In recent years, the German Greens have evolved into a party of responsibility within liberal democratic society in terms of both their programme and their pragmatism. They have taken the current era of epochal change more seriously than any other party, shed some cherished illusions and made painful concessions to reality. They have, in other words, grown a lot in their second term of government.

In the recent federal election, however, this worked against them. Despite the lacklustre offerings from their liberal democratic opponents (CDU/CSU and SPD), the Greens ended up with just 11.6 per cent of the votes – 3.1 percentage points lower than in the 2021 election, which had itself seen their vote share fall well below their previous approval ratings. For a brief moment in time, they were everybody’s darling. Now, large sections of society are happy to see them back in opposition. What went wrong?

The Greens’ evolution

The election of Winfried Kretschmann as the Greens’ first Minister President (in Baden-Württemberg) and Robert Habeck as party leader and, later, Vice-Chancellor marked a new phase in the party’s history. In their first phase, the Greens had been seen as a party of protest; in their second, they tried to be both government and opposition, parliamentary party and movement, power and resistance. Underlying this identity was a left-leaning alternative culture in the Federal Republic that had been shaped by the protests of 1968 and with which “salon socialist” and environmentalist circles felt a natural affinity. It took the form of harsh verbal criticism of “the status quo” and the State, combined with neo-bourgeois, affirmative participation in society – in some cases even as civil servants.

It was only under Robert Habeck that the party and its supporters began to take a close, rational, and questioning look at their positions on a wide range of issues. For example, Habeck called for military support to enable Ukraine to defend itself against Vladimir Putin after a visit to the Ukrainian front in the spring of 2021 – a year before Russia’s war of aggression. At the time, his proposal did not have majority support either within or outside the party, and was dismissed with the usual references to the Nazi past and German responsibility. Left-leaning liberals, especially, were enamoured with the illusion of “The End of History”, Francis Fukuyama’s thesis that the collapse of socialism meant that liberal democracies and their achievements could now be expanded indefinitely. This illusion has been dented in recent years, both by reality, which has become ever harder to ignore, and by Habeck’s self-reflective speeches. However, the desire to go on living in a world which we never actually inhabited but very much hoped to live in clearly has deep cultural roots.

The Greens were beaten back by a wave of nostalgia that was both conservative and progressive.

This is one of the main reasons why traditional progressives were drawn to the Left Party in the Bundestag election. Now that “Evil” in the form of Sahra Wagenknecht and her followers has been exorcised from the party (or rather, has set up a party of its own, the BSW), the Left Party is able to function emotionally as the party of “the Good” again, despite having virtually no ability to influence the key geopolitical issues of the day. Even without Wagenknecht, however, the Left Party is still characterised by scepticism towards the EU and NATO; it also has an ambiguous relationship with Putin (to put it mildly), has shown indifference to the suffering and deaths of the people of Ukraine, and with its openly socialist agenda, is not aligned with the Federal Republic of Germany, its liberal democracy, or its market economy.

None of this seems to have troubled the Left Party’s new fans, however, particularly young voters. A quarter of people aged between 18 and 29 voted for the Left Party this time, presumably attracted via social media. Those born in the 2000s, especially, have grown up in a world dominated by crises, and their experiences of politics and family life have left them with the impression that adults, be they parents, teachers, or government politicians, simply cannot get their act together anymore. It seems to them that the tried and tested politics of social or Christian democracy, Christian democracy – and even (given their role in the “traffic light” coalition government) the Greens – are no longer up to the job of dealing with the various escalating crises, and that liberal democracy therefore offers them neither security nor a future.

As a result, many young people favour parties that are both critical of the political system and unaligned with the Federal Republic – the AfD and the Left Party, in other words. Another important factor here may have been the strategic ploy by Friedrich Merz (CDU), Germany’s likely next Federal Chancellor, whereby he “blackmailed” the Greens and SPD by telling them that if they did not vote for his highly symbolically charged motion to limit illegal migration, he would get it passed with votes from the right-wing populist AfD instead – which he proceeded to do.

A friend to all, a friend to none

For some left-wing Green voters, this was intolerable: they wanted the Greens to distance themselves from it as much as possible and say they would never enter into a coalition with Merz. Now that the Greens have become a party of responsibility, however, Robert Habeck was unable to offer that. He calculated that being seen to resist was less valuable than being able to directly influence the crucial political decisions that lie ahead. In addition to the 700,000 votes lost to the Left Party, the Greens also lost 460,000 to the CDU/CSU. For the latter, Habeck was too left-wing; for the former, not left-wing enough. This is the classic Catch-22 for the Greens, and precisely the situation that Habeck had wanted to free them from so that they could finally live up to their founding motto – “Not left, not right, but forwards”. But while the door had been open for a new centrist party of responsibility in the previous federal election, it has now closed again.

