communist legacies. With these extremist ideas, AUR obtained over 9 per cent of votes in Romania’s 2020 parliamentary elections.   

Katja Plate, the Director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) in Romania, argues that Simion is now “dressing AUR in a more acceptable coat for the broader Romanian electorate” in order to secure his place in the presidential runoff. 

“Rough and extremist positions were significantly toned down in the past months,” she said. This includes reducing pro-Russia rhetoric and, at times, even condemning Russia’s actions, while also moderating its hostile position on minority groups in the country, such as Hungarians. Simion has been focusing on “cleverly addressing real social issues, like housing prices and the availability of healthcare in rural regions,” she adds. 

These issues are tacked in the so-called “Simion Plan”. A key proposal is to construct one million apartments, to be sold at a starting price of 35,000 euros for a two-bedroom unit. To qualify, interested buyers must sign a “contract” with Simion. This touches on an increasingly sensitive issue for many Romanians, especially young ones, who struggle to afford housing due to rising average costs and a shortage of available homes. 

Luciana Alexandra Ghica, a political science professor at the University of Bucharest, dismissed the initiative as “not only plain populism, but rather a typical scam,” one that uses “sensitive private data from those credulous enough to fall into this trap of “contracts” for unsustainable housing. “In a more consolidated democracy with [a] higher level of civic culture, such a scheme would be more thoroughly investigated for fraud or at least more widely recognized as such.” 

Housing is just one component of the Simion Plan; it also includes proposals for enhancing public transportation, particularly rail services. Simion has announced his intention to invest in high-speed trains – currently lacking in Romania – improve regional and metropolitan transit, and reduce bureaucracy within the Ministry of Transportation. This resonates strongly with Romanians, as progress in this area has been stagnant for years. 

Given his current polling, Simion’s strategy of toning down extreme messages and making promises that resonate with so many seems to be working. Ghica notes that AUR has attracted “a portion of the frustrated middle class who traditionally voted for PNL and later for USR, even though they tend to be more educated than the average. “It is likely that some traditional supporters of PSD and PNL, as well as segments of the diaspora, will vote for Simion.”  

The pro-AUR diaspora 

The diaspora has indeed been a strong AUR supporter ever since the party’s creation. During the 2020 parliamentary elections, one in four Romanians abroad voted for it. The party topped the polls in Italy and Cyprus, and ranked second in France, Germany, and Spain. 

Magdalena Ulceluse, who lectures in international migration and ethnic relations at Malmö University in Sweden, notes that AUR resonates particularly with those who have migrated for economic reasons, often driven by poverty and lack of opportunities. Recent challenges such as the pandemic, high inflation, and rising living costs have disenfranchised – and radicalised – diasporic voters as well as those in Romania. The AUR remains the primary party engaging this audience, Ulceluse says.  

“Simion is essentially the only candidate reaching out to Romanians abroad. When you compare the social media accounts of all candidates, he is the only one directly asking questions of the diaspora, making promises, and planning visits.” She explains that while this outreach might, in fact, be “lip service,” it is working to “engage them, make them feel heard.” 

“Simion has recognized the diaspora’s potential to influence election outcomes, not only through their direct votes but also by impacting the opinions of their families and friends back home.”  

Electoral precedent 

If Simion reaches the second round of the presidential election, he would become the first far-right candidate to do so since Corneliu Vadim Tudor in 2000. Tudor, the leader of the Greater Romania Party (PRM), relied heavily on nationalist rhetoric and populism. He was ultimately defeated by Ion Iliescu, an ex-Communist Party leader and member of dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu’s close entourage, who had already served a presidential term from 1990 to 1996. 

The same dissatisfaction, frustration, and disaffection with the major parties – born in part of their failure to deliver on promises – that is now fuelling Simion’s rise also propelled Vadim Tudor into the second round in 2000. Like Simion, Tudor portrayed himself as the only true alternative to the “corrupt and ineffective political class ” that had governed Romania since the fall of communism in 1989. 

The possibility of Tudor winning the presidency in 2000 significantly influenced voter behaviour in Romania, leading many to choose Iliescu even if they did not fully endorse him. This sentiment was echoed by various political leaders, civil rights groups, and media organisations that urged voters to unite against Tudor, framing Iliescu as the only viable option to safeguard democracy. 

