With the future of the transatlantic alliance in doubt and war on its doorstep, Europe finds itself in uncharted territory. How can the European project stay true to its foundational values of democracy and respect for human rights as it seeks to rethink its place in the world and form new partnerships? An interview with Green Member of the European Parliament Sergey Lagodinsky.
Green European Journal: As someone who lived on both sides of the Iron Curtain, what role have ideals of freedom played in your personal and political life?
Sergey Lagodinsky: My childhood in the Soviet Union deeply impacted my political outlook. I grew up in a country in decay, with an ailing economy, faulty ideology, and a tightly sealed information sphere. Opposition was not just pointless, but completely unknown as a concept. Individualism was undesired, and the concept of “personal” was crudely subordinated to the “collective” – it was out of our experience by definition. Perestroika (the opening up of the Soviet society and economy during the 1980s) was a process of discovering freedom, historical truths, and, in fact, oneself. So freedom is not just a political but also a very personal project for me.
My work in the European Parliament is the antithesis of the life I would have led if I had stayed in Russia back then. The persistence I show today when it comes to defending the freedom of each and every one of us is based on the fact that I know very well what it means not to have it. Some people see my insistence on freedom and liberal democracy as an annoyance or a burden. I am deeply grateful that I am able to carry that burden.
Thirty years ago, we thought liberal democracy would triumph everywhere. Now the world order is crumbling, and the transatlantic alliance is in crisis. What happened?
Democracies have been tested on multiple levels and on many occasions. The 2008 financial crash, the Covid-19 pandemic, the massive cost-of-living crisis following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine – citizens of the world have been wondering who can protect them best. Authoritarians see these crises as a unique opportunity and have used them to tighten their grip over their societies under the pretext of restoring stability. They have also leveraged misinformation and a lack of transparency to cover their misgivings and blame democracy for our many shortcomings. At the same time, democratic governments have proven ill-equipped to produce fast and visible results in times of crisis and to convey the feeling that future generations will be better off than their parents. Much of this is the result of emergencies that nobody can control, but people understandably blame their governments – and ultimately the democratic system itself.
The battle against crisis has become a competition between freedom on the one hand and suppression disguised as stability on the other. Social media accelerates these developments by fuelling disinformation and division. As a result, authoritarian movements promising simple solutions are gaining strength, while the complexities of democracy become ever more difficult to explain.
The crisis of transatlantic relations is of a different type. The underlying issue here is that common values are questioned by a specific government that pursues isolationist instead of globalist exceptionalism. The US’s global reach is no longer integral to its national self-understanding.
What’s more, in a world of deals, there is no room for long-term alliances – or at least the trust and reliability that are a prerequisite for them. Under Trump 2.0, the US has become an impulsive and unpredictable partner that requires maximum flexibility and promises little reliability. Long-term planning, which in turn would provide security, has become virtually impossible. The transatlantic alliance is therefore facing a crucial test – not only politically, but also in terms of its survival. Trump’s policies are dismantling the world order, and the combination of a lack of trust within the alliance and Washington’s chaotic behaviour on the global stage means that our Trump 1.0 strategy of “wait and see” is no longer viable.
But the biggest risk vis-à-vis liberal democracies comes not from the weakening of the alliance but from the Trump administration’s ideological decision to become a patron for illiberal forces. This is the only international ideological outreach that currently interests the US government. The US administration’s stance will weaken liberal democracies and accelerate the decay of the transatlantic alliance, calling into question its identity as a community of values rather than merely of complementary interests.
Liberal democracy has not failed, but it is under considerable pressure worldwide – from outside by authoritarian powers, and from within by social divisions and systemic crises. Since the EU is the largest remaining liberal leader globally, we have a unique role to play in protecting and possibly reforming the world order.
Europe is rearming to cope with rising geopolitical tensions. Can military power be reconciled with the European project as a peace project? And can Europe’s Greens meaningfully contribute to addressing today’s challenges while upholding their identity as a movement rooted in pacifism?
The European project is a peace project because it brought Europeans together and allowed them to develop a common space of peaceful coexistence. However, it is not a peace project in the sense of defenceless naivety. The European Union was never geopolitically naive because it could always count on the protection of NATO. But now that the US’s determination to continue its leadership role within transatlantic cooperation is wavering, we must first supplement and, in the long term, substitute the alliance with European capabilities. I do not see any contradiction between peace and geopolitical awareness. The EU continues to be a peace project because of its cooperative nature; it is also a geopolitically mature project as it aims to become responsible for its own defence.
