The Labour Party has historically been the largest centre-left party in the Netherlands. Between 1946 and 2017, it was either the largest or the second largest party in parliament.¹ It was in government for about 40 of the last 80 years, in coalition with either the Christian Democrats or the conservative-liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD, ALDE), supplying three prime ministers. 

Compared to other European parties of the same political family, the Dutch Labour Party has been more environmentalist and open to post-materialist values. Like many social-democratic parties in Europe, it laid the basis for the welfare state in the 1950s, but later pivoted towards third-way politics in the late 1980s, reflecting the neoliberal consensus. It veered again to the left following the global financial crisis. Yet between 2012 and 2017, in government with the VVD, it pushed through an agenda of austerity, budget cuts, and structural reforms. In the subsequent elections, it fell from 25 to 6 per cent of the vote, and it has never fully recovered. 

The GreenLeft was formed in 1989 from the merger of four parties that were all related to the Labour Party. The Communist Party of the Netherlands and the Pacifist Socialist Party believed that Labour was too moderate and too willing to make compromises with centre-right forces, whereas the Political Party Radicals and the Evangelical People’s Party split from Christian-democratic forces, seeking closer cooperation with Labour.  

In the merger in 1989, the four parties adopted a green profile. Later, in 2004, the GreenLeft co-founded the European Green Party. Within its party family, the Dutch GreenLeft is more left-wing on economic issues than many European Green forces. Despite participating in coalition formation talks in 2006, 2012, 2017, and 2021, the GreenLeft has never been part of the government. The party’s electoral support fluctuated over the years, reaching its highest in 2017 (9 per cent). 

Moving closer together 

The idea to form a joint list emerged in 2021. Both the GreenLeft and the Labour Party did poorly in that year’s elections, outperformed by the social-liberal Democrats 66 (D66, ALDE), which surged to second place, promising “new leadership”. That promise was not fulfilled, as the Christian Democratic Appeal (European People’s Party) and the VVD persuaded D66 to form another centre-right government.  

However, that election brought the GreenLeft and Labour closer together. Already during the campaign, the leader of the GreenLeft Jesse Klaver indicated that he wanted his party to cooperate more closely with Labour. During the coalition talks, the two parties negotiated as one bloc. Once they ended up in opposition, their cooperation intensified. 

As journalist Coen van de Ven detailed in his book about the merger process, cooperation was strongly supported by both party leaderships and bases, with the notable exception of some critical voices within the Labour Party. These critics feared that a merger would result in a more amorphous left-wing party, unable to win back the working-class voters that the Labour Party lost in 2017. This wing also tends to have more conservative views about immigration, often citing the Danish Social Democrats as a source of inspiration.²

In spring 2023, the two parties formed a joint parliamentary group in the Senate, and in the fall, they ran on a joint list for the general elections under the leadership of Frans Timmermans, then first vice-president of the European Commission. By running together, the parties hoped to become the largest political force in the country, presenting voters with the concrete possibility of a progressive government. The joint list secured 25 out of 150 seats (up from 17 previously held by the two parties combined) but fared well below expectations. What’s worse, the far-right Party for Freedom won the election, conquering 37 seats and forming a right-wing coalition government. 

The GreenLeft-Labour Party remained in opposition. In June 2024, the alliance won the European elections as a joint list under the leadership of Green MEP Bas Eickhout, securing 21 per cent of the vote and eight seats in the European Parliament. Meanwhile, plans for a merger took shape, with members of both parties voting overwhelmingly in favour. A draft for a new manifesto of principles was written by the parties’ think tanks, focused on the value of solidarity. 

When the right-wing government fell after slightly more than a year of infighting and incompetence, the GreenLeft-Labour Party geared up for new elections, still as a joint list. The alliance drafted a clearly left-wing and green manifesto, with particular emphasis on building more homes to tackle the housing crisis. On migration, however, the joint list moved to the right, reflecting a broader shift in Dutch politics. The manifesto accepted the notion that government policy should establish a maximum number of immigrants, and criticised labour migration as a driver of exploitation and social problems. It also endorsed the EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, including the agreements with third countries outside of the EU to take asylum seekers. 

A decisive campaign 

However, the plan to replace the right-wing government with a progressive one led by Timmermans did not materialise. The key reason for this was the unexpected surge of D66. Its leader, Rob Jetten, claimed that the elections were less a choice between Left and Right than about the “vibe” you feel with a party. D66 projected an optimistic vibe, emphasising that ambitious plans become possible if parties work together.  

While the position of D66 on migration does not differ significantly from that of the GreenLeft-Labour Party (if anything, D66 is more liberal on labour migration), the party presented itself as more nationalist. At his party’s convention, Jetten stood in front of a big Dutch flag, trying to reclaim this symbol from the Right.  

Throughout the campaign, Jetten was also seen as more sympathetic than Timmermans. However, while polling for D66 and GreenLeft-Labour was relatively stable in the months before the elections, D66 registered a surge in the last weeks of the campaign (see Figure 1 below), attracting votes first from the Right and then from the Left too. This surge started when the PVV’s frontman, Geert Wilders, pulled out of a debate with the leaders of the largest parties, and Jetten took his place. In that debate, Jetten said that under his leadership, the Netherlands would build 100,000 new homes – a promise Timmermans dismissed as unrealistic, seemingly unaware that the joint list made the very same commitment in a political ad aired just before the debate.  