That said, there are plenty of Green voters, both old and (especially) new, who have embraced Habeck’s path and still stand by it. The Greens also suffered the lowest losses of any of the three coalition partners, dropping from 14.7 per cent to 11.6 per cent, compared with the FDP, which failed to secure any seats. Similarly, the SPD’s 16.4 per cent vote share marked their worst result ever, meaning that they have now lost their status as a “people’s party”.

Nevertheless, for all their aspirations to mature politics, the Greens have still not been able to fill the gap left by the SPD and the CDU/CSU in the centre. To put it more bluntly: they were beaten back by a wave of nostalgia that was both conservative and progressive.

None of this is to say that the Greens themselves got everything right – they clearly did not, and political maturity is nowhere near as widespread in the party as the case of Habeck and Kretschmann might suggest. Some of them still think of themselves as a form of resistance, something they see as taking a stand, but which is ultimately just a comfortable spot in an outdated political world.

It is unclear, however, to what extent the increased rejection in various sectors of society, rising to hatred in some circles, especially in the East, is based on actual Green policies as opposed to anti-Green bias or strategic messaging – from foreign and domestic opponents of climate policy and the energy transition, for example. What is clear is that there are now far more misgivings about the party than there were just a few years ago, and that these relate specifically to the Greens’ social and gender policies on the one hand and climate policy on the other. The Greens are often accused of patronising or nannying “chatter”, being obsessed with banning things, and so on.

Robert Habeck’s approach to politics is in tune with the challenges – but not with the mood in society.

Whether the Greens’ actual policies – and the Buildings Energy Act put forward by Habeck’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, in particular – really justify these criticisms depends on one’s point of view. It is also possible to argue that the only real progress achieved by the self-proclaimed “progressive coalition” of SPD, FDP and the Greens was in Habeck’s area of responsibility, notably in the expansion of renewable energies, one of the few fields in which Germany is a leader.

Polling shows that the public still views climate policy as important or very important, in theory, at least – but since Habeck started putting it into practice, things have looked rather different. The future benefits of a heat pump or self-generated electricity are in competition with the cost of installing them now, and it is classic human behaviour to say: “Not now, later.” The same competition between the needs of tomorrow and the needs of today also occurs at the level of society, making it almost impossible for left-wing politics to extend the concepts of “social” and “justice” to children, young people and provision for the world of tomorrow.

Ultimately, it was not primarily climate policy that backfired in this federal election, but Robert Habeck’s new approach to politics. He was proposing to move beyond the traditional political camps – green-left here, liberal-conservative there – and forge alliances between all sectors of society. This was a radical departure from the traditional idea that “everything will be fine if everyone does what they want”. His proposition would have meant a readjustment on key fundamental issues (Europe, defence, the economy, and climate) beyond the old foundational utopias. For some, this new approach represented genuine progressive thinking, but for traditionalists of all parties it was wholly unacceptable, as it would have meant progress through compromise and alliances between the disparate.

This proposed approach was partly based on the realisation that right-wing populism cannot be overcome without moderate conservatives and requires relations between liberal democrats to be stabilised. But the problem with Habeck’s approach to bridge-building is that it does not work when, on the other side of politics, people like CSU leader Markus Söder are tearing bridges down on a daily basis – something that may have brought him short-term gains in the election, but could well erode liberal democracy in the future. Habeck’s approach to politics is in tune with the challenges – but not with the mood in society.

The road to a Green revival

But at the end of the day, the Greens’ own policies are also in need of an overhaul. “Robert Habeck focused industrial strategy too much on old industry and its subsidies,” says business journalist Wolf Lotter. As Lotter argues, while it is not true that the Greens solely concentrated on supporting “their own” green industries, they did not provide enough support for small and medium-sized businesses, which led to a severe loss of trust among these entrepreneurs.

Ultimately, however, Lotter says, the real problem was Habeck’s “business as usual” approach, which failed to address the need to further develop the German economy. It is not clear whether Habeck really did lose the business vote in the election – as the spin doctors would have us believe – but, either way, German economic policy must now be fundamentally rethought. This includes addressing questions such as which future technologies Germany still has a chance to excel in, which core industries – the automotive sector, for example – may now be beyond rescue, and what the consequences may be. Efforts to revitalise the German economy also need to involve creating a better balance between regulation and space for innovation, and rethinking immigration in terms of the top talent that can be acquired – from the US, for example. These kinds of questions have never formed any part of Green thinking to date. They are examples of issues that the Greens were not founded to address, but which are now critical for the future. Whether the Greens have what it takes, culturally and programmatically, to rise to these challenges remains to be seen.

One thing is clear, however: Robert Habeck’s approach to politics will be an essential basis for the future of both the Green party and wider society, since politics in the next few years will no longer be concerned with the cosy issues that dominated the old Federal Republic, but will have to deal seriously – perhaps even brutally – with ensuring a free future for Europe. The question is, how can that approach be implemented? And above all: can it be done without Robert Habeck?

Translated by Paula Kirby | Voxeurop