What France has experienced in the past months is nothing short of a political roller coaster: following the European elections which saw the far-right decimate opponents, left-wing forces defied expectations in national polls to form the largest political bloc domestically. Despite this strong showing, however, the French progressives are in a weaker position than ever before, due largely to a growing rift between politicians and their electorate. An interview with Nora Hamadi.
Edouard Gaudot: Over the past few weeks, France has lived through an extremely intense and dramatic political period. It began with a resounding victory for the extreme Right in the European elections, followed by a shock dissolution of parliament and two rounds of voting in legislative elections, with the threat of an absolute majority for the far-right National Rally (RN), followed by a relative victory for the left alliance New Popular Front (NFP), and finally the division of the National Assembly into three relatively equal blocks. As both a journalist and columnist on European and social issues, what do you make of this, and what lessons should we take from it?
Nora Hamadi: I see huge confusion. I also observed a disconnect between the political and media spheres and the real lives and worries of French people. With all of the media noise, we only hear the partisan arguments of the various groupings, or the parties’ internal strategies. While some manifesto pledges have come through, they have been drowned out by the political squabbling, particularly on issues of costings for the NFP’s manifesto.
I have also noticed that – and I say this with respect – the general public seems to lack knowledge of institutional politics and does not understand the political process. They are wondering why a European election has led to a dissolution of parliament and early legislative elections. Likewise, many columnists and commentators have also struggled to understand what Emmanuel Macron did. I have met many people on the ground who are confused and looking for an explanation of the situation.
When I consider the studios that I work in, where columnists sit in their echo chambers discussing internal party disputes and wranglings and power plays between parties, I am struck by the astronomical distance between normal citizens and the political and media sphere.
This disconnect has allowed toxic rhetoric to creep in, which further feeds into the discrediting and rejection of a political class interested only in fighting for its own positions, and not in the concerns of real people.
And yet, the French people came together in this dramatic moment.
Yes, and that is the interesting part. In fact, others filled the gap left by politicians and the media, with huge amounts of work achieved by grassroots organisations and citizens on the ground, from working-class areas and elsewhere. They came together to form anti-racism movements and deliver campaigns to get people to vote and make public policy statements. I saw ad-hoc groups created on WhatsApp in just a few days to organise leafleting and canvassing as a response to the significant threat.
This educational effort was far more effective. Grassroots organisations clearly showed the greatest sense of responsibility on these issues, unlike the petty nit-picking of the party leaders, who refused to “choose between the extremes” or to back opposing candidates to tackle the far right.
There were many people on the ground who embraced this outlook, saying, for example, that they would “not choose between the plague and cholera.” That was a line that worked very well. As for the issue of knowing whether the RN “really is the extreme right” as heard in the mainstream conversation, this demonstrates to what extent politics has disappeared from general discourse, with political communications and marketing crushing the fundamental arguments.
You point out a dramatic failure by the media in their role as intermediaries and political mediators. People often say that the media has a direct role in the rise of the extreme right in France. How true would you say this is?
I should specify that I am involved both in what you might call “high-brow” cultural media with a more progressive view, and media with a wider reach such as the 24-hour channel BFM-TV, which is fully invested in the “attention economy” and audience figures. There, information is no longer hierarchical, and only the most recent event is important. News is sensationalised and dramatised, to the point of becoming a soap opera or political reality show, hinging on wars of words, tweets and outraged reactions with varying degrees of calculation.
The National Rally, with its 10-12 million voters as potential viewers, plays a key role in this whole system. To underline this, in May I even saw “freelance” paid columnists and spokespeople in TV studios, with the same status as me, a journalist. Thus, you would have the former “advisor” or “spokesperson” for Marine Le Pen or the RN in all of the studios, every day, paid by a major news channel.
There is clearly a direct link between the mainstream media and the general normalisation of the discourse of the extreme right, and this is not limited to [media tycoon] Vincent Bolloré’s media empire. Therefore, airtime is given to the National Rally’s racist and xenophobic discourse, as channels do “not want to overlook 11 million French people”. The Bolloré empire maintains this vicious circle and plays a key role in the ever-fiercer competition for attention.
Surveys confirm what I have already heard from internal staff: that programme schedulers and news editors are being advised to accommodate columnists and guests from the extreme right. This means that our studio panels are extremely unbalanced, which is why, for example, I often find myself as the only person assigned to the left-wing and “working class” political identity.