Figure 1. Red line: GL-PvdA; Black line: D66, with 95 per cent confidence interval. The circles indicate the election results. Source: Peilingwijzer. 

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This is just one example of a poorly run campaign which, as journalist Yasmin Ait Abderrahman noted, clearly lacked focus. In a clumsy attempt to prevent D66 from winning over left-wing voters, the joint list started focusing on healthcare in the last weeks before the elections, even though this hadn’t previously been part of its core campaign themes. Moreover, the leadership was isolated from the rest of the party and not receptive to feedback.  

It is therefore unsurprising that Timmermans lost to the optimism, consistency, and strong organisation of D66, which continued to surge in the last days before the elections while the alliance dipped. Polling indicates that the GreenLeft-Labour Party alliance lost about five seats to D66. 

Competing for the same voters? 

In many countries, Greens and Social Democrats traditionally appealed to different voters: the former to university-educated urbanites, and the latter to a working-class, unionised electorate without university degrees. In the Netherlands, by the time the GreenLeft and the Labour Party started working together, this was no longer the case. In the 2017 elections, the Labour Party had lost its traditional working-class base, and both parties now mainly appeal to highly educated voters, even though the Greens’ electorate remains substantially younger than Labour’s. 

In this year’s elections, both the GreenLeft-Labour alliance and D66 got most of their votes among university-educated citizens (about 20 per cent each – see Figure 2 below). They performed the worst among people with degrees from vocational colleges. Both parties did slightly better among people with a high school diploma, which is likely explained by their appeal among younger voters who don’t have a university degree yet.  

Figure 2. Red bars: GreenLeft-Labour; Purple bars: D66, with 95 per cent confidence interval. Source: Leiden University Election Survey. 

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Differences between the alliance’s electorate and D66’s are more pronounced in terms of economic and cultural views (see Table 1 below). The GreenLeft-Labour Party performs very well among voters who are economically left-wing (in favour of income redistribution, against excessive inequality) and culturally progressive (in particular on immigration): 50 per cent of them voted for the joint list. However, the alliance fares poorly among economically left-wing, culturally conservative voters (13 per cent), among economically right-wing, culturally progressive voters (10 per cent) and among economically right-wing, culturally conservative voters (only 2 per cent).  

D66 attracts a comparatively more economically right-wing electorate: 27 per cent of economically right-wing, culturally progressive voters, and 24 per cent of economically left-wing, culturally progressive voters. Despite its adoption of a much more nationalistic rhetoric, the party does only slightly better among culturally conservative voters than the GreenLeft-Labour Party. All in all, the electorate of D66 was only slightly more culturally conservative than the GreenLeft-Labour Party, and quite a bit more economically right-wing. 

Table 1: D66 and GreenLeft-Labour Party in a two-dimensional model
		Economic
		Left	Right
Cultural	Progressive	GL-PvdA: 50% D66: 24%	GL-PvdA: 10% D66: 27%
	Conservative	GL-PvdA: 12% D66: 13%	GL-PvdA: 2% D66: 9%

Table 1. Source: Leiden University Election Survey. 

A first reckoning 

The joint list’s election result was received as a devastating loss, leading to the resignation of Timmermans, quite a bit of soul-searching, and a return to talk shows of the social-democratic critics of the cooperation. By joining forces, the two parties hoped to expand their appeal. Instead, they got less than 13 per cent of the vote (a decline compared to 2021, but an increase compared to 2017). The result clearly shows that cooperation with the GreenLeft has not reversed the Labour Party’s decline since 2017.  

However, it is also important to note that the gap between the most voted party – D66 –  and the GreenLeft-Labour Party was only 4 per cent. While some commentators concluded that the joint list has structural problems, it could be argued that it was simply outclassed by D66 in the final stretch of the campaign. 

The GreenLeft-Labour Party appeals to an electorate that is, in general terms, quite similar to that of D66. Under these circumstances, it is significant that both these forces ended up in the top four. Compared to the joint list, D66, which is more economically centrist, has been able to appeal to voters from a broader set of parties, while the GreenLeft-Labour alliance consolidated its popularity among left-wing progressives, to the detriment of the other left-wing parties. 

Of the many Dutch political forces that are left-wing in at least some respects (including an animal rights party,  a pensioners’ party, a left-wing populist party, a pro-European social-liberal party, a Christian-social party, and a party for bicultural citizens), nearly all lost votes and none won more than three seats.  

What next?  

What will happen next largely depends on the outcome of the ongoing coalition talks. Currently, the negotiations are clearly moving in the same direction as in 2021, when D66 promised a progressive coalition but eventually capitulated to the VVD’s veto and entered a centre-right government. As the largest political force, D66 is in a stronger position today than four years ago, but the party is again caving to right-wing demands. 

For the future of the new party that GreenLeft and Labour will officially form in 2026, the stakes are high. If it stays in opposition, as seems likely, the new party may be able to win over the more progressive wing of the D66 electorate (as it did in 2023). If it were to enter the coalition, it would have to navigate a complex merger process while at the same time trying to maintain a clear ideological profile in a government with only parties to its right.  

This article was commissioned in collaboration with the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.

1. With one exception, between 2002 and 2003. ↩︎
2. However, research by Tarik Abou-Chadi and Markus Wagner, among others, consistently shows that conservative positions on migration cost Social Democrats votes, instead of benefiting them electorally. ↩︎