Notably absent in this race are green or progressive leftist parties. They remain marginal in Romania’s political landscape.

Ghica stresses that a runoff between Simion and Ciolacu, mirroring the Iliescu-Tudor precedent, would benefit Ciolacu the most, as it would likely mobilise urban voters to support “whoever is the counter-candidate to Simion.” 

After defeating Tudor, Iliescu’s government implemented some measures aimed at reducing the appeal of extremist views and strengthening democratic governance. By addressing (to some extent) economic issues like unemployment and inflation, and promoting unity among ethnic groups – especially the Hungarian minority, whom Tudor targeted with hateful rhetoric – as well as forming strategic alliances, Iliescu significantly diminished Tudor’s influence. 

Tudor participated in the 2004 elections but failed to reach the second round, and his party’s influence declined further as Romania moved towards European integration and adopted more moderate policies. The far-right did not play a significant role again in Romanian politics until AUR’s creation.  

The other options 

Apart from Ciolacu and Simion, there are only a few other candidates that stand a chance of advancing to the second round of the presidential elections. A prominent figure is Mircea Geoană, former NATO deputy secretary general and former PSD leader, who is now running as an independent.  

Another contender is Nicolae Ciucă, leader of the centre-right PNL and Ciolacu’s predecessor as prime minister under the PSD-PNL coalition. While Ciucă would typically be the natural rival to Ciolacu in a runoff, most polls currently put him in third, fourth, or fifth place. This seems to reflect a growing sense of disillusionment within his party’s base. The joint candidate list with PSD for the European elections in 2024 left many traditional PNL supporters feeling betrayed.  

Historically, PNL has positioned itself as an opponent of the PSD, which is often associated with corruption and clientelism. While the official reasoning for this alliance was to prevent AUR winning more seats, it led many PNL supporters to feel that the party has compromised its values by aligning with its longtime opponent. 

Although the coalition with PSD allowed them to secure more seats collectively, a closer examination reveals substantial losses for PNL itself: its leadership in county councils dropped from 17 in 2020 to just 11 in the latest elections, signalling a loss of local influence and voter confidence. 

Beyond party challenges, Ciucă himself faces significant controversy. In 2022, he was accused of plagiarising parts of his doctoral thesis. He denied any wrongdoing. An investigation by G4Media revealed that the ensuing case was improperly directed to a judge known for his connections with Ciucă’s party. The judge then cleared Ciucă, sparking new debates about corruption and accountability in the Romanian government.  

Elena Lasconi, leader of USR, Romania’s other centre-right party, stands out as the only viable female candidate. Lasconi recently took the helm of USR after the party’s disappointing electoral results in the local and EP elections. As she campaigns for the presidency, Lasconi is positioning herself as a candidate who can attract both traditional USR supporters and undecided voters. This strategy reflects an understanding of the need to unify various segments of the electorate. 

However, she faces significant challenges, not least the pervasive issue of misogyny. According to a 2023 World Bank report, over 80 per cent of Romanians believe a woman’s primary role is to care for the home and family. Presidency would be an extremely long way from that role.  

Notably absent in this race are green or progressive leftist parties. They remain marginal in Romania’s political landscape, with little indication they’ll grow in popularity in the near future. 

Political depression 

Simion is unlikely to win the presidential race, but Romanians will still have to contend with a bleak and uninspiring presidency. “The same old faces and empty promises currently drive Romanian voters into political depression,” stressed Plate.  

She added that even without Simion securing the presidency, AUR’s growing influence in the Romanian Parliament would give the far right “a tangible influence on several policy areas.” This could, for instance, result in a shift toward more conservative healthcare policies and complicate efforts to build majorities in support of Ukraine. 

The best strategy to effectively counter AUR’s growing influence would be to “ensure good governance,” Plate argues, as Romanian voters “hunger for decisive political actions and results.” Without this, “Romania’s weak democratic institutions might be pushed further in the direction of authoritarian tendencies.”  

In the context of an increasingly polarised Europe, with stronger and more influential far-right parties in countries around the Union, this makes the outcomes of Romania’s presidential and parliamentary elections all the more important.