As Greens, we must not let our ideological underpinnings be minimised to a very one-dimensional understanding of pacifism. There are many actors, especially outside the Green movement, who try to project such limited understandings on us. But if we establish that the Green foreign policy outlook is multidimensional and contextual, we will have little difficulty combining our principles: pacifism is not defeatism, and we have a very clear commitment to defending state borders, international law, human rights, and democratic spaces. We are anti-colonialists and do not accept violence by tyrants. These principles make defence capabilities and solidarity with victims of aggression quite a Green endeavour. I already outlined this vision in our manifesto for the German Greens in 2015.
We must not let our ideological underpinnings be minimised to a very one-dimensional understanding of pacifism.
It is also important to look at the changing context. With Russia’s growing aggressiveness and the US showing less and less solidarity, we, the EU, are on our own. This means that we need to rethink our principles to defend our values. Our values are the same, but our strategies are changing. The Greens can play a constructive role here if we see ourselves as a bridge between peace policy responsibility and security policy realism. And with the unquestionable credibility that we have earned in the area of defence due to our support for Ukraine, we have a special mission: we must ensure that rearmament does not become an aim in itself, but remains embedded in a foreign policy that doesn‘t lose sight of diplomacy, climate protection, and human rights. And coming back to the value of freedom: if we are serious about freedom, we must be able to defend it – including against outside forces.
Yet different EU member states seem to have diverging visions of democracy, freedom, and security, based on their geographical position and historical experiences. Is there a way to find common ground?
Diversity is a norm in Europe, and it exists in discussions of freedom as well. The issue is managing this diversity in the most productive way and keeping it from diverging from common principles and values. Different societies have different histories and geographies, which determine how they live and feel.
A common denominator is possible and necessary, but it requires political will, institutional openness, and mutual understanding. First of all, there needs to be a common basic understanding that democracy is more than just majority decisions: it also includes the separation of powers, protection of minorities, and media freedom. These principles are mutual obligations enshrined in the EU treaties, and they are not imposed by any outside actor. They represent our key positions and common foundation, even if their practical implementation varies from one member state to another.
With regard to security, a coordinated European approach is needed that takes regional threat levels seriously. This requires more coordination in foreign and defence policy, but also solidarity in the face of different challenges – including Russian military aggression or hybrid threats such as disinformation. One possible path to greater unity lies in “differentiated integration”: member states that are willing to work together more closely in certain areas do so without forcing others to join in. At the same time, common basic values must be defended – with sanction mechanisms if necessary.
Europe is also facing challenges from within amidst rising illiberalism and authoritarianism. The far right is in government in several member states, restricting civil liberties and eroding the rule of law. Hard lines against immigration have become mainstream. Can we still speak confidently of common European values today?
The foundation of common European values – such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and solidarity – is now more fragile than ever. The growing illiberalism in parts of Europe, particularly in countries like Hungary, Slovakia, and most recently, Italy, is openly calling these foundations into question. Governments with authoritarian tendencies are restricting press freedom, controlling the judiciary and education, and propagating a nationalistic understanding of democracy that clashes with the fundamental principles of the EU.
Nevertheless, the values themselves have not disappeared – they are deeply rooted in the EU treaties and in European societies.
Europe’s policies are often not to our liking. The Greens are not the rulers of the EU, and European citizens have their own perspectives. Democracy is an ongoing exercise in negotiation, which means we will never get all of our preferred outcomes. But we can strive for our ideals. So our role as Greens is to fight for our positions and vision. But it is also our responsibility to accept democratic outcomes that emerge as a result of political battles and compromises – as long as they respect the core values of the EU.
We might differ on the modalities of border controls and immigration procedures, but pushbacks or denial of asylum applications is the red line, because they constitute a violation of human rights rather than just Green values.
A less friendly US and an increasingly multipolar world order mean that Europe must find new allies. Can it strike the right balance between values and pragmatism without asserting itself as a civilisational power? What are the red lines when dealing with other countries and leaders?
In a world where the US can no longer be taken for granted as a reliable partner, Europe faces the strategic challenge of forging new alliances – with countries that do not always share its values. The key lies in striking a clever balance between a values-oriented foreign policy and the pragmatic safeguarding of our interests. I have always been critical of foreign policy that is branded as “values-based” or “interest-based”. Foreign policy must be “brain-based”. It must calibrate and combine approaches that are effective, useful, and sustainable.