That is also where I am different. I am on the ground, and I report what I see; but the media machine is based on taking sides and posturing, with studios feeding polarisation and conflict culture to match their business model of politics as entertainment. Often, programmes are led by journalists who do not have the political experience or professionalism to ask the questions that need to be asked, or to rise above the “spin language” used by politicians. This is a complete disconnect from people’s everyday lives. It is something that personally angers me and politically worries me.
Other than the role of the media, do you think that the rise of the extreme right in France can be blamed on the record of the past seven years of Macron’s presidency? And if yes, why?
In fact, the problem is the way Emmanuel Macron has exercised power. In 2017, one of the first things that he said when he was elected against Marine Le Pen was: “My goal is to bring down the far right.” This profoundly dangerous black-and-white view quickly took hold, as perfectly demonstrated by the 2019 European elections, in which the “nationalists” were pitted against the “progressives”.
There is clearly a direct link between the mainstream media and the general normalisation of the discourse of the extreme right.
I wrote articles warning about the dangers of this clash because the two camps were fundamentally two sides of the same coin. The dominant discourse assumes that “progressives” are all in one camp, supporting Europe, progress, and positivity under Macron, while those who are against Macron and his vision are clearly nationalists, populists and dangerous people. Macron therefore made Marine Le Pen his main opponent, a position which she consolidated in 2022 with an increased tally of 89 deputies (MPs) at the National Assembly.
So, yes, Macron’s tactical political posturing bolstered the RN as the only credible alternative. In addition, following the recommendations of his closest advisors, he has fed the RN with his clumsy lopsided debates on remembrance issues and on the Immigration Act, which, naturally, he voted on with the National Rally.
Macron’s attempts at social dialogue have also been a disaster. The way in which the Gilets jaunes (“Yellow vests”) and retirement reform policies have been handled has not so much bolstered the RN as increased resentment towards Macron and his entourage. The RN has been able to capitalise on this anger.
This is also where the Left has failed, as it wasn’t able to reach the working class and channel its anger.
In the current landscape of power relations, we have seen the emergence of a third block called the New Popular Front. In a French system which punishes disunion, this alliance was able to win a relative majority. Firstly, who makes this left-wing grouping? And secondly, what does this say about the deeper aspirations of the French people?
“Who” makes the Left is a more difficult question than you would think. I think that there is in fact a left-wing electorate, but in this case, there was also a so-called “republican front” which stopped the extreme right from gaining power. I don’t know exactly which left-wing family won, because this alliance contains several different groups who all appeal to different segments of society.
The pragmatic social democrats made a comeback with good results in the European elections, bringing with them some established leaders, illustrated by François Hollande’s return to the National Assembly. Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s France Unbowed party (La France Insoumise) is trying to appeal to the working classes, but his main supporters are young people, students, and those from poorer neighbourhoods. And, quite honestly, I am not sure who the Greens are targeting, other than a microcosm of urban, educated people.
This alliance was born of an electoral and political emergency. The most difficult part was not the substance, as there is a consensus on most issues including social justice, environmental justice, redistribution, combating racism and xenophobia, and fighting for equal rights. The left-wing parties are more or less aligned on their values and the challenges.
However, this is not the case for strategy. These political groups do not appeal to the same people and are unable to think in terms of a wider voter base. The proof of this is that even when combining all of their strengths, and bringing in even the most marginal groups, they are on around 30 per cent. France has never been so right-wing, and the Left has never been as weak as it is now.
On that topic, in recent rounds of media interviews, you expressed some very harsh opinions of certain figures as well as the Left in general.
It was first and foremost a feeling of anger, as the Left literally decided to abandon its own voter base, i.e. the working classes and some of the more modest middle classes. It embraced urban expansion and globalisation and agreed to sacrifice some of its citizens for the sake of (primarily) economic pragmatism. [Former Socialist Prime Minister] Lionel Jospin, who in 2001 said “the state cannot do everything”, was a symbol of this rupture.
How does that abandonment translate into policies?
Effectively, it translates into policies in which certain regions have been abandoned, or where some state policies for young people, working-class education, and access to culture have disappeared. Of course, the financial situation after 2007 set some constraints, but while the Left had kept many local governments (regions and “départements”), it made some budgetary and political decisions aligned with different priorities. We are now paying the price of these decisions.
This abandonment was also mutual, as this was the moment when the working classes became disengaged and started to abstain. That consequently led to a form of “client politics” in which you design policies aimed at your own voter base. They may be pensioners, older working people, and more engaged people who vote. You then end up leaving behind some of those people you should be tending to.
So, yes, you can blame the Left, but also the unions, and the intermediary bodies who are no longer doing their jobs. These intermediary spaces have disappeared. There are of course wider reasons, but there has been a general weakening of intermediary or representative spaces and spaces for politics in society. And these spaces tended to foster the Left and more progressive ideas. They included the main working-class education centres, namely Ligue de l’enseignement (“Teaching League”), the Léo-Lagrange centres and the CEMEA (a working-class education scheme).
We have abandoned the work we did on creating direct links to educate the citizenship. One by one, these hubs have been closing across entire regions due to a lack of resources. I am talking about urban regions, which have been completely abandoned despite being in towns or cities. I grew up in a town 19 kilometres from Paris, which is a medical desert and where all the centres that I used as a child no longer exist. These organisations, which used to create links with society and foster a shared purpose and education around citizenship and emancipation, have been reduced to just a few scraps. This creates a feeling of isolation and disaffection amongst many voters. It is also a reason why many more people don’t vote anymore.
We might revel in the fact that turnout reached 67 per cent in the recent election, which, granted, is not bad. But that still means that one in three voters stayed at home. That is a significant proportion. That means that 16 million people remained silent.
The Gilets jaunes movement was a manifestation of the disengagement on the Left. The way in which the Left scorned and ignored this powerful social movement in its first few weeks shows how dangerous the disconnect of left-wing politics is. It also explains the limited support that it now has. Many people do not really have a link with activist spaces, or only occasionally foray into action with green movements like Extinction Rebellion or Les Soulèvements de la Terre (“The Earth Uprisings”), particularly when these groups demonstrate against so-called “mega basins”.
This link is now more informal than the previous mode of engagement, which was a kind of political biotope where you could go and find activists and make connections with grassroots organisations. That connection is now broken. In addition, the Gilets jaunes emerged with no representation, fuelled solely by the success of an online petition.
And yet, during the Gilets jaunes’ first few weeks, left-wing politicians treated them as a factious movement made of prospective fascists, racists and xenophobes in suburban areas who wanted to keep burning diesel fuel. How have we reached this level of disconnect with real people on the ground? Did the left-wing politicians and their entourage deny these people a political voice simply because they had not been educated at prestigious universities such as the Parisian Sciences Po or the ENA (National School of Administration)?
When I publicly expressed my anger towards the Left, I simply reminded it of its responsibilities to the working classes, minorities, and those on a low income, all groups that have been cast aside by a succession of failures to fulfil these duties. And to make matters worse, the disconnect has left them unable to represent these communities, as the Left no longer know them. They are too entrenched in their urban, educated world.
Indeed, we saw that the candidates from these types of backgrounds tended to be from the National Rally.
Yes, exactly. I concede that La France Insoumise have made some efforts on this, but their approach is based on cultural and regional stereotyping. And that is also dangerous. Working-class people and areas deserve better than to be portrayed as voting solely because their solidarity lies with countries of the Middle East and Gaza, or because of their religious identity, as they are assumed to be – or look like – Muslims. In reality, they are first and foremost working-class individuals.
Moreover, nowadays, in the working-class areas where I spend much of my time, new immigrants and their children often come from the Indian sub-continent or Sub-Saharan Africa, which includes a significant number of Catholics and Evangelists. Therefore, I don’t understand why we feel the need to oversimplify and pigeonhole this diverse range of people.
So, to summarise, the Left is a victim of its own social perspective on two levels: its misguided view of the electorate, and then its societal perceptions, fantasies, and prejudices.
Absolutely. It is a disconnect on two fronts. It is also a failure to read the population, with this simplistic three-way divide into “metropolitan”, “rural,” and “suburban.” Indeed, there is to a certain extent an over-simplification, because in urban metropolitan France there are huge pockets of deprivation, and in medium-sized towns like Laval, in Mayenne, or Guéret in Creuse, there are ‘vulnerable’ neighbourhoods located in old town centres, a world away from the big concepts which are often cited.
We need to get away from these arbitrary categories which suggest that France is divided into three types of places, to match the three-way split in politics. We also have many areas occupied by primarily white, working-class people on low incomes in the North, in Aisne and in the South-East inland areas which are RN strongholds. These voter groups are often misunderstood. Real life is often far more complex than our interpretations.
The Left are too entrenched in their urban, educated world.
As for the Greens, they have found themselves in an interesting paradox. Could you explain why they failed in the European elections, and how they managed to pull things back nationally?
It was thanks to the NFP. The main reason behind the French Greens’ success on the national level was knowing how to slot into a coalition movement. That is what has saved them.
And, in fact, when their National Secretary Marine Tondelier started negotiations that led to the formation of the NFP on the evening of the dissolution of the parliament, she was fully aware that by forming part of a movement, Greens would be able to serve their voters although the cards were stacked against them.
Let’s go back to their resounding failure in the European elections, where the Greens saw their worst result since their rout in 1994. Competition aside, how would you explain this total collapse?
It was both the competition itself, which was difficult with the rise of the RN, but also the campaign choices made by the lead candidate. This is a typical example of a disconnect from real life. Of course, the media then zeroed in on these shortcomings and the disconnect.
The shaky campaign launch and the dancing performances were signs of an off-shore campaign first and foremost designed for activists, and certainly not for the people. Far from breaking “the sound barrier”, the Greens’ European campaign in fact never really even took off, and therefore wasn’t heard at all.
Despite the farming crisis, the Greens’ list was invisible and did not gain traction, whereas for the national parliamentary elections, we saw more of Marine Tondelier. I must admit that she gained my respect during these periods. I know that she is committed to extending and embracing a green movement for the working classes. Will she have the resources to do it?
We urgently need the Greens in politics to move towards the working classes. This is something which has existed in the past. La zone d’écologie populaire (“The people’s green zone”) was a strong movement within the party in the mid-2000s. We need to think about those working-class people who are living restrained or constricted lives, who in a way are the “greenest” of us all. They are also the people whose daily lives and living conditions are the first to be impacted by environmental breakdowns, including with regard to water and air quality, food quality, noise pollution, high energy bills, and poor home insulation.
I really think that if the Greens changed their narrow social outlook, and if they were able to think about their own actions from the perspective of those most affected, they could be the number one political force in the country in the current climate. However, in order to do that, they need to be humble and speak to people in an extremely straightforward and accessible way.
Moreover, the Greens need to be able to support social and cultural changes like reducing meat consumption and using our cars less. If you can accompany people through this new awareness, they will be able to rethink and politicise their actions.
Let’s move away from France towards a wider European context. What does the extreme right’s ability to get to the gates of power say both about France and about Europe? Can we escape from this spiral? What options do we have in the face of the shift of the European political sphere towards the extreme right?
Put simply, we need to “deliver”. This movement is not just European; it is also global. We are witnessing a hardening of the systems which govern the balance of power. These are not “soft” power relationships. There is a kind of “masculinity” which is playing into the increased brutality in public life. The system is crushing, and in France, the majority-based system of the Fifth Republic is symptomatic of that. Consensus is seen as a weakness.
A change of system is essential. In my view, the Fifth Republic has reached an impasse. For years, we have been talking about introducing proportional representation into our ballots, and we have not done it. I think that, as the Gilets jaunes called for with the Citizen’s Initiative Referendum, there is now a call to share power, participate, and reconcile. We are no longer in a 1960s system where we can simply call on our citizens every five years. We need to be able to express ourselves more frequently; we need to be heard and listened to, and we need transparency.
As for Europe, we can’t have a Europe which is active on only one side. We have established the free movement of capital, people and goods, but this “big market” still needs to protect Europeans and their values. We have not done enough to protect the individuals who are the lifeblood of our continent. We have also put them in direct competition with their neighbours and with the rest of the world, with this [former UK Prime Minister, Margaret] Thatcher-inspired slogan that “there is no alternative” to unhealthy and fatal deregulation. We are now paying the price for excessive liberalisation without looking at the details.
The fear of decline and downgrade is something which permeates the whole of Europe. There is a feeling of limited hope which makes us think that our children or grandchildren’s future will be worse than ours. Politics now needs to tackle this feeling. It is not only about numbers and public finances. We must also make sure that people are socially and environmentally secure, and – especially – that they have food security.
If we feel secure in the face of future challenges, we can start to feel hope.