Europe shouldn’t make the mistake of taking the moral high ground or presenting itself as a “civilising power”. Such an approach comes across as lecturing and leads to rejection – especially in the Global South, where the memory of colonialism is still fresh. At the same time, there is no need to follow the path of China and Russia. We are a self-confident and safe space for freedom and democracy, not a corrupt authoritarian regime. We have our faults, but we are a democratic and benevolent international actor.
As an international force, we have to cooperate with others on the global stage. But we want to be neither complicit with, nor dependent on, dictators and human rights violators: we can have dialogue, yes, but not at any price. Europe should learn from its past mistakes, such as years of dependence on Russian gas or the naive opening of its market to China.
Such dependencies undermine our ability to act politically. Sustainable partnerships are based on reciprocity, respect, and long-term interests, not on short-term opportunism. It is crucial for Europe to find its way in the middle: firm in its values, but open to dialogue; not missionary, but responsible, as an equal partner.
Should EU enlargement be a priority in these uncertain times?
European enlargement is a strategic decision, especially in uncertain times. Countries like Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkan states deserve a European future, but their membership is also in our strategic interests. Anyone who wants to strengthen European democracy has to ensure that our continent becomes more stable, more interconnected, and more resilient, and enlargement is an important part of that goal. However, it cannot come at the expense of democracy and the rule of law. On the contrary, these principles must be strengthened, both within the EU and its aspiring members. That is why it is our responsibility to achieve these objectives at the same time: reforming the EU institutions and opening up to new members who share our values.
European enlargement is a strategic decision, especially in uncertain times.
Aside from the threat of an assertive Russia on their doorstep, why does the future of Ukraine matter so much to many Europeans?
Today, Ukraine is a symbol of the European idea. Since the Maidan Uprising in 2013/14 [pro-European protests in Kyiv that led to the fall of President Viktor Yanukovych in what was called the “Revolution of Dignity”], it has been fighting for democracy, human dignity, and a life in freedom – values that also form the foundation of the EU. The Russian war of aggression is not just a war against Ukraine, but a frontal attack on the European peace project. Those who support Ukraine today are also indirectly protecting the principles on which our own coexistence is based.
Ukrainian civil society is showing impressive resilience. It deserves our solidarity, not only as a victim of war, but also as an active proponent of European democracy. It must also be very clear to many members of the EU and their citizens that Ukraine is the only barrier standing between Russia’s imperial ambitions and European borders. Therefore, Ukraine’s heroic fight is also a struggle against a threat to the EU.
Unlike most other political forces in Germany, the Greens have consistently stood up to autocracies like China or Putin’s Russia. Why is this the case, and is it a strength or a liability when it comes to winning consensus?
The Greens have always advocated for a holistic foreign policy centred around human rights, democracy, feminism, and protections for minorities. And since we have always viewed our domestic fight as part of a global movement, we prioritise these values in our foreign policy agenda. While other parties have often focused on short-term economic interests, we have warned against totalitarianism, dependencies, and illusions. Of course, this was not always popular, but in retrospect, it is clear that adherence to principles is not a weakness, but a necessary strength. Especially in times of global systemic conflict, a clear stance against authoritarian power politics is a must.
Greens in Europe – and in Germany in particular, after their recent experience in government – are being identified as a party of bans and an enemy of freedom. Is this framing justified? And how can the Green movement move past this negative association?
This reputation is well deserved. For a long time, we preached regulation and restraint as the main instruments of our political ideology. This has not been the case for years, but the stereotype is sticky and readily used by our political adversaries. The reality is that the Greens have long moved beyond paternalism. Our policies are about responsibility – towards the environment, society, and future generations.
Of course, ecological and social change needs rules, and rules are often perceived as restrictions. But steering our collective behaviour is not possible with bans alone. Freedom is an integral part of the Green outlook, and it must coexist with responsibility. In a modern sense, freedom means that all people have equal opportunities and that the natural foundations of life are safeguarded to guarantee future freedoms as well. We need to do a better job of communicating that Green policy is not directed against freedom, but aims to take the concept beyond the age of fossil fuels to make it socially just, sustainable, and based on solidarity.
The future doesn’t belong to a backwards-looking freedom based solely on consumption, but to a responsible freedom. We must be careful not to inflict too much harm on our shared free space. Ultimately, a comprehensive understanding of freedom is not a restriction – it is progress